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The sixteenth-century Reformation in Germany is often viewed as having made a radical 
change by breaking with the thinking of the past and starting something new. One 
example given is the Reformation’s perceived rejection of philosophy (that is, 
philosophy’s method, subject matter, and purpose), although the regard for philosophy 
has often been assessed only on the basis of second-order data. Past research has looked 
at various individuals’ keeping or breaking with the preceding era and at the question of 
continuity between individuals within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth 
century. This interdisciplinary study examines the regard for philosophy and both the 
keeping and breaking of the whole movement, by considering how philosophy is used in 
The Book of Concord, which contains Reformation documents from the earlier and later 
sixteenth-century that were widely accepted and given authoritative status. The specific 
Book of Concord uses of philosophy considered are second-order statements about 
philosophy and its cognates and about logic, as well as first-order uses of organization by 
 (“topics”) or loci (“places”) and of argumentation by both induction (namely, 
example and analogy) and deduction. The study’s taking philosophical uses as indicators 
of regard for philosophy has been called for in previous research and is relatively unique. 
Another significant contribution of this study is a detailed treatment of syllogisms used in 
arguing, for example, for the Reformers’ position that justification, or righteousness 
 
viii 
before God, is only on account of faith in Jesus Christ. The study also considers the 
Reformers’ formal distinction between justification and sanctification, or holy living, as a 
case study for philosophy in service to theology as its handmaiden in a ministerial role. 
More than finding an inexplicable, eclectic use, the dissertation concludes that The Book 
of Concord where necessary rejects philosophy and logic but nevertheless at the same 
time makes use of them, except where the use of such methods contradicts or goes 
beyond the Reformers’ understanding of God’s revelation in the Bible. Such rejection but 
simultaneous use both keeps and breaks with the preceding medieval period and 
continuous within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century. 
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Let the intelligent reader just consider this. If this is Christian 
righteousness, what difference is there between philosophy and the 
teaching of Christ? If we merit the forgiveness of sins by these elicited acts 
of ours, of what use is Christ? If we can be justified by reason and its 
works, what need is there of Christ or of regeneration? 
 —Apology IV:12 
Around the turn of the third century, a north-African priest from Carthage named 
Tertullian, known as the Father of Latin theology, asked the following questions, 
referring both to Athens, the city of the famous academies of ancient Philosophy, and to 
Jerusalem, the city where central events of Christianity took place: “What has Athens to 
do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church?” (Quid 
ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiae et ecclesiae?) Tertullian continued: 
“Away with all attempts to produce a blended Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and 
dialectic composition!” (Viderint qui Stoicum et Platonicum et dialecticum 
christianismum protulerunt).1 Tertullian’s polemic against both philosophy, which 
Tertullian saw as fostering heresy, and against the philosopher Aristotle centered only on 
using philosophy as a source of truth, however; his polemic did not stop Tertullian from 
using philosophy as a tool.2 Some thirteen centuries later, a Saxon monk in Wittenberg 
named Martin Luther, known as the founder of the German Reformation, proposed as a 
thesis for debate: “Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light” 
                                                 
1 Tertullian, Prescriptions Against the Heretics, 7, translated by Peter Holmes, in Forrest E. Baird 
and Walter Kaufmann, Medieval Philosophy, Philosophic Classics (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
2003), 38; Tertullian, Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Opera, Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina, 2 
vols. (Turnholti: Brepols, 1954), 193. Acts 17 tells of Paul’s stop in Athens, where he preached to 
Epicureans and Stoics. 
 Baird and Kaufmann note that some early Christian writers, using the Bible as evidence, claimed 
that philosophy could supplement revelation, while others, using different passages, claimed that revelation 
superseded philosophy (Baird and Kaufmann, Medieval Philosophy, 30). 
2 For background on Tertullian, see, for example, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 
eds. F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, 3 ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1591-1592; 
Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Second Printing (New York: Random 
House, 1955), 44-45, 574-757 n.45.  
 
2 
(Breviter, Totus Aristoteles ad theologiam est tenebrae ad lucem).3 As with Tertullian, 
however, Luther’s polemic also did not stop him from using Aristotle and philosophy.4 
Yet another half-century or so later, the church that bore Luther’s name confessed in The 
Book of Concord, regarding a question related to the topic of original sin: “No 
philosopher, no papist, no sophist, indeed, no human reason, be it ever so keen, can give 
the right answer” (kein Philosophus, kein Papist, kein Sophist, ja kein menschliche 
Vernunft, wie scharf auch diselbige immermehr sein mag, > die recht < Erklärung geben 
kann; declarationem veram nullus philosophus, nullus Papista, nullus sophista, imo nulla 
humana ratio [quae etiam acutissimi sit iudicii] proferre potest).5 This statement, 
                                                 
3 Martin Luther, Thesis #50, translated by Harold J. Grimm, as Disputation Against Scholastic 
Theology, in Martin Luther, Luther's Works, American Edition, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. 
Lehmann, 55 vols. (St. Louis & Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House & Fortress Press, 1955-1986), 
31:12; Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517), in Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: 
Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 68 vols. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1883-1921), 1:226; #263 in 
Kurt Aland, Hilfsbuch zum Lutherstudium, 4 ed. (Bielefeld: Luther-Verl., 1996). The editors of AE 31 
temper this thesis by limiting Luther’s condemnation to the logical and metaphysical writings incorporated 
into scholasticism (AE 31:12 n.7). 
 Hereafter all references to the Weimar edition of Luther’s works will be indicated with “WA”, all 
references to the American Edition of Luther’s works will be indicated with “AE”, and the cross-reference 
numbers in Aland will simply be given as “Aland #”. 
4 Martin Grabmann’s significant study of the history of the scholastic method rightly notes that, 
despite his opposition to scholasticism, Luther and his followers in many ways kept the method (Martin 
Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode: Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen, 2 
vols. [Graz: Akademische Druck-und Verlagsanstalt, 1957], II:49). 
5 Formula of Concord Solid Declaration, I:60, The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Jaroslav Pelikan, Robert H. Fischer and Arthur 
C. Piepkorn, ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 519; Die Bekenntnisschriften 
der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 12th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 864. (Confer 
The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, eds. Robert Kolb and 
Timothy J. Wengert [Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2000], 542.)  
 Hereafter all references to the Tappert edition will be indicated “Tappert”, those to Die 
Bekenntnisschriften “BKS”, and those to the Kolb-Wengert edition “K-W”. Other editions also referenced 
are The Book of Concord: Or, the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Henry E. 
Jacobs, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: The General Council Press, 1908) (hereafter “Jacobs”); and Concordia 
Triglotta: Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, deutsch-lateinish-englisch, eds. F. 
Bente and W. H. T. Dau (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921) (hereafter “Triglotta”). 
 Standard abbreviations for the works contained in The Book of Concord are given on pp.xiii-xiv. 
 “Sophists”, based on the Greek word for “wisdom”, were originally wise people in general, but the 
ancient philosopher Plato applied the term negatively to teachers he rejected, although at least some of 
Plato’s characterizations may not be born out by the facts. Later, the word and cognates continued to be 
used negatively, including by the Reformers, as obvious from he passage cited. (Ralf Heinrich Arning, 
“Sophistik; sophistisch; Sophist,” Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie: unter Mitwirkung von mehr als 
700 Fachgelehrten in Verbindung mit Gunther Bien eds. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer [Basel: 
Schwabe, 1971], 9:1082-1086; “Sophists,” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn 
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however, did not stop that very same confession from immediately explaining original sin 
by using a philosophical term (namely, “accident”, or the Latin accidens, accidentis in 
both the German and Latin). These similar statements critical of philosophy from 
Tertullian, Luther, and The Book of Concord introduce the context for the work of this 
dissertation: a close reading that explores the logic and argumentation of The Book of 
Concord, considering opposition to philosophy, the use of philosophy despite that 
opposition, and the continuity of that use with the preceding medieval period and within 
the Reformation era. 
 The question is rightly asked what is meant by “philosophy” as it has been 
mentioned and discussed so far, and the answer can widely differ depending on when and 
where the term is used, how and why it is being used, and who is using it. Some 
philosophers even argue that a key philosophical question is just what philosophy is.6 
From its root words, the Greek + , philosophy is love of wisdom, but the 
etymology does not help that much in this context. “As an intellectual activity”, 
“philosophy” can be defined in three different ways: according to its method as rational 
inquiry, according to its subject matter either as rational inquiry into any number of 
different subjects or as the study of first principles and concepts used in various 
disciplines, and according to its purpose of obtaining “wisdom, virtue or happiness”.7 In 
this dissertation, “philosophy” is used with overtones of all three of these senses. Perhaps 
most frequently, although again depending on the author, “philosophy” herein refers to 
the tool of logic that is used to argue, ultimately with a view towards persusasion, and, as 
will be seen, the use of such logic and argumentation is a central focus of this 
dissertation. Worth noting is that in some divisions of the sciences, such as is claimed of 
                                                                                                                                                 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1994], 356; Harry A. Ide, “Sophists,” The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 862-864.) 
6 Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1980), 13. 
7 “Philosophy”, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy ed. Thomas Mautner, Revised ed. (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2000), 422-423. 
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Aristotle’s, primary philosophy is equated both with metaphysics and with theology (that 
is, “the science of divine things”).8 
 This initial chapter of the dissertation gives the background both for the findings 
presented in the four following chapters and for the discussion in Chapter VI that 
concludes the dissertation. There are several different areas of background that this initial 
chapter covers. The first subsection surveys the relationship between philosophy and 
theology through the centuries before the so-called Lutheran Reformation, and the second 
subsection surveys philosophy and theology in the era of that Reformation. The third 
subsection highlights previous scholarship regarding three areas of inquiry and this 
author’s own previous exploration of The Book of Concord for relevant evidence to 
answer those three questions: (a) the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, 
(b) continuity or discontinuity between the late-medieval period and the Reformation 
period, and (c) continuity or discontinuity between the initial “Reformers” and the next 
generation. The fourth subsection presents the scope and limitations of this research, and 
the fifth subsection of this introductory chapter presents the “close reading” methodology 
used for the dissertation. The sixth subsection gives necessary background on The Book 
of Concord, including the various works contained in it and the authors of those works, as 
well as discussing those authors’ regard for philosophy as evidenced in The Book of 
Concord. The seventh and final subsection of this introductory chapter briefly overviews 
the organization and content of the five chapters that follow. 
Overview philosophy and theology relationship 
 This first subsection, then, surveys the relationship between philosophy and 
theology through the centuries before the so-called Lutheran Reformation. One could 
almost say “millennia” before the Reformation, since there are what at least some regard 
as records of history going back to the beginning of time, and those records give some 
evidence of what might be regarded as philosophical thought. In the Old Testament’s 
references, “philosophy” may well go under the name of “wisdom”. The third part of the 
                                                 
8 Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 39-45.  
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Old Testament canon according to Hebrew tradition contained the—implicitly “holy” or 
“sacred”—“Writings” ( , Kethubim), included in which miscellaneous category are 
four writings considered to have the character of “wisdom” ( , chokmah): Proverbs, 
Job, Song of Solomon, and Ecclesiastes. Especially the Old Testament book of Proverbs 
is said to reflect “mainstream wisdom activity”, and at least some parts of the book are 
thought to have been written by Solomon (tenth century B.C.E.), even as others may date 
back even earlier.9 The book of Job may have been written by a wisdom teacher, 
although some traditions hold that Moses wrote it; regardless, the date of the events the 
book tells and the date of its being penned are likely different, with the events possibly 
occurring at the time of the patriarchs (roughly 2250 B.C.E.) and the book being written 
as early as Solomon’s time or as late as Israel’s exile (970-586 B.C.E.).10 Song of 
Solomon, sometimes thought to have less of the “wisdom” character, is nevertheless 
generally associated with Solomon and dated at his time.11 Likewise, Ecclesiastes, with 
its stronger character as wisdom, is associated with Solomon and dated at his time.12 In 
short, the four major Old Testament works of a wisdom or more-overtly philosophical 
character likely date before the fifth century B.C.E. Moreover, even Malachi, the last-
written of the Old Testament books (or at least the book ostensibly covering the latest 
period of time), was written before the inter-testamental period of canonical silence (432-
5 B.C.E.) that begins around the same time as the lives of the most well-known of the 
ancient Greek philosophers: Socrates (c.470-399 B.C.E.), Plato (428/427-348/347 
B.C.E.), and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.).13 
 Although there is much debate over the meaning of “wisdom” in the context of 
the Old Testament, “wisdom”, depending on the more specific context, can be regarded 
                                                 
9 For example, see Horace D. Hummel, The Word Becoming Flesh: An Introduction to the Origin, 
Purpose, and Meaning of the Old Testament (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1979), 448-450. 
10 For example, see Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 457-461. 
11 For example, see Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 491-496. 
12 For example, see Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 525-530. 
13 The inter-testamental apocryphal writing known as 4 Maccabees shows evidence of trying to 
reconcile Judaism with Hellenistic philosophies (Otto Michel, “φιλοσοφία, φιλοσοφός,” trans. Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Friedrich [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974], 9:179-180). 
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subjectively as “natural law” and objectively as awareness of such “eternal norms” and 
the resulting “ability to cope”. Such “wisdom” can be viewed on three levels: the 
anthropological; that of “interpersonal relationships, of society, politics, and history”; and 
the cosmic.14 As a result, Horace Hummel writes the following: 
Thus, if said with due caution, one may say that wisdom was the “science” 
of antiquity; at very least, it did proceed somewhat inductively or on the 
basis of observation, and it developed lists and classification of various 
sorts. Also, if said again with proper reserve, it was the “philosophy” of 
the ancient Near East (both in comparison and contrast with “theology”), 
and from the Hellenistic age on it became one of the major avenues of 
merger of Occident and Orient …15 
In the Old Testament, the wise people and associated schools are sometimes presented as 
a fourth class of Israelite intellectual (with prophet, priest, and king), and sometimes the 
wise people and their knowledge are said to be a part of any one of the three spheres of 
activity: popular (“family or clan wisdom”), political (“court wisdom”), or theological 
(“scribal wisdom”). Yet, the Old Testament records clashes between those who might be 
called theologians and those who might be called philosophers, thus indicating that 
revealed theology and human philosophy were not always compatible from the 
beginning.16 In fact, while revealed knowledge and human knowledge often grappled 
with the same topics and could be presented in the same format, the two are quite distinct. 
Louis Goldberg explains as follows: 
Reflected in OT wisdom is the teaching of a personal God who is holy and 
just and who expects those who know him to exhibit his character in the 
many practical affairs of life. This perfect blend of the revealed will of a 
holy God with the practical human experiences of life is also distinct from 
the speculative wisdom of the Greeks. The ethical dynamic of Greek 
philosophy lay in the intellect; if a person had perfect knowledge he could 
live the good life (Plato). Knowledge was virtue. The emphasis of OT 
wisdom was that the human will, in the realm of practical matters, was to 
                                                 
14 Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 387-389. 
15 Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh 389. Hummel notes how the apocryphal book “The Wisdom of 
Solomon” was kept out of the canon due in part to its “strong admixture of Greek, semi-pagan thought” 
(Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 401). Michel notes that the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the 
Hebrew Old Testament, of Daniel 1:20 renders  (“magicians and astrologers”, KJV) with 
the words  (Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 179-180).
16 Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 390, 391. 
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be subject to divine causes. Therefore, Hebrew wisdom was not theoretical 
and speculative. It was practical, based on revealed principles of right and 
wrong, to be lived out in daily life.17 
So, the Old Testament can be taken as showing evidence of a philosophy that at times 
was in service of the belief in and worship of the Old Testament God but at other times in 
conflict with His revelation. 
 The words “philosophy” and “philosopher” originate, as mentioned above, as the 
Greek words  and . Otto Michel has traced out the earliest uses of 
these words beginning in the fifth century B.C.E. forwards, taking in many different 
ancient philosophers and such groups as the “Sophists” before Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle. Especially in Aristotle, Michel observes, the related verb  (“to 
philosophize”) relates to “methodical attempts to understand the world around man” , 
“the reduction of phenomena to basic principles”, “the knowledge of eternal and 
unmoved or general being”, as well as, significantly, “systematizing arrangement within 
the totality of knowledge”. (Each of these aspects of philosophy is important to the work 
of this dissertation.) Later, various “schools” of philosophy with their unique ideas 
battled for ideological dominance in the Hellenistic period: Academicians, Peripatetics, 
Epicureans, and Stoics. Eastern ideas about wisdom and religion also were known and 
blended into philosophy at the time of Alexander (356-323 B.C.E.), in some cases linking 
a human being’s salvation with knowledge, such as that revealed by God. Increasingly in 
the final centuries B.C.E., Jewish thinking and Hellenistic philosophy shared ideas and 
influenced each other.18 
 In the New Testament, there are essentially two specific references to 
philosophers and philosophy.19 First, Acts 17:18 tells how on St. Paul’s so-called second 
missionary journey (ca. 46-48 C.E.) some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers disputed 
                                                 
17 Louis Goldberg, “ָחַכם,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, eds. R. Laird Harris, 
Gleason L. Archer, Jr. and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 1:283. 
18 Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 172-185. 
19 Although at least one contemporary English translation (namely, the New International Version) 
uses the English “philosopher” in 1 Corinthians 1:20, the Greek word being rendered there is , 
which in the New Testament is used only there. Compare the translations “disputer” in the KJV and 
American Standard Version (ASV) and “debater” in the New American Standard Bible (NASB). 
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Vulgate: quidam autem epicurei et stoici philosophi disserebant cum eo et 
quidam dicebant quid vult seminiverbius hic dicere alii vero novorum 
daemoniorum videtur adnuntiator esse quia Iesum et resurrectionem 
adnuntiabat eis22 
Luther Bibel: Etliche aber der Epikurer und Stoiker Philosophen stritten 
mit ihm. Und etliche sprachen: Was will dieser Lotterbube sagen? Etliche 
aber: Es sieht, als wolle er neue Götter verkündigen. (Das machte, er hatte 
das Evangelium von Jesu und von der Auferstehung ihnen verkündigt.)23 
KJV: Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoicks, 
encountered him. And some said, What will this babbler say? other some, 
He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he preached unto 
them Jesus, and the resurrection.24 
Michel writes how the first, disparaging reaction given seems to be that of the 
Epicureans; how the second, somewhat interested reaction given seems to be that of the 
Stoics; and how both seem to fit the Epicureans and Stoics. Significantly also, the term 
, which the KJV translates “babbler”, is said to denote a “pseudo-
philosopher”. Of this whole event in Athens, Michel writes, “There is no debate with 
Greek philosophy but rather a criticism of pagan worship which in part uses arguments 
                                                 
20 When the words used in the various languages of the Biblical text being quoted are significant, 
the original language and relevant subsequent language translations (such as the Greek Septuagint, the 
Latin Vulgate, Luther’s German translation, and an English translation, usually the KJV) will be be given 
as below. 
21 All Nestle-Aland 26th edition text is from “Libronix Digital Library System,” 2.1c (Bellingham, 
WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 2000-2004). 
22 All Vulgate text is from John Walker, Index Librorum Liberorum, Available: 
http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/www/Vulgate/Vulgate.html2007. 
23 All Luther Bibel text is from Gospel Communications International, BibleGateway.com, 1995-
2007, Available: http://www.biblegateway.com/, 2007. 
24 All King James Version text is from “Libronix Digital Library System”. 
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forged by philosophy itself.”25 And, that statement is not even to mention the 
philosophical terminology used to describe the debate.26 
 The New Testament’s second of two specific references to philosophers and 
philosophy is in Colossians, one of the so-called “captivity letters” of Paul (ca. 59-61 
C.E.). There, in Colossians 2:8, the apostle warns the believers in Collosae not to be 
deceived by worldly teaching. 
NA26: 
  
Vulgate: videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam 
secundum traditionem hominum secundum elementa mundi et non 
secundum Christum 
Luther Bibel: Sehet zu, daß euch niemand beraube durch die Philosophie 
und lose Verführung nach der Menschen Lehre und nach der Welt 
Satzungen, und nicht nach Christo. 
KJV: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, 
after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after 
Christ. 
Michel writes that Paul is referring to what is being said by false teachers, not to Greek 
philosophy in general or a to classical school in particular, although Michel also says “the 
error has features of a religious fellowship to which late Hellenism and Hellenistic 
Judaism could accord the predicate .” Michel goes on to say that Paul does 
not introduce the label “philosophy” disparagingly but uses the designation likely used by 
his opponents and then “sets it aside” with the polemical parallel expression (that is, 
“vain deceit”).27 Significant also is Paul’s use of the word , which the KJV 
translates “rudiments”, as it also has a rich philosophical background.28 
                                                 
25 Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 187-188. 
26 The verb used in verse 17, , is used by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle for “the art of 
persuasion and demonstration”, although one commentator says of this passage, “There is here no reference 
to ‘disputation,’ but to the ‘delivering of religious lectures or sermons’” (Gottlob Schrenk, “διαλέγομαι, 
διαλογίζομαι, διαλογισμος,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 
ed. Gerhard Kittel [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964], 2:93-95). 
27 Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 185-187. Perhaps with this understanding, this verse was taken, in the late 
Reformation at least, as condemning only false philosophy, “a construct of human imagination” (Sachiko 
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 Not only does the New Testament use the words “philosopher” and “philosophy”, 
but, as has been seen, there is also evidence of philosophy on a more subtle level. In the 
New Testament one can also find terms and ideas that arguably have a philosophical 
background, although, as Michel rightly points out, one does not know how much of the 
philosophical significance the authors of the New Testament works either knew of or 
intended to use. After giving various New Testament passages as examples,29 Michel 
makes the following important observation. 
Yet adoption of philosophical terms does not mean unqualified acceptance 
of their content. Primitive Christianity uses the thought-forms and 
expressions of philosophy only to the degree that they can contribute to 
the presentation, elucidation, and establishment of the Gospel. The central 
theme of the NT message, the declaration of God’s eschatological action 
which brings the history of Israel and the nations of the world to its 
divinely determined goal, is neither related to philosophy nor dependent 
on it. On the contrary, it radically calls in question philsophy’s own goal 
of helping to master being with the tools of human thought and contradicts 
fundamental philosophical ideas by Semitic thought-forms which to a 
certain extent are an irrevocable part of the message.30 
Note well that the New Testament writers can be taken to be using philosophical terms 
and concepts that serve the writers’ purposes without per se depending on philosophy but 
in fact possibly directly refuting philosophy. Moreover, as the Semitic thought-forms 
were an irrevocable part of the message the New Testament writers extended, so 
philosophical thought-forms, to a somewhat similar extent, became an irrevocable part of 
the message the New Testament writers passed on to succeeding generations. 
 The Scriptures themselves thus can be taken to lay the groundwork for some sort 
of relationship between theology and philosophy, and one of Scripture’s “wisdom” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The case of Philip Melanchthon, Ideas in context, 
ed. Quentin Skinner [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 206-207). 
28 Gerhard Delling, “στοιχειον,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament, ed. Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971), 
7:670-687. On the use of commentary on Colossians 2:8 as a litmus test, see below, n.152, p.51. 
29 Michel’s list follows: in teaching about God, creation, and creation’s related Christology, John 
1:1-3; Colossians 1:15-17; Hebrews 1:3; in teaching about human beings and ethics, Romans 1:20, 28; 
2:15; and in exhortation, 1 Corinthians 9:24; 11:13-15; James 3:3-5; 2 Peter 1:5-7 (Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 
185). 
30 Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 185. 
 
11 
writings may well provide the basis for a figure of speech used widely to express that 
relationship. Some ancient figure said philosophia ancilla theologiae (“philosophy is the 
handmaiden of theology”), perhaps alluding to, among other, such passages as Proverbs 
9:3 and thereby casting theology in the role of “wisdom”.31 
BHS: ׃ָׁשְלָחה ַנֲערֶֺתיָה ִתְקָרא ַעל־ַּגֵּפי ְמרֵֺמי ָקֶרת  [ָחְכמֹות] 
LXX: [ ] 
 
Vulgate: [sapientia] misit ancillas suas ut vocarent ad arcem et ad moenia 
civitatis 
Luther Bibel: [Die Weisheit] sandte ihre Dirnen aus, zu rufen oben auf den 
Höhen der Stadt: 
KJV: [Wisdom] hath sent forth her maidens: she crieth upon the highest 
places of the city, 
Considering the wide uses of this figure of speech of theology as the mistress of the 
house33 and philosophy as her handmaid provides a vehicle for surveying the relationship 
between the two. Malcolm de Mowbray, in a well-documented article, draws on a 
number of other earlier studies to trace especially well the meanings of the idea from the 
first century to the seventeenth, although for the purposes here interest stops at the 
                                                 
31 The statement is variously ascribed. According to “Adventures in Philosophy” (Adventures in 
Philosophy, 1998-2007, Center for Applied Philosophy, Available: 
http://radicalacademy.com/adiphiljewish1.htm, March 17 2003), philosophy as the handmaid of theology 
was one of the main ideas of Philo Judaeus (c. 25 B.C.E.-c. 50 A.D), who is also known as Philo of 
Alexandria. According to William Turner (William Turner, History of Philosophy [Boston: Ginn, 1957]), 
St. John of Damascus at the end of the seventh century reportedly authored the statement, though Turner 
thinks it probably originated later. According to Jewish Encyclopedia (Jewish Encyclopedia, 2002, The 
Kopelman Foundation, Available: www.jewishencyclopedia.com, March 17 2003), Isaac Arama “deduced” 
philosophy as the handmaid of theology around the time of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). Thomas 
Aquinas also is given credit for the quote, perhaps stemming from his comments in the Summa, I, 1, 5, 
where he refers to wisdom sending out her maidens in Proverbs 9:3. De Mowbray, whose study is 
discussed in the text below, says, if any attribution is given, the statement is often attributed, perhaps 
wrongly, to Peter Damian (1007-1072) (Malcolm de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid of Theology: 
Biblical Exegesis in the Service of Scholarship,” Traditio 59 [2004]: 1-2).  
32 All Septuagint (LXX) text is from Lancelot C. L. Brenton, ed., The Septuagint with Apocrypha: 
Greek and English (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, Ltd., 1851). 
33 “Mistress” here likely has the Oxford English Dictionary’s sense of a “woman having control or 
authority” or the now-obsolete sense of “a thing personified as female considered to be chief, first, or 
unequalled among a specified group” and most decidedly not “a woman other than his wife with whom a 
man has a long-lasting sexual relationship”, although that adulterous sense does enter into consideration, 
albeit by way of another term (The Oxford English Dictionary, eds. J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], IX:900-902). 
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sixteenth. (This dissertation will refer to this figure of speech with the shorthand 
“handmaid metaphor”.) 
 De Mowbray writes that “the original and principal meaning of the concept of 
philosophy as a servant of theology was that philosophy had a part to play in the 
development of rational Christianity and that [the handmaid metaphor] was mainly used 
to combat those who wished to reject all secular knowledge.”34 He identifies three 
attitudes toward “rational philosophy”: (1) contempt for human reason with no role for 
philosophy; (2) philosophy as leading to the same goal as theology; and (3) the Bible as 
the source of all human knowledge with no role for philosophy since it came out of 
theology. A hybrid attitude of the second and third, de Mowbray says, “saw human 
knowledge as compatible with revelation and thus recognized a role for philosophy in 
understanding the Bible, who sought to define its place in religious thought.” That 
“fourth” attitude is said to result in “the description of philosophy as a servant of 
theology”, although de Mowbray says, the idea’s “precise meaning varied according to 
the circumstances in which it was used.35 
 De Mowbray examines several early Christian writers who describe philosophy as 
a servant of theology, or revealed knowledge. First is Philo of Alexandria (ca. 15 B.C.E.-
ca. C.E. 50), a Jew who used philosophy to explain away parts of the Pentateuch and said 
Moses invented philosophy and transmitted it to the Egyptians, who transmitted it to the 
Greeks. De Mowbray details how Philo allegorized the Genesis 16:1-6 story of Abraham, 
Sarah, and her handmaid Hagar to represent, respectively mind, philosophy, and the 
liberal arts.36 Second for de Mowbray is Clement of Alexandria (d. ca. 220), who in the 
same locale brought Philo’s ideas into Christianity, including that of Sarah and Hagar, as 
he argued against those who denied secular learning any role in interpreting scripture and 
                                                 
34 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 2. 
35 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 3. 
36 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 3-5. De Mowbray refers to a fragment possibly from 
Ariston of Chios (ca. 250 B.C.E.) as a potential source for Philo’s interpretation (de Mowbray, “Philosophy 




acquiring faith.37 Third is Origen (185-253), who succeeded Clement in Alexandria and 
made other arguments for the use of worldly learning, including some based on other 
Bible passages. But, Origen’s great use of philosophy eventually forced him to leave 
Alexandria, although others there and elsewhere continued the use of philosophy and the 
figure of speech of it as a servant.38 Notably, Amphilochius Iconiensis (d. ca. 403) said 
worldly learning should serve the mistress of divine wisdom “without becoming 
arrogant”, and John of Damascus (d. 749) likewise said that as servants could minister to 
a queen, so anything could be used to serve the truth. In all of these, de Mowbray says, 
against those completely rejecting secular knowledge, philosophy is viewed favorably as 
serving theology, with theology placed higher than philosophy but with no hostility 
towards philosophy.39 
 De Mowbray details how philosophy came into the Latin western tradition later 
and how the image of philosophy as a handmaid to theology may have come through 
reading of Philo. Ambrose (339-397) makes use of Philo and the allegory of Hagar and 
Sarah, although Ambrose is said to have more or less rejected philosophy.40 Jerome (347-
420) also knew Philo but drew on Origen’s allegorical use of Deuteronomy 21 to describe 
Christianity taking captive secular wisdom and producing servants of the Lord.41 
Augustine (354-430) made wide use of philosophy but appropriated a different 
allegorical interpretation of Origen’s for its defense.42 After Augustine and the decline of 
philosophy, de Mowbray details only Alcuin of York (735-804), who, in justifying his 
curriculum, allegorizes wisdom’s seven pillars in Proverbs 9:1 to be the seven liberal arts. 
De Mowbray suggests Alcuin’s use of Proverbs 9:1 may have contributed to the later use 
of Proverbs 9:3.43 
                                                 
37 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 5-6. 
38 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 6-7. 
39 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 7-8. 
40 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 9. 
41 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 9-10. 
42 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 9, 10-11. 
43 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 11. 
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 When philosophy and the associated figure of speech resurface in the 11th century, 
there has been a subtle shift, according to de Mowbray. In arguing for God’s 
omnipotence against those said to be “excessively inclined towards dialectic”, Peter 
Damian (1007-1072) with some hostility argues against philosophy’s arrogance in 
claiming dominion over the mistress in the context of religious belief. Yet, de Mowbray 
notes, Damian could also call for those with secular knowledge to apply that knowledge 
in service of theology. Damian’s use of the handmaid metaphor, however, seems to be an 
extension of Gregory the Great’s (ca. 540-604) allegory on Genesis 29-30, involving 
Jacob, Rachel and Leah, and their respective handmaids, Bilhah and Zilpah.44 The next 
significant figure for de Mowbray in that time period is Peter Abelard (1079-1142), who 
equates the philosopher’s study of ethics with the Christian’s study of divinity and says 
all other disciplines serve ethics/divinity as servants serve their mistress. But, Abelard’s 
opponents said he distorted theology with philosophy, and Abelard held that some 
revealed truths were accessible by reason.45 
 De Mowbray proceeds to the late-12th and early-13th centuries, when philosophy’s 
influence was increasing, due in part to Aristotle and his commentators being translated 
into Latin, and when universities were being established and setting up philosophy as a 
separate, preparatory subject for theology. Pope Gregory IX’s 1228 letter titled Ab 
Aegyptis (From Egypt) to Paris theologians used the handmaid metaphor and the Exodus 
and Deuteronomy passages to discourage too much of a theological reliance on secular 
learning. Despite that warning and bans in 1210, 1215, and 1231 on some Aristotelian 
teaching, philosophy advanced.46 De Mowbray highlights four authors of the period who 
used both philosophy in their theology and the handmaid metaphor in its defense. 
Bonaventure (ca. 1217-1274) put human knowledge—its examples and terminology—in 
service of revelation but kept philosophical knowledge somewhat separate and held 
                                                 
44 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 11-14. De Mowbray notes how Immanuel Kant, 
drawing on Peter Damian, wrote that philosophy could not be banished or gagged if she is to perform her 
duties as maidservant, whether those be to lead the way carrying the torch or follow behind carrying the 
train (de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 1). 
45 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 15-17. 
46 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 17-18. 
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theological knowledge to go higher.47 Roger Bacon (ca. 1210-ca. 1294), in at least one 
place, held theology to be the mistress of all other sciences but elsewhere held 
experimental sciences to be the queen, perhaps each in their own realms. Bacon also said 
theology could not “achieve its purpose” without the rest and held that philosophy could 
acquire knowledge of the Divine, as well as prove articles of faith and demonstrate 
theological principles.48 Albertus Magnus (ca. 1200-1280, in English often “Albert the 
Great”) incorporated into his arguments those of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, making all 
other sciences serve theology.49 According to de Mowbray, Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274) strongly argued that philosophy could serve theology, using as authorities some of 
the examples discussed above, including passages from Deuteronomy and Exodus. 
Aquinas said anything in philosophy that contradicted matters of faith was an improperly 
reasoned abuse of philosophy. Thus, Aquinas put philosophy to use demonstrating the 
praeambula fidei (“introduction to the faith”), revealing theological things by analogy, 
and resisting positions opposed to the faith. Thomas regarded all the other sciences to be 
servants to theology and held that theology could use the other sciences’ principles and 
tools.50 De Mowbray considers that the Latin West did not have a (different) formula like 
the handmaid metaphor or only one use of it, since authors alternately used it both to 
limit secular learning’s role in theology and to justify the same. And, de Mowbray 
correlates the metaphor’s cycle of emergence and disappearance with the reemergence of 
philosophy itself or new challenges presented by “different philosophical principles”.51 
(De Mowbray does not discuss in systematic detail the use of the handmaid metaphor in 
the two centuries before or at the time of the Lutheran Reformation.52) 
                                                 
47 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 18-20. 
48 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 20-24. 
49 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 24-25. 
50 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 26-28. 
51 de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 28-29. 
52 De Mowbray in one place mentions that in Protestant lands “ever since Martin Luther it had 
been argued that the Scholastics had corrupted theology through an excessive reliance on Aristotle” and 
elsewhere mentions that the handmaid metaphor “was used by Protestants to argue that Aristotelianism had 
become hopelessly enslaved to theology and that the only way forward was its replacement” (de Mowbray, 
“Philosophy as Handmaid,” 32, 35). 
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 While de Mowbray’s survey of the handmaid metaphor has served its useful 
purpose of surveying the period from the New Testament to the time of the Reformation, 
it is useful to note that in general the role of philosophy in Christianity is often portrayed 
as a struggle between Aristotelianism and Platonism. Aristotle studied with Plato at the 
Academy in Athens but later founded a rival school. Aristotle’s lecture notes more or less 
survived in famous texts on such things as ethics, metaphysics, and logic and became 
hugely significant in the thought of the following centuries. Though early in the Christian 
Church Plato was held in greater regard, Aristotle rose to ascendancy, in part due to a 
philosophical and theological synthesis built by the Dominican philosopher Thomas 
Aquinas. Aquinas’ synthesis subsequently was supported or attacked by those who came 
after him, including such significant figures as the Franciscan Duns Scotus at the turn of 
the fourteenth century, the Franciscan William of Ockam in the fourteenth century, and 
Gabriel Biel in the late fifteenth century. The interplay of philosophy and theology also 
passed through men such as Jodocus Trutvetter and Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen, 
teachers of Martin Luther’s at Erfurt, and it continued through Martin Luther and his 
colleagues at Wittenberg to their students after them.53 Where continuities and 
discontinuities arise between the medieval and Reformation eras and within the time 
period of the Reformation are questions the dissertation considers, and there is more 
background information for those questions below. 
 At this point, however, two other names are worthy of mention: John Wycliffe 
(d.1384) and John Hus (d.1415). Both the earlier English “reformer” and the later 
Bohemian one were significant figures in the efforts to effect reforms at a more-local 
level in doctrine and practice. In both their teaching and how they lived out that teaching 
                                                 
53 For example, Oberman reviews Bengt Hägglund’s work regarding the idea that Luther depends 
on Ockam for a separaton of revelation and reason, and Oberman discusses evidence in Luther’s teacher 
Usingen that grace uses reason. Ultimately, Oberman, for his part, rejects the idea that the relationship 
between reason and revelation in Luther depends on Nominalism, for Oberman finds too much evidence 
that the earliest Luther was already too independent of the nominalist tradition. (Heiko A. Oberman, 
“Facientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther’s 
Theology,” The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought 
[Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992], 95-103.) For a closer look at Ockham’s 




they were precursors of the later sixteenth-century Reformation. Positions of both were 
condemned by the Roman Catholic church, and both were eventually burned. A student 
and instructor at Oxford, Wycliffe, like Luther later, was heavily influenced by Augustine 
and Neoplatonism, and he therefore was opposed to medieval nominalism. Wycliffe held 
that reason and revelation could not contradict, and he put revelation and the Bible’s 
authority over reason and the authority of traditions or church leaders, although he did 
not deny some church interpretation of Scripture. Wycliffe attacked the Roman Catholic 
teaching of transubstantiation, the authority of the pope, and the practice of indulgences, 
just as Luther later did. Perhaps as a result of a dynastic marriage, Wycliffe’s ideas 
spread to and later emerged from Bohemia, where John Hus became associated with 
versions of them, said to be influenced by a Czech understanding of religious reform. Hus 
studied and taught at the University of Prague, holding anti-nominalist positions similar 
to those of Wycliffe. Although Hus was more moderate and drew from Wycliffe 
selectively (for example not denying transubstantiation but also challenging the authority 
of the pope and the practice of indulgences), Hus ultimately was condemned, with 
debated involvement of figures significant to Luther, such as Pierre d’Ailly and Jean 
Gerson. Wycliffe and Hus both also had controversial writings about the church and the 
validity of sacramental acts performed by “wicked” priests. A copy of Hus’s On the 
Church prompted Luther to say he had held all of Hus’s teachings, and that his teacher 
Staupitz and even Paul and Augustine were “Hussites”. Still, there were obvious 
differences between these earlier Reformers and the later ones, such as the understanding 
of the antichrist.54 To the later Reformers and their understanding of philosophy and 
theology attention now turns.  
                                                 
54 On the two, see Heiko A. Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late 
Medieval Thought, trans. Paul L. Nyhus (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 1967), 207-217; Williston 
Walker, Richard A. Norris, David W. Lotz and Robert T. Handy, A History of the Christian Church, 4th ed. 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 377-385; Justo L. González, A History of Christian Thought, 
rev. ed., 3 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987), 327-333; and Heiko A. Oberman, “Hus and Luther,” 
The Contentious Triangle: Church, State, and University: A Festschrift in Honor of Professor George 
Huntston Williams, eds. Rodney L. Petersen and Calvin Augustine Pater, Sixteenth Century Essays & 
Studies LI (Kirksville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999).  
 Especially with its apparent nod to Oberman’s work, Walker’s concluding paragraph on the pair is 
worth quoting in full: “Wyclif and Hus have often been styled forerunners of the Reformation. The 
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Philosophy and theology in the era of the Reformation 
 Next, however, this introductory chapter’s second subsection surveys philosophy 
and theology in the era of so-called Lutheran Reformation in Germany. That universities 
were the arena in which theology met philosophy has been mentioned, and, in the case of 
the Lutheran Reformation, the University of Wittenberg is especially significant. The 
University of Wittenberg was not only where Martin Luther received part of his 
theological training but also where he lived out his career, including reforming the very 
curriculum through which he matriculated. For the most part setting aside for a moment 
Luther’s own education, this subsection briefly discusses the University of Wittenberg’s 
origin and its curricular changes, as well as evidence of a twist that Luther appears to 
have given the handmaid metaphor, which has been seen to serve as a signpost for an 
author’s position on the relationship between theology and philosophy. 
 The University of Wittenberg was founded in 1502 with representation from the 
usual two schools of thought of the via antiqua and their differing approaches to the 
interplay of theology and philosophy.55 Those schools are Franciscan Scotism, which 
kept natural philosophy sublimated to theology, and Dominican Thomism, which gave 
                                                                                                                                                 
designation is appropriate if regard is given to their protest against ecclesiastical abuses, their exaltation of 
the Bible, and their contribution to the sum total of agitation that ultimately resulted in church reform. The 
fundamental doctrines of the Protestant reformers, however, owed little of their substance to the doctrines 
of Wyclif and Hus, and they were far more radical in their break with traditional teaching. Nevertheless, 
insofar as Wyclif and Hus and a great number of ‘orthodox’ thinkers of the late Middle Ages were already 
confronting the same central issues that the Protestant reformers were to confront, they may be justly called 
‘forerunners’ of the Reformation. There remained a basic continuity of ‘questions,’ albeit not of ‘answers.’” 
(Walker, Norris, Lotz and Handy, A History of the Christian Church, 385.)  
 For his part, Oberman delineates “three levels of inquiry” for Luther’s relationship to Hus: “the 
significance of Luther’s alliance with Hus in terms of its political repercussions, the discovery of the ‘last 
days,’ and the function of the outlawed Hus in Luther’s self-understanding as a reformer.” (Oberman, “Hus 
and Luther,” 148-161.) 
55 Maria Grossman, Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517 (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graf, 1975), 68. 
Confer pp.64-65, where Grossman cites the 1507 Rotulus listing of Wittenberg’s faculty of philosophy 
divided into Scotists (Nikolaus von Amsdorf [1483-1565] and Symon Steyn [no dates available]) and 
Thomists (Andreas Bodenstein of Carlstadt [1480-1541] and Chilian Reuter [1480-1516]). See also the list 
given by Ernest G. Schwiebert, Luther and his times: The Reformation from a new perspective (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 294. 
 Some modern scholars now dismiss the framework of competing schools of thought or intellectual 
outlooks; a recent indicative example is William J. Courtenay, “Fruits of the Harvest,” The Work of Heiko 
A. Oberman: Papers from the Symposium on His Seventieth Birthday, eds. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., 
Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn, and James D. Tracy (Boston: Brill, 2003), 135-145. 
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philosophy a pseudo-scientific standing of its own.56 Shortly after the University’s 
founding, however, it acknowledged the “third way”, the so-called via moderna,57 of 
which one representative, Gabriel Biel, took for granted the presence of Aristotle’s 
philosophy in theology.58 Later, tension between proponents of the “ways” opened the 
door for Martin Luther to return to Wittenberg in 1512 and represent the via moderna. 
Luther, who had previously taught Aristotelian philosophy in Wittenberg from 1508 to 
1510, was educated in Erfurt. In the Erfurt monastery, evidence suggests, there existed a 
spirit at odds with the established relationship between philosophy and theology.59 That 
spirit may have influenced Luther or been the result of his influence. Either way, it was 
soon manifest in Wittenberg in the form of what some regard as a radical break with the 
role medieval philosophy played in theology.60 
 Changes in the curriculum at Wittenberg were underway there soon after the 
University’s institution in 1502, and they continued both during Luther’s first stint on the 
                                                 
56 Edith Dudley Sylla, “Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William 
of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist,” The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of 
the first International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages--September 
1973, eds. John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla, Boston studies in the philosophy of science ; v. 
26 (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975), 353. In n.23 on p.380, Sylla cites Gilson, History of Christian 
Philosophy, 331ff., 366. 
57 Grossman, Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517, 68. 
58 Lawrence Murphy, “Martin Luther, the Erfurt Cloister, and Gabriel Biel: The Relation of 
Philosophy to Theology,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 70 (1979): 17. Murphy is drawing a 
conclusion from Biel’s Epitome et collectorium ex occamo circa quator sententiarum Libros, cited in his 
n.15 on p.12. Biel stood in line with William of Ockham and was himself represented at Wittenberg 
initially by Jodocus Trutfetter. 
59 Lawrence Murphy, “The Prologue of Martin Luther to the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1509): 
The Clash of Philosophy and Theology,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 67 (1976): 55-58, 74; 
Murphy, “Relation of Philosophy to Theology,” 7, 10, 12-13. 
60 Part of the evidence for Luther and Melanchthon’s knowledge of and reaction to different 
schools of thought comes from examining the library at Wittenberg. One scholar in particular has 
catalogued the library’s more than one-thousand volumes, circa 1536, taking note of which volumes Luther 
and Melanchthon were known to have read and even in some cases annotated. (Sachiko Kusukawa, A 
Wittenberg University Library Catalogue, Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies [Binghamton, NY: 
Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1995]; confer her own mention of this work Sachiko Kusukawa, 
“Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought: Melanchthon, Schegk, and Crellius,” The Medieval Heritage 
in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory: 1400-1700, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. 
Nielsen, The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 147. 
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faculty and after he left.61 When Luther returned in 1512, opposition to scholasticism 
grew and emphasis shifted from scholastic authors to the Bible and early church fathers.62 
Even as Luther drafted a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, he envisioned the use of 
Aristotle coming to an end.63 In the years after Luther’s “posting” of the Ninety Five 
Theses, the provision of Hebrew and Greek teachers and new translations of Aristotle 
contributed to the changing theology at Wittenberg.64 In order to reform the church, 
Luther saw the need to do away with the traditional philosophical approach.65 
 While Luther himself was not a philosopher per se,66 he did have views about 
philosophy. For example, just a month before what is today thought of as Reformation 
Day, Luther had a student defend a thesis that called almost all of Aristotele’s Ethics “the 
                                                 
61 Steven E. Ozment, The Age of Reform (1250-1550): An Intellectual and Religious History of 
Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 310; Grossman, 
Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517, 53, 55, 73-74; Charles B. Schmitt, “Philosophy and Science in 
Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments,” The Cultural Context of Medieval 
Learning: Proceedings of the first International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the 
Middle Ages--September 1973, eds. John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla, Boston studies in the 
philosophy of science; v. 26 (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975), 494; Bernd Moeller, “The German 
Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation,” Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays, 
eds. H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr. (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press, 1982), 22. More 
recent is Jens-Martin Kruse, Universitätstheologie und Kirchenreform: Die Anfänge der Reformation in 
Wittenberg 1516-1522 Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz. Abteilung 
Abendländische Religionsgeschichte (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2002). Kruse’s work was quite favorably 
reviewed by Susan R. Boettcher, "Universitätstheologie und Kirchenreform: die Anfänge der Reformation 
in Wittenberg 1516-1522," Sixteenth Century Journal XXXVI.3 (2005). 
62 Grossman, Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517 74, 76, 80-81, 84; Ernest G. Schwiebert, “The 
Reformation and Theological Education at Wittenberg,” The Springfielder 28 (1964): 15-16.  
63 See the introduction to the “Disputation against Scholastic Theology”, AE 31:6. 
64 Grossman, Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517, 73 ff., 84, 91-92; WA Br 1, no. 74, pp.169-
172; Robert Rosin, “The Reformation, Humanism, and Education: The Wittenberg Model for Reform,” 
Concordia Journal 16 (1990): 308-310, 314; Lewis W. Spitz and American Council of Learned Societies, 
The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) 246, 
249; Kusukawa, Transformation of Natural Philosophy 34-35. 
65 WA Br 1 no.74 (to Jodokus Trutfetter from Erfurt on May 9, 1518), pp.169-172 (this letter is 
not translated in the AE). 
66 Fowler notes that Luther “wrote more as a preacher than as a systematic theologian or 
philosopher—and he was decidedly more theologian than philosopher. We look in vain in his writings, 
therefore, for any systematic treatment of philosophical issues.” But, he did “have a position that can be 
clearly identified from his writings on important issues of philosophy. … a very clear picture of his views 
on reason and faith emerges from his writings.” S Fowler, “Faith and Reason in the Period of the 
Reformation,” Our Reformational Tradition: A Rich Heritage and Lasting Vocation (Potchefstroom, 
Transvaal, Republic of South Africa Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1984), 67. 
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worst enemy of grace” (pessima gratiae inimica).67 However, Luther did not “utterly” 
reject philosophy, as some suggest.68 On one occasion, while rejecting some treatises of 
Aristotle, Luther cited others favorably.69 Theses drafted by Luther for the Heidelberg 
Disputation also seem to allow some use of Aristotle, 70 and, later, Luther claimed his 
opponents misunderstood Aristotle and that the true Aristotle was acceptable.71 Luther 
could even cite reason along with Scripture, the Fathers, and canon law against Thomas 
Aquinas and his followers.72 For Luther, reason, especially that of a sanctified believer, 
was appropriate in its sphere.73 Yet, at other times, Luther’s polemic against reason could 
be quite sharp, in a way that some modern ears find even offensive.74 
                                                 
67 Thesis 41, “Disputation against Scholastic Theology” (1517), AE 31:12, translated by Harold J. 
Grimm; Aland #263; WA 1:226. 
 Ronald Frost offers the thought-provoking idea that Luther’s Reformation was primarily a reaction 
to the collision in his mind between Aristotle’s understanding of the human will and the Bible’s and 
Augustine’s understanding of the human will (Ronald N. Frost, “Aristotle's Ethics: The Real Reason for 
Luther's Reformation?,” Trinity Journal 18 (1997)). 
68 Dean Inge, cited by Lewis W. Spitz, “Images of Luther,” Concordia Journal 11 (1985): 47. 
69 An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung (1520), WA 
6:457-459; Aland #7; translated by Charles M. Jacobs and revised by James Atkinson as To the Christian 
Nobility, AE 44:200-202. Confer Ozment, The Age of Reform 310-312. 
70 Theses #29-40, WA I:355; Aland #276; “Heidelburg Disputation” translated by Harold J. 
Grimm, AE 31:41-42. Confer the introduction, AE 31:37-38. 
71 Ozment, The Age of Reform, 310-312; AE 31:317, thesis 3 “The Leipzig Debate” (1519), 
translated by Harold J. Grimm; Aland #167; WA:160-161. See also J. Heywood Thomas, “Logic and 
Metaphysics in Luther’s Eucharistic Theology,” Renaissance and Modern Studies 23 (1979). Thomas finds 
this assessment of his opponents’ use of Aristotle in other writings of Luther, such as the later De 
Babylonica Captivitate. With Étienne Gilson, Thomas affirms Luther’s assessment of Aquinas’ 
misunderstanding Aristotle, locating the problem in Avicenna’s filtering (Thomas, “Logic and 
Metaphysics,” 152). 
72 Denis Janz, “Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and the Origins of the Protestant Reformation,” 
Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP, ed. R. James Long, 
Papers in mediaeval studies 12 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 76, 78. Janz 
cites, for example, WA 1:648, Ad dialogum Silvestri Prieratis de potestate pape responsio (1518), Aland 
#582. Confer Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 150. 
73 Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 31; Ozment, The Age of Reform 302; 
Rosin, “Wittenberg Model for Reform,” 305, 308; and Fowler, “Faith and Reason,” 66-67, where Fowler 
cites Luther, Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (1528), AE 37:224. Confer Spitz and Societies, 
Religious Renaissance, 146-147, 248. Spitz says that Luther’s 1536 Disputation Concerning Man is one of 
Luther’s clearest statements on reason’s place in the kingdom of nature. That Disputation is found in WA 
391:175-180; Aland #292; AE 34:137. Confer also Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 150. 
74 Some are offended by the Luther expression Teuffel hureren (“devil’s whore”) discussed below 
in the text. The German Hure is in the line of the origin of the English word “whore”, which the Oxford 
English Dictionary says “is now confined to coarse and abusive speech, except in occasional echoes of 
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 With what might be regarded as his typical earthiness, Martin Luther on occasion 
referred to reason essentially as Teuffel hureren (“the devil’s whore”),75 possibly a twist 
on the metaphor of philosophy as theology’s handmaid. 76 What may be the most 
frequently cited such reference—and thus the locus classicus for Luther’s so-called 
“invective on reason”77—comes in Luther’s last sermon preached in Wittenberg before 
his death.78 But, there are other times and places where Luther uses the label against 
                                                                                                                                                 
historical expressions, as the whore of Babylon” (OED, 20:301-302). Certainly such “whore” and 
“Babylon” passages as Revelation 17:1 and 5 were in Luther’s mind. 
75 Putting those words on Luther’s lips is apparently so much of a commonplace that some writers 
make reference to them without any citation at all, while other writers question the quotation’s authenticity 
due to the lack of a citation. Most remarkably, one website offers as authentic a quotation of the phrase that 
was spoken by the character of Martin Luther in the 1961 English play by John Osborne titled Luther: 
“This I know: reason is the devil’s whore, born of one stinking goat called Aristotle, which believes that 
good works make a good man” (John Osborne, Luther: A Play [London: Faber and Faber, 1961] 63). While 
this precise quotation may not be found in extant works of Luther, Osborne does seem to accurately 
simplify Luther’s major complaint against Aristotle in particular and philosophy in general. 
76 A relationship between Luther’s phrase and the centuries-old handmaid metaphor was suggested 
by none less than Heiko Oberman: “… for [Luther], philosophy – which for Aquinas was still the willing 
handmaiden of theology – had become the wily whore, when fashioning and faking a liaison between the 
human mind and God’s inner being” (Heiko A. Oberman, “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna: Late Medieval 
Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought,” The Impact of the Reformation [Grand Rapids, MI: WIlliam 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987] 11). Oberman had earlier written that after the 1958 work of 
Bernhard Lohse, Ratio und Fides: Eine Untersuchung über die ratio in der Theologie Luthers, “it will no 
longer be possible to be satisfied with the observation that for Luther reason is the whore, Frau Hulda, in 
order to prove that Luther is antirational. Lohse has furhter [sic] shown that the distinction between the use 
of reason coram mundo or coram hominibus – scientia – in contrast with its use coram deo – sapientia – is 
not adequate unless one insists that it is the same reason which operates on the levels of creation and 
redemption.” (Oberman, “Robert Holcot and Luther’s Theology,” 94-95.) In a posthumously published 
article, Oberman writes that philosophy as the ancilla (“handmaid”) of theology was on the wane “when 
Luther came on the scene” but would “reassert itself” after the Aristotelian Renaissance (Heiko A. 
Oberman, “Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough,” 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 54.4 (2003): 641-642). 
77 Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1962) 1. 
78 Roman Catholic historian Jacques Maritain gives a version of the quote (with certain passages 
omitted and ellipses inserted) that shows up in a number of sites on the internet simply attributed to Luther 
(Jacques Maritain, Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau [London: Sheed & Ward, 1928], 33; 
compare below at n.98, p.35). Maritain gives two citations for the quote: the Erlangen edition of Luther’s 
Works 16:142-148 and Denifle-Paquier, III:277-278. According to Vogel, the Erlangen citation 
corresponds with Aland #648 and the WA and AE citations below (Heinrich J. Vogel, Vogel's Cross 
Reference and Index to the Contents of Luther's Works: A Cross Reference between the American Edition 
and the St. Louis, Weimar and Erlangen Editions of Luther's Works [Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing 
House, 1983], 194-195; confer Aland, Hilfsbuch zum Lutherstudium). Maritain comments: “If the practical 
result aimed at by Luther, above all else, be to exhort his hearers to act according to faith and not according 
to human reason only, this does not take anything away from the diseased falsity and absurdity of the 
formulae to which he has recourse” (Maritain, Three Reformers, 200 n.36., emphasis added). If, as is 
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reason and false churches that eschew the Word of God.79 The passages relevant to 
reason are now discussed in chronological order. 
                                                                                                                                                 
contended in this dissertation, the devil’s whore expression is related to the handmaid metaphor, Maritain 
certainly missed that connection, as well as the biblical background for Luther’s choice of words. 
79 A search of the electronic version of the Weimar edition of Luther’s works produced some 28 
hits linking Hure with Tueffel (some hits overlap, so the actual total of different passages treated in this 
discussion is less than 28). This author here expresses appreciation to Concordia Seminary Library (St. 
Louis) Reference Services and then-student Rob Korsch, who conducted the electronic search in the spring 
of 2005 and compiled and sent detailed documentation to this author. (The search results did not include 
any of the references in the “last sermon”, because the precise word combination does not occur in that 
work, although, as will be seen, the concept is certainly there.) What follows in this note is an extremely 
brief survey of the uses of the phrase against the false churches. (Two other uses where Luther seems to 
refer to the world as “the devil’s whore” are WA 47:514 and WA 49:792.) 
 In the 1528 Ein Bericht an einen guten Freund von beider Gestalt des Sakraments aufs Bischofs zu 
Meitzen Mandat, in connection with 2 Thessalonians 2 Luther writes of teuffels kirche und Satanas braut 
and teuffels hure, contrasting them to Christ’s Church and Bride who hears His word, all in the context of 
Psalm 26:5, Ephesians 5:22-33, and the creedal statement about the Church (WA 26:568b; Aland #666). 
 In the 1528 sermon on Matthew 12:46-50 that was apparently published in 1529, Luther similarly 
contrasts the Christian Church and God’s Word with des Teuffels hure (WA 28:25; Aland #475). 
 In the 1531 Sommerpostille on 1 Peter 3:8-15, Luther sets Teufels Hure opposite die rechte 
Kirche, which has God’s Word and Sacrament (WA 22:59, Aland #Po 261).  
 In the 1531 Glosse auf das vermeinte kaiserliche Edikt that responds to the emperor’s November 
19, 1530, decree from the Diet of Augsburg, regarding an accusation that Christ’s institution of the 
Sacrament of the Altar has changed, Luther first refers to hure des teuffels as a slanderous insult to 
Christians’ mother, the Christian Church and Bride of Christ (WA 30III:340b, Aland #174; AE 34:73), and 
then Luther identifies the Roman Catholic Church as des teuffels hure for blasphemously and arrogantly 
exerting power over God’s Word (WA 30III:341b; AE 34:74). 
 Likewise, in a 1535 writing known as Die Zirkulardisputation de concilio Constantiensi, Etliche 
spruce, wider das Constentzer Concilium gestellet zu Wittemberg durch D. Martinus Luther, the Turks and 
Roman Catholics as opponents of Christ’s Church are discussed in the context of labels such as Satans 
Schule (“Satan’s school”), Widerchristi (“Antichrist”), ketzer (“heretic”), and des teufels wuetige hure (“the 
devil’s rabid whore”; furiosam meretricem Diaboli) (WA 39I:16b, Aland #135). 
 Similarly, in a July 26, 1539 sermon on John 3:29, Auslegung des dritten und vierten Kapitels 
Johannis in Predigten 1538-1540, Die zwei und viertzigste Predigt, am Sonnabend nach Maria Magdalena, 
Luther writes how in keeping with John the Baptizer’s words the Church can only have the one 
Bridegroom, Christ, and that the church that accepts the pope’s claim to be the church’s bridegroom, which 
Luther calls das redet der Teuffel, is in fact des Teuffels Hure (WA 47:164, Aland #Pr 1791 [confer #318]; 
AE 22:450). 
 While continuing to preach on John, in a March 13, 1540, sermon on John 4:4 and verses 
following, Auslegung des dritten und vierten Kapitels Johannis in Predigten 1538-1540, Die andere 
Predigt uber das vierde Capittel Joannis. Gepredigt am Sonnabend nach Judica, den 13. Martij, Luther 
denies that the Reformers are schismatics and says that their preaching is dismantling die rothe hure, des 
Teuffels Sinagog zu Rom (“that scarlet whore, the synagog of Satan in Rome”) (WA 47:217, Aland 
#Pr1800 [confer #318]; AE 22:513, translated by Martin H. Bertram, with the editors adding the citation 
Revelation 2:9). 
 Around the same time, 1537-1540, while preaching on Matthew 23:37 and verses following, 
Predigt D. M. Luthers uber das 23. Capittel Matthei. Gepredigt am 18. Sontag Nach Trinitatis, Luther 
likens Rome and its followers to ein Hurhaus des Teuffels, and, countering his opponents’ claim that they 
were the church and ought to be heard, he, with reference to Isaiah 1:21, says that because they will not 
hear the Word of God but put themselves over it they have made Jerusalem eine Teuffels hure, later adding, 
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 In 1525, Luther wrote Wider die himmlischen Propheten, von den Bildern und 
Sakrament (Against the Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of Images and Sacraments) 
against Andreas Karlstadt, a former colleague and opponent of Luther’s turned advocate 
turned opponent again. As the title of the work suggests, Luther’s problems with 
Karlstadt began with the iconoclastic controversy but also regarded the Sacrament of the 
Altar. In part II of the work, regarding the real, presence of Christ’s body and blood in the 
bread and wine of the Sacrament of the Altar, Luther reacts to Karlstadt’s use of reason in 
order to deny Christ’s presence, and Luther also significantly draws in Karlstadt’s other 
arguments, which essentially were based on grammar.80 
Hynfurder leret er uns, was fraw hulde, die natůrlich vernunfft, zu diesen 
sachen sagt, gerade alls wuesten wyr nicht, das die vernunfft des teuffels 
hure ist und nichts kan denn lestern und schenden alles, was Gott redt und 
thut. Aber ehe wyr der selben ertzhuren und teuffels braut antworten, 
Woellen wyr zuvor unsern glauben beweysen, und nicht grosse 
buchstaben noch puncten odder Tuto Tato sondern duerre helle sprueche 
der legen, die der tueuffel nicht soll umbstossen. 
Furthermore he teaches us what Frau Hulda, natural reason, has to say in 
the matter, just as if we did not know that reason is the devil’s prostitute 
and can do nothing else but slander and dishonor what God does and says. 
But before we answer this arch-prostitute and devil’s bride, we first want 
to prove our faith, not by setting forth capitals or periods or touto tauta but 
by clear, sober passages from Scripture which the devil will not 
overthrow.81 
                                                                                                                                                 
with a reference to John 8:43, that because they hear the devil they are not the Christian Church but are des 
Teuffels brauth und Hure (WA 47:534, 536, Aland #Pr 1845). 
 Finally, in the 1541 Vermahnung zum Gebet wider den Türken (Appeal for Prayer against the 
Turk), Luther refers to the person in charge of the emperor’s court as eine teuffels hure (WA 51:589a, 
Aland #733; AE 43:221, translated by Paul H. G. Moessner as “a hellish whore”). 
80 The extended quotations in this dissertation generally provide the original language version first, 
followed by an English translation, for which sources are noted in each case. In the case of Luther’s works, 
English translations are from the American Edition when available and reasonably accurate. For quotations 
from The Book of Concord, see below, n.220, p.80.  
81 WA 18:164 (Aland #588); AE 40:174-175, translated by Conrad Bergendoff (note that 
Bergendoff switches the order of “saying and doing”, probably for more-idiomatic English). The AE 
editors report that Melanchthon complained about Luther’s violent style in this work (AE 41:76). 
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Note well the significance of Luther’s equating reason with the capricious Frau Hulda82 
and the devil’s whore, arch-prostitute, and devil’s bride. (That the devil has a family, 
including a bride, is not an idea unique to Luther, although he does often use it.83) The 
Bible makes use of rich imagery contrasting bride (Braut) and whore (Hure).84 
 Some sixteen years later in 1541, Luther wrote Wider Hans Worst (Against 
Hanswurst), a writing that is replete with references to the devil’s whore, most in 
connection to what Luther saw as the falsity of the Roman Catholic church but some 
nevertheless relevant to our discussion of reason.85 The writing was to defend Elector 
John Frederick from an attack by Henry of Braunschweig/Wolfenbüttel, a staunch 
opponent of the Reformation who in a writing of his own had virulently attacked Elector 
John and said that Luther called Elector John “Hanswurst”, a clown-like characterization 
that Luther slapped on Henry as Luther replied in kind.86 In the work, Luther develops 
                                                 
82 The AE notes: “In Germanic mythology, Frau Hulda is the name of the leader of a group of elfin 
creatures who were looked upon as instigators of good and evil among men. Like them Frau Hulda is of a 
capricious nature, now friendly, now hostile especially in times when disorder arises among men. She may 
therefore be regarded as a personification of order and clever reasoning. However, in matters of faith 
Luther looked upon reason as seductive, hence as ‘the devil’s prostitute.’” (AE 41:174 n.134.) Reason’s 
“seductive” nature contributes significantly to Luther’s objection to reason and thus his use of the “devil’s 
whore” figure of speech. 
83 Jacob Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1984), 21:267. 
84 For the German words, see Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, 2:330-332; 10:1958-1960. For 
example, in Revelation, chapter 17 “describes [the great whore] in her appearance, activity, and following, 
and indicates her downfall”, while chapter 18 “tells of her destruction, recalls memories of what she had 
been, and records the mourning and lament of her followers”, and chapter 19 glorifies God for His 
judgment over her and transitions to such things as the marriage of the Lamb to His Bride, the Church 
(21:2, 9 ff.) (Luther Poellot, Revelation: The Last Book in the Bible [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1962], 217, 240). 
85 WA 51:469-256, Aland #777; translated by W. P. Stephens and Eric W. Gritsch in AE 41:179-
256. AE 41:181-184 gives background on the controversy and the character of “Hanswurst” who wore a 
sausage around his neck. 
 The electronic search of the WA found a total of fifteen references to the “devil’s whore” and its 
associated expressions in this work, the ones not treated in the text follow here and in subsequent notes 
with additional context and similar uses mentioned: des teuffels hure vnd schule (WA 51:487a&b; AE 
41:199, “Satan’s whore and synagogue [Rev. 2:9]”; confer “arch-whore of the devil and the synagogue of 
hell (Rev.2:9)” [AE 41:201]); for taking the devil’s teaching and passing it along, eine rechte teuffels hure 
(WA 51:497&ba; AE 41:204, “the devil’s own whore”; confer der verlauffenen teuffels huren, “that 
apostate devil’s whore” [WA 51:497a, AE 41:205]; confer “arch-whore of the devil” [AE 41:205] and the 
invoking of Revelation 18:4-5 [AE 41:206]). For the “a” and “b” references, see below, n.87, p.27. 
86 The AE editors half apologize for the potentially offensive nature of the work in preparing the 




the thesis that his opponents at one time had been faithful but turned away from the truth, 
significantly after they had reached the age of reason, and he emphasizes the use of the 
German vernacular to make sure his pointed statements are understood. 
Jungfraw vnd liebe braut war ist eine abtrunnige verlauffene ehehure, eine 
haushure, eine betthure, eine schlusshure, die ym hause frawe ist, 
schlussel, bette, kuchen, keller vnd alles hat ynn yhrem befelh so bose das 
Da gegen die gemeynen freyen huren, puschhuren, feldhuren, landhuren, 
Heerhuren, schier heilig sind, Denn diese is die rechte Ertzhure vnd 
eigentlich eine teuffels hure. 
 Von solcher hüren sagt Hosea, vnd gar viel groblicher vnd schier 
zu groblich, der prophet Ezechiel capt xxiij, das mugt yhr lesen, so yhr 
wiseen wolt, was fur eine hure ewr kirchen ist, Denn eine solche hure 
Meine ich, wenn ich euch eine abtrunnige verlauffene hure schelte, die yhr 
ynn der kindheit rechte Christen getaufft auff den lieben herrn ettliche iar 
gelebt, wie die alte kirche, darnach wenn yhr gross worden vnd zur 
vernunfft komen (wie ich selbs mit allen andern auch gethan), sehet vnd 
horet yhr die schone Ceremonien der Bepstlichen kirchen dazu den ge nies 
ehre vnd gewalt der drinnen gleisset ia die prechtige heligkeit vnd grossen 
Gottes dienst vnd für geplaudertes hymelreich vergesset yhr ewrs 
Christlichen glaubens tauffe vnd sacrament werdet der Lene der Ertzhuren 
vleissige schulerin vnd iünge hurlin, jr alte Huren, widerumb iungehürlin 
machet, und so fort an des Bapsts ja des Teufels Kirche mehret, und viel 
von den rechten Jungreqlin Christi, so aus der Tauffe geborn, jmer fort 
auch zu Ertzhuren machet. Solchs, halt ich sey Deudsch gered, das jr und 
jederman verstehen kan, was wir meinen. Denn ob jr solch Newerey bey 
euch fur schertz haltet, die jr keinen Gott habt noch achtet, so ists doch fur 
Gott schrecklich, grewlich, Abgötterey, Mord, Helle und alles unglück, 
das Gott nicht leiden kan, das er darumb die Ertzhure ewiglich verdammen 
wil. 
This whore, who before was a pure virgin and dear bride, is now an 
apostate, erring, married whore, a house-whore, a bed-whore, a key-
whore, being the mistress of the house, having the key, the bed, the 
kitchen, the cellar, and everything at her command. Yet she is so evil that 
beside her the common unattached whores, the pimp-whores, the whores 
of the field, the country, and the army are almost holy. For she is the true 
arch-whore and the true whore of the devil. 
 Of such a whore Hosea speaks, and Ezekiel indeed does so much 
more coarsely, in fact almost too coarsely, in chapter 23. You should read 
that if you want to know what kind of a whore your church is. For this is 
what I mean when I call you an apostate, erring whore—you who were 
baptized as children in the dear Lord and even lived some years like the 
ancient church. But when you grew up and reached the age of reason (as I 
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and everyone else have done), you saw and heard the lovely ceremonies of 
the papal church, and also its glittering profit, honor, and power, yes, its 
magnificent holiness, the mighty worship, and all the yarns about the 
kingdom of heaven. Then you forgot your Christian faith, baptism, and 
sacrament, becoming the diligent pupils and young little whores (as the 
comedies say) the procuresses, the arch-whores, until you old whores once 
more make young whores. Thus the church of the pope, indeed, the church 
of the devil, grew, transforming many of Christ’s young virgins, who were 
born in baptism, into arch-whores. This, I hold, should be said in German, 
so that you and everyone can understand what we mean. For if you hold 
these innovations of yours to be a joke—you who neither have a God nor 
honor him—then it is something terrible and abominable before God. It is 
idolatry, murder, hell, and every calamity, which God cannot bear, so that 
he will damn the arch-whore for eternity.87 
Clearly Luther does not think the age of reason itself is bad, but he says that is the age 
when the temptation to misuse reason hits in force, and such virgins and brides once 
fallen beget more whores. Significantly, even in this context Luther demonstrates, with 
the reference to Aristophanes, his own education.88 In contrast, Luther says that, although 
the target of Luther’s polemic could teach his friends things that do not matter, he is 
beyond learning the things that matter and beyond reason itself. 
Vnd der grobe filtz Rultz vnd tolpel der Esel aller Esel zu Wolffenbuttel 
schreiet daher sein Esel geschreye vrteilt vnd ketzert so er doch nimmer 
mehr lernen kan wenn er hundert iar studirt vnd seine meister ym gantzen 
Bapstum horet, was kirche sey oder ketzer, Was ein Christ oder 
abtrunniger sey, der verstand ist yhnen zu hoch Was aber mordbrenner 
sey, das kundte er seine meister auch den Bapst selbs wol leren 
 Die heilige Christliche kirche (ich rede itzt mit den unsern. Denn 
bey dem Bapst Esel oder bey den Heintzen klotzen vnd steinen ist kein 
vernunfft, sehen noch horen), ist nicht ein rohr noch zalpfennig Nein sie 
wanckt nicht vnd gibt nicht nach. wie des Teuffels hure die Bepstliche 
                                                 
87 WA 51:503b-504b (confer 511b); AE 41:208-209 (the AE translation says it follows the first 
German edition; the top or “a” text in WA 51 is Luther’s handwritten draft, while the “b” text is the printed 
edition that reflects changes purportedly made by Luther himself). Confer also “the whoredom of the devil” 
and “devilish whoredom” (AE 41:210). 
88 AE 41:208 n.34. A study of the American Edition of Luther’s Works for a handful of authors 
usually cited in the medieval curriculum found: “Luther quite favorably uses ancient writers of both mid- 
and late-medieval popularity. Negative references to them come, if at all, when the otherwise secular 
authors are given any weight in matters theological.” (Jayson S. Galler, “Martin Luther and Auctores 
Quattuor: A Study of the Use and Treatment of Four ‘Medieval’ Authors in the American Edition of 
Luther’s Works,” [University of Texas at Austin, 2003] 25pp.). Luther arguably cites Aristotle and other 
philosophers in the same fashion as the auctores quattuor. 
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kirche, die, wie eine und gibt nicht nach, wide die Tuefels hure, die 
Bepstliche Kirche, die, wie eine Ehebrecherin, meinet, sie müssen nicht 
feste halten bey jrem Ehemanne, Sondern müge wol wancken, nachgeben, 
zulassen, wie es der Hurrenjeger haven wil. 
And that vulgar boor, blockhead, and lout from Wolfenbüttel, that ass to 
cap all asses, screams his heehaws, judges, and calls men heretical. Why, 
he could never learn if he studied a hundred years, not even if he heard his 
masters in the whole of the papacy tell what the church is and what a 
heretic is, what Christ is and what an apostate is. This would take too great 
a measure of understanding. But he could indeed teach his masters, and 
even the pope himself, what arson is. 
 The holy Christian church (I am speaking to our own people now, 
for with the papal ass and with these Harrys and other blocks and stones 
there is no reasoning, no perception or listening) is neither a reed nor a 
counter. No, it does not waver or give way, like the devil’s whore—the 
papal church—who, like an adulteress, thinks she need not remain faithful 
to her husband, but may waver, yield, and submit to the will of the 
whoremonger.89 
Luther has greater confidence in just about everyone else, as is clear later in the same 
work, just after calling the Roman church the devil’s whore. 
 Denn das kan wol ein kind von sieben iaren, ia wol ein grober narr, 
an den fingern zelen und rechnen (wie wol der grobe Bapst Esel sampt 
seine verdampten Heintzen nichts verstehen konnen, Das die loblichen 
vorigen keiser; fursten, herrn und frome leute on zweiuel nicht gemeinet 
noch willens gewest sind yhre guter zu geben, damit eitel Teuffels hurn 
oder abgotterey zu stifften, zu schmucken und zu ehren, Viel weniger, das 
                                                 
89 WA 51:510b-511b; AE 41:212-213. The AE editors refer to their own introduction to explain 
the allegations of arson made against Henry (AE 41:212 n.40). And, elsewhere they explain that Heintz is a 
pun on Hans (AE 41:218 n.48). 
 Shortly after the passage cited, Luther refers to the lying and idolatrous “whore-church of the 
devil” (AE 41:214). A little further down, having listed the innovations in the papal church without the 
support of the Word of God, Luther writes: So mussen sie zugleich bekennen, das sie solche heilige kirche 
night sind noch sein konnen, weil sie vol solcher grewliger yrthumb lugen vnd abgotterey sind Sondern 
seyen die richete verlaüffeneabtrunnige, schendliche hure des Teüffels, dem sie ynn solchen grewlichen 
lugen folget vnd dienet; “But at the same time they must confess that they are not and cannot be such a holy 
church, since they are full of abominable errors, lies, and idolatry. In fact, they must confess that they are 
the true, erring, apostate, shameless whore of the devil, whom they follow and serve with such abominable 
lies.” (WA 51:515a&b; AE 41:214-215.) Confer also where Luther says the Romanists must confess das 
sie die rechte Teufels Hure kirche sind (WA 51:523b; AE 41:219,“they are the true whore-church of the 
devil”), where he takes as an antecedent that they are not the church but des Teufels hure (WA 51:523b; AE 
41:220, “the devil’s whore”), and where he considers it proved that they are die rechte mord grube vnd 
teuffels hure; “the true den of robbers and devil’s whore” (WA 51:524a&b; AE 41:220).  
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sie damit seel morder, kirchen reuber, Heintzen und mordbrenner erzihen 
oder unterhalten wolten ... 
A seven-year-old child, indeed, a silly fool, can figure it out on his 
fingers—although that stupid ass, the pope, together with his damned 
Harrys cannot understand anything—that the worthy emperors, princes, 
lords, and pious people of former days undoubtedly neither intended nor 
desired to give their property for the purpose of adorning and honoring 
nothing but the devil’s whores and idolatry, much less to educate and to 
support murderers of men’s souls, robbers of churches, Harrys, and 
arsonists.90 
Thus, in this work, the devil’s whore expression is used to criticize the falsity of the 
Roman Catholic church in part by portraying its defenders as essentially misusing reason 
or being unable to reason and producing others just as ill-suited to reason as themselves,91 
unlike others for whom the truth is obvious. 
 Considering the latest and most frequently cited work in which Luther uses the 
devil’s whore expression to describe reason is the most illuminating. Luther’s last 
Wittenberg sermon for which there is a record was preached on Romans 12:3, the first 
verse of the Epistle reading for the day, January 17, 1546, the Second Sunday after 
Epiphany.92 In a sermon full of various uses of imagery related to marriage and harlotry, 
Luther attacks both his reformed and Roman Catholic opponents. The sermon basically 
warns people against regarding too highly their own wisdom and letting the devil “kindle 
the light of reason” (das liecht der vernunfft anzünden) and rob them of their faith, but 
the sermon also comforts people with the forgiveness of sins by the blood of Jesus, 
exhorting them to drown reason in baptism and feed their faith in the Sacrament of the 
                                                 
90 WA 51:524-525; AE 41:221. Confer the similar reference to the age of discretion or reason in 
SA III:xii:2. 
 The final hit for teuffels Hure comes in criticism of the Roman Catholics for their prohibition of 
married clergy; there Luther asks if eine geringe teuffels Hure (“a little whore of a devil”) set up the article 
(WA 51:527a&b; AE 41:222) and goes on to speak of the Roman church “made into a whore by the devil” 
(AE 41:223). 
91 Perhaps confer Matthew 23:13-15. 
92 Die letzte predigt Doctoris Martini Lutheri heiliger gedechtnis, So her gethan hat zu Wittenberg, 
am andern Sontag nach Epiphanias Domini, den xvii. Januarij. Im M.D.xlvij Jhar, WA 51:123-34, Aland 
#648; AE 51:369-380, translated by John W. Doberstein as “The Last Sermon in Wittenberg”, 1546. 
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Altar.93 Reason’s attacks on those sacraments is Luther’s first mention of reason in the 
sermon. 
Da mus man nu predigen unnd jderman auff sich achtung haben, das ihn 
seineigene vernunfft nicht verfüre, Denn sihe, was die schwermgeister 
thun, das word und den glauben haben sie angenommen, so kümpt die 
klugheit hergelauffen, die noch ist augsgesegt, unnd wil sein in den 
Geistlichen sachen, wil schrifft und glauben meistern unnd macht 
Ketzerey, wenn wir gantz rein weren, so bedürfften wir keines 
zuchtmeisters, sondern würden von uns selbst alles willig thun wie die 
Engeln im Himel, Aber weil wir noch stecken im schendtlichem 
madenfack, den die schlangen mit der zeit sollen freffen, hette wol ergers 
verdient, das ehr inn der helle brente ewiglich, so ist not, das man immer 
dem alten menschen an, der do vernewert wird zu der erkentnis nach dem 
ebenbilde des, der ihn geschaffen hat. Wucherey, seufferey, ehebruch, 
mord, todschlag etc., die kan man mercken, und verstehet auch die welt, 
das sie sünde sein, Aber des Teuffels Braut Ratio, die schöne Metze, feret 
herein und wil klug sein, und was sie sagt, meinet sie, es sey der heilig 
Geist, wer wil da helffen? wedder Iurist, Medicus, noch König odder 
Keyser, Denn es ist die höchste Hure, die der Teuffel hat, Die andern 
groben sünde sihet man, aber die vornunfft kan niemand richten, die feret 
daher, richtet schwermerey an mit der Tauff, Abendtmal, meinet, alles, 
was ihr einfelt, und der Teuffel ins hertz gibt, sol der heilig Geist sein, 
Darumb spricht Paulus: so war ich ein Apostel bin, unnd Gott mir hat den 
Geist gegeben, also vermane ich. 
So there must be preaching and everyone must also take care that his own 
reason may not lead him astray. For, behold what the fanatics do. They 
have accepted the Word and faith, but then, added to baptism, there comes 
wisdom, which has not yet been purged, and wants to be wise in spiritual 
things. They want to master both the Scriptures and faith by their own 
wisdom, and they perpetrate heresy. If we were wholly clean, we should 
not need everywhere the ministry of the Word. If we were altogether pure, 
we should have no need to be admonished, but would be like the angels in 
heaven with no need for a schoolmaster, and do everything willingly of 
ourselves. But since we are still confined to this miserable carcass—which 
in time the worms will devour, though it deserves something worse, to 
burn in hell eternally—it is necessary constantly to resist and put off the 
old man and his works and put on the new man, which is being renewed in 
knowledge after the image of him that created him [cf. Col. 3:10]. Usury, 
gluttony, adultery, manslaughter, murder, etc., these can be seen and the 
world understands that these are sins. But the devil’s bride, reason, the 
                                                 
93 WA 51:129-131; AE 51:376-377—what could be called the central part of the sermon, with the 
clearest application to the text. 
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lovely whore comes in and wants to be wise, and what she says, she 
thinks, is the Holy Spirit. Who can be of any help then? Neither jurist, 
physician, nor king, nor emperor; for she is the foremost whore the devil 
has. The other gross sins can be seen, but nobody can control reason. It 
walks about, cooks up fanaticism [Schwärmerei] with baptism and the 
Lord’s Supper, and claims that everything that pops into its head and the 
devil puts into its heart is the Holy Spirit. Therefore Paul says: As I am an 
apostle and God has given me the Spirit, so I appeal to you [cf. Rom. 12:1; 
I Cor. 4:16].94 
Luther then writes how, even in believers, sin remains (such as lusts leading to 
fornication and lewdness), not losing sight, as he continues, of his target: misused reason. 
Und was ich von der brunft, so ein grobe sünde ist, rede, solchs ist auch 
von der vernufft zuverstehen, denn dieselbige schendet unnd beleidiget 
Gott in Geistlichen gaben, hat auch viel einfreulicher huren übel denn ein 
Hure. Ein Abgöttischer leufft hie einem Abgott nach, der einem andern, 
wie die Propheten reden, unter einem baum, wie ein hurentreiber einem 
unzüchtigem weib nachleufft,darumb heists die schrifft Abgötterey, 
hurerey,der vernunfft weisheit und heiligkeit. Wie haben sich die 
Propheten mit der schönen hurerey, Abgötterey zerscholten, die ist 
einwild, das sich nicht leichtlich sahen lest, unnd ist jhr die torheit 
angeborn, welche sie für die höchste weissheit und gerechtigkeit helt, und 
kan doch in GOTtes sachen nicht auff denbergenorder in thalen noch unter 
den bewmen dienen, sondern zu Hierusalem, da sein word und der ort jhm 
zu dienen verordnet ist. Hie widder sagt die vernunfft: Es ist war, ichbin 
wol beruffen, beschnitten, unnd ist mir auch befohlen, das ich gen 
Hierusalem gehe, Aber hie ist eine schöne wiesse, ein sein grüner bergk, 
wenn man hie einen Gottesdienst anstifftetet, das wird Gott unnd allen 
Engeln im Himel gefallen. Ist denn Gott ein solcher GOTT, der sich allein 
zu Hierusalem lest anbinden? Solche weisheit der vernunfft heissen die 
Propheten hurerey. 
And what I say about the sin of lust, which everybody understands, applies 
also to reason; for the reason mocks and affronts God in spiritual things 
and has in it more hideous harlotry than any harlot. Here we have an 
idolater running after an idol, as the prophets say, under every green tree 
[cf. Jer. 2:20; I Kings 14:23], as a whorechaser runs after a harlot. That’s 
why the Scriptures call idolatry whoredom, while reason calls it wisdom 
and holiness. How the prophets inveighed against this lovely whoredom, 
idolatry! It is a wild thing which is not easily caught and its foolishness is 
inborn, but it considers itself the height of wisdom and justice, and still it 
cannot understand the things of God. We must guard against it, as the 
                                                 
94 WA 51:125-126; AE 51:373-374; emphasis added. 
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prophets say: You must not serve God on the mountains or in the valleys 
or under the trees, but in Jerusalem, which is the place that God appointed 
for his worship and where his Word is. But here again, reason says: True 
enough, I have been called, circumcised, and adjured to go to Jerusalem, 
but here is a beautiful meadow, a fine green mountain; if we worship God 
here this will please God and all the angels in heaven. After all, is God the 
kind of God who binds himself only to Jerusalem? Such wisdom of reason 
the prophets call whoredom.95 
Luther goes on to equate the Reformers’ preaching of faith and worship of God alone 
with being in Jerusalem’s temple, and he contrasts that with reason leading the Roman 
Catholics to worship the Virgin Mary as the mother of Christ and even invoke the saints. 
Daher ist das gemeld, wie Gott zürnet undChristus demVatter die wunden, 
Maria aber Christo jhr brüste zeiget, Das treibt die hübsche Braut, der 
vernunfft weisheit, Maria ist des HERrn Christi Mutter, vorwar so wird sie 
Christus erhören, Christus ist ein gestrenger richter, Ich will S. Georgen, 
S. Christoffel anruffen ... 
So you have the picture of God as angry and Christ as judge; Mary shows 
to Christ her breast and Christ shows his wounds to the wrathful Father. 
That’s the kind of thing this comely bride, the wisdom of reason cooks up: 
Mary is the mother of Christ, surely Christ will listen to her; Christ is a 
stern judge, therefore I will call upon St. George and St. Christopher.96 
Recalling the glittery attractions that tempted Henry and his ilk away from the faith after 
they reached the age of reason,97 Luther warns against the temptation to put reason over 
the Scriptures, continuing to bring together various relevant Bible passages and devil’s 
whore expressions from his own years of writing. (The following passage is quoted at 
greater length in part because the well-known Luther quote regarding reason is somewhat 
dishonestly excerpted from it.) 
Derhalben wie ein junger Gesel mus der bösen lust wehren, ein Alter dem 
Geist, Also ist die vernunfft von art und natur ein schedliche hure, aber sie 
soll mir nicht schaden, wenn ich allein jhr widderstrebe. Ia, sie ist aber 
schöne, sie gleisset uber die massen sein, Da sollen Prediger sein unnd die 
leute weissen auff den Kinder glauben: Ich gleube in Ihesum Christum, 
nicht in S. Georgen odder S. Christoffel, denn alleine von Christo wirt 
gesagt: ‘Sihe das Lamb GOTTES, welchs die sünde der Welt hinweg 
                                                 
95 WA 51:127-128; AE 51:374-375; emphasis added. 
96 WA 51:128; AE 51:375. 
97 See above at n.87, p.27. 
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nimpt’, nicht von Maria odder Engeln. Der Vatter schreiet vom Himel 
herab: ‘Diesen höret’, nicht vom Gabriel etc. Darumb sol ich bey dem 
Kinder glauben bleiben, da kan ich mich der vernunfft erwehren, wenn die 
widderteuffer geisseren: Die Tauff ist wasser, was kans aufsrichten? Oder 
Geist mus es thun. Hörestu es, du schebichte, auffetzige hure, du heilige 
vernunfft, das geschrieben stehet: ‘Diesen höret’, der da sagt: ‘gehet hin 
und teuffet alle Heiden’, ‘wer gleubt und getaufft wirt’, Es ist nicht 
schlecht wasser, sondern die Tauffe, so im namen der heiligen 
dreifaltickeit gegeben wirt, darumb sihe, das due die vernunfft im zaum 
haltest unnd folgest nicht jhren schönen gedancken, wirff jhr ein dreck ins 
angesicht, auff das sie hesslich werde, Gedenckestu nicht daselbst an das 
geheimnis der Heiligen Dreyfaltigkeit unnd an das blut Jhesu Christi, 
damit du von deinen sünden gewasschen bist? Item vom abentmal sagen 
die schwermergeister,die Scramentierer: was sol Brod, Wein? wie kan 
Gott der Almechtige seinen Leib in Brot geben? ich wolt, das du müstest 
mit dem hindermaul etc. Sind so klug, das sie niemand zu narren kan 
machen, wenn sie einer in einem mörser hette unnd mit dem stempel 
zuschlüge, so wieche doch die torheit nicht von jhnen. Die vernunfft is 
unnd sol in der Tauf erseufft sein, und sol ihr die narrete weisheit nich 
schaden, allein so sie den Son Gottes höret, der da sagt: ‘Nemet hin, das 
ist mein Leib, der für euch gegeben wirt’, diss Brot, das dir dargereicht 
wirt, sage ich, sey mein Leib, wenn ich solchs hab, trette ich die vernunfft 
mit jhrer weisheit mit füssen, du verfluchte Hure, wilt du mich verfüren, 
das ichmit demTeuffel hurerey treiben solte? Also wird die vernunfft 
durch das Wort des Sons Gottes gereiniget und frey gemacht, Also last uns 
auch handeln mit den Rotten, wie die Propheten mid den Geistlichen 
Hurern, den Abgöttischen, mit den klüglingen, die es besser wollen 
machen, denn es Gott machet, unnd sollen zu jhnen sagen: Ich hab ein 
Breutgam, en wil ich hören, Deine weisheit ist die gröste torheit etc. 
Dieser streit wehret biss auff den letzten tag, Das wil S. Paulus, wir sollen 
nicht allein di andern lüste, sondern auch die vernunfft unnd hohe weisheit 
dempffen. So dich hurerey ansicht, schlage sie todt unnd thu solchs viel 
mehr in der geistlichen Hurerey. Es gefelt einem nichts so wol als die 
philautia, wenn einer sein eigen lust an seiner weissheit hat. Die begirde 
der geistigen ist nichts dar gegen, wenn einem sein eigen dünckel hertzlich 
gefelt, unnd bringet denn die schönen gedancken inn die schrifft, das ist 
der Teuffel gantz und gar, Diese sünde ist vergeben, aber wenn sie in der 
natur, so noch nicht gar gereiniget ist, herschet, da verleurt man bald die 
rechte lere, da ist Christus auch hinweg, und sie, die lerer, fallen auff dem 
berge für dem Teuffel nidder unnd beten jhn an. Matth. iiij. 
As a young man must resist lust and an old man avarice, so reason is by 
nature a harmful whore. But she shall not harm me, if only I resist her. Ah, 
but she is so comely and glittering. That’s why there must be preachers 
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who will point people to the catechism: I believe in Jesus Christ, not in St. 
George or St. Christopher, for only of Christ is it said, “Behold, the Lamb 
of God, who takes away the sin of the world” [John 1:29]; not of Mary or 
the angels. The Father did not speak of Gabriel or any others when he 
cried from heaven, “Listen to him” [Matt. 17:5]. 
 Therefore I should stick to the catechism; then I can defend myself 
against reason when the Anabaptists say, “Baptism is water; how can 
water do such great things? Pigs and cows drink it. The Spirit must do it.” 
Don’t you hear, you mangy, leprous whore, you holy reason, what the 
Scripture says, “Listen to him,” who says, “Go and baptize all nations” 
[Matt. 28:19], and “He who believes and is baptized [will be saved”]? 
[Mark 16:16]. It is not merely water, but baptism given in the name of the 
holy Trinity. 
 Therefore, see to it that you hold reason in check and do not follow 
her beautiful cogitations. Throw dirt in her face and make her ugly. Don’t 
you remember the mystery of the holy Trinity and the blood of Jesus 
Christ with which you have been washed of your sins? Again, concerning 
the sacrament, the fanatical antisacramentalists say, “What’s the use of 
bread and wine? How can God the Almighty give his body in bread?” I 
wish they had to eat their own dirt. They are so smart that nobody can fool 
them. If you had one in a mortar and crushed him with seven pestles his 
foolishness still would not depart from him. Reason is and should be 
drowned in baptism, and this foolish wisdom will not harm you, if you 
hear the beloved Son of God saying, “Take, eat; this is my body, which is 
given for you; this bread which is administered to you, I say, is my body.” 
If I hear and accept this, then I trample reason and its wisdom under foot 
and say, “You cursed whore, shut up! Are you trying to seduce me into 
committing fornication with the devil?” That’s the way reason is purged 
and made free through the Word of the Son of God. 
 So let us deal with the fanatics as the prophets dealt with the 
spiritual harlots, the idolaters, the wiseacres, who want to do things better 
than God does. We should say to them, “I have a Bridegroom, I will listen 
to him. Your wisdom is utter foolishness. I destroy your wisdom and 
trample it under foot.” This struggle will go on till the last day. This is 
what Paul wants; we are to quench not only the low desires but also the 
high desires, reason and its high wisdom. When whoredom invades you, 
strike it dead, but do this far more when spiritual whoredom tempts you. 
Nothing pleases a man so much as self-love, when he has a passion for his 
own wisdom. The cupidity of a greedy man is as nothing compared with a 
man’s hearty pleasure in his own ideas. He then brings these fine ideas 
into the Scriptures, and this is devilishness pure and simple. This sin is 
forgiven, but when it reigns in one’s nature, not yet fully purged, then 
assuredly the true doctrine is soon lost, however willingly one preaches 
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and willingly one listens. Then Christ is gone. Then they fall down before 
the devil on the mountain and worship him (Matt. 4 [:8–10]).98 
The contrast between reason and the Scripture and the Catechism is especially striking, 
and note how Luther closely connects the devil’s use of reason with idolatry that 
ultimately makes the devil the center of worship. Luther continues to preach on the right 
relationship between, on the one hand, the Word of God and faith and, on the other hand, 
reason. Luther likens the use of reason to controlling lusts in a human marriage, and, at 
the end of a significant passage very near the end of the sermon itself, Luther makes what 
can be taken as an allusion to the handmaid metaphor. 
Wenn du einen Sacramentschwermer hörest, der daher lestert: Im 
Sacrament des Altars ist nur Brot und Wein, Item: solte Christus auff dein 
wort vom Himel steigen in dein maul und bauch? Ey es gefelt mir wol, 
was du sagest, ey hat der Teuffel so ein gelarte Braut? Aber was sagestu 
mir hirzu: ‘Dis ist mein delibter Son, den höret’, und der sagt: ‘Dis ist 
mein leib.’ Troll dich mit deinem dunckel auff das heimlich gemach, höre 
auff, du verfluchte hure, wiltu meisterin sein uber den Glauben, welcher 
sagt, das im Abentmal des Herrn sey der ware Leib und das ware Blut, 
Item, das die Tauff nicht schlecht wasser ist, sonder wasser Gottess des 
Vaters, Gottesdes Sons und Gottes des heiligen Geistes? Diesem glauben 
mus die vernunfft unterthan und gehorsam sein, Item die von uns sagen, 
wir sind stoltz, wir solten weichen, Reden sie von leiblichensachen? Nein, 
sondern von Glaubens sachen, Nu ist aber also geschrieben, das uns der 
dünckel so gefallen, so ferne ehr nicht widder den glauben ist, aus welchen 
du nicht solt einen knecht machen noch Christum vom Himel herab 
stürmen. 
 When you hear a fanatical antisacramentalist say, “There is only 
bread and wine in the sacrament of the altar,” or “Do you think that at 
your word Christ is going to descend from heaven into your mouth and 
your belly?” You just say to him, “Ah, I like what you say; what a learned 
bride the devil has! But what do you say to this: ‘This is my beloved Son, 
listen to him?’ And he says, ‘This is my body’ [Matt. 17:5; 26:26]. Go, 
trot to the privy with your conceit, your reason! Shut up, you cursed 
                                                 
98 WA 51:128-130; AE 51:376-377; emphasis added. Maritain’s questionable representation of 
Luther’s sentiments is clear by comparing Luther’s statements as quoted in the text and Maritain’s version 
of Luther’s thoughts (confer at n.78, p.22; admittedly the text of the edition from which Maritain translates 
could be different). Maritain quotes as follows: “Reason is the devil’s greatest whore; by nature and manner 
of being she is a noxious whore; she is a prostitute, the devil’s appointed whore; whore eaten by scab and 
leprosy who ought to be trodden under foot and destroyed, she and her wisdom . . . Throw dung in her face 
to make her ugly. She is, and she ought to be, drowned in baptism . . . She would deserve, the wretch, to be 
banished to the filthiest place in the house, to the closets.” (Maritain, Three Reformers, 33.) 
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whore, do you think you are master over faith, which declares that the true 
body and the true blood is in the Lord’s Supper, and that Baptism is not 
merely water, but the water of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit?” 
Reason must be subject and obedient to this faith. 
 Likewise, those who say that we are proud and ought to give in; 
are they talking about material things? No, they are really talking about 
matters of faith. But it is written here that we are to accept conceit and 
reason only in so far as it is not contrary to faith; you must not make faith 
a servant nor cast Christ out of heaven [i.e., rob Christ of his divinity].99 
Quite simply for Luther redeemed reason and philosophy must serve faith and theology 
(the so-called “ministerial use” of reason), not the other way around. Who the opponent 
is—the iconoclast and sacramentarian Karlstadt, the Romanist Henry, or other 
sacramentarians or Romanists—does not make a difference. When reason, the devil’s 
whore, takes the position of authority over the Word of God (the so-called “magisterial 
use” of reason100), the household is turned upside down, the mistress becomes the maid 
and the maid becomes the whore. Then, all is lost, as Christ’s Bride and Church becomes 
the devil’s whore and church, hearing the devil instead of Christ.101 
 For centuries, the saying philosophia ancilla theologiae (“philosophy is the 
handmaiden of theology”) served as a metaphor for the proper relationship between 
theology and philosophy, faith and reason, the Word of God and human opinions. Those 
using the handmaid metaphor did not exclude all uses of philosophy or reason in the 
realm of theology and faith, as other figures did, but the metaphor instead indicated their 
allowing philosophy and reason a role in the realm of theology and faith, in some cases 
                                                 
99 WA 51:133-134; AE 51:379; emphasis added. 
100 Note especially Luther’s statement about “mastering Scriptures and faith by their own wisdom” 
(above at n.94, p.31). 
101 Confer above, as at n.79, where many of the references to the false church as the devil’s whore 
and church are in connection with the displacing of the Word of God as the final authority. In a February 8, 
1517, letter to Johann Lang that served as a cover letter of sorts for a letter to Iodocus Trutfetter, Luther 
complained that people listened to Aristotle instead of “good books” (bonos libros), and he also said of 
Aristotle, “He is the most subtle seducer of gifted people, so that if Aristotle had not been flesh, I would not 
hesitate to claim that he was really a devil” (illusorem vaferrimum ingeniorum, ita ut nisi caro fuisset 
Aristoteles, vere diabolum eum fuisse non puderet asserere) (AE 48:36-38, translated by Gottfried G. 
Krodel; WA Br 1:88-89). Confer “I would not hesitate to assert that he was the Devil himself” in Heiko A. 
Oberman, Luther: Man Between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New York: Image 
Books, 1990), 121, 337 n.12. Also see Frost, “Aristotle's Ethics,” 231-232, although Frost mistakenly gives 
the citation as “WA” instead of “WA Br”. 
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the role of helping understand the Word of God. Various passages from the Bible were 
allegorized to support the truth the handmaid metaphor held forth. And, early on, the 
danger of reason overstepping its bounds was clear, and for Luther such misuse of reason 
and its false fruits drew fire with the “devil’s whore” expression.102 The preceding 
overview of the relationship between philosophy and theology essentially from the 
beginning up to and then including the era of the Reformation leads us to highlights of 
previous scholarship regarding the areas of inquiry, the third subsection of this 
introductory chapter. 
Existing scholarship 
 Look up the word “reformation” in a standard dictionary, and one of the 
definitions is likely to refer to something such as “the religious movement in the 16th 
century that lead to the establishment of the Protestant churches”.103 Despite etymology 
that would suggest a now-obsolete sense of “reformation” as “restoration”, the usual 
sense since the 16th century has been that of a new formation, a radical change.104 The 
Oxford Dictionary of the Catholic Church indeed connects the term “Reformation” with 
“an involved series of changes in Western Christendom” in the 16th century, but that 
same work notes that “most of the Reformation movements demanded not innovation, 
but a return to a primitive excellence”.105 Similarly, Anthony Levi, in his 2002 book, 
Renaissance and Reformation: the intellectual genesis, is somewhat critical of the terms 
“reformation” and “renaissance” for “marking a fundamental cultural discontinuity with 
what had gone before”. However, when Levi suggests, “Real history knows no 
                                                 
102 If the handmaid metaphor indeed comes from Proverbs 9, then the temptations from adulterous 
reason might be found in Proverbs 9, as well as 5-7. While there is some irony in such a use, for “wisdom” 
is the protagonist in the opening chapters of Proverbs and “folly” the antagonist, surely the resolution lies 
in the “wisdom” of Proverbs being found in faith, “the fear of the Lord” (Proverbs 1:7), and not in fallen 
human reason. 
103 “Reformation”, The Random House Dictionary, ed. Jess Stein (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1980), 752. 
104 “Reform”The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. T. F. Hoad (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 394. 
105 “Reformation”, Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 1374. 
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discontunities”,106 one may react to it as an overstatement. Perhaps the question 
“Reformation: Continuity or Discontinuity?” is itself put falsely, because the real 
operators for many modern scholars appear to be not “either/or” but “both/and”. 
 Mindful, then, that one might expect both continuity and discontinuity, this 
section’s focus is on the findings of previous scholarship regarding three different 
aspects, or sub-questions, of the larger continuity/discontinuity question. The first, a 
consideration of the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, is not so much 
itself a question of continuity, however, although it becomes one when examined across 
different time periods. The second is a consideration of continuity between the late-
medieval period and the Reformation period, and the third is a consideration of continuity 
between the initial Reformers and the next generation. This section treats each of the 
three questions in turn and then summarizes this author’s own previous work looking for 
their answers within The Book of Concord. 
Repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use 
 The first question regards the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, 
and consideration begins with Martin Luther. Already in this introductory chapter the few 
quotations from Luther’s theses for the Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (1517) 
have made it clear that at least at one time Luther could fairly soundly condemn Aristotle 
and the philosophy and reasoning that he came to represent. Other quotations have made 
it clear also that Luther allowed Aristotle, philosophy, and reason a role. If the theses are 
taken as Luther’s genuine position—a debated assumption given the nature of such 
propositions for an academic disputation107—then what explains Luther’s apparent 
inconsistency: on the hand repudiating philosophy, while on the other hand 
simultaneously using it? One of any number of answers is possible, such as the 
                                                 
106 Anthony Levi, Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual Genesis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 1. 
107 For an informed idea of how disputations proceeded, see Graham White, Luther as Nominalist: 
A Study of the Logical Methods used in Martin Luther's disputations in the Light of their Medieval 




repudiation not being Luther’s position, the repudiation being a polemical overstatement, 
Luther changing his position, Luther simply being inconsistent, etc. Most studies of 
Luther and philosophy note the problem and proceed to some sort of explanation. 
 When appraising someone’s treatment of philosophy or reception of Aristotle, 
some studies examine writings for mentions and citations of Aristotle or his works and 
assess those mentions and citations as positive or negative.108 For example, Joseph 
Freedman examined the work of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624), a German Calvinist 
philosopher and professor at the Gymnasium illustre Arnoldinum in Steinfurt/Westphalia 
from 1595 to 1624.109 Freedman found that in some cases Timpler cites Aristotle 
favorably, in others negatively, in others “radically reinterprets him” (perhaps as Aquinas 
and others before Timpler had done), and in others uses Aristotle as a source of opinions. 
Freedman summarizes: “Timpler’s main concern seems to have been to present and to 
defend his own positions as well as to integrate those opinions into his own systematic 
textbooks.” Freedman points out that Timpler’s Lutheran opponents, Jacob Martini and 
Christian Matthiae, are similarly eclectic in their use of Aristotle.110 Such an approach 
might seem reasonable to apply to works of Luther himself. 
 The American Edition of Luther’s Works (AE), while not a complete collection of 
his works,111 might be thought of as at least an appropriate sample to examine. In one 
                                                 
108 For example, see Joseph S. Freedman, “Aristotelianism and Humanism in the Late Reformation 
German Philosophy: The Case of Clemens Timpler,” The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays 
in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 213, 
215, 216. 
 See also Jayson S. Galler, “Aristotle and Luther: A General Overview and An Investigation of 
Their Relationship in Class-Related Works,” (University of Texas at Austin, 2002), 35pp.; and Jayson S. 
Galler, “Martin Luther’s Reception of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” (University of Texas at Austin, 
2003), 19pp.  
109 Freedman, “Aristotelianism and Humanism,” 213. 
110 Freedman, “Aristotelianism and Humanism,” 216. 
111 The American Edition, produced from 1955-86 under the joint auspices of Concordia 
Publishing House and Fortress Press, contains only a fraction of Luther’s total work (Timothy Lull, 
“Luther's Writings,” The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald K. McKim [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003] 39). One estimate puts that fraction at between one-fifth and one-fourth 
of Luther’s extant works (Mark Sell, then senior editor for Concordia Publishing House, personal e-mail to 
author October 29, 2003). (Another estimate puts the fraction at one-third, if the Bible translation is 
excluded.) Nevertheless, the collection spans his career (see Vogel, Vogel’s Cross Reference). The first 
thirty volumes include some of Luther’s biblical writings (“lectures, commentaries, and expository 
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study, the American Edition was examined for references to Aristotle’s Categories, 
Generation of Animals, History of Animals, Metaphysics, Parts of Animals, Physics, 
Posterior Analytics, Prior Analytics, and Topics.112 The examination found 59 references: 
32 positive (54%), 21 negative (36%), and 6 neutral or errant (10%). A closer inspection 
of the data yielded some significant findings. All 4 of the references to Prior Analytics, in 
which Aristotle develops his theory of the syllogism, were positive. The vast majority of 
the references were from the “exegetical” writings (40, 68%) and were overwhelmingly 
positive (30-10, 75-25%). The majority of the references in the “theological” writings 
(public treatises, private letters, etc.) were overwhelmingly negative (11-2, 85-15%). 
Since the exegetical writings are about half of AE, this finding may be significant. That 
in the exegetical writings so many references were positive may be especially 
significant—perhaps Luther was trying to make his exposition appeal to the better 
educated by favorably using Aristotelian distinctions, or it may be that given the nature of 
the lectures in a university community he could make more-scholarly references. 
Likewise perhaps significant is that the majority of the non-exegetical references were 
negative, possibly due to the more polemical nature of these writings, the greater candor 
Luther could or did express in letters (even open ones), or perhaps to their somewhat 
earlier dates. As to the dating, 24 (40%) of the references are from Luther’s Genesis 
lectures, given between 1535 and 1545, and thought to be his most mature work. Of 
these, 16 (67%) are positive, compared to 7 (29%) negative. When sorted by date, there is 
a cluster of negative references in 1517-20 (including letters to Lang and Spalatin, 
Galatians, the Babylonian Captivity, and Christian Nobility), and there is a cluster of 
positive references in the Genesis lectures, especially after chapter 11.113  
                                                                                                                                                 
sermons”), and the second twenty-four contain “Reformation documents” (including correspondence and 
table talk), with the final volume being an index to the Edition (Lull, “Luther's Writings,” 40, although 
Lull’s breakdown of the volumes is corrected in the text of this note). Concordia Publishing House is, at 
this writing, in the early stages of producing additional volumes of the American Edition. 
112 Galler, “Aristotle and Luther.” 
113 The lectures were given as follows: chapters 1-14 between 1535-1536, chapters 15-20 between 
1538-1539, chapters 21-25 between 1539-1540, chapters 26-30 between 1541-1542, chapters 31-37 
between 1542-1544, chapters 38-44 in 1544, and chapters 45-50 in 1545. 
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 In general based on that examination, Luther across the board could make both 
positive and negative references to and use of those selected works of Aristotle. The 
specific work of Aristotle, work of Luther, and date of reference did not seem to control 
whether the reference was positive or negative. What seemed to be the controlling factor 
was that Luther favorably referred to and used Aristotle when it supported his point, and 
Luther negatively referred to Aristotle when Aristotle supported a point Luther needed to 
defeat.114 Relevant issues included the righteousness of the soul, creation and eternity of 
the world and man, justification, free will, and God’s involvement in the world. The 
discovery of such a controlling principle is completely in keeping with the ministerial use 
of reason and philosophy in the spiritual sphere. When human reason and philosophy 
arrogantly tried to take over the house of faith supported by God’s revelation in Holy 
Scripture, Luther criticized reason and philosophy. When reason and philosophy stayed 
as the dutiful handmaiden, Luther for the most part was happy. (For example, when 
Luther refers specifically to Aristotelian causes or categories, the references are 
predominantly positive: 10-5, 67-33%.)115 
 An examination of the American Edition regarding references to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics with a similar but refined methodology produced consistent 
findings.116 In this case, the type and content of the reference was also observed. Types of 
                                                 
114 While such a principle might seem obvious, one that any person would use in debate, it offers 
more explanatory force than simply saying Luther’s use was eclectic. Moreover, with Luther the principle 
is not so arbitrary, as he at least believes that the position he is taking is firmly based on the Bible. 
115 This approach for analyzing the American Edition has its own drawbacks. First, while the 
American Edition has translated many of Luther’s significant works, not all of them are translated, and, 
while the AE does translate works from a number of different categories of Luther’s works, saying whether 
the AE is any type of representative sample of the whole is not possible (it is certainly not a random 
sample). Second, various translators, editors, and undoubtedly indexers worked on AE and there are 
inconsistencies in how references to Aristotle and his works are treated. Third, taking index references and 
editors’ connections at face value is somewhat superficial, treating equally statements possibly influenced 
by Aristotle, possible references to Aristotle, or actual citations of Aristotle. Fourth and finally, not every 
reference is easily classified as positive or negative. Moreover, each publishing company had at least one 
general editor, so from the outset one expects differences between the volumes produced by each company. 
Those differences multiply exponentially when one considers different editors for each volume and 
different translators and revisers for each work. Finally, during the 31 years that the Edition was being 
published, other scholarship and resources were developed, so that one finds works cited in later volumes 
that were not available to cite in earlier ones. 
116 Galler, “Luther's Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics.” The consistency of the findings when 
considering the different types of Aristotle’s works may well go to the findings’ reliability. 
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references included simple references, paraphrases, uses, allusions, quotations, and 
imitations. The content of the references included such things as statements, maxims, 
definitions, arguments, and distinctions.117 Of the 40 references that could be classified as 
positive or negative, 25 were positive (63%), and 15 were negative (37%). Of the positive 
references, one was made in what is thought to have been Luther’s first sermon in 1510, 
and another one was made in his last sermon in 1546, thereby setting the limits for the 
1510-1546 range of both the positive references and the data as a whole. Just inside that 
range, the 15 negative references were made in years ranging from 1515 to 1540. While 
there were no positive references to the whole of the Nicomachean Ethics, three of the 15 
negative references (20%) were to the Nicomachean Ethics in general, and the twelve 
others were as follows: to Book I, 4, 8, 12, 13; Book II, 1-7, 1, 4, 4&5, Book V (twice), 
and Book X, 8 (twice). The greatest frequency of positive references regarded  
(“clemency”). Mentions to Aristotle’s comments regarding works drew praise and fire, 
although in one case Luther significantly uses Aristotle to support his distinction between 
righteousness before God and righteousness before other people.118 Luther especially 
condemned Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics for being wrong on matters related to 
original sin, and “reason” gets dragged into the fray, too. 
 One of the latest and in some ways more sophisticated studies of Luther’s 
reception of Aristotle is Theodor Dieter’s 2001 combined publication of his dissertation 
and habilitation, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch-systematische 
Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie (The Young Luther and 
Aristotle: A Historical-Systematic Inquiry into the Relation of Theology and 
Philosophy).119 Dieter, of course, surveys the major preceding inquiries (for example, 
Gerhard Ebeling’s, Brian Gerrish’s, Leif Grane’s, Wilhelm Link’s, Heiko Oberman’s, 
                                                 
117 These categories are not mutually exclusive, and a reference’s categorization was subjective 
and in many cases debatable. 
118 AE 25:152, the 1515-1516 commentary on Romans (confer 410-411). The reference is to EN 
III.7. 
119 Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung 
zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Band 105, eds. O. 
Bayer, W. Härle and H.-P. Müller (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001). 
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Graham White’s, etc.), builds on them where he can, and, as one might expect, he 
criticizes the methodology of many and proceeds to justify his own. Part of Dieter’s 
methodology is to reconstruct disputations and treat the topic as if Luther were debating 
not just with the scholastic theologians but with Aristotle himself. Dieter rightly points 
out some of the problems with trying to read Luther and determine what he thought about 
philosophy, such as determining how philosophy itself is to be determined (for example, 
should it be what Luther knew it to be, what someone like Thomas Aquinas actually said 
about Aristotle, or what we now know Aristotle himself said, etc.). And, Dieter is 
certainly right that Luther’s use of philosophy is eclectic, but that conclusion does not 
mean there is not method to Luther’s madness. 
 Dieter’s work generally has received praise,120 but that Dieter escapes the very 
problems he describes with the earlier research is not entirely clear, and Dieter’s work 
has problems of its own. Dieter’s methodology of anachronistic reconstruction is 
somewhat far-fetched, especially when he writes about how Aristotle responds to a 
particular statement of Luther (or about Aristotle saying the same thing as the Apostle 
James, or about Thomas Aquinas making a distinction almost like Luther does)—many 
might like to see such a disputation or debate, but such an event never actually took place 
and reading something that is written as if it did can be disconcerting to the reader. For 
some reason, Dieter cites Aristotle in German, instead of the more authoritative Greek or 
Latin, and when Dieter cites Luther, as he naturally does often, he seldom satisfactorily 
identifies the work and its date. Moreover, Dieter’s limiting his focus to Luther’s early 
years (up to 1518) is also not without its problems. The year 1517 may indeed have been 
the highpoint of Luther’s attacks on Aristotle, but Luther continued to refer to Aristotle, 
to use philosophy, and to debate the philosophers throughout his life. Furthermore, 
Luther did not himself, nor did those who followed him, regard all of his writings as 
                                                 
120 Markus Mühling-Schlapkohl, “Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 5.1 (2003); Ulrich Kühn, “Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: 
eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie,” Theologische 
Literaturzeitung 128.5 (2003); Richard Penaskovic, “Der junge Luther und Aristoteles,” Heythrop Journal 
45.3 (2004); Hellmut Zschoch, “Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: eine historisch-systematische 
Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie,” Journal of Theological Studies 55.2 (2004). 
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equally valuable or indicative of his thought, although Dieter does at times quote from 
those writings of Luther’s, such as the Large Catechism, given confessional standing in 
The Book of Concord.  
 Across his career and its various writings, Luther thus generally repudiated but 
simultaneously used philosophy in some form, likely rejecting the philosophy that 
worked against his position taken on the basis of the Bible and using that which 
supported it. Is Luther the only practitioner in his tradition to approach philosophy and 
theology this way? There is evidence of such a repudiating-using approach in at least one 
strain of more-modern Lutheranism,121 but what of others at the time of the Reformation? 
How does one begin to select works that are more-reliable indicators of the approach of 
those other than the works’ author, to the extent even those are reliable indicators? And, 
can one move beyond the somewhat superficial evidence, namely mentions and citations 
of a philosopher and his works, for philosophy is part of theology at a much deeper level 
and one more difficult to detect.122 That this dissertation has a methodology to address 
these issues will be seen in due time, but next attention is given to the second aspect of 
the main research question. 
Continuity of late-medieval period with Reformation period 
 The second question regards the continuity between the late-medieval period and 
the Reformation period. Much of modern scholarship’s acceptance of the notion of at 
least some continuity between at least some period before the Reformation and the period 
after the Reformation can be attributed to the late Heiko Oberman’s lifetime of work. 
Oberman’s insightful and scholarly publications extend from his seminal 1963 work, The 
                                                 
121 Francis Pieper’s standard seminary textbook, Francis Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 4 vols. (St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1924-1928), translated as Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, trans. 
Theodore et al. Engelder, 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950-1953), can both condemn 
philosophy as leading to a religion “diametrically opposed” (diametralen Gegensatz) to the Christian 
religion (I:17; German 18) and praise philosophy in its place (I:199-200; German 240-241). 
122 Diogenes Allen goes so far as to suggest that theology, as a discipline, is inherently 
philosophical due to its Hellenic influence [Diogenes Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology 
(Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985], 5-6). 
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Harvest of Medieval Theology,123 to its 1977 sequel, translated into English as The 
Masters of The Reformation,124 to what might be regarded as the third volume in the 
series, his 1989 biography of Martin Luther, translated into English as Luther: Man 
Between God and the Devil,125 and to dozens of other articles, essays, chapters and other 
books.126 Oberman both confirmed Luther’s continuity with his medieval predecessors 
and declared the discontinuity that set Luther apart.127 As much as Oberman argues for 
continuity, he, too, might have disagreed with Levi’s statement regarding no historical 
discontinuities.128 Scott Hendrix refers to Oberman’s Luther as “re-forming” the 
preceding tradition and in the process making something new.129 
 Tracing continuity or discontinuity of thought was not something new with 
Oberman, although Oberman is up-front about his own “break” with some preceding 
scholarship, such as that of Étienne Gilson.130 Gilson’s 1931-1932 Gifford Lectures at the 
University of Aberdeen, for example, which were published and translated into English 
as The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, traced Christian philosophical thought from its 
roots in the Greek tradition forward, primarily to the time of Thomas Aquinas in the 13th 
                                                 
123 Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval 
Nominalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
124 Heiko A. Oberman, Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate 
in Europe, trans. Dennis Martin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
125 Oberman, Luther. Peter Blickle reportedly said that Oberman’s Luther was one of the 20th 
century’s most original contributions to understanding the Reformer (G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes, “The 
Life of Heiko Augustinus Oberman,” The Work of Heiko A. Oberman: Papers from the Symposium on His 
Seventieth Birthday, eds. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn and James D. 
Tracy [Boston: Brill, 2003], 200).  
126 See Oberman’s bibliography in Robert J. Bast and Andrew C. Gow, eds., Continuity and 
Change: The Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History: Essays Presented to Heiko A. Oberman 
on his 70th Birthday (Boston: Brill, 2000), 431-446. 
127 A characterization shared by Scott Hendrix, “‘More than a Prophet’: Martin Luther in the Work 
of Heiko Oberman,” The Work of Heiko A. Oberman: Papers from the Symposium on His Seventieth 
Birthday, eds. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn and James D. Tracy (Boston: 
Brill, 2003), 12. 
128 See above at n.106, p.38. 
129 Hendrix, “More than a Prophet,” 13-14. 
130 See, for example, Oberman’s “Preface to the Third Edition” of Harvest (Oberman, Harvest of 
Medieval Theology, vii ). 
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century.131 Where The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy was topical, History of Christian 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages,132 another significant Gilson work, was more historical 
and chronological in approach, treating writers and thinkers of Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism, beginning with the second century after Christ and continuing up through 
Nicholas of Cues (1401-1464). Gilson sees what he calls Christian philosophy133 to have 
blossomed with Aquinas but declined thereafter. Oberman to some extent took issue with 
the view of Gilson and others that medieval philosophy culminated in the High Middle 
Ages, and Oberman essentially worked from that time period forward. Yet, they both 
picked loci, or specific topics, on which to consider the continuity or discontinuity. For 
example, Gilson’s Spirit traced thoughts on such topics as being, providence, and free-
will. Oberman’s Harvest traced thoughts on such topics as humanity, predestination, and 
Christ and the Eucharist. Nevertheless, neither saw himself as doing “theological” 
studies; rather their investigations wereprimarily philosophical and historical, 
respectively.134 
 Neither Oberman’s nor Gilson’s works are without their critics. For example, 
Oberman’s Harvest was first published in 1962; twelve years later Denis Janz in his 
Master’s thesis discussed critical reaction to Oberman’s work.135 Although a truly tertiary 
                                                 
131 Étienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (Gifford Lectures 1931-1932), trans. A. H. 
C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940). 
132 Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy. 
133 James Keating alludes to the debate over whether such a thing as “Christian philosophy” exists, 
but Keating is more concerned about Gilson’s “more radical” thesis of there being “the Christian God of 
philosophy as well as of revealed theology”. Keating refers more to Étienne Gilson, Elements of Christian 
Philosophy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Catholic Textbook Division, 1960) and Étienne Gilson, God and 
Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), and Keating uses Gilson’s own evidence to 
ultimately reject Gilson’s notion of such a god. (John W. Keating, “The Christian God of Philosophy,” The 
Harvard Theological Review 58.4 [1965].) 
134 At least not explicitly theological—Oberman passed examinations for and was ordained by his 
father into the ministry of the Dutch Reformed church (see, for example, Posthumus Meyjes, “The Life of 
Heiko Augustinus Oberman,” 196-197). In a review of a collection of Oberman’s essays published 
posthumously, Mattox writes of one particular essay, “Here, too, one perceives most clearly the 
interconnections between Oberman’s legendary passion for history and his perhaps less well known 
commitments to his faith tradition” (Mickey L. Mattox, “The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last 
Days to the New World,” Sixteenth Century Journal XXXVI.1 [2006]). 
135 Denis Janz, “Semipelagianism and the Catholicity of Nominalism: A Critical Reaction to Heiko 
Oberman's ‘Harvest of Medieval Theology’,” University of St. Michael’s College, 1975. 
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work and now woefully out of date, still today Janz’s introduction helpfully sets the stage 
before and immediately after Oberman’s seminal work, especially pertaining to the semi-
pelagianism of the central figure of Harvest’s analysis, that is, Gabriel Biel.136 (Strictly 
speaking, semi-pelagianism refers to the position between the diametrically opposed 
teachings of Augustine and Pelagius regarding the role of the human will in salvation, 
although the term came to be used to refer to positions taken in the 16th century that some 
modern scholars are careful to distinguish from the earlier semi-pelagian teachings.137) 
With an eye to how modern ecumenism and one’s view of the Reformation might 
condition one’s interpretation of the late medieval period, Janz describes how Oberman 
concludes Biel was semi-pelagian but nevertheless also concludes that Biel and much of 
the nominalism that precedes him are “basically Catholic”. Janz’s research found scholars 
reacting to Oberman in one of three ways: some agreed both that Biel was semi-pelagian 
and that he was Catholic, others agreed that Biel was semi-pelagian but disagreed that he 
could then be Catholic, and still others disagreed that Biel was semi-pelagian and agreed 
that he was Catholic.138 In treating the positions of other scholars, Janz highlights critical 
weaknesses in Oberman’s work, such as Oberman’s lack of commonly accepted 
definitions of both semi-pelagianism and Catholicity.139 For his part, Janz concludes that 
since Biel was not catholic on justification, the very locus at which the Reformation 
centered, “to say that Biel was ‘basically Catholic’ is beside the point. Though 
Oberman’s judgement on this may be technically correct, we must conclude that it is, 
nevertheless, historically irrelevant.”140 Janz nevertheless recognizes the significance of 
                                                 
136 Janz, “Critical Reaction,” 1-4. 
137 “Semipelagianism”, Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 1481. 
138 When putting Hermann Sasse in the category of those who agree with Oberman, Janz, perhaps 
due to the journal publishing Sasse’s review, curiously describes the Lutheran as a scholar “from the 
reformed tradition” (Janz, “Critical Reaction,” 25). 
139 See, for example, where Janz deals with the work of his own thesis director, Henry McSorley 
(Janz, “Critical Reaction,” 49-53) and the related subsections in Janz’s final chapter (Janz, “Critical 
Reaction,” 71-83).  
140 Janz, “Critical Reaction,” 82. Janz indicates that he is following McSorley in this regard. 
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Oberman’s work and that in some regards, at least at the point in time at which Janz was 
writing, the verdict was still out.141 
 Oberman continued to assess the claims he made in Harvest,142 and to some 
extent he moved beyond Biel to Luther and the Reformation, although the studies were 
not unrelated. Like others among his contemporaries, Oberman found that the usual 
picture of the medieval period grossly simplified the way the evidence indicates things 
actually were. For example, in a 1974 essay titled “Headwaters of the Reformation”, 
Oberman distinguished between the initia Lutheri (“Luther’s beginnings”) and the initia 
reformationis (“beginning of the Reformation”), and Oberman intentionally avoided 
speaking of causes of the Reformation and instead wrote of cross currents and converging 
tributaries. He referred to nominalism, humanism, and Augustinianism “as currents 
within the history of the Reformation,” but was careful to clarify each in terms of what 
earlier scholarship had said about them. And, Oberman did not stop with those three, but 
took note of other factors such as the devotio moderna (“modern devotion”), late 
medieval mysticism, and the reemergence of apocalyptics.143 There’s little surprise that a 
1975 essay, “Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile”, took up those 
factors as well as three other aspects of the medieval context, which factors Oberman 
called “The Myth of the Thomist Phalanx”, “The Augustinian Renaissance”, and “The 
                                                 
141 If Biel is semi-pelagian, he may not necessarily be the one who initially contaminates the pure 
line of doctrinal transmission. One might say that there was a “creeping pelagianism” and that someone like 
Scotus was “three-quarters” Pelagian. 
142 For a listing of just some of Oberman’s reassessments, see Courtenay, “Fruits of the Harvest,” 
135 n.3; Courtenay points out there that many of the essays were reprinted in Heiko A. Oberman, The 
Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992). In a review of Heiko A. Oberman, The Two 
Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World [ed. Donald Weinstein (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2003)], Mattox comments, “Oberman not only restates and defends some of his 
most controversial claims (e.g., the via Gregorii), but also buttresses them with new and noteworthy 
supporting argumentation. Any who may have been hoping for retractions will be sadly disappointed.” 
(Mattox, “The Two Reformations,” 316.) 
143 Heiko A. Oberman, “Headwaters of the Reformation: Initia Lutheri - Initia Reformationis,” 
The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992). 
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Franciscan Hegemony”.144 Oberman concluded that essay with statements such as the 
following. 
The historian must respect this plurality of phenomena and trends and 
withstand the temptation to present a coherent pattern. It is clear, however, 
that fourteenth-century thought can no longer be described only in terms 
of philosophy and academic theology, as we have been inclined to do. Lay 
thought and lay piety now begin to occupy the center of the stage.145 
By the end of Oberman’s career, in what is arguably his last essay (one published 
posthumously), philosophy was reduced to one of four scenes on a distant “backdrop” for 
the Reformation “breakthrough”. In that essay one can say Oberman seems to have 
settled on “four basic co-ordinates” for “Luther’s platform”: Scripture as an authoritative 
communication from God, the pactum (or “covenant”) as God’s promise founding 
salvation through the sacraments, Luther’s perspective that the end was near as an 
imminent eschatology, and the via moderna (or “modern way”) of his intellectual 
upbringing, even if that via moderna was not as monolithic as it once was thought to 
be.146 
 The foregoing is merely a summary, and that of only a few of Oberman’s works, 
and of his works only as a chief representative of modern scholarship familiar with that 
which has gone before. Nevertheless, the work of Oberman and others like him faces 
some of the same drawbacks that were discussed above in terms of the first question, the 
question of the repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy. In looking for the use of 
philosophy in any of Luther’s writings, researchers limit themselves to only one—albeit 
the leading—reformer and make no distinction among his writings, as he himself or 
others after him made. Such limitations are also seen regarding the research pertaining to 
the third and final question, that of continuity between the earlier and later Reformers. 
                                                 
144 Heiko A. Oberman, “Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile,” The Dawn 
of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992). The paper was originally given at the Fiftieth Anniversary Meeting 
of the Medieval Academy of America on April 18, 1975, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
145 Oberman, “Premature Profile,” 16. 
146 Oberman, “Philosophical Backdrop.” 
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Continuity between Reformers and the next generation 
 The third question, then, is a consideration of continuity between the initial 
Reformers and the next generation. Luther was not the only proponent of the theology of 
the Reformation—there were converts to the Lutheran cause among the humanists and 
clergy, and there were others educated in the Lutheran mold all along. Wittenberg 
University especially had a significant impact on the pastors entering the field in the early 
days of the Reformation, equipping them with skills for properly interpreting Scripture 
and communicating its message.147 Smaller parishes and villages would temporarily put 
up with a Notprediger (or “emergency pastor”) while waiting for a highly-trained pastor, 
and the university did not rush pastors into the field with some lesser, alternate training. 
The highly educated clergy was important and desired. 148 (Of course, research done by 
scholars such as Bruce Tolley considers the problems of highly-educated clergy dealing 
with lesser-educated laity.149) 
 In the later sixteenth century, Aristotle—although a fundamentally different 
Aristotle—continued to be taught, with some ongoing struggle between theology and 
philosophy.150 It is said that the Lutheran blend of humanism and scholasticism 
“confessionalized” Aristotle, or put another way, “integrated [him] into the larger task of 
formulating the new … doctrine and communicating it to the faithful.”151 Still, 
philosophy needed to be kept—and was kept, in most cases—to a ministerial role in 
                                                 
147 Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 10, 20, 32. While Schwiebert says the 
Reformation-trained pastors “knew Biblical teaching on the basis of their own private investigations” 
(Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 32.), this should not be understood in some 
subjective way as if the interpretation was private or unique to themselves and not normed by the regula 
fide. 
148 Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 32; Rosin, “Wittenberg Model for 
Reform,” 311, 313. 
149 Bruce Tolley, Pastors & Parishioners in Würtemberg During the Late Reformation, 1581-1621 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 41-42, for example. 
150 Freedman, “Aristotelianism and Humanism,” 217-218, 219, 220-221; James M. Kittelson, 
“Humanism in the Theological Faculties of Lutheran Universities during the Late Reformation,” The 
harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer (St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 151-153; Schmitt, “Philosophy and Science,” 510. 
151 Ozment, The Age of Reform, 316. Confer Rosin, “Wittenberg Model for Reform,” 301; 




theology.152 Philosophy served as a “necessary part of understanding and expounding the 
Scriptures and refuting heretics.”153 Especially Aristotle’s categories were used in the 
theology of the later sixteenth century, though neither on every locus nor by every 
user.154 The doctrine of God is a good and relevant example of a locus where the 
categories were used and arguably used appropriately. Speaking of the one Being 
(essence or substance) of God preserves the unity of the Trinity, but speaking of three 
distinct Persons preserves its tripartite nature. Such terminology was used already about 
380, and, without understanding Aristotle’s terminology, one can think such terminology 
is—at best—unclear (if not heretical).155 It is hard to imagine what theology would be 
like without the availability and use of philosophical terminology and distinctions. 
Another example illustrates the importance of Aristotle further. In his Categories, 
Aristotle distinguishes between individual primary substances, say “that piece (of 
bread)”, and its accidental qualities, say “beige”. Asking: “What is it?” and answering 
“bread”, identifies its substance. Asking: “What is it?” and answering “beige”, however, 
identifies one of its accidents (attributes such as quantity, quality, place, and the like). In 
general, one can predicate substances with or without specific accidents, but one cannot 
predicate accidents without the substances to which they belong: accidents by nature are 
in something.156 The third and final reseach question, then, is to what extent philosophical 
                                                 
152 A litmus test of sorts would be one’s commentary on Colossians 2:8, which gave occasion for 
criticism of “philosophy.” Most Lutherans of the era would not just criticize but also give “a defense of the 
proper role of learning and the study of the disciplines” (Robert Kolb, “Philipp's Foes, but Followers 
Nonetheless: Late Humanism among the Gnesio-Lutherans,” The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: 
Essays in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1992], 160). Confer the discussion of Colossians 2:8 above, beginning on p.9. 
153 Kolb, “Philipp's Foes,” 161. 
154 Kolb, “Philipp's Foes,” 162-163, 168; Robert Kolb, “Dynamics of Party Conflict in the Saxon 
Late Reformation: Gnesio-Lutherans vs. Philippists,” The Journal of Modern History 49 (1977): D1296, 
D1303-D1304; Kusukawa, Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 204-205; Kittelson, “Humanism in the 
Theological Faculties,” 143-144; Manfred P. Fleischer, “Humanism and Reformation in Silesia: Imprints of 
Italy—Celtis, Erasmus, Luther, and Melanchthon,” The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays in 
Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 71-72. 
155 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 96ff.  
156 Categories 4-5, 1b25-2a33, Terence Irwin and Gail Fine, Aristotle: Selections (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 3-5. Confer 606-607, 616-617. Confer also Jonathan Barnes, ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55-57, 79-81; 
Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction 64-67; Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology 93-96; 
 
52 
terminology and concepts are prevalent in the later sixteenth century and whether the 
later Reformers’ use of philosophy and Aristotle in that way is consistent with the use of 
the Reformers earlier in the sixteenth century. 
 What may be one of the most recent comparisons of earlier and later Reformers is 
Robert Kolb’s 2005 essay “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament: The 
Responsiones ad articulos Bavaricae inquisitionis as His Final Confession of Faith”.157 
Kolb draws on Bernhard Lohse to identify four areas in which some of Melanchthon’s—
and no doubt in some cases also Luther’s—former students later criticized Melanchthon, 
their former praeceptor (“teacher”)158: allowing some adiaphora (“matters of 
indifference”) that others felt compromised the Gospel, emphasizing good works in such 
a way as to at best obscure the teaching of grace and at worst teach works righteousness, 
teaching about the human will so that some understood Melanchthon to give human 
action partial credit for salvation, and expressing his teaching on the Lord’s Supper so 
that some thought he no longer confessed the real, physical presence of Christ in the 
Sacrament.159 Kolb examined Melanchthon’s last theological testament on these matters 
and essentially concluded that, especially pertaining to justification by faith in Christ and 
the comfort of consciences, “the underlying structure and the dynamic core of his 
doctrine remained much the same as they had been at Augsburg when he composed the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 150. Thomas discusses at length the application of these categories to 
the Eucharist (Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 150-152). 
 Hereafter this dissertation generally refers to Aristotle’s works with the conventional abbreviations 
of the Liddell-Jones-Scott Lexicon, as found in G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) xiii. (Confer and compare the lists in Barnes, ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle xxiii-xxv.) The abbreviations for works of Aristotle referenced in 
this dissertation are included in the List of Abbreviations on pp.xiii-xiv. Usually following the 
abbreviations one will find a book number in Roman numerals, a chapter number in Arabic numerals, and a 
specified page number, column letter, and line number from Immanuel Bekker’s standard edition of the 
Greek text, which numbering scheme is generally used by all subsequent standard editions. 
157 Robert Kolb, “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament: The Responsiones ad 
articulos Bavaricae inquisitionis as His Final Confession of Faith,” Sixteenth Century Journal XXXVI.1 
(2005). 
158 On the title, Kolb refers to the announcement of Melanchthon’s death on April 19, 1560, in CR, 
9:1100 (Bernhard Lohse, “Innerprotestantische Lehrstreitigkeiten,” Handbuch der Dogmen- und 
Theologiegeschichte, vol. 3 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988] 99 n.6). 
159 Kolb, “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament,” 97 n.1. Kolb refers to Lohse, 
“Innerprotestantische Lehrstreitigkeiten,” 2:102-138. 
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Augsburg Confession”.160 Yet, especially pertaining to human involvement in salvation 
and the presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper, Kolb recognized that Melanchthon’s 
students in the Formula of Concord interpreted the Augsburg Confession differently than 
did Melanchthon himself in his Responsiones.161  
 These four controversies Kolb addressed are among those that precipitated the 
Formula of Concord, and, while none are explicitly philosophical in nature, at least 
several arguably touch on philosophy at some level, whether sub-sentential, sentential, or 
supra-sentential. In that most recent work, Kolb did not consider the use of philosophy 
and whether such might be behind the different teacher’s and students’ differing 
interpretations of the Augsburg Confession. Moreover, Kolb himself recognizes that the 
Responsiones’ limited “influence and significance”. To be sure, Melanchthon’s own 
statements regarding his and his students’ positions are bound to be biased, and even an 
relatively objective assessment of the Responsiones in comparison to Melanchthon’s 
earlier writings are indeed limited in what they can tell about the positions of others, even 
relative to this work of lesser significance. There would seem to be a need for a better 
way of answering the third and final research question, as well as the preceding two.162 
Exploration and hypothesis development 
 Having considered the three sub-questions or aspects of the larger question 
regarding both continuity and discontinuity, this subsection now summarizes this author’s 
own work, prior to this dissertation, looking for answers to the questions within The Book 
of Concord, especially as that work pertains to the development of a hypothesis for this 
                                                 
160 Kolb, “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament,” 103. 
161 Kolb, “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament,” 114. 
162 For more on philosophy and theology after the immediate events of the Reformation see 
Fowler, “Faith and Reason,” 61-85. 
 Kusukawa, in her more recent essay on Jacob Schegk, a professor of philosophy in Tübingen who 
worked alongside Andreä and Brenz, describes how Schegk saw dialectics as a way of distinguishing false 
and true arguments, how he distinguished between dianoia and the Mind, and how that distinction resulted 
in him holding to a difference between hypothetical and non-hypothetical principles as to their respective 
degrees of certainty. In this way, Schegk kept philosophy from establishing theological principles, but he 
also saw a necessary role for dialectics in preventing theologial heresies. (Kusukawa, “Uses of Philosophy 
in Reformation Thought,” 148-152.) 
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dissertation’s research. (The particular justification for using The Book of Concord as 
source material will be detailed below, and further introduction to the writings contained 
in The Book of Concord is also found below.163) 
 In terms of the first research question, that of the repudiation but simultaneous use 
of philosophy, a casual reading indicates some second-order repudiation of philosophy in 
the works of both the earlier and later Reformers. (The detailed evidence regarding 
second-order “philosophy” is included later in this chapter.164) A casual reading also 
indicates some second-order use of philosophy, but more telling is the close reading for 
the first order use that was undertaken with more of a view to the second and third 
research questions. 
 In terms of second research question, that of continuity or discontinuity between 
the period before and the period after the Reformation, preliminary results, in keeping 
with earlier scholarship, suggested evidence of both. On the side of continuity are two 
specific loci: the Trinity and the real, physical presence of Jesus Christ in the bread and 
wine of the Lord’s Supper. In these cases, the confessors use the same philosophical 
content and terminology that the church had used for centuries. 165 Also on the side of 
continuity, although perhaps with somewhat of a caveat, is The Book of Concord’s use of 
the concept of four-causes drawn from Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, which 
terminology and distinctions are used when discussing the causes of sin, election, and 
conversion.166 On the side of discontinuity, is the locus of justification (how people stand 
righteous before God). In this case, philosophical terminology is not so much in use, and 
                                                 
163 The justification for the source material is found beginning on p.59, and the background on the 
writings contained in The Book of Concord begins on p.60. 
164 See below, beginning on p.79. 
165 See Jayson S. Galler, “The University of Wittenberg: Where German Studies Meets History, 
Philosophy, and Theology,” The 5th Annual German Studies Graduate Student Conference (University of 
Wisconsin-Madison: 2003), 16pp.; Jayson S. Galler, “The Lutheran Confessions: A Break with Medieval 
Philosophy?” (University of Texas at Austin, 2003), 30pp. 
166 See Jayson S. Galler, “Aristotle’s Causes and Their Theological Use,” (University of Texas at 
Austin, 2004), 10pp. Not considered for that analysis was Lowell C. Green’s suggestion that, at least in the 
case of conversion, the terminology is not used in the same way as the previous tradition (Lowell C. Green, 
“The Three Causes of Conversion in Philipp Melanchthon, Martin Chemnitz, David Chytraeus, and the 
‘Formula of Concord’,” Lutherjahrbuch 47 [1980]). 
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the Lutherans specifically reject philosophical content—the notions of human ability to 
be righteous before God or even to please God in any way apart from faith.167 Arguably 
what discontinuity was found with the immediately preceding medieval tradition may not 
have been discontinuous with an earlier philosophical tradition.168 
 In terms of the third research question, that of continuity between the original 
Reformers and those of the next generation, the initial investigation into the use of 
philosophy related to the Trinity, the Lord’s Supper, and causes yielded no significant 
observable differences between the writings of the earlier and later Reformers. 
 The initial investigation led to the some preliminary conclusions. Despite some 
second-order repudiation, there is both second and first-order use of philosophy in The 
Book of Concord, and the use appears to be continuous between the Reformers and their 
successors. Where there is discontinuity with the immediately preceding tradition, the 
possibility remains that such usage is continuous with an earlier tradition. As for the 
reason for the break with the immediately preceding tradition (to the extent there was a 
break), a preliminary hypothesis was as follows:  
Philosophical terminology and concepts are not a problem for either the 
authors of the earlier documents or the authors of the later ones contained 
in The Book of Concord; rather, the problem with philosophy and 
philosophers seems to arise where the content of their teaching directly 
contradicts how the authors understood God’s revelation in the Bible. 
More research was needed to fully consider whether the preliminary hypothesis would 
hold true. 
                                                 
167 See Galler, “Break with Medieval Philosophy?” See also “The Vocabulary of Justification” in 
Martin Chemnitz, Justification: The Chief Article of Christian Doctrine as Expounded in Loci Theologici, 
trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1985), 61-77. 
168 In other words, the philosophical element being rejected might well be a later accretion. Under 
this view, earlier theologians incorporating philosophical content into their theology would be the ones 
making something new, not the Reformers who break with that preceding tradition to return to an earlier 
one—returning “to a primitive excellence” in the words of The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church’s definition of “reformation” (see above at n.105, p.37). 
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 Although an examination of The Book of Concord could be conducted locus by 
locus as the preliminary investigation was,169 a complete examination of the use of 
philosophy in The Book of Concord would in the end consider three different levels of 
first-order philosophical use: sub-sentential, sentential, and supra-sentential.170 
Terminology and concepts are used on what can be called a sub-sentential level. 
Philosophical terminology includes terms such as “substance” or “accident”, and 
concepts include such things as the four different causes (that is, material, formal, 
efficient, and final). Content and theses are used on what can be termed a sentential level 
and include, for example, the principle that a human being is oriented towards the highest 
good. Method of argumentation and organization can be regarded as a supra-sentential 
level and includes, for example, deductive argumentation and the loci method of 
organization. 
 As there had been no initial investigation into the supra-sentential use of 
philosophy in The Book of Concord, research for this dissertation began there, and to 
some extent it ended there. Once that phase of the work reached a point nearing 
completion, its magnitude and unexpected discoveries were deemed sufficient for the 
dissertation. Although the decision to narrow the scope primarily to the supra-sentential 
use of philosophy to some extent left the dissertation unable to fully consider the 
preliminary hypothesis, the dissertation’s findings shed light on the preliminary 
hypothesis, especially as revised into a working hypothesis that concentrates on the 
supra-sentential aspects of philosophy’s use and the research questions.  
Despite a second-order repudiation of philoshopy, logic and philosophical 
argumentation are not a problem for either the authors of the earlier 
documents or the authors of the later documents contained in The Book of 
Concord; rather, consistent with the preceding medieval tradition, the 
problem with philosophy and philosophers seems to arise where the use of 
                                                 
169 For examples, the locus of the two natures personally united in Christ includes philosophical 
terminology and concepts, and loci such as original sin, free will, and predestination include philosophical 
content. 
170 These three levels follow the usual divisions of Aristotle’s logical treatises (known collectively 
as the Organon, “tool” or “instrument” of thought): Categoriae as sub-sentential, de Interpretatione as 
sentential, and Analytica Priora and Analytica Posteriora as supra-sentential. 
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such methods directly contradicts how the authors understood God’s 
revelation in the Bible. 
The future will undoubtedly hold plenty of opportunities to consider fully the original 
preliminary hypothesis’ merits as it pertained to the sub-sentential and sentential uses of 
philosophy. 
Scope and Limitations 
 Having considered the relevant research questions, the work that led to the 
development of a hypothesis, and considerations that resulted in the dissertation’s more 
limited focus on the supra-sentential use of philosophy, this fourth subsection of the 
introductory chapter more clearly specifies the scope and limitations of this dissertation’s 
research. 
 The dissertation considers the supra-sentential use of philosophy in the works 
contained in The Book of Concord and what answers whatever use is found might suggest 
to the three different aspects of the primary research question discussed above: 
repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, continuity between the medieval and 
Reformation periods, and continuity between the earlier and later Reformers. In this 
context, the supra-sentential use of philosophy means logic and argumentation, and 
specific aspects considered are metalogical opinions and practices (such as the first-order 
regard for logic and the use of  [“places”] as an organizational tool), inductive 
argumentation, deductive argumentation, and what amounts to a case study in the use of 
such logic and argumentation, namely the theological distinction between justification 
and sanctification that is thoroughly philosophical in nature but nevertheless a product of 
philosophy in the ministerial or handmaiden role. 
 While essentially limited to the supra-sentential use of philosophy in the forms of 
logic and argumentation, the dissertation nevertheless touches on the sub-sentential and 
sentential uses of philosophy. For example, the nature of the close-reading methodology 
outlined below produces a focus on words and terms as indicators of an application of 
philosophy bigger than the words themselves. 
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 There are a number of things that this dissertation does not encompass. As 
indicated, a full survey of the sub-sentential and sentential uses of philosophy in The 
Book of Concord is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, the dissertation is 
not a theological inquiry, nor is the dissertation specifically an investigation as would 
occur in the philosophy of religion school of thought (that is, into the theory of religious 
belief). Moreover, somewhat unlike the work of Gilson, Oberman, and other scholars, the 
dissertation does not aim to find theological precedents for the positions taken in the 
writings of The Book of Concord, nor does it find each and every philosophical 
precedent. Instead, the methodology is sufficient to consider the supra-sentential uses of 
philosophy and with that information consider potential answers to the three sub-
questions. 
Methodology 
 For its consideration of the three sub-questions in light of the supra-sentential use 
of philosophy, this dissertation uses a close reading The Book of Concord. This fifth 
subsection of the introductory chapter thus provides additional details on this 
methodology and discusses the justification of the methodology and the source material 
as they relate to advantages over the approaches of previous research. 
 First, then, are the additional details on this close-reading methodology. Although 
the text of The Book of Concord is not examined in isolation and although other specific 
analytical techniques outlined by practioners such as Ivor Armstrong Richards in his 
1929 Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment are also not strictly followed, the 
text is given a requisite “detailed, balanced and rigorous critical examination”.171 The 
work as a whole is certainly considered, but appropriate emphasis is often placed on 
particular passages and words. This dissertation’s methodology is not the imposition of 
higher forms of literary criticism on the text but rather a recognition that such literary 
criticism has its roots in both ancient Biblical exegesis and in the classical and 
renaissance rhetoric that were part of the milieu in which The Book of Concord 
                                                 
171 John A. Cuddon, “close reading,” The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary 
Theory, Fourth ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 142. 
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documents themselves were born. Searches for specific words in the Latin or German 
versions of The Book of Concord’s works were conducted with the aid of the search 
engine in the Libronix Digital Library System as applied to the German and Latin text of 
the Concordia Triglotta.172 Results include data of the second order (where “philosophy”, 
“philosophers”, etc. are discussed) and of the first order (where “philosophy” itself is not 
mentioned but its logic and argumentation are clearly in play). The Book of Concord and 
its supra-sentential use of philosophy thereby serve as source material for considering the 
repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, the continuity between the medieval and 
Reformation traditions, and the continuity of the original Reformers and the next 
generation. 
 Second is the justification of the methodology and the source material as they 
relate to advantages over the approaches of previous research. As noted above, previous 
studies that examine an author’s works for mentions of a philosopher or his works result 
in a superficial analysis of the use of philosophy.173 In comparison to previous studies, 
the close reading conducted for this dissertation was much more sensitive to contextual 
and verbal indicators that philosophical logical and argumentation were in use in The 
Book of Concord. And, the interdisciplinary approach can interpret the data in a broader 
context than a strictly philosophical or strictly theological approach could alone. Where 
previous studies of authors such as Luther either considered only an arbitrarily selected 
handful of the author’s works (or an indiscriminately larger number), authors such as 
Luther did not always regard their works equally,174 and even then the works considered 
arguably represent only the author’s position. Luther was but one figure—albeit a 
significant figure —in the Reformation that usually bears his name. To see the continuity 
or discontinuity between the periods before the Lutheran Reformation and the period 
                                                 
172 “Libronix Digital Library System.” Confer the Triglotta. 
173 Even White concludes his significant work on Luther by noting that few have looked at the 
logical methods Luther used in order to find out his attitude to logic (White, Luther as Nominalist, 346). 
174 In Luther’s 1545 Preface to a published collection of his Latin works, Luther not only wrote 
how he wished his books were “buried in perpetual oblivion” (adductus cupiebam omnes libros meos 
perpetua oblivione sepultos), but he also suggested to the readers that in his earlier writings he took 
positions he might not have taken later in life (AE 34:327-328, translated by Lewis W. Spitz, Sr.; Aland 
#753; WA 54:179-180). 
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after for more than just Luther, one looks elsewhere than to just the corpus of Luther’s 
writings, such as to a collection of writings, including some of Luther’s, that were not 
only widely accepted but also given authority and thus arguably are representative of the 
whole movement. To examine a collection of works such as those found in The Book of 
Concord is to examine a limited number of carefully selected works that represent more 
than the authors’ positions. The Book of Concord is at least intended as non-contradictory 
commentary on the Augsburg Confession175—presented in 1530 at the emperor’s request 
by the electors, princes, and estates and regarded as the preeminent of the Lutheran 
confessions—and received widespread acceptance and authority.176 Moreover, where a 
vast survey encounters the variability of many different topics being addressed, closer 
readings comparing the same, specific topics are more beneficial. Furthermore, the 
authors in question produced works of various natures under different circumstances and 
for different purposes. Examining treatments of the topics contained in The Book of 
Concord is worthwhile because those works were recognized to have similar natures, as 
evidenced by their broader acceptance and confessional status (that is, normative force) 
among Lutherans. The additional background on The Book of Concord, to which 
attention is given in the next subsection, illuminates the foregoing matters. 
The Book of Concord 
 This sixth subsection gives necessary background on The Book of Concord, 
including information about the various works it contains and their authors, as well as 
discussing those authors’ regard for philosophy and reason as evidenced in The Book of 
Concord. 
                                                 
175 See, for example, the Preface to The Book of Concord, Tappert, 5, 8; BKS, 5, 9-10. 
176 For example, the Augsburg Confession had been signed by eight princes and representatives of 
two free cities. The Smalcald Articles were subscribed to by theologians and adopted by Lutheran princes 
and estates. The Formula of Concord was signed by “the electors of Saxony, of Brandenburg, and of the 
Palatinate; furthermore by 20 dukes and princes, 24 counts, 4 barons, 35 imperial cities, and about 8,000 
pastors and teachers, embracing about two-thirds of the Lutheran territories in Germany.” (F. Bente, 
“Historical Introductions to the Book of Concord,” Concordia Triglotta (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1921), 22, 58, 247.  
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 The Book of Concord, sometimes also called “The Concordia”, like nearly all the 
individual writings or documents it collects into one work, arose out of a particular 
historical context. In the case of The Book of Concord, its historical context is 
inextricably tied to the Formula of Concord (the background of which is discussed 
below).177 At this point worth noting is that, although the printing process for the official 
German edition edited by Jacob Andreä was begun in 1578, the book was not formally 
presented and promulgated until June 25, 1580, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
presentation of one of the book’s chief works, the Augsburg Confession. As for the Latin 
translation of The Book of Concord, a little regarded work edited by Nikolaus Selnecker 
was published in 1580, but a more-widely accepted, revised Latin translation under the 
added supervision of Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586) was published in 1584.178 Also worth 
noting at the outset is that upon The Book of Concord’s publication in 1580, the 
collection served what historians call the gnesio (“genuine”) Lutherans as their 
confession on a number of theological loci, as the collection continues to do for genuine 
Lutherans even today. 
Documents included 
 Although The Book of Concord also contains the three Ecumenical creeds from 
the earliest centuries of the church, the bulk of its contents are documents written in Latin 
and German that for the most part span the years 1530-1580. Although they are not in 
                                                 
177 The Preface to the Book is more properly to the Formula (Henry E. Jacobs, “Historical 
Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” The Book of Concord: Or, the Symbolical Books of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church [Philadelphia: The General Council Press, 1908], II:61). 
178 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §2-3, pp.3-6. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:61-63. 
 In the case of each document included in The Book of Concord, the historical information given in 
the text is primarily drawn from Bente’s standard work, which, though dated and arguably somewhat 
biased against Melanchthon, remains a valuable source (regarding this assessment of Bente, confer Charles 
P. Arand, “The Apology as a Polemical Commentary,” Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) and the 
Commentary, eds. Timothy J. Wengert and M. Patrick Graham [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1997], 171 n.1). Also somewhat dated but worthwhile is Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, 
Appendixes and Indexes.” Other English translations of The Book of Concord have some brief introductory 
material (for example, Tappert and K-W), often drawn from the BKS, which arguably has the 
essential-up-to-date critical information. Some other relatively recent relevant resources will be mentioned 
where appropriate in notes. 
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The Book of Concord in strict chronological order, the documents quite easily classify as 
earlier and later. From the early 16th century, the documents are the Philip Melanchthon-
authored Augsburg Confession, its Apology, and their appendix-like Treatise on the 
Power and Primacy of the Pope; and the Martin Luther-authored Large and Small 
Catechisms and Smalcald Articles. The later 16th century documents are Jacob Andreä’s 
and Martin Chemnitz’s Epitome and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord. The 
table that follows (Table 1) provides an easy reference for the essential information about 
the Reformation-era works included in The Book of Concord.179 In the subsections that 
follow the table, each work is considered briefly in turn in order to provide necessary 
background for the analysis in the dissertation as a whole. 
Table 1: The Book of Concord Reformation-era contents 
Work (abbreviation) Date Author Authoritative Language “Translator” 
Augsburg Confession (AC) 1530 Philip Melanchthon German & Latin — 
Apology of the Augsburg 
Confession (Ap) 1531 Philip Melanchthon Latin 
Justus Jonas 
Philip Melanchthon 
Smalcald Articles (SA) 1537 Martin Luther German Nikolaus Selnecker 
Treatise on the Power and 
Primacy of the Pope (Tr) 1537 Philip Melanchthon Latin Veit Dietrich 
Small Catechism (SC) 1529 Martin Luther German Johannes Sauermann 
Large Catechsim (LC) 1529 Martin Luther German Vincent Obsopoeus Nikolaus Selnecker 
The Epitome of the Formula 





The Solid Declaration of the 
Formula of Concord (SD) 1577 
Jacob Andreä  
Martin Chemnitz 
David Chytraeus  









                                                 
179 Note that in general the Formula of Concord may be abbreviated “FC” and its “Rule and 
Norm” section “R&N”. 
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Three Ecumenical Creeds 
 As mentioned, The Book of Concord contains the three Ecumenical Creeds from 
the earliest centuries of the Christian church. In this context, “Ecumenical” means those 
symbols or confessions of faith that “at least in the past, have been accepted by all 
Christendom, and are still formally acknowledged by most of the evangelical 
Churches”.180 These creeds were included in The Book of Concord in order for the 
Reformers to confess the same faith that had always been confessed and to refute their 
opponents’ claim that the Reformers taught something new.181 While originally in Greek 
or Latin, in The Book of Concord those Ecumenical Creeds all appear, depending on the 
language of the edition, in either German or Latin. The following subsections give brief 
background on the three Ecumenical Creeds: the Apostolic (or “Apostles’”) Creed, the 
Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed.182 
Apostolic Creed 
 The Apostolic (or “Apostles’”) Creed is, at its core, the most ancient of the 
confessions of faith found in The Book of Concord. Connecting, as Jesus did, His 
teaching with Baptism in the Triune Name, the Apostolic Creed and its “I believe” 
( ; credo; Ich gläube) amplifies that Name primarily in connection with the 
individual who is being—or who has been—baptized. Thus, the Creed is not thought to 
have arisen out of a specifically polemical context. The contents of the person’s faith and 
the Creed have their origin in the teaching of the apostles, even as the popular tradition 
that each apostle contributed a phrase in the Creed has no biblical or early church 
support. Although there were various confessions of faith within the Bible itself and in 
the years immediately following the time of the New Testament, evidence dates to at 
least the eighth century C.E. the present form of the Apostolic Creed, although its roots 
                                                 
180 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §1, p.3. “Evangelical” here is used with the more-original 
sense meaning those churches centered on properly teaching the  (the Gospel), not with the 
sense of the word referring to the Lutheran-Reformed churches in Germany (synonymous with 
“Protestant”) or with the sense of the word referring to churches in America under the influence of the 
1800s’ revivalism or of the 1900s’ fundamentalism. 
181 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §8, p.9. 
182 On the Three Ecumenical Creeds, see also BKS, 11-15; Tappert, 17-18. 
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can be traced back at least as early as the third century C.E. Originally in Greek, the 
Apostolic Creed had been translated into German before Luther’s day, and, while he did 
render  (“catholic Church”) with christliche Kirche (“Christian 
Church”), that change in translation is found before his, and he considered the 
expressions to be equivalent.183 
Nicene Creed 
 Where the Apostolic Creed is today more connected with Baptism, the Nicene 
Creed (technically the “Niceno-Constantinopolitan” Creed), with its original Greek 
 (“We believe”), is in some sense more connected with the Sacrament of the 
Altar, although it, too, began as a baptismal creed. The Nicene Creed was adopted by the 
First Ecumenical Council at Nicea, a council called by the Emperor Constantine the Great 
in the year C.E. 325 to settle the controversy over the teaching of Arius of Alexandria 
(d.336), who denied that Jesus Christ was truly divine. The Council modified the 
confession of Eusebius into a clearly anti-Arian statement of faith and banished Arius and 
two Egyptian bishops who refused to sign the modified creed. Arianism continued, 
however, so Emperor Theodosius in C.E. 381 called the Second Ecumenical Council at 
Constantinople. Generally scholars hold that that Council gave the Creed its present form 
(affirmed by the councils of Ephesus in 431 and Chalcedon in 451), except for the 
insertion of the word(s) Filioque (“and the Son”) regarding the procession of the Holy 
Spirit, which insertion was made by a council in Toledo, Spain, according to some texts, 
in C.E. 589.184 
Athanasian Creed 
 With a name like “Athanasian Creed”, one would think that the Creed was the 
work of Athanasius, Greek bishop of Alexandria (d.373) known for his anti-Arianism at 
                                                 
183 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §9-13, pp.10-13. For the Latin and German, BKS, 21. See 
also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:14-19; K-W, 19-20. 
184 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §14-15, p.13. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:20-22; K-W, 20. The addition of Filioque became a chief point of 




the Council of Nicea, which is similarly expressed in this Creed, and for a long time 
people thought Athanasius indeed was the Creed’s author. This Creed, however, was not 
known except in Latin and until later. The Creed’s first Latin word Quicunque 
(“Whoever”), as with other elements of the historic liturgy, gives it another title by which 
it is known. Opinions regarding the dates and places of the Quicunque’s origin differ, but 
at least one opinion is that it originated in Southern Gaul around the fifth century C.E.185 
Where contemporary orders of Divine Service that use the ancient liturgy might use the 
Apostolic Creed or the Nicene Creed on any given Sunday, the Athanasian Creed, if used 
at all, is in the Lutheran tradition usually confessed only on Trinity Sunday, that is, 
depending on how one measures it, either the first Sunday after the feast of Pentecost or 
the eighth Sunday after Easter. 
Augsburg Confession 
 The first of the relevant “particular” creeds and Lutheran confessions186 is the 
Augsburg Confession of 1530, sometimes called the Augustana. More than twelve years 
after Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses in an effort to reform the Roman Catholic 
Church and arguably began religious turmoil in the Germanic lands, Emperor Charles V, 
who had previously made Luther an outlaw and banned his reform efforts, on January 21, 
1530, ordered an imperial diet (or assembly) to address a resolution of the religious 
division, apparently in order to better unite the country to deal with the threat of the 
Turks. (Previous diets had been held but produced ambiguous and mixed results.) The 
Emperor’s call prompted Elector John to commission Martin Luther, Justus Jonas, John 
Bugenhagen, and Philip Melanchthon to prepare a document that treated the division in 
terms of articles of doctrine and practice; later the scope was increased to include articles 
pertaining to heresies the Reformers were falsely accused of holding (demonstrating their 
                                                 
185 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §16, pp.13-14. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:22-24. 
186 Bente defines the particular symbols as those “adopted by the various denominations of divided 
Christendom” but is careful to write that, while they are “particular” in that sense, the Lutheran confessions 
nevertheless “are in complete agreement with Holy Scripture, and in this respect differ from all other 
particular symbols, the Lutheran confessions are truly ecumenical and catholic in character” (Bente, 
“Historical Introductions,” §1, p.3). 
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catholicity and distinguishing them from the Roman Catholics on the one hand and from 
other, more radical reformers on the other).187 The bulk of the work was completed by 
Melanchthon, although there had been earlier articles drawn up by others, including 
Luther, that served as Melanchthon’s “sources”.188 Once completed and signed by seven 
princes and those representing two free cities, the Confession was presented to the 
Emperor at Augsburg on June 25, 1530, in both German and Latin, the German being 
read aloud. The text of the Augsburg Confession, printed in 1531, is thus authoritative in 
both languages.189 
 As noted, the principal author of Augsburg Confession was Philip Melanchthon, 
and some background on him is useful, especially as he also authored the Apology of the 
Augsburg Confession and the Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope. Philip 
Melanchthon (1497-1560) was a grand-nephew of the German humanist Johannes 
Reuchlin (1455-1522), who perhaps is best known for generally defending Jewish 
literature in the Pfefferkorn affair that united German humanists. Reuchlin influenced his 
nephew in a number of different ways, including suggesting Philip change his last name 
from birth, Schwartzerd, German for “black earth” and indicative of his family’s heritage 
as blacksmiths and armorers, to the equivalent in Greek. Melanchthon at the age of 12 
entered Heidelberg University and received his bachelor’s degree at the age of 14. He 
then attended Tübingen, where at the age of 17 he earned his master’s degree and was 
part of the faculty for the following four years. At the age of 21, Melanchthon, at the 
urging of Reuchlin, went to the University of Wittenberg and was installed as professor 
of Greek in 1518. His inaugural address with its call for improving the educational 
system caused a stir, as did the theses he delivered the following year in connection with 
his Bachelor of Theology degree. Melanchthon never received a doctorate nor was he 
                                                 
187 The two purposes are somewhat reflected in the two parts of the Confession: “Chief Articles of 
Faith and Doctrine” (articles I-XXI) and “Articles about Matters in Dispute” (articles XXII-XXVIII). For a 
listing, see the Appendix, “A Breakdown of The Book of Concord by Structure and Content”. 
188 Although the sources are not of immediate concern in this dissertation, one can see, in 
particular, Wilhelm Maurer, Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, trans. H. George 
Anderson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986). 
189 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §18-29, pp.51-23. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:24-36; BKS, xv-xxi; Tappert, 23-24; K-W, 27-29. 
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ever ordained, but he nevertheless had a profound influence on those who did receive 
doctorates and were ordained. A sharp contrast to Luther’s personality, Melanchthon 
worked closely with Luther in the years that followed, although differences between the 
two appeared as early as 1530 and gradually widened. They did continue to agree on 
some issues, and Melanchthon in some ways strengthened Luther’s teaching. On other 
issues, they disagreed, and, while Luther never publicly criticized or broke with 
Melanchthon, students of theirs did. In addition, after Luther’s death, Melanchthon was 
involved in compromises that later even he admitted that he had sinned in supporting. 
Nearly twenty years after Melanchthon’s death in 1560, the Formula of Concord, 
although not mentioning him by name, nevertheless indirectly criticized positions of 
Melanchthon and of some of his students. A theologian, classicist, and philosopher, 
Melanchthon wrote not only the three confessional works receiving attention here, but he 
also published editions of classical and ancient philosophical authors and theological and 
other types of textbooks that are discussed later in this dissertation.190 
Apology of the Augsburg Confession 
 Melanchthon’s Augsburg Confession was eventually “answered” on August 3, 
1530, by the Roman Catholic side with what is known as the Confutatio Pontificia or 
simply the Confutation,191 which then received a response from Melanchthon: the 
Apology (that is, Defense) of the Augsburg Confession. Although at least initially denied 
                                                 
190 Textbooks in general and Melanchthon’s in particular are discussed below beginning on p.199. 
 On Reuchlin, see, for example, Walker, Norris, Lotz and Handy, A History of the Christian 
Church, 394, 408, 421. On Melanchthon, there is a worthwhile brief biography by J. A. O. Preus in Philipp 
Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1992), 8-14. There is a brief overview of Melanchthon’s disputed legacy in Charles P. Arand, 
“Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument for Sola Fide in the Apology,” Lutheran Quarterly XIV (2000): 281. 
What may be the latest significant work on Melanchthon is Nichole Kuropka, Philipp Melanchthon: 
Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft; Ein Gelehrter im Dienst der Kirche (1526-1532) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2002). 
191 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §36-47, pp.28-36. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:36-39. The principal authors of the Confutation were John Eck, John 
Faber, Conrad Wimpina, and John Cochlaeus. (Confer Arand, “The Apology as a Polemical Commentary,” 
172.) A critical Latin text is in CR 27:81-184. English translations include Johann Michael Reu, ed., The 
Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources (Fort Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press, 
n.d.), *348-*383; Robert Kolb and James A. Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts of The Book of 
Concord (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 105-139. 
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a copy of the Confutation, Melanchthon worked from notes, taken down during its 
reading, regarding its chief points. (Melanchthon did eventually get a copy of the 
Confutation, although there were allegations it was obtained fraudulently.) A first draft of 
the Apology was presented to the emperor on September 22, 1530, but the emperor 
declined it. After in some cases extensive revisions by Melanchthon, the Apology in 
Latin was published in the spring of 1531 (the quarto edition). That fall, a German 
version of the work was published (more a paraphrase than a translation), the work of 
Justus Jonas, apparently with some input from Melanchthon, who around the same time 
published a revised edition of the Latin version, streamlining and focusing the arguments 
(the octavo edition). The Apology endeavored to refute the Confutation and defend and 
elaborate on the Augsburg Confession. Where Melanchthon, hoping for a possible 
reunion, used a tone in the Augsburg Confession that is often called “irenic”, in the 
Apology, perhaps recognizing that reconciliation was no longer a possibility, 
Melanchthon used a tone that was much sharper. Originally published under 
Melanchthon’s name, the Apology, together with the Augsburg Confession, was being 
referred to as a confession of faith already in 1532, a status made official five years later 
in 1537 at Smalcald, where a different set of articles were slated for approval.192 
Smalcald Articles 
 Anticipating a long-requested and promised general council of the church—as of 
June 2, 1536, appointed for Mantua in May of 1537 (but not held there or then)—and 
debating whether or not the adherents to the Augsburg Confession and its Apology could 
or should attend it,193 Elector John Frederick of Saxony, likely as early as August 20, 
                                                 
192 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §48-60, pp.37-47. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:39-41; BKS, xxii-xxiii; Tappert, 97-98; K-W, 107-109. Notably, K-W 
translates the Apology from the octavo edition, what K-W regards as “the final form”. The octavo edition 
was signed at Smalcald, but the quarto edition was used for the Latin Book of Concord in 1584 and 
somewhat set a trend thereafter, thereby raising some questions about the changes from the quarto edition 
to the octavo edition. 
 Two worthwhile recent examinations of the Apology are Arand, “The Apology as a Polemical 
Commentary.” and Arand, “Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument.” The latter mentions the shortening and 
refocusing of the octavo edition (p.283). 
193 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §61-67, pp.47-52. The council eventually opened in 
December 1545 in Trent. 
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1536, requested Luther to lead the preparation of a statement of faith suited for the new 
context of the council. The request was apparently reiterated on December 11, 1536, and 
Luther had drafted a set of articles by December 28, 1536, when a group of theologians in 
Wittenberg reviewed them, suggested changes and additions to them, and ultimately 
approved them. Having approved the articles himself, the Elector, on February 8, 1537, 
then took them to a meeting of the Smalcald League. (The Smalcald League consisted of 
leaders of Lutheran territories and free cities who had formed a political and military 
alliance in February of 1531, pledging, for example, to help defend all of their lands if the 
emperor attacked.) At that February 1537 meeting of the Smalcald League, illness kept 
Luther from the sessions, and Melanchthon variously is said to have taken advantage of 
Luther’s absence to keep the League from officially discussing Luther’s articles or 
officially adopting them as a League, although the articles were circulated privately, 
widely read, and signed by many. (The Augustana and the Apology, however, were 
officially subscribed, and a special treatise addressing the papacy was requested.194) In 
1538 Luther published the articles he had authored as written in German, and in 
subsequent printings they came to be known, somewhat mistakenly, as the Smalcald 
Articles. In 1541 Peter Generanus published a Latin translation, with a revised edition 
following in 1542, but, apparently in part due to Generanus’s conversion to Romanism, 
the Latin translation of the Smalcald Articles included in The Book of Concord was the 
work of Nikolaus Selnecker.195 
 As indicated, Martin Luther authored the Smalcald Articles, and he also authored 
the Small and Large Catechisms discussed below. Thus, some biographical details about 
Luther are in order. On November 10, 1483, Martin Luther was born in Eisleben, Saxony. 
This eldest son of Hans and Margaretta Luther’s likely ten children was baptized the next 
day, the festival of St. Martin of Tours, which gave him his name. Of peasant origins, 
Hans worked as a copper miner, and, a few months after Martin’s birth, they moved to 
                                                 
194 This treatise, Melanchthon’s Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope, is discussed 
below in the text, beginning on p.72. 
195 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §68-77, pp.52-60. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:41-44; BKS, xxiv-xxvi, xxvii; Tappert, 227-228; K-W, 295-296. 
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Mansfeld (1490-1497), where Hans won civic respect and considerable prosperity and 
planned for Luther to be educated for a career in law. Luther attended preparatory schools 
in Mansfeld, Magdeburg (1497), and Eisenach (1498) before entering the University of 
Erfurt in 1501, where the classics and ancient philosophy were a usual part of the 
curriculum (how much influence humanism had at that time in Erfurt is debated).196 
Luther got his bachelor’s degree in 1502, his master of arts in January 1505, and entered 
the law school in May at the age of 21.  
 After the sudden death of a classmate and a close call with a lightning storm when 
returning to school from a visit home, Luther vowed to St. Anne that he would become a 
monk, and he did. He broke off his legal studies and entered the Augustinian monastery 
in Erfurt on July 17, 1505. That monastery was under the supervision of Johannes von 
Staupitz, to whom Luther would later give credit for initiating the Reformation. At the 
monastery, Luther studied St. Augustine, especially through the work of Gregory of 
Rimini, whom Luther thought to be only scholastic theologian free of Pelagianism. In so 
doing Luther was profoundly shaped by Augustinianism, although some debate the nature 
and validity of that form of Augustinianism. Luther was ordained to the priesthood and 
conducted his first mass in 1507, and the following year he was in Wittenberg, lecturing 
at the new university there on the topic of the ethics of Aristotle.197 Luther graduated with 
his bachelor of theology in 1509, and he went back to Erfurt for additional study there. 
Over the winter of 1510-1511, he went to Rome on the business of his cloister, returning 
                                                 
196 Bartholomaeus de Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter were two of Luther’s logic teachers who 
influenced him. See Henrik Lagerlund, Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages, Studien und Texte zur 
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (Boston: Brill, 2000), 203. Lagerlund cites Gustav L. Plitt, Jodokus 
Trutfetter von Eisenach, der Lehrer Luthers, in seinem Wirken geschildert (Erlangen: A. Deichert, 1876); 
Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: sein Weg zur Reformation, 1483-1521 (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1981). 
 Worthwhile on Luther’s development and also his cold and hot attitude towards Aristotle is 
Helmar Junghans, “Luther's Development from Biblical Humanist to Reformer,” trans. Katharina Gustavs, 
Martin Luther in Two Centuries: The Sixteenth and the Twentieth, eds. Terrance Dinovo and Robert Kolb 
(St. Paul: Lutheran Brotherhood Foundation Reformation Research and Luther Northwestern Theological 
Seminary, 1992). Junghans concludes: “Is it true that the Reformation was one of the results of biblical 
humanism? Luther himself held this view. In 1524, looking back on the past, he found that God himself had 
initiated the study of languages in order to prepare for the rediscovery of the gospel. Luther research will be 
well-advised to keep Luther’s judgment in mind, when it gives attention to the positive meaning of biblical 
humanism for Luther’s development into a reformer.” (Junghans, “Biblical Humanist to Reformer,” 14.) 
197 Remember that Aristotle and his ethics were Luther’s targets some ten years later in his theses 
Against Scholastic Theology (see above at n.67, p.21). 
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to Erfurt and then Wittenberg, where he received his doctor of theology in 1512 and 
succeeded Staupitz as professor of Bible. As professor of Bible, Luther lectured on the 
Psalms (1513-1518), Romans (1515-1516), Galatians (1516-1517), and Hebrews (1517-
1518). Over time and based on his study and spiritual direction, Luther became more and 
more convinced that salvation is a new relationship with God, not based on human work 
but on trust in God’s promise of forgiveness for Christ’s sake. This Reformation or 
Gospel breakthrough did not necessarily occur in one sudden flash of insight, however. 
Most likely it began in some form as early as 1513 and neared its full development at the 
beginning of 1519, at which point it is quite well stated. Luther did not think he 
discovered anything other theologians had not previously known.198 Reforms in the 
curriculum of the University and changes in Luther’s thinking each seemed to feed the 
other. 
 The usual events of the Reformation may be greater or lesser known to individual 
readers. The previously mentioned Ninety-Five Theses against indulgences came the end 
of October of 1517 and within weeks were published and widely disseminated. (An 
indulgence was commonly understood, if not actually intended, to wipe away all one’s 
former sins and restore one to a state of spiritual innocence.) By the beginning of 1518 
Luther was formally charged with heresy, and by the summer Pope Leo X essentially 
called him a heretic. In 1520, the pope formally condemned Luther and threatened 
excommunication, and by January of 1521 the pope did excommunicate Luther. Around 
the same time, Luther was summoned to a meeting of the Reichstag at Worms, where in 
April of 1521 he said he would stand by what he had written unless convinced of its 
                                                 
198 Jaroslav Pelikan seems to have the sentiment right but the citation wrong. Pelikan writes of 
Luther, “he long professed the conviction that what he had ‘discovered’ was something that the best 
theologians of the church must have known all along”, and for that statement Pelikan cites WA 8:45 
(Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700), The Christian Tradition: A History of 
the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4 [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984], 127). In that 1521 
Ad Praefacionem Latomi (“On the Preface of Latomus”), in the context of having submitted his early 
writings to the pope, Luther writes: semper arbitratus in Academiis latere theologos, qui si impia haec 
essent, non silerent (“I always believed there were theologians hidden in the schools who would not have 
been silent if these teachings were impious”) (WA 8:45; Aland #399; AE 32:141, translated by George 
Lindbeck). There may not be a single citation from Luther as a “proof text” for what is otherwise an 
accurate claim based on a general sense from Luther’s works. 
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wrongfulness—and this is significant—“by the testimony of the Scriptures or by clear 
reason”, reportedly finishing his statements at the Diet with the words “Here I stand. God 
help me, Amen.” Luther lived secretly under protective custody for about a year, during 
which time he began to translate the Latin Bible into German, not the first such 
translation but arguably the best and the one that had the greatest impact. Back in 
Wittenberg some of Luther’s colleagues, such as Andreas Karlstadt, made changes going 
faster and further than Luther would have, which in 1522 brought Luther back to the city 
to restore order and undo some of the changes. In 1524, Luther both faced Erasmus over 
the freedom or bondage of the will and faced angry mobs of peasants who somewhat 
wrongly claimed Luther for their cause, similar to the princes who crushed their rebellion 
with excessive violence. In 1525 Luther married Katherine von Bora, a former nun, with 
whom he fathered six children. In 1529 the Catechisms were published, a protestatio 
(“protest”) lodged at the diet in Speyer, and Luther in Marburg faced off against those 
who denied the real, physical presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar. The events 
of the next few years, at least in terms of the confessional writings, have already been 
rehearsed, and it would be Luther’s death on February 18, 1546, that would precipitate 
the need for one more such writing, as will be seen below.199 
Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope 
 At the same time that the Smalcald Articles were to be considered, as mentioned, 
there was a call for a more extended treatment on the authority of the papacy. The call for 
the church council and the question of whether the Reformers should or would attend 
                                                 
199 There are numerous works on the life of Luther covering the basics sketched in the text. A 
recent concise treatment is Albrecht Beutel, “Luther's Life,” trans. Katharina Gustavs, The Cambridge 
Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald K. McKim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). A 
popular standard biography is Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: 
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950). Dedicated to Bainton was the previously mentioned Oberman, Luther. 
A more recent full-length biographical treatment is James M. Kittelson, Luther the Reformer: The Story of 
the Man and His Career (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1986). Less of a biography and more 
of a study in Luther reception is Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero: Images of the 
Reformer, 1520-1620, Texts and studies in Reformation and post-Reformation thought (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Books, 1999). An even more-recent full-length biographical treatment, although one intended for the 
Luther “novice”, is Paul R. Waibel, Martin Luther: A Brief Introduction to His Life and Works (Wheeling, 
IL: Harlan-Davidson, 2005). (Waibel’s book was reviewed favorably by Timothy M. McAlhaney, “Martin 
Luther: A Brief Introduction to His Life and Works,” Sixteenth Century Journal XXXVII.2 [2006].) 
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were the immediate context. Like the Augustana and its Apology subscribed at Smalcald, 
the resulting Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope of 1537 was authored by 
Melanchthon in Latin, reportedly drawing on Luther’s 1520 German work “On the 
Papacy”,200 and Melanchthon’s Treatise was seemingly immediately translated into 
German by Veit Dietrich. While still at Smalclad, the theologians approved both the 
Latin original and its German translation, and the record of the princes’ meeting notes the 
theologians work approvingly. Often published with the Smalcald Articles, the Treatise 
came to be regarded as an appendix to those articles, even though the Smalcald Articles 
have their own treatment of the pope;201 more properly the Treatise is regarded as an 
appendix to the Augustana and its Apology. There was confusion in the sixteenth century 
not just over the Treatise’s relation to other confessional writings, but there was also 
confusion over the work’s author and its official language, and, even in the editions of 
The Book of Concord that got the authoritative language right, Melanchthon’s authorship 
seems omitted intentionally.202 
Small Catechism 
 There is no doubt that Luther authored the bulk of the next work in The Book of 
Concord, namely the Small Catechism. Catechisms and catechetical instruction had a 
long history before Luther, of course (arguably going back to the Bible itself), and Luther 
tried to get others to produce one before he took it upon himself to do so. In 1528 and 
1529, Luther had “visited” Saxon congregations, in a formal examination sort of way, 
and found pastors and people needing greater knowledge of such basics as the Ten 
Commandments, the Apostolic Creed, and the Lord’s Prayer—the usual parts of ancient 
“catechisms”. Luther describes such findings in the Preface to the Small Catechism. (The 
additional three parts Luther adds to his catechisms address Baptism, Confession and 
                                                 
200 Von dem Bapstum zu Rome: wider den hochberumpten Romanisten zu Leipstzck, WA 6:285-
324; Aland #548; AE 39:49-104, translated as “On the Papacy in Rome Against the Most Celebrated 
Romanist in Leipzig” by Eric W. Gritsch and Ruth C. Gritsch. 
201 SA II:iv. 
202 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §78-80, pp.60-62. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, 
Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:44-45; BKS, xxvi-xxvii; Tappert, 319; K-W, 329-330. 
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Absolution, and the Lord’s Supper.) He thought of the Catechism as a lay person’s Bible, 
although never as a substitute for the Bible itself. Luther had preached and published on 
individual parts of the Catechism previously, but the Catechisms themselves are the first 
works where all the parts are treated together. The “tables” that are the Small Catechism 
came out of Luther’s work on the “larger” Catechism discussed below. The Small 
Catechism was particularly aimed at children, with the head of the household being 
responsible for teaching them (and for putting the text itself in the children’s hands), 
although Luther also had pastors and schoolteachers in view. The chart form of the Small 
Catechism was published in German, perhaps in stages, in January and March of 1529, 
and the book form came out in May. (Additional text and various appendices were added 
over time.) While there were several Latin translations, that of Johannes Sauermann of 
Bambergen seems to have had Luther’s approval and was essentially used in the 1584 
Latin edition of The Book of Concord. By the time of The Book of Concord both the 
Small and Large Catechisms had in various ways been given confessional authority.203 
Large Catechism 
 Although the Large Catechism was likely begun before the smaller Catechism and 
itself provided the milieu out of which the smaller came, the Large Catechism was 
apparently published later: in April of 1529 and also in German. As with the smaller, the 
Large Catechism had children in view, even as the primary target for the Large 
Catechism were pastors, teachers, and parents. Luther revised the text in different ways 
for later editions. There was an almost-immediate Latin translation by John Lonicer in 
May of 1529, and there was another in 1529 by Vincentius Obsopoeus. When Selnecker 
put together the Latin Book of Concord he himself revised and then used Obsopoeus’s 
translation.204 
                                                 
203 On both the Small and Large Catechisms, see Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §81-118, 
pp.62-93. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:45-51; BKS, 
xxviii-xxxi; Tappert, 337-338, 357-358; K-W, 345-347, 377-379. 
204 For relevant citations see above, n.203, p.74. 
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Formula of Concord (Epitome & Solid Declaration) 
 The various confessional writings did not prevent all disputes from arising 
amongst the Lutherans and eventually brought about the Formula of Concord. Especially 
after the death of Luther in 1546 controversies arose that necessitated not so much a new 
confession but elaboration on some points of the earlier Augustana and its Apology. A 
war and “compromise” documents, such as the Augsburg and Leipzig Interims, 
contributed to the difficulties that necessitated the Formula. The specific details about 
each controversy do not need elaboration here, other than to note that in some cases they 
had aspects touching on philosophy (for example, terminology, or sub-sentential 
philosophy was involved). The discussion below presents together the basics of both the 
Formula of Concord’s Epitome, the shorter “version”, and its Solid (or Thoroughgoing) 
Declaration.205 
 Those contending for the faith that had been handed down to them in many cases 
desired peace and were working to bring it about, a process that culminated decades later 
in The Book of Concord. For example, Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520-1575), who was 
on the “right” side in some controversies but the “wrong” side in others, made some of 
the first appeals for a resolution to the differences, although his appeals ultimately 
failed.206 More effective approaches were eventually applied by Jacob Andreä and Martin 
Chemnitz. Over the course of 1572 and 1573, Andreä preached and published a number 
of sermons, directed to the pastors and laity, treating of controverted topics.207 At the 
suggestion of Chemnitz, David Chytraeus (1531-1600), and others, Andreä reduced those 
sermons to theses and antitheses, which work when completed was known as the 
                                                 
205 For the historical background of the Formula and its controversies, see Bente, “Historical 
Introductions,” §119-266, pp.93-235; Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” 
II:51-56; Robert Kolb, Andreae and the Formula of Concord: Six Sermons on the Way to Lutheran Unity 
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1977), 19-39. A more recent treatment is Irene Dingel, Concordia 
Controversa: Die Öffentlichen Diskussionen um das Lutherische Konkordienwerk am Ende des 16. 
Jahrhunderts, Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 63 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1996). 
206 Specifically on Flacius, see Wilhelm Preger, Matthias Flacius Illyricus und seine Zeit, 2 vols. 
(Erlangen: T. Bläsing, 1859-1861). More recent is Oliver K. Olson, Matthias Flacius and the Survival of 
Luther's Reform (Wiesbanden: Harrassowitz, 2002). 
207 The sermons are available in English translation: Kolb, Andreae and the Formula. 
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Swabian Concordia, or the Tübingen Book, and amounted to a first draft of the Formula. 
After conferences in 1574, Chemnitz in 1575 revised the document into what is known as 
the Swabian-Saxon Concordia. Later in 1575, at the direction of Elector August of 
Saxony, Lucas Osiander, Balthasar Bidembach and others produced a document known 
as the Maulbronn Formula, and, in 1576, the Elector had Andreä, Chemnitz, and 
Nicholas Selnecker meet with others, including Chytraeus, Andrew Musculus (1514-
1581), and Christopher Körner (1518-1594). They revised the Swabian-Saxon Concordia 
with a view to the strengths of the Maulbronn Formula and produced what is known as 
the Torgau Book. Acting on feedback that the Torgau Book was too long, Andreä 
prepared a summary, or “Epitome”, of its contents. In March of 1577, meeting at Cloister 
Bergen near Magdeburg, Andreä, Chemnitz, and Selnecker made revisions, and later in 
1577 Chytraeus, Körner, and Musculus joined the process of revisions that resulted in the 
Bergic Book, or Formula of Concord, as it is known today. Another name given to it, 
Book of Concord later was limited in use to the 1580 collection of all the Lutheran 
Confessions. Electors, dukes, princes, counts, barons, representatives of free cities, and 
pastors and teachers subscribed to the Formula over the course of approximately two 
years before it was published. A translation of the Formula from German to Latin was 
soon completed, the work of Lucas Osiander and Jacob Heerbrand (1521-1600, a former 
student of Luther and Melanchthon’s in Wittenberg and colleague of Andreä in 
Tübingen208); the official Latin translation of the Formula is their work as revised by 
Selnecker and Chemnitz.209 
 From the foregoing narration of the Formula’s development, one likely can tell 
that naming the authors of the Formula of Concord’s Epitome and Solid Declaration is to 
                                                 
208 Theodore R. Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula of Concord: Four Architects of Lutheran 
Unity (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1977), 29. Although there are perhaps some questionable 
interpretations in Jungkuntz’s work, the facts seem to be accurate. 
209 On the peace process and development of the Formula of Concord itself, see Bente, “Historical 
Introductions,” §3, 267-293, pp.5-6, 235-256. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes 
and Indexes,” II:56-61; BKS, xxxii-xliv; Tappert, 463-464; K-W, 481-485. The K-W edition makes some 
indication of which of the relevant preceding works may be behind the various paragraphs of the Formula. 




make a somewhat subjective judgment as to who contributed what. Although in various 
stages almost countless people were involved, Table 1210 listed only six authors, as the 
Torgau book listed six signatures of those “chiefly responsible for its form and 
contents”.211 J. A. O. Preus says Chytraeus “became disillusioned with the entire process 
of producing the Formula of Concord and in many ways simply backed out of it.”212 
Theodore Jungkuntz says that Koerner and Musculus were present at the Formula’s “final 
stages of writing and editing” for political reasons and played only “a minor role”.213 
Friedrich Bente says Selnecker “contributed little to the contents of the Formula”, 
although Bente credits Selnecker for cooperating “in its preparation, revision, and 
adoption”.214 Those “disqualifications” leave us with Andreä and Chemnitz as the 
Formula’s principal authors to discuss in the paragraphs that follow.215 
 Born into a poor smith family, Jacob Andreä (1528-1590) went to school at 
Stuttgart and Tübingen thanks chiefly to the support of his duke. In 1546 at the age of 18, 
and after only one year of theological studies, Andreä returned to Stuttgart as a pastor. 
Andreä stayed at his post during the 1547 Smalcald War but was deposed in 1548 for 
refusing to submit to the Interim. The next year, 1549, he became pastor in Tübingen, 
where he resumed his doctoral studies and later, after some time in Göppingen, was 
superintendent, university professor, and university chancellor. Though Andreä did not 
attend Wittenberg’s university, that school and its theologians influenced him through 
John Brenz, who had been active in the duchy of Württemberg where Andreä was born 
and raised and who later became a 20-year personal acquaintance and colleague of 
Andreä, shaping his thought and practice. By making philosophical distinctions, such as 
                                                 
210 See above, p.62. 
211 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” 246. 
212 Jacob A. O. Preus, The Second Martin: The Life and Theology of Martin Chemnitz (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1994), 170. 
213 Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 11-12. 
214 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” 246. 
215 For his part, Junkuntz does discuss Chytraeus (pp.69-88) and Selnecker (pp.89-109) along with 
Andreä and Chemnitz, and Jungkuntz writes that each brought something to the table that was needed for 
the Concord produced (Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 114). Preus also seems to intimate such 
sentiments (Preus, The Second Martin, passim). 
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those between causes, Andreä also rose to the defense of Brenz and Osiander, 
harmonizing what otherwise might have been taken as contradictory statements. A 
lecturer on Melanchthon’s Loci and good at disputations, Andreä was nevertheless 
“deceived” by Victorin Strigel when adjudicating his case, which experience along with 
others is said to have cost Andreä the confidence of the Gnesio-Lutherans later when he 
was trying to make peace between the disputing parties. Andreä’s involvement in the 
peace process introduced him to Martin Chemnitz when the two were conducting “visits” 
for Duke Julius of Brunswick. The Andreä-authored summary of the Torgau book that 
later became the Formula of Concord’s Epitome is said to be “the only part of the 
Formula written by Andreae”,216 and some further minimize Andreä’s role by pointing to 
that part’s only being a summary of the rest. Nevertheless, Andreä is typically regarded 
as one of the leading authors of the Formula.217 
 The other leading author of the Formula is Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586). 
Chemnitz shares a namesake with “the other Martin” of the Reformation, but that was not 
his only point of contact with Luther. In 1536 Chemnitz briefly studied at Wittenberg as a 
14-year-old, but family finances put an end to that and made his other schooling 
somewhat intermittent. Chemnitz also attended school in Magdeburg, where he learned 
Latin, Greek, dialectics, rhetoric, and, Chemnitz’s favorite, astronomy. Later he 
continued his studies at Frankfurt an der Oder before eventually returning to Wittenberg 
in 1545, at which time Melanchthon “directed his studies”. Chemnitz was gone from 
Wittenberg again from 1548 until 1553, at which time Chemnitz boarded with and even 
taught for Melanchthon. Chemnitz was ordained in November of 1554 and left 
Wittenberg for Brunswick, where he served the rest of his life. From there, Chemnitz, 
like Andreä, had occasion to be involved in the case of a pastor accused of false teaching, 
and Chemnitz exposed faulty reasoning and deceitful wording. Chemnitz’s own writing 
was clear and significant, including such things as a treatise on the Lord’s Supper and his 
                                                 
216 Preus, The Second Martin, 188. 
217 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §275, pp.242-243; Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 
19-45. See also the accessible biographical discussion of Andreä in Kolb, Andreae and the Formula, 9-18. 
There are brief biographical details about Andreä in Preus, The Second Martin, 171-172. 
 
79 
examination of the Council of Trent, even before he was involved in authoring the 
Formula of Concord.218 
 Thus, each of the documents contained in The Book of Concord arose from a 
specific context, even as their authors were shaped by their own educational background, 
including training in philosophy, and the circumstances in which they found themselves. 
Second-order regard for philosophy 
 The opening of this introductory chapter made reference to The Book of 
Concord’s repudiation of philosophy and reason; now, with some details provided 
regarding the works contained in The Book of Concord and the four main authors of those 
works, attention turns to a more detailed examination of the works’ regard for those two 
things. Such second-order data is especially enlightening before moving into the 
following chapters that contain primarily first-order data indicating whether the 
Reformers used philosophy and reason, and, if so, how they did so. Thus, this subsection 
summarizes all and closely examines two of the references made by the documents in The 
Book of Concord to “philosophers” and “philosophy”, as well as the book’s use of 
“philosophical” and “philosophize”. The examination of these cognates gives both an 
idea of what “philosophy” is for the documents’ authors and an idea of how they regard 
“philosophy”.219 
“Philosophers” 
 When it comes to “philosophers”, there are three references that may be regarded 
as neutral. What may be one neutral reference comes in the Apology’s treatment of 
                                                 
218 Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §275, pp.242-243; Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula 
46-68. With Chapter 7 detailing his involvement in the Formula of Concord, a book length treatment of 
Chemnitz’s life is Preus, The Second Martin. 
219 “Reason” is often indicted in the some of the same statements critical of philosophy. To be 
sure, a close examination of the references to “reason” and its English cognates and the references to 
equivalent cognates in Latin and German could be conducted, although a cursory examination of the 
English gives reason to believe the results would be similar to those for “philosophy” and its cognates as 
follow in the text. 
 A perhaps more interesting inquiry would look at all the “philosophers” who are named and all of 
the contexts in which they are named for assessment of the relevant topics and whether the references are 
positive or negative. 
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original sin, where Melanchthon explains that what the philosophers said about the need 
for something to be voluntary in order to be regarded as blameworthy in the civil courts 
was used in theology by the scholastics.220 
Sed in scholis transtulerunt huc ex philosophia prorsus alienas sententias, 
quod propter passiones nec boni nec mali simus, nec laudemur nec 
vituperemur. Item nihil esse peccatum nisi voluntarium. Hae sententiae 
apud philosophos de civili iudicio dictae sunt, non de iudicio Dei. Nihilo 
prudentius assunt et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco 
dictum, non reprehendimus; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum 
peccatum originis. Et tamen hae sententiae leguntur apud scholasticos, qui 
intempestive commiscent philosophicam seu civilem doctrinam de 
moribus cum evangelio. Neque haec in scholis tantum disputabantur, sed 
ex scholis, ut fit, efferebantur ad populum. Et hae persuasiones regnabant 
et alebant fiducium humanarum virium et opprimebant cognitionem 
gratiae Christi. 
Here the scholastics have taken over from philosophy the totally foreign 
idea that because of our emotions we are neither good nor bad, neither to 
be praised nor condemned. Or they say that nothing is sin unless it is 
voluntary. The philosophers said this about the civil courts, not about the 
judgment of God. It is no wiser to say that nature is not evil. In its place 
we do not object to this statement, but it is not right to twist it in order to 
minimize original sin. Yet these ideas appear in the scholastics, who 
improperly mingle philosophical and civil ethics with the Gospel. As often 
happens, these ideas did not remain purely academic, but moved out 
among the people. These notions prevailed, feeding a trust in human 
powers and obscuring the knowledge of the grace of Christ. 
Aber die Sophisten in Schulen haben zu dieser Sache wider die klare, 
öffentliche Schrift geredet und aus der Philosophie ihr eigen Träume und 
Sprüche erdichtet, sagen, daß wir um der bösen Lüste willen weder bös 
noch gut, noch zu schelten noch zu loben sind. Item, daß Lüste und 
Gedanken inwendig nicht Sünde sind, wenn ich nicht ganz drein 
verwillige. Dieselben Rede und Worte in der Philosophen Büchern sind zu 
verstehen von äusserlicher Ehrbarkeit für der Welt und auch äußerlicher 
Strafe für der Welt. Denn da ists wahr, wie die Juristen sagen: L. 
cogitationis, Gedanken sind zollfrei und straffrei. Aber Gott erforschet die 
Herzen; mit Gottes Gericht und Urteil ists anders. Also flicken sie auch an 
                                                 
220 Generally in keeping with the procedure noted above (n.80, p.24), quotations from The Book of 
Concord in this dissertation will be presented in the authoritative original language first, followed by the 
alternate language’s translation, an English translation of the authoritative language, and, if needed, an 
English translation of the alternate language’s translation if it is significantly different. Although the 
English translations are generally those of the Tappert edition, sources of all translations are noted. 
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diese Sache andere ungereimte Sprüche, nämlich: Gottes Geschöpf und 
die Natur könne an ihr selbst nicht bös sein. Das fecht ich nicht an, wenn 
es irgend geredt wird, da es statt hat; aber dazu soll dieser Sprüch nicht 
angezogen werden die Erbsunde gering zu machen. Und dieselbigen 
Sprüche der Sophisten haben viel unsäglichen Schaden getan, durch 
welche sie die Philosophie und die Lehre, welche äusserlich Leben für der 
Welt belangend, vermischen mit dem Evangelio, und haben doch solchs 
nicht allein in der Schule gelehret, sondern auch öffentlich unverschämt 
für dem Volk gepredigt. Und die selbigen ungöttlichen, irrigen, fährliche 
und schädliche Lehren hatten in aller Welt überhand genommen, da ward 
nichts gepredigt denn unser Verdienst in aller Welt, dadurch ward das 
Erkenntnis Christi und das Evangelium ganz untergedrückt. 
But the sophists in the schools have spoken on this matter against the 
clear, public Scripture and imagined from philosophy their own dreams 
and expressions, saying that on account of evil desires, we are neither evil 
nor good, we are neither to scold nor to praise. Again, that desires and 
thoughts are not sins, if I do not altogether consent thereto. These same 
statements and words in the philosopher’s books are to be understood of 
external worthiness before the world and also of external punishment 
before the world. For there it is true, as the jurists say, L. [presumably Lex] 
cogitationis, thoughts are toll-free and punishment-free. But God searches 
the hearts; with God’s court and judgment it is a different matter. So they 
botch also in this matter other nonsensical expressions, namely: God’s 
creature and nature cannot in itself be evil. That I do not contest, if 
someone speaks it where it has a place; but for that reason these 
expressions should not be stretched to trivialize original sin. And, these 
same expressions of the sophists have done much unspeakable damage, 
through which they have mixed philosophy and the teaching, which 
concerns the external life before the world, with the Gospel, and they have 
even taught such not only in the school but also unashamedly publicly 
preached it to the people. And the same ungodly, erroneous, dangerous, 
and harmful teachings have gotten out of hand in the whole world, where 
nothing was preached other than our merit in the world, whereby the 
knowledge of Christ and the Gospel have become completely 
suppressed.221 
(This example includes several other negative uses of cognates to which attention is 
given later.) A second possibly neutral reference to “philosophers” comes in the 
Apology’s treatment of justification, how sinners stand righteous before God, and occurs 
                                                 
221 Ap II:43-44, BKS, 155-156; Tappert, 106. The English translation of the German is this 
author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 117. The BKS editors note that the Latin expression in the German is 
after Ulpian and Cicero. Confer the discussion of this passage below at n.61, p. 217. 
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as Melanchthon identifies what the apostles describe as “the duty of love” (de hoc officio 
dilectionis toties praecipiunt apostolic; die apostel vermahnen nicht ohn Ursache zu 
solcher Liebe) with what the philosophers call “leniency” (philosophi vocant ; 
welches die Philosophi Epiikian genennet haben).222 The third arguably neutral reference 
comes in the Apology’s treatment of monastic vows, where Melanchthon says the 
philosophers praise Aristippus for throwing his gold into the sea, though Melanchthon 
says, “Such examples have nothing to do with Christian perfection” (Talia exempla nihil 
pertinent ad christianam perfectionem).223 
 The vast majority of the Book of Concord references to “philosophers” are 
negative. Several of these negative references come in connection with 
misunderstandings of righteousness: the scholastics are said to “have followed the 
philosophers” (Hic scholastici secuti philosophos; Hie haben die Scholastici den 
Philosophis gefolget) in teaching “only a righteousness of reason—that is, civil works” 
(tantum docent iustitiam rationis, videlicet civilian opera; lehren sie allein ein 
Gerechtigkeit und Frommkeit, da ein Mensch äußerlich für der Welt ein ehrbar Leben 
führet und gute Werk tut) that gives too much ability to unconverted reason (quod ratio 
sine spiritu sancto posit diligere Deum supra omnia; daß die menschliche Vernunft ohne 
den heiligen Geist vermüge Gott über alles zu lieben),224 which civil righteousness the 
philosophers themselves are elsewhere also said not to have achieved.225 Because the 
                                                 
222 Ap IV:243, Tappert, 141; BKS, 207. The translation of  may be debated. The 
Triglotta, 189, anticipates Tappert’s “leniency”, but K-W, 157, renders “fairness”. The word is classically 
defined as “reasonableness”, “equity”, and “clemency” (Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-
English Lexicon [New York: Harper, 1968], 632). 
 In canon law,  is equity, which explains or corrects a positive human law, and can be 
defined as follows: “The benign application of the law according to what is good and equitable, which 
decides that the lawgiver does not intend that, because of exceptional circumstances, some particular case 
be included under his general law.” (Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Canon Law, 2nd rev. ed. [Philadelphia: 
Dolphin Press, 1935], 15.) The Reformers’ uses, of course, are not necessarily going to follow canon law. 
223 Ap XXVII:46, Tappert, 277; BKS, 391. (This particular statement is not found in the German 
version of the Apology. Confer below at n.226, p.83; n.233, p.84; n.237, p.85; n.239, p.85; n.240, p.86; 
n.241, p.86; n.243, p.86; and n.244, p.86. Compare below at n.235, p.85. Omissions from the Latin to the 
German may have some significance, perhaps lessening the anti-philosophy polemic given the confessions’ 
own use of philosophical terminology and concepts.) The concept of “perfection” is a sentential use of 
philosophy outside the scope of the dissertation. 
224 Ap IV:9, Tappert, 108; BKS, 160. 
225 ACG&L XX:33; Ap XVIII:5. 
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philosophers look for the wrong righteousness (in contrast to the righteousness revealed 
by the foolishness of the Gospel), the philosophers are said to be deceived by human 
wisdom, along with the scholastics, Pharisees, and Mohammedans.226 The Book of 
Concord criticizes the philosophers not only on the topic of righteousness but on other 
related and unrelated topics. Along with the papists, sophists, and human reason, the 
philosophers are said to be unable to indicate what kind of accident original sin is; only 
Holy Scripture can correctly define it.227 Following the philosophers, the scholastics are 
said to teach “error and stupidity” (Irrtum und Blindheit; errores et caligines) when 
saying that after the fall a human’s natural powers are “whole and uncorrupted” (ganz 
und unverderbt; integras et incorruptas) and that a human “by nature possesses a right 
understanding and a good will” (von Natur eine rechte Vernunft und guten Willen; 
rationem rectam et bonam voluntatem).228 Where philosophers understand only one mode 
of being, God is said to have more,229 and what is called the “dream” (Schwarm; delirum) 
of Stoic philosophers regarding compulsion, like that of the heretical Manicheans, is 
condemned.230 
“Philosophy” 
 When it comes to “philosophy”, the authors of The Book of Concord in four 
references have only negative things to say. The first of those references, where, in the 
Apology’s treatment of original sin, “philosophy” is given as the scholastics’ source of 
the “foreign idea” that people’s emotions make them “neither good nor bad”, has already 
                                                 
226 Ap IV:229. Although working with limited knowledge but wanting an honest presentation 
about those who today we would call Muslims, Luther for one often polemicized against Islam, primarily 
for spiritual reasons, although he saw the religion as a threat to all three estates. He emphasized how 
Christians should repent in the face of Turkish attacks. Luther could not only group his Roman Catholic 
opponents, Jews, and Muslims together since he held that all taught works righteousness, but he could 
substitute one for the other in his polemic and accuse one of trying to keep information about the other 
secret so people would not know how alike they were. (Sarah Henrich and James L. Boyce, “Martin 
Luther—Translations of Two Prefaces on Islam,” Word & World XVI.2 [1996].) Naumann also helpfully 
reviews not only Luther’s but The Book of Concord’s views of Islam (Jonathan C. Naumann, “Luther, 
Lutherans, and Islam,” Concordia Journal 28.1 [2002]). 
227 SD I:60.  
228 SA III:i:3-4, Tappert, 302; BKS, 434. 
229 Ep VII:14; SD VII:97. A discussion of Christ’s three modes follows there. 
230 Ep II:8, Tappert, 470-471; BKS, 778. 
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been seen.231 The second negative reference to “philosophy” comes in the Apology’s 
treatment of justification, where Melanchthon in discussing the righteousness of reason 
and civil works begins a string of rhetorical questions by asking, “If this is Christian 
righteousness, what difference is there between philosophy and the teaching of Christ?” 
(Si haec est iustitia christiana, quid interest inter philosophiam et Christi doctrinam?; … 
was doch vor Unterscheid fein wollt zwischen der Philosophen und Christi Lehre …).232 
(This particular paragraph goes on to mention some philosophers, including Aristotle, by 
name, and ends with one of The Book of Concord’s references to “philosophical” that is 
mentioned again below.) The third negative reference to “philosophy” comes later in the 
same article from the Apology dealing with justification, as Melanchthon writes that, “the 
theologians have mingled more than enough philosophy with Christian doctrine” 
(Theologos constat plura ex philosophia admiscuisse doctrinae christianae, quam satis 
erat).233 The Book of Concord’s fourth and final negative reference to “philosophy” 
comes in the Formula of Concord’s Solid Declaration, where the authors treat of free will 
and deny philosophy and reason a role as the ultimate source of truth.  
Diese Erklärung und Häuptantwort auf die im Eingang dieses Artikels 
gesetzte Häuptfrage und statum controversiae bestätigen und bekräftigen 
folgende Gründe des göttlichen Worts, welche, ob sie wohl der hoffärtigen 
Vernunft und Philosophie zuwider seind, so wissen wir doch, daß ,,dieser 
verkehrten Welt Weisheit nur Torheit für Gott“ ist, und daß von den 
Artikeln des Glaubens alleine aus Gottes Wort soll geurteilt werden. 
Hanc piam declarationem et generalem (ad statum causae, in exordio 
huius tractationis propositum) responsionem e verbo Dei desumpta 
argumenta, quae recitabimus, confirmant. Licet autem ea supercilio 
humanae rationis et philosophiae displiceant, tamen novimus mundi huius 
perversissimi sapientiam coram Deo esse stultitiam et quod de capitibus 
religionis nostrae tantummodo ex Verbo Dei sit iudicandum. 
The following reasons from the Word of God support and confirm the 
foregoing explanation of and summary reply to the questions and issues 
stated at the beginning of this article. It is true that they are contrary to 
                                                 
231 Ap II:43, see above, at n.221, p.81. 
232 Ap IV:12, Tappert, 109; BKS, 161. (This statement was part of the epigram at the beginning of 
this chapter.) 
233 Ap IV:390, Tappert, 166; BKS, 232. (This particular statement is not found in the German 
version of the Apology.) 
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proud reason and philosophy, but we also know that ‘the wisdom of this 
perverse world is folly with God’ and that it is only from the Word of God 
that judgments on articles of faith are to be pronounced.234 
This statement is especially significant since the statement directly attacks philosophy as 
an ultimate method for obtaining the truth. 
“Philosophical” 
 When it comes to the adjective “philosophical”, The Book of Concord uses the 
word to makes negative comments about a number of things. That the most frequently 
attacked item is specifically “philosophical righteousness” (philosophicam iustitiam) by 
this point is hardly a surprise; those four attacks come in the Latin version of Augsburg 
Confession’s treatment of good works and in the Apology’s treatments of original sin and 
justification (the latter two of which attacks come in a paragraph to which reference was 
made earlier).235 In the same context as these attacks on “philosophical righteousness” 
come attacks: on “philosophical views about the perfection of nature” (philosophiam de 
perfectione naturae; viel Philosophie gemengt und viel von dem Licht der Vernunft) that 
the scholastics are said to have mingled with Christian doctrine instead of employing 
more the Word of God,236 on “philosophical questions” (dialecticis quaestionibus; 
quaestiones philosophicas; philosophische Quästion und Frage) that the preachers who 
want to appear to be or are “more learned” (doctiores; gelehrtesten) are said to take up 
but not understand,237 on “philosophical ethics” the scholastics mingled with the 
Gospel,238 on “vain … philosophical speculations” (vanitatem illarum speculationem 
philosophicarum),239 on “philosophical or judicial investigation” (in philosophia aut in 
                                                 
234 SD II:8, BKS, 874; Tappert, 521. The quoted phrase is from 1 Corinthians 3:19. 
235 ACL XX:18; Ap II:12; Ap IV:13,16. 
236 Ap II:12-13, Tappert, 102; BKS, 149-150. The German equally indicts “much from the light of 
reason”. 
237 Ap II:15, Tappert, 102; BKS, 150. Ap XXIV:43, Tappert, 258; BKS, 362. 
238 Ap II:43. See above at n.221, p.81. 
239 Ap IV:37, Tappert, 112; BKS, 167. (This particular statement regarding the “philosophical 
speculations” is not found in the German version of the Apology.) 
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foro quaerimus) of one’s own righteousness,240 on “a philosophical or a Jewish manner” 
(seu philosophico seu iudaico more) of interpreting Holy Scripture,241 on “philosophical 
teaching” about human righteousness different from “the teaching of the Holy Spirit” 
regarding spiritual righteousness (inter iustitiam humanam et spiritualem, inter 
philosophicam et doctrinam spiritus sancti; ),242 on “philosophical disputes” (rixarum 
philosophicarum) that come from scholastic doctrine,243 and on “philosophical 
discussions” (philosophicis disputationibus) that obscure Christ.244  
“Philosophize” 
 When it comes to the verb “philosophize”, The Book of Concord makes only one 
use, which use also carries a negative connotation. In the Apology’s treatment of original 
sin, while discussing the definition of original sin and concupiscence, Melanchthon 
writes how “so many philosophize about it irreligiously” (de ea nonnulli parum religiose 
philosophantur), to which reference the German adds a comment about their failing to 
use God’s Word, or Holy Scripture.245  
                                                 
240 Ap IV:306, Tappert, 154; BKS, 219. (This particular statement is not found in the German 
version of the Apology.) Note this reference is grouped with references to the English adjective 
“philosophical”, though in the Latin the noun form of the word is used. 
241 Ap IV:376, Tappert, 164; BKS, 230. (This particular statement is not found in the German 
version of the Apology.) 
242 Ap XVIII:9, Tappert, 226; BKS, 312. Note this reference is grouped with references to the 
English adjective “philosophical”, though in the Latin the noun form of the word is used. 
 The German is different: Also bleibet weltliche, äußerliche Zucht; denn Gott will ungeschicktes, 
wildes, freches Wesen und Leben nicht haben, und wird doch ein rechter Unterscheid gemacht unter 
äußerlichem Weltleben und Frömmikeit, und der Frömmkeit, die für Gott gilt, die nicht philosophisch 
äußerlich ist, sondern inwendig im Herzen. (“What remains is a worldly, external discipline; because God 
will not have clumsy, wild, insolent behavior and life, and yet a proper distinction is made between external 
worldly life and goodness, and the goodness, which is relevant for God, which is not philosophically 
external but internal in the heart.”) (The English translation of the German is this author’s adaptation of the 
Triglotta, 337.) 
243 Ap XXI:41, Tappert, 235; BKS, 326. (This particular statement is not found in the German 
version of the Apology.) 
244 Ap XXVII:54, Tappert, 278; BKS, 393. (This particular statement is not found in the German 
version of the Apology.) 
245 Ap II:4, Tappert, 101; BKS, 147. 
 The German reads: Darumb so ich habe wollen sagen, was Erbsunde sei, ist das nicht zu 
übergehen gewest, sonderlich dieser Zeit, da etliche von derselbigen angebornen bösen Lust mehr 
heidnisch aus der Philosophie, denn nach dem göttlichen Wort oder nach der heligen Schrift reden. 
“Therefore I have wished to say what original sin is, so that it is not passed over, especially at this time, 
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Second-order “philosophy” summary 
 The foregoing examination of The Book of Concord’s second-order use of 
philosophy—that is, the use of “philosophers”, “philosophy”, “philosophical”, and 
“philosophize”—has shown an overwhelmingly negative regard, arguably for the 
method, subject matter, and purpose of the intellectual activity that is “philosophy”. This 
negative regard has emerged primarily in discussions of justification, but the negative 
regard has also been evident in other places where the issue of righteousness has come 
up, such as in faith and good works, original sin, free will, invocation of the saints, the 
mass, monastic vows, and the Lord’s Supper. Although the vast majority of the 
references were in early documents written by Melanchthon, there was no apparent 
difference (other than frequency) between those references and the others in early 
documents written by Luther or in later documents written by Andreä and Chemnitz. 
 Striking also in this examination has been how The Book of Concord refers to 
philosophy and things philosophical being mingled or mixed with the Gospel or Christian 
doctrine, objecting to such an adulteration of Christian doctrine, and how, directly or 
indirectly calling opponents “philosophers”, The Book of Concord groups them with 
scholastics, Pharisees, Mohammedans, papists, sophists, and the like. Furthermore, it has 
been striking how philosophy and its cognates were often set opposite God’s Word and 
Holy Scripture246 and how the polemic against philosophy was often sharper in the 
Latin.247  
 Yet, despite the repudiation of second-order philosophy just detailed (and an 
interesting second-order regard for logic detailed in the next chapter), the authors of the 
works contained in The Book of Concord, as the following chapters show, nevertheless 
simultaneously make supra-sentential use of philosophy in the form of logic and 
                                                                                                                                                 
when many speak of this inborn, wicked desire more in a heathenish way from philosophy than according 
to God’s Word, or according to Holy Scripture.” (The English translation of the German is this author’s, 
based in part on the Triglotta, 105.) 
246 See examples above at n.227, p.83; n.236, p.85; and n.245, p.86. 
247 See the listing of examples above in n.223, p.82. In addition to the example of a difference in 
the German to the Latin noted above (n.235, p.85), the German of Apology IV:235 in the context of 
perfection makes reference to books specifically of “philosophers” where the Latin simply refers to “sages” 
(see BKS, 205; Tappert, 140). (See also the reference to “perfection” at n.223, p.82.) 
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argumentation. Further consideration is needed to see the continuity of such uses with the 
medieval tradition and within the Reformation tradition itself. The rest of the dissertation 
in part considers those very questions. 
Dissertation Organization 
 The following four chapters of this dissertation present the evidence to consider 
and begin that consideration, while the last chapter of the dissertation draws the 
conclusions from that consideration. This seventh and final subsection of this 
introductory chapter thus briefly overviews the organization and content of the following 
five chapters. 
 Chapter II addresses meta-logical opinions and practices in The Book of Concord. 
First in Chapter II is a survey of the second-order data regarding “logic”, principally from 
the Apology, although there is some data from the locus on Original Sin in both the 
Apology and the Formula of Concord, which allows for a very direct comparison. The 
rest of Chapter II looks at how the works within The Book of Concord are organized by 
 or loci (“places” or “topics”). That examination includes other major uses of the 
relevant words and a survey of the philosophical background for the method of 
organization, from Aristotle forward. 
 Chapter III deals with The Book of Concord’s use of inductive argumentation. 
The two types of inductive argumentation explored are example and analogy. The 
philosophical background of these inductive methods is first presented to serve as a basis 
for comparison after the way The Book of Concord uses the two methods has also been 
presented. That the Reformers use the two methods both for their own positions and 
against their opponents’ positions will be seen. 
 Chapter IV explores the use of deductive argumentation in The Book of Concord. 
After presenting the philosophical background of syllogisms, the chapter moves on to 
survey Melanchthon’s method regarding “sophistries”, terminology used in connection 
with the arguments, and then arguing passages themselves, making general observations 
along the way.  
 
89 
 Chapter V in some ways is a case study of how the logic and argumentation of 
The Book of Concord is used. First, Chapter V shows how the word prius (“before”) is 
used in The Book of Concord , eventually indicating some sense of necessity for works to 
follow faith. With a cause and effect relationship between faith and works established, 
the chapter goes on to examine how the Reformers treated justification by faith as 
inseparable but distinct from the resulting good works of sanctification, arguably using a 
somewhat controversial philosophical concept known as a formal distinction, which, if 
true, makes the justification-sanctification distinction less discontinuous than often 
alleged. 
 As noted above, the final chapter, Chapter VI, draws on the evidence and 
discussion of the preceding chapters pertaining to the supra-sentential use of philosophy 
by The Book of Concord to reach conclusions about its repudiation but simultaneous use, 
its continuity with the preceding medieval tradition, and its continuity within the 
Reformation tradition, contrasting the uses by the authors of the earlier documents with 
the uses of the authors of the later documents. 
Chapter I Summary 
 In the beginning, through the time of Tertullian, and up through the time of the 
Reformation, the relationship between theology and philosophy occasionally was 
contentious. Nevertheless, theologians well-trained in philosophy have allowed 
philosophy and reason to serve theology in a ministerial role, as handmaid to the mistress 
of the house, a metaphor with a basis in such Bible passages as Proverbs 9; Genesis 16, 
29-30. Although Martin Luther and some of his Reformation successors could give 
blanket condemnations of philosophy and reason (such as Luther’s famous quotation that 
“reason is the devil’s whore”), initial investigations indicated they still used “baptized” 
forms of philosophy and reason. A close reading of The Book of Concord is uniquely 
suited to explore the Reformers’ repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy and that 
use of philosophy’s continuity and discontinuity between the late-medieval and 
Reformation periods and within the Reformation era itself. The close reading is more 
sensitive than somewhat-superficial previous studies, and The Book of Concord provides 
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works of a similar type from several earlier and later authors that were widely accepted 
and thus represent more than the positions of the individual authors, thereby allowing a 
more-meaningful comparison. After introducing the relevant works and their 
philosophically trained authors, this chapter provided evidence that those same authors 
could speak quite sharply against philosophy and set limits to what it and its practitioners 
could do in relationship to Scripture. What they said about logic and the philosophical 




Metalogical Opinions and Practices 
In the same way, prior to this controversy, the theologians in our schools 
and churches, following the rules of logic, used the same terminology 
freely and without incurring suspicion, and for that reason without ever 
being corrected either by Dr. Luther or by any other dependable teacher 
of our pure Evangelical churches. 
 —Solid Declaration I:56  
In the Formula of Concord, the confessors claim that “following the rules of logic” (nach 
der Dialectica; iuxta regulas dialecticae) Lutheran theologians had not run into problems 
prior to the controversy over terminology related to original sin.1 Indeed, Lutheran 
theologians frequently made uncontroversial supra-sentential use of philosophy, such as 
logic and organization, and in more than just the article on Original Sin. This chapter 
traces out the Reformers’ second-order regard for logic and the confessors’ 
organizational approach according to  or loci (“topics” or “places”). 
Regard for logic 
 Perhaps the most obvious next place to proceed with the examination of the 
supra-sentential use of philosophy in The Book of Concord is with the specific uses the 
authors in the work make of the words for “logic” and their cognates.2 This examination 
yields what might be called a second-order regard for logic. The uses of “logic” and its 
cognates follow below, roughly in the order that they appear in The Book of Concord, 
which, in this case, is also essentially chronological order.  
                                                 
1 SD I:56, Tappert, 518; BKS, 863. 
2 The words in the Latin writings are dialecticum, dialectici and dialectica, dialecitcae; the words 
in the German writings are both the German Dialektika and the Latin dialectica, dialecticae. Both the Latin 
dialecticum, dialectici and dialectica, dialecitcae are said to mean “dialectics (pl.), logic; art of 
logic/reasoning; logic questions” (Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975]). 
 The English word “logic” derives through the French from medieval Latin logica, which translates 
the Greek , an elliptical expression for  or ars logica (“logical art”). Although often 
used synonymously with “dialectic(s)”, more strictly speaking “logic” was a broader category that included 
“dialectic(s)”, which itself was used in various ways by different authors. (OED, 4:599-600; 8:1107-1108.) 
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Apology IV (Justification) 
 Melanchthon is the principal author of the document that contains six of the seven 
uses of “logic” and its cognates. The first use considered here comes in Apology IV, 
Justification, where Melanchthon says his opponents “do violence not only to Scripture 
but also to the very usage of language” (non solum contra Scripturam, sed etiam contra 
sermonis consuetudinem; nicht allein wider die Schrift, sondern auch wider gemeinen 
Gebrauch zu reden) and use a completely new logic as they reason, on the basis of the 
word “reward” ( , merces) in Luke 6:23, that works merit eternal life apart from 
faith.3 
Plane nova est haec dialectica: vocabulum audimus mercedis, igitur nihil 
opus est mediatore Christo aut fide habente accessum ad Deum propter 
Christum, non propter opera nostra. Quis non videt haec esse 
? 
Das ist gar einen neue Dialektica, da finden wir das enzele Wort Lohn, 
darum tun unsere Werk vollkömmlich genug dem Gesetze, darum sind wir 
durch unsere Werke Gott angenehm, dürfen keiner Gnade noch keines 
Mittlers Christi. Unsere gute Werke sind der Schatz, dadurch das ewige 
Leben erkauft und erlanget wird. 
Such logic is completely new. We hear the term “reward”: therefore we 
need neither Christ the mediator nor the faith that has access to God for 
Christ’s sake, not for our works’ sake. Who cannot see that this is a 
fallacious conclusion?4  
                                                 
3 Ap IV:357, Tappert, 161-162; BKS, 227-228. (Confer Ap IV:362.) There may be an intended 
sense of “common usage”, although with Tappert confer Triglotta, 217,219; K-W, 170. 
 The label nova dialectica is probably not to be taken a reference to the logica nova, the “new 
logic”, of Aristotle’s more recently discovered works (see in the text below, p.198). In general, calling 
something “new” is a negative reference, describing it as an innovation or otherwise heretical. In this 
context, Melanchthon seems to be suggesting his opponents’ “new” logic is no logic at all. 
4 Ap IV:358, BKS, 228; Tappert, 162. The Triglotta’s English translation renders the rhetorical 
question: “Who does not see that these are anacoluthons?” K-W does not seem to translate the question. 
The lack of the specific Greek term in the German version is likely due to the simplifying tendencies of the 
German version for its different audience. 
 According to the OED, the etymology of the Greek word, which means “wanting sequence” is the 
privative prefix  +  “following”. Thus, an “anacoluthon” is an instance of a grammatical 
problem where a change is made to a second constructions without completing the first (OED, 1:427). Put 
another way, the term refers to “Beginning a sentence in one way and continuing or ending it in another” 
(John A. Cuddon, “anacoluthon,” The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, Fourth 
ed. [New York: Penguin Books, 1998], 33). The literary figure of speech may be used by design to clarify 
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Significantly, Melanchthon here connects the misuse of Scripture with the misuses of 
language and logic.5 Furthermore, he not only accuses his opponents of bad logic, but he 
also intimates that their error in logic is clear to all, which by implication means the error 
in logic is especially clear to the theologians of the Augsburg Confession who can use 
logic soundly. 
Apology XII (Penitence) 
 Sound logic was taught in the medieval schools, and how one made use of logic 
could depend on how one was taught. So, the fact that Melanchthon’s polemic against his 
                                                                                                                                                 
or emphasize something or simply be more elegant.  
 In the third edition of Melanchthon’s logic (1547), however, the term, which he attributes to Plato, 
is used for making a connection where one does not exist. (Confer “inconsequence” in Liddell and Scott, A 
Greek-English Lexicon 109.) Melanchthon says the error means the consequence, or conclusion, must be 
denied. He gives the following example: 
 In omnibus sanctis in hac vita manet peccatum, (In all the saints in whom there is life [P] sin remains [M],) 
 Adulterium est peccatum, (Adultery [S] is a sin [M],) 
 Ergo in sanctis manet adulterium. (Therefore adultery [S] remains in the saints [P].) 
Melanchthon goes on to explain that the AAA form of the syllogism is not valid in the second figure and 
that nothing can follow from pure affirmatives in this form. (CR, 13:716-717; confer BKS, 228 n.1; this 
author’s translation. Confer and compare the edition of his logic text current at the time Melanchthon wrote 
the Apology, Philipp Melanchthon, De dialectica libri quatuor, 2nd [1528] ed. [Wittenberg: Josephum 
Klug, 1536], 207-208. [Neither the pages of the book as photographed nor the images of the folios on the 
fiche are numbered, so for reference purposes the pages beginning with the title page were given cardinal 
numbers the way pages of a book would be numbered today.]) The example of the bad argument is 
significant; all Melanchthon’s examples are said to be ethical and scriptural (Lisa Jardine, “Humanism and 
the teaching of logic,” The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, 
Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 803 n.37; confer 
Sachiko Kusukawa, “Vinculum Concordiae: Lutheran Method by Philip Melanchthon,” Method and Order 
in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, eds. Daniel A. Di Liscia, 
Eckhard Kessler and Charlotte Methuen [Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997] 346). Background on syllogisms 
and their forms is provided below, beginning on p.193. 
 A search for any declension of the Greek term  in the Latin and for the English term 
“anacoluthon” in the English failed to produce any other uses in The Book of Concord. The Tappert edition, 
however, which in this case of Ap IV:358 translated  as “fallacy”, in Ap IV:222 uses “It would 
be a fallacy to reason” to translate Neque vero recte ratiocinabitur (the German does not have a direct 
equivalent) (Tappert, 137; BKS, 202) and in Ap IV 246 “It is therefore fallacious for our opponents to 
argue” to translate Quare errant adversarii, cum hinc ratiocinantur (Darum irren die Widersacher weit) 
(Tappert, 142; BKS, 208). For more on the uses of ratiocinor, see n.72 below, p.221. 
5 In the octavo edition of Ap IV (see the explanation above n.192), however, Melanchthon says, 
“We are not engaging in a mere war over words” (K-W, 170). Confer SD I:3, where nearly an identical 
statement is made regarding the dispute over original sin: “This controversy concerning original sin is not a 
useless contention about words” (Tappert, 507; BKS, 648: Nun ist dieser Streit von der Erbsünde nicht ein 




opponents includes raising questions about their logic teachers is not surprising. We find 
a case in point in the Apology at the locus of penitence.6 
 Deus perdat istos impios sophistas, tam sceleste detorquentes 
verbum Dei ad sua somnia vanissima. Quis bonus vir non commoveatur 
indignitate tanta? Christus inquit: Agite poenitentiam, apostoli praedicant 
poenitentiam: igitur poenae aeternae compensantur poenis purgatorii, 
igitur claves habent mandatum remittendi partem poenarum purgatorii, 
igitur satisfactiones redimunt poenas purgatorii. Quis docuit istos asinos 
hanc dialecticam? Sed haec neque dialectica neque sophistica est, sed est 
sycophantica. Ideo allegant hanc vocem, Agite poenitentiam, ut cum tale 
dictum contra nos citatum imperiti audiunt, concipiant opinionem nos 
totam poenitentiam tollere. His artibus alienare animos et inflammare odia 
conantur, ut con clament contra nos imperiti, tollendos esse e medio tam 
pestilentes haereticos, qui improbent poenitentiam.  
 Gott wolle schänden und strafen solche verzweifelte Sophisten, die 
so verräterlich und böslich das heilige Evangelium auf ihre Träume 
deuten. Welchem from men, ehrbarn Mann sollt nicht solch groß, 
öffentlich Mißbrauch göttliches Worts im Herzen wehe tun? Christus 
spricht: Tut Buß. Die Aposteln predigen auch: Tut Buße. Darum ist durch 
die Sprüche beweiset, daß Gott Sünde nicht vergebe ohne um der 
erdichteten Satisfaction willen? Wer hat die groben unverschämten Esel 
solche Dialektiken gelehret? Es ist aber nicht Dialektika noch Sophistika, 
sondern es sind Bubenstück, mit Gottes Word also zu spielen und so 
verdrießlichen Mutwillen zu treiben. Darum ziehen sie den Spruch als 
dunkel und verdeckt an aus dem Evangelio: Tut Buße usw., daß, wenn die 
Unerfahrenen hören, daß dies Wort aus dem Evangelio wird wider uns 
angezogen, denken sollen, wir sein solche Leute, die gar nichts von der 
Buße halten. Mit solchen Böswichtstücken gehen sie mit uns um. 
Wiewohl sie wissen, daß wir recht von der Buße lehren, so wollen sie 
doch die Leute abschrecken und gern viele Leute wider uns erbittern, daß 
die Unerfahrnen schreien sollen: Kreuzige, kreuzige solche schädliche 
Ketzer, welche von der Buß nicht halten; und werden also öffentlich als 
die Lügner hier überwunden. 
 May God destroy these wicked sophists who so sinfully twist the 
Word of God to suit their vain dreams! What good man would not be 
moved by such dishonesty? Christ says, “Be penitent”; the apostles preach 
penitence. Therefore the punishments of purgatory compensate for eternal 
punishments; therefore the keys have the command to remit part of the 
                                                 
6 Melanchthon’s logic textbook was mentioned above in n.4, p.92, and is further discussed below 
beginning on p.199. See also, for example, Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §169. 
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punishments of purgatory; therefore satisfactions buy off the punishments 
of purgatory. Who ever taught these asses such logic? This is not logic or 
even sophistry, but sheer dishonesty. They quote the word, “Be penitent,” 
against us so that when the uninitiated hear this they will conclude that we 
deny all penitence. With such tricks they try to alienate men’s minds and 
fan their hatred, so that the uninitiated may demand that such terrible 
heretics, who reject penitence, should be removed from their midst.7 
Again, Melanchthon connects twisting the Word of God to bad logic (and vice versa). In 
the case of penitence, he regards his opponents’ bad arguments as worse than sophistry—
the bad arguments are dishonest tricks. 
Apology XX (Good Works) 
 At the Apology’s locus on Good Works, Melanchthon again impugns his 
opponents by stating that they learned tricks in their logic courses that enable them to 
draw out of Scripture whatever conclusions they want. Melanchthon even gives 
expression to their bad arguments. 
 Adversarii etiam addunt testimonia suae condemnationi. Et operae 
pretium est unum atque alterum recitare. Allegant ex Petro: Studete 
firmam facere vocationem vestram etc. Iam vides, lector, adversarios 
nostros non perdidisse operam in discenda dialectica, sed habere artificium 
ratiocinandi ex Scripturis prorsus, quidquid libet. Facite firmam 
vocationem vestram per bona opera. Igitur opera merentur remissionem 
peccatorum. Sane concinna erit argumentatio, si quis sic ratiocinetur de 
reo capitalis poenae, cui poena remissa est: Magistratus praecipit, ut in 
posterum abstineas ab alieno. Igitur per hoc meritus es condonationem 
poenae, quod nunc ab alieno abstines. Sic argumentari est ex non causa 
causam facere. Nam Petrus loquitur de operibus sequentibus remissionem 
peccatorum et docet, quare sint facienda, scilicet, ut sit firma vocatio, hoc 
est, ne vocatione sua excidant, si iterum peccent. Facite bona opera, ut 
perseveretis in vocatione, ne amittatis dona vocationis, quae prius 
contigerunt, non propter sequentia opera, sed iam retinentur fide, et fides 
non manet in his, qui amittunt spiritum sanctum, qui abiiciunt 
poenitentiam, sicut supra diximus, fidem exsistere in poenitentia. 
 Die Widersacher führen auch etliche Sprüche der Schrift ein, 
warum sie diesen Artikel verdammen. Nämlich bringen sie den Spruch 
Petri herfür: „Fleißet euch, euren Beruf fest zu machen durch gute Werk 
                                                 
7 Ap XII:123, BKS, 277-278; Tappert, 200-201. 
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usw.” Da siehet jedermann, daß unsere Widersacher ihr Geld nicht übel 
angelegt, da sie Dialecticam studiert haben. Denn sie mügen die Sprüche 
der Schrift gereimt, ungereimt, schließlich, unschließlich, wie sie wollen, 
und wie es ihnen gefällt, einführen. Denn also schließen sie: Petrus sagt: 
„Fleißet euch durch gute Werke, euren Beruf fest zu machen”, darum 
verdienen wir durch Werke Vergebung der Sunde. Es ist wahrlich ein 
feine Argumentation, als wenn einer spräche von einem Beklagten im 
Halsgericht, welchem das Leben gefristet wäre: Der Richter hat geboten, 
daß der forthin sich solcher Übeltat soll enthalten; darum so hat er 
verdienet mit solchem Enthalten, daß ihm das Leben gefristet ist. Also 
argumentieren, das heißt, ex non causa causam machen. Denn Petrus redet 
von guten Werken und Früchten, die da folgen dem Glauben, und lehret, 
warum man sie tun solle, nämlich, daß wir unsern Beruf fest machen, das 
ist, daß wir nicht wiederum vom Evangelio fallen, wenn wir wiederum 
sundigeten. Will sagen: Tut gute Werke, daß ihr bei dem Evangelio, bei 
eurem himmlischen Beruf bleibet, daß ihr nicht wiederum abfallet, kalt 
werdet, verlieret Geist und Gaben, die euch aus Gnaden durch Christum 
widerfahren sind, nicht um der folgenden Werke willen. Denn in dem 
Beruf bleibet man fest durch den Glauben, und der Glaube und heilige 
Geist bleibet in denjenigen nicht, die sündlich Leben führen.  
 Our opponents quote many Scripture passages to show why they 
have condemned our article, and it is worthwhile to examine some of 
these. From Peter they quote (II Pet. 1:10), “Be zealous to confirm your 
call.” Now you see, dear reader, that our opponents have indeed got the 
most out of their logic courses, for they have learned the trick of deducing 
from Scripture whatever suits them. “Confirm your call by good works”; 
therefore works merit the forgiveness of sins! By the same argument we 
could say to a man who was sentenced to die and then pardoned, “The 
magistrate commands that from now on you steal no more, and therefore 
you are pardoned.” Such argumentation is to make the effect the cause. 
For Peter is talking about the works that follow the forgiveness of sins; he 
is giving instruction that they should be done in order to confirm their call, 
that is, lest they fall from their call by sinning again. Do good works to 
persevere in your call and not to lose its gifts, which were given to you 
before your works and not because of them and which now are kept by 
faith. Faith does not remain in those who lose the Holy Spirit and reject 
penitence; as we have said before, faith has its existence in penitence.8 
                                                 
8 Ap XX:12-13, BKS, 315-316; Tappert, 228-229. Note that in this case the German translator uses 
the Latin words in the German text (confer n.77 below, p.354, where the German philosophical and 
theological vocabulary is said to still be in development). 
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The specific error Melanchthon accuses his opponents of committing is making a non-
cause a cause,9 yet, as with the foregoing uses, the bad logic in question is notably being 
applied to Holy Scripture. The Reformers’ own proper use of cause and effect will be 
seen later in Chapter V. 
Apology I (Original Sin) 
 Coming earlier in the Apology but treated later here is the use of “logic” at the 
locus of original sin. The Roman Catholic opponents in their Confutation attacked the 
definition of original sin given in the Augsburg Confession. Thus, at issue in the 
Apology’s treatment of original sin is whether lacking fear of God and faith is actual or 
original guilt and whether original sin can be said to include the concupiscence that 
remains after Baptism.10 Melanchthon calls these questions “sophistry” (cavillatio, 
Deutungen) or “quibbles” (argutias; cavillatio) that “have obviously come from the 
schools” (satis apparet in scholis natas esse; von Theologen ... herkommet).11 
Nevertheless, Melanchthon refers back to the Augsburg Confession12 and explains that 
original sin entails the lack “of actual fear and trust in God” and the lack “of the 
possibility and gift to produce” the fear and trust in God and, according to the definition 
given in the Latin version of the Augsburg Confession, concupiscence.13 Melanchthon 
defends including concupiscence in the definition of original sin, saying even his 
opponents regard concupiscence as “the so-called ‘material element’ of original sin” 
(Adversarii in scholis fatentur: materiale, ut vocant, peccati originalis esse 
concupiscentiam; Die Widersacher selbst reden also davon in ihren Schulen und 
bekennen, daß die Materien oder Materiale der Erbsünde, wie sie es nennen, sei böse 
                                                 
9 For more on this passage and the specific logical error identified, see below, at n.33, p.335.  
10 Ap II:1. 
11 Ap II:2, Tappert, 100; BKS, 146. 
12 AC II:1. 
13 Ap II:3, Tappert, 101. That the definition is not in the German may again reflect its tendency to 
simplify content and omit more technical terminology. 
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Lust).14 Melanchthon’s reference to his opponents’ philosophical terminology is 
significant, but we must note that he does not endorse the distinction per se. Quite the 
contrary, Melanchthon goes on to criticize the scholastics for misunderstanding the 
Church Fathers, as a result minimizing original sin, and thereby erring on the matter of 
righteousness. In the matter of righteousness, too, Melanchthon says his opponents’ 
misuse logic.15 
Neque novi quidquam diximus. Vetus definitio recte intellecta prorsus 
idem dicit, cum ait: peccatum originis carentiam esse iustitiae originalis. 
Quid est autem iustitia? Scholastici hic rixantur de dialecticis 
quaestionibus, non explicant, quid sit iustitia originalis. 
Und wir haben da nichts Neues gesagt. Die alten Scholastici, so man sie 
recht verstehet, haben gleich dasselbige gesagt; denn sie sagen, die 
Erbsünde sei ein Mangel der ersten Reinigkeit und Gerechtigkeit im 
Paradies. 
We said nothing new. Properly understood, the old definition says exactly 
the same thing, “Original sin is the lack of original righteousness.” But 
what is righteousness? Here the scholastics quibble about philosophical 
questions and do not explain what original righteousness is.16  
 Melanchthon goes on to explain righteousness and original sin as described by the 
Scriptures and Fathers, and he contrasts the correct teaching to that of his opponents.17 
Melanchthon basically says there is a tradeoff: one has righteousness or concupiscence; 
concupiscence (the “vicious disposition”) comes with the lack of righteousness (the 
defect or deficiency).18 After Melanchthon has adduced Scriptural and patristic support 
for his position, he says: “No quibbling can overthrow these proofs” (Haec testimonia 
nulla cavillatione everti possunt. Dieses sind Pauli helle, gewisse Worte und klare 
Sprüche; da vermag keine Gloß, kein listiges Fündlein nichts wider; diese Sprüche 
                                                 
14 Ap II:4, Tappert, 101; BKS, 147. The BKS editors and Tappert make reference at this point to 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theological, II, 1, q.82, a.3.c (BKS, 147 n.1; Tappert, 101 n.4). On the opponents’ 
identification of concupiscence with the material element of original sin, confer Ap II:35. 
15 Ap II:5-14, Tappert, 101-102.  
16 Ap II:15, BKS, 150; Tappert, 102. 
17 Ap II:16-50. 




werden alle Teufel, alle Menschen nicht mögen umstossen).19 And, Melanchthon is 
confident the emperor will be able to see through the bad logic (or at least trust 
Melanchthon’s conclusion regarding the matter). 
 Haec arbitramur satisfactura esse Caesareae Maiestati de puerilibus 
et frigidis cavillationibus, quibus adversarii articulum nostrum calumniati 
sunt. Scimus enim nos recte et cum catholica ecclesia Christi sentire. Sed 
si renovabunt hanc controversiam adversarii, non defuturi sunt apud nos, 
qui respondeant et veritati patrocinentur. Nam adversarii in hac causa 
magna ex parte, quid loquantur, non intelligunt. Saepe dicunt pugnantia, 
nec formale peccati originis nec defectus, quos vocant, recte ac dialectice 
expediunt. Sed nos hoc loco noluimus istorum rixas nimis subtiliter 
excutere. Tantum sententiam sanctorum patrum, quam et nos sequimur, 
communibus et notis verbis duximus esse recitandam. 
 Dieses achten wir, solle die kaiserliche Majestät ihr billig lassen 
gnug sein wider das lose; kindische, ungegründt Fürbringen der 
Widersacher, durch welches sie der Unsern Artikel ohne Ursache ganz 
unbillig anfechten. Denn sie singen, sagen, wie viel, was und wie lange sie 
wollen, so wissen wir eigentlich das und sinds fürwahr gewis, daß wir 
christlich und recht lehren und mit der gemeinen christlichen Kirche 
gleich stimmen und halten. Werden sie darüber weiter mutwilligen Zank 
einführen, so sollen sie sehen, es sollen hie, will Gott, Leute nicht feilen, 
die ihnen antworten und die Wahrheit dennoch erhalten. Denn die 
Widersacher wissen das mehrer Teil nicht, was sie reden. Denn wie ofte 
reden und schreiben sie ihnen selbst Widerwärtigs? Verstehen auch ihre 
eigen Dialektica nicht vom Formal der Erbsünde, das ist, was eigentlich an 
ihrem Wesen die Erbsunde sei oder nicht sei, was auch der Mangel der 
ersten Gerechtigkeit sei. An diesem Orte aber haben wir nicht wollen von 
ihrer zänkischen Disputation subtiler oder weiter reden, sondern allein die 
Sprüche und Meinung der heiligen Väter, welchen wir auch gleichförmig 
lehren, mit klaren, gemeinen verständlichen Worten erzählen wollen. 
 This, we believe, will satisfy His Imperial Majesty about the 
childish and trivial quibbling with which our opponents have slandered 
our article. We know that our doctrine is correct and in agreement with 
Christ’s church catholic. If our opponents reopen the controversy, we shall 
not lack men to reply in defense of the truth, for in this case our opponents 
frequently do not know what they are talking about. They often contradict 
themselves and fail to explain logically and correctly either the formal 
                                                 
19 Ap II:40, Tappert, 105; BKS, 155. Note the intensification of the statement in the German: 
“These are Paul’s certain words and clear expressions, which no gloss, no smart little discovery is able to 
refute; all devils, all people will not be able to reverse these expressions” (this author’s translation). 
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element of original sin or the so-called deficiency. For our part, we have 
been reluctant to enter upon their arguments at great length. We have 
thought it worthwhile rather to list, in the usual familiar phrases, the 
opinions of the holy Fathers, which we also follow.20 
For Melanchthon and the other Lutherans, Scripture and the simple statements of the 
Church Fathers are preferred over philosophy-influenced distinctions or conclusions 
reached by bad logic. In the case of the Apology on Original Sin, the dispute centered not 
on a use of philosophy where none should be used, however, but over bad theology 
reached by bad philosophy. The limits of logic from the Lutheran perspective, somewhat 
notable on this locus of original sin in the Apology, become even more explicit in the 
final use of “logic” and its cognates, that from the Formula of Concord on the same 
locus.21 
Formula I (Original Sin) 
 Nearly 30 years after Melanchthon authored the Apology, a controversy arose 
among the Lutherans themselves regarding Original Sin.22 The Formula of Concord 
addressed that controversy in its first article, citing the Apology and continuing to 
approve the use of logic.23 Put simply, the controversy centered on whether original sin is 
to be identified with or distinguished from a human being’s “substance, nature, essence, 
body, and soul” (Substanz, Natur, Wesen, Leib, Seele; substantiam, naturam, essentiam, 
corpus et animam), and the authors of and subscribers to the Formula confessed that such 
                                                 
20 Ap II:51, BKS, 157; Tappert, 106-107. The Triglotta’s English adds into its translation from the 
Latin after “formal element” a bit from the German: “i.e., that which is or is not properly of the essence of”. 
The K-W translation is essentially the same as Tappert’s. 
21 In the years between the Apology and Formula, Luther in SA III:I condemned the scholastics on 
original sin and held the same position as Melanchthon, but he did so without invoking logic or philosophy 
by name (Tappert, 302-303). Confer at n.34 below, p.104, where the SD’s reference back to SA III:I is 
discussed. Later it will be seen further how throughout The Book of Concord the second-order data match 
the first-order data. 
22 In 1560, Victorine Strigel and Matthias Flacius disputed over original sin, but Flacius went too 
far and was himself opposed by men such as Chemnitz and Andreä, principal authors of the Formula. 
Strigel’s and Flacius’ positions are condemned by the Formula (see, for example, Tappert, 468 n.7 and 9, 
508 n.5 and 6). 
23 For its references to the Apology, see SD I:3, 8, 10. 
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a distinction existed both before and after the fall into sin.24 (As is seen below, the 
distinction between the corruption of original sin and human nature relates directly to the 
article of justification.25) The confessors held to a distinction between original sin and 
human nature, but they also made it clear only God could separate the two, and that that 
separation would come only at the resurrection.26 Formula I condemns a number of 
different positions, most theological aberrations,27 and the article also clearly sets a limit 
to the use of logic, though it does not rule out any and every use of logic. 
 Und dieweil unter andern dieses auch dieses ein ungezweifelter, 
unwidersprechlicher Grundspruch in der Theologia ist, daß eine jede 
substantia oder selbständiges Wesen, sofern es eine Substanz ist, entweder 
Gott selber oder ein Werk und Geschöpf Gottes sei: so hat Augustinus in 
vielen Schriften wider die Manichäer mit allen wahrhaftigen Lehrern 
wohlbedacht und mit Ernst die Rede: Peccatum originis est substantia vel 
natura, das ist: Die Erbsünde ist des Menschen Natur oder Wesen, 
verdammet und verworfen, nach welchem auch alle Gelehrte und 
Vorständige allzeit gehalten, daß dasjenige, so nicht für sich selbst 
bestehet noch ein Teil ist eins andern selbständigen Wesens, sondern in 
einem andern Dinge wandelbarlich ist, nicht ein substantia, das ist, etwas 
Selbständiges, sondern ein accidens, das ist, etwas Zufälliges, seie. Also 
pflegt Augustinus beständiglich auf diese Weise zu reden: Die Erbsünde 
sei nicht die Natur selbst, sondern ein accidens vitium in natura, das ist, 
ein zufälliger Mangel und Schaden in der Natur. Wie man denn auf solche 
Weise auch in unsern Schulen und Kirchen nach der Dialektika für diesem 
Zank frei und unvordächtig geredet hat, und deswegen weder von D. 
Luthern, noch einichem rechtschaffenen Lehrer unserer reinen 
evangelischen Kirchen jemals gestraft worden. 
 Et cum sit indubitatum certissimumque axioma in re theologica, 
quod omnis substantia (quatenus est substantia) aut sit Deus ipse aut opus 
et creatura Dei: Augustinus in multis suis scriptis contra Manichaeos 
(quemadmodum et reliqui sinceri ecclesiae doctores) rem diligentissime 
expendit et propositionem hanc (peccatum originis est substantia vel 
natura) magno zelo reiecit atque damnavit. Et post eum etiam omnes 
eruditi et intelligentes semper senserunt, quidquid non per se subsistit, nec 
                                                 
24 Ep I:1-2, Tappert, 466; BKS, 770. Confer SD I:1-2. 
25 See the discussion of justification and sanctification in regards to Formula I that begins on 
p.342. Original sin distinct from human nature also relates directly to the teaching about Christ (AC II:1). 
26 Ep I:10, Tappert, 467. 
27 The Epitome has one list of antitheses in I:2-19; the Sold Declaration essentially has two lists in 
I:16-23, one pertaining to Pelagian errors and the other to Manichaean errors. 
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est pars alterius per se subsistentis essentiae, sed in alio est mutabiliter, id 
substantiam non esse, id est, quiddam per se subsistens, sed accidens, 
quod aliunde accidit. Et Augustinus constanter in hanc sententiam loqui 
solet: Peccatum originale non est ipsa natura, sed accidens vitium in 
natura. Et hoc ipso modo etiam nostro saeculo in scholis et ecclesiis 
nostris (iuxta regulas dialecticae) ante motam hanc controversiam libere et 
sine ulla haereseos suspicione locuti sunt viri docti, neque eam ob causam 
vel a D. Luthero vel ab ullo alio sincero doctore Evangelicarum 
ecclesiarum unquam sunt reprehensi. 
 It is one of the unquestioned and irrefutable axioms in theology 
that every substance or self-subsisting essence, in as far as it is a 
substance, is either God Himself or a product and creature of God. Thus in 
many of his writings against the Manicheans, Augustine, in accord with all 
dependable teachers, deliberately and seriously condemned and rejected 
the statement, “Original sin is the nature or essence of man.” On this basis 
all scholars and intelligent people have always held that whatever does not 
subsist by itself and is not a part of another self-subsisting essence, but is 
present in another thing mutably, is not a substance (that is, something 
self-subsistent) but an accident (that is, something accidental). Augustine 
therefore constantly speaks in this fashion: Original sin is not man’s nature 
itself, but an accidental defect and damage in the nature. In the same way, 
prior to this controversy, the theologians in our schools and churches, 
following the rules of logic, used the same terminology freely and without 
incurring suspicion, and for that reason without ever being corrected either 
by Dr. Luther or by any other dependable teacher of our pure, Evangelical 
churches.28  
While logic helps make the distinction between the accident of original sin and the 
substance of the human nature, the Formula also says those Latin terms are not to be used 
with the “common, unlearned people” (gemeinen unvorständigen Volk), the “simple folk” 
(einfältigen Volks).29 
 Relative to the distinction between the corruption of original sin and the human 
nature, there is an important limitation to observe: human beings’ corrupted reason 
                                                 
28 SD I:55-56, BKS, 862-863; Tappert, 518. (The epigram for this chapter comes from this same.) 
29 Ep I:23, Tappert, 469; BKS, 775. The Latin reads: abstinendum est ab illis in publicis sacris 
concionibus, ubi indocta plebs docetur, et hoc in re simplicium et rudiorum merito habenda est ratio (“they 
ought to be abstained from in public sermons, where the unlearned commoners are taught; and for this there 
is a correct rationale in the affairs of the simple country folk”) (this author’s translation). Confer SD I:54.
 The use of these terms belongs to the sub-sentential use of philosophy, and further consideration 
of their use is, strictly speaking, outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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cannot understand the corruption but can only come to believe in it from Scripture. 
Flacius reportedly had held, “that no distinction should be made, even in the mind, 
between man’s nature itself after the Fall and original sin, and that the two cannot be 
differentiated in the mind” (kein Unterschied zwischen der Natur nach dem Fall an ihr 
selbst und der Erbsünde sollte auch nicht gedacht, noch mit Gedanken voneinander 
unterscheiden werden könnten; inter naturam corruptam post lapsum per se ipsam 
consideratam, et inter peccatum originis nulla prorsus sit differentia neque ulla distinctio 
cogitari, aut saltem peccatum illud a natura cogitatione discerni possit).30 While the 
Epitome condemns that position, it makes clear that “This damage is so unspeakable that 
it may not be recognized by a rational process, but only from God’s Word” (Welcher 
Schade unaussprechlich, nicht mit der Vernunft, sondern allein aus Gottes Wort erkennet 
werden mag; Hoc quantum sit malum, verbis revera est inexplicabile, neque humanae 
rationis acumine indagari, sed duntaxat per Verbum Dei revelatum agnosci potest).31 
The Solid Declaration reiterates the need for God’s Word to reveal the characteristics of 
original sin by quoting from Luther’s Smalcald Articles,32 and it further cites other Luther 
writings in support of this same point.33  
                                                 
30 Ep I:19, Tappert, 468; BKS, 774. Flacius in this passage might be understood as ruling out the 
kind of distinction Scotus called a “formal distinction”, one this dissertation argues the Reformers 
essentially made in the case of justification and sanctification (see below, beginning on p.372). The 
condemnation of Flacius’s position that itself rejected the formal distinction, then, is not without additional 
significance. 
31 Ep I:9, Tappert, 467; BKS, 772. 
32 SD I:8, citing SA III:i:3 (see BKS, 847 with n.5 and 434). Confer n.21 above, p.100. 
33 SD I:33 (BKS, 854 n.1; Tappert, 514 n.5; K-W, 537 n.38). The works cited are as follows: a 
sermon on 1 Corinthians 15:54f. preached on April 14, 1532 (WA 36:68219; Aland #Pr1386); 1535 lecture 
on Genesis 3:7 (WA 42:12521-32; Aland #517; AE 1:167); 1544 lecture on Genesis 42:6-7 (WA 44:47230-37; 
Aland #517; AE 7:233-234); 1544 lecture on Genesis 42:18-20 (WA 44:4891-3, 19; Aland #517; AE 7:256); 
1544 lecture on Genesis 42:29-34 (WA 44:50610-16; Aland #517; AE 7:278-279); etc. None of the 
references given, however, seems to directly speak to corrupted reason not being able to discern the 
characteristics of the corruption. 
 SD I:61-62 also cites the following works of Luther in support of the use of the word “accident” 
(BKS, 865 n.1-2; Tappert, 519 n.7-9; K-W, 542 n.50-51): the 1535 lecture on Genesis 3 (WA 42:12025-131-
20; Aland #517; AE 1:160-182) and the 1534-1535 exposition of Psalm 90:12 (WA 40III:57118-20; Aland 
#612; AE 13:127-128). 
 The editors of BKS note that both sides in the dispute the Formula is addressing had gathered 
evidence from Luther in support of their respective positions (BKS, 854 n.; confer Tappert, 517 n.3). 
 
104 
Wiewohl aber die Erbsünde die ganze menschliche Natur wie ein geistlich 
Gift und Aussatz (wie Lutherus redet) vergiftet und verderbt hat, daß man 
in unserer verderbten Natur augenscheinlich nicht zeigen und weisen kann 
die Natur besonders für sich und die Erbsünde auch besonders für sich ... 
so in der Natur wohnt die beiden müssen und können auch unterschiedlich 
nach der Heiligen Schrift betrachtet, gelehrt und geglaubt werden.  
Etsi vero peccatum originale totam hominis naturam ut spirituale quoddam 
venenum et horribilis lepra (quemadmodum D. Lutherus loquitur) infecit 
et corrupit, ita quidem, ut iam in nostra natura corrupta ad oculum non 
monstrari possint distincte haec duo, ipsa natura sola et originale peccatum 
solum ... Haec enim duo secundum Sacrae Scripturae regulam distincte 
considerari, doceri et credi debent et possunt. 
Although, in Luther’s words, original sin, like a spiritual poison and 
leprosy, has so poisoned and corrupted man’s whole nature that within the 
corrupted nature we are not able to point out and expose the nature by 
itself and original sin by itself as two manifestly separate things … 
According to the Holy Scriptures we must and can consider, discuss, and 
believe these two as distinct from each other.34 
The important sequence to note is God’s Word enlightening corrupted reason that can 
then make use of philosophical words and the rules of logic to further elucidate the 
Bible’s teaching. 
Summary of regard for “logic” 
 From the foregoing uses of “logic” and its cognates, we see that the Lutherans 
wrote in the Apology of their opponents’ bad logic and in the Formula of Concord of 
their own good logic. Implicit in the condemnation of the opponents’ bad logic and 
explicit in the reference to their own good logic is that logic has its place in theology. 
Despite the facts of the negative context of the references to logic in the earlier writing 
and the positive context to the reference to logic in the later, there is no essential 
difference between the earlier and later writings. The subscribers to The Book of Concord 
present themselves as knowing logic’s place in theology and keeping it there. For them, 
applying logic to Holy Scripture is not out of place in and of itself, but using bad 
                                                 
34 SD I:33, BKS, 854-855; Tappert, 514. (The portion omitted by this author further denies the 
identification of the corrupt nature with original sin and extends the leprosy illustration.) 
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arguments or logical sleight-of-hands to deduce desired positions is condemned. Doing 
violence to the Word of God, abusing language, and bad logic are all related, they say, 
and they hold that logic is only able to help after one’s corrupt reason has been 
illuminated by the Scriptures. 
 The locus of original sin provides the only opportunity to compare the explicit 
references to logic between the earlier and later confessors. Neither the earlier nor the 
later confessors see themselves as innovating in terms of the teaching of original sin. In 
fact, they claim continuity by explicitly mentioning their predecessors by name or by 
referring favorably to their teaching: Thomas Aquinas, Anselm of Canterbury, Irenaeus, 
Ambrose, Peter Lombard, Augustine, Bonaventure, Hugo of St. Victor, Cyril, and 
Basil.35 (In similar ways they also disfavorably refer to authorities such as the 
“scholastics”, Gabriel Biel, Duns Scotus, “modern theologians”, Thomas Aquinas, Albert 
Pighius, the Council of Trent, Ulrich Zwingli.36) Such references occur in both the earlier 
and later writings contained in The Book of Concord. When it comes to the expression of 
the teaching regarding original sin, the philosophical concept of a “material element” is 
used early to help identify concupiscence as a part of original sin, and the distinction 
between a substance and its accidents is used to help separate human nature from original 
sin (put another way, original sin is not allowed to be a material element of human 
nature).  
 Despite a greater focus on original sin, all the loci where these second-order uses 
of “logic” and its cognates arise are notable: original sin, justification, penitence, and 
good works—all relate most closely to the central teaching of The Book of Concord. 
Where the Lutherans accuse their opponents of bad logic on these loci, the Lutherans 
themselves make a logical distinction in the nexus of these same issues that raises 
questions of a different sort, as will be seen in Chapter V. 
                                                 
35 Ap II:4, 15, 19-22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 36, 41; SD I:30, 54, 55, 56. 
36 Ap II:7, 8, 10, 32, 43, 46; SA III:1:3; Ep I:11, 12, 17, 18. 
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 as the philosophical method of organization 
 This chapter now moves from the confessors’ second-order regard for logic to 
their organizational approach according to  or loci (“topics” or “places”), a first-
order supra-sentential use of philosophy.37 First, this section considers the confessors’ use 
of the word loci especially as it pertains to the method of treating theological topics. 
Next, this section overviews the  organizational structure used by The Book of 
Concord, and finally it gives evidence for the use of this method being philosophical in 
nature and discusses what implications the use of the loci method might or might not 
have had. 
Book of Concord use of locus, loci 
 There are some 270 occurrences in The Book of Concord’s Latin of the masculine 
noun locus, loci; the neuter noun locum, loci that has essentially the same meaning; and 
the adverb loco.38 These Latin words both are translated by and themselves translate a 
number of different German words, chiefly, in alphabetical order, Artikel, hier, Ort, and 
Spruch.39 The Latin and the German are translated into English chiefly with the roughly 
                                                 
37 The Greek  in the singular and  in the plural are respectively transliterated as topos 
and topoi and translated into Latin as locus and loci. Confer Ong, who gives the German vernacular forms 
as Ort or Gemeinplatz (Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of 
Discourse to the Art of Reason [Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1958], 112). 
38 More specifically, the Libronix search of the Triglotta’s Latin found 42 occurrences of locus 
(nominative singular masculine), 47 occurrences of locum (accusative singular masculine and nominative, 
vocative, and accusative singular neuter), 7 occurrences of loci (genitive and locative singular masculine or 
neuter and nominative and vocative plural masculine), 112 occurrences of loco (dative and ablative singular 
masculine or neuter, in addition to being the adverb), 13 occurrences of locos (accusative plural masculine), 
7 occurrences of loca (nominative, vocative, and accusative plural neuter), 4 occurrences of locorum 
(genitive plural masculine and neuter), and 39 occurrences of locis (locative, dative, and ablative plural 
masculine or neuter). Not all of the occurrences found were, strictly speaking, in the text of The Book of 
Concord, so the total number of occurrences, 271, is not exact. No other forms of the words were used. 
39 The longer list, based principally on Libronix’s German edition of the Triglotta, follows in 
alphabetical order. andern Ep VIII:8; SD VIII:10. anstatt SD I:11; VII:119. Artikel AC XXVIII:52; Ap 
Preface:17; IV:2, 3; XII:10; XV:49; XVI:2, 13; XXVII:52; SD III:29 (twice), VIII:86. da Ap IV:207; 
XXIV:46; LC I:195; III:58, 120; SD VIII:84; LC II:63. daselbst/derselben Ap IV:238; SA Preface 19; LC 
Preface 3; I:278; SD II:44. diesem/dieses Ap II:3; XXIV:52; LC III:73. erste LC III:5, V:53. dritten Tr 38. 
für LC I:23, 54; III:75. Gründe Ap XXVIII:6. hier Ap I:35; XII:90; XX:5; XXIV:14; XXVII:20; Tr 22; LC 
I:56, 180, 200, 206, 261 (hiermit); II:26; III:55, 72; IV:12, 47 (Hierbei), V:28; SD I:15 (allhier), 39; III:67 
(hiermit); VI:15; VII:66, 111 (hiermit), 128 (allhier); VIII:38 (hieher), 39 (hie). mehr … denn Ap XXIII:23. 
solches Ap XXIII:68; LC I:53; III:118. Ort AC XXII:5; Ap Preface 14; I:4, 43, 51; IV:, 154, 208; XX:11; 
XXI:40 (twice), 42; XXIV:9, 31, 53; SA II:iv:8; Tr 26; LC I:167, 275; V:48; Ep VII:25, 32, 34; VIII:8, 29, 
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corresponding “topic”, “here”, “place”, and “passage”.40 The various German and 
English words used in translation give a sense of the relevant meanings and uses of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
30, 33; SD I:49; IV:26; V:7; VII:75, 97, 103, 119, 122, 126; VIII:10, 28, 82, 84 (twice), 92; X:9, 30; XI:2; 
XII:8. Raum LC I:203, 328; II:48; SD VII:99 (twice, one oder Stätte), 100 (four times); VIII:83; XII:7 
(Platz noch R.). Spruch Ap II:31; IV:83, 107, 218, 219, 231, 235, 244, 245, 259, 281, 282, 371; 
VII/VIII:19; XXII:7 (twice); XXIII:32; XXIV:31, 34, 53, 66; XXVII:11, 18, 40, 45 (twice), 65, 66; 
XXVIII:8, 21; SD II:27, 81. Stätte Ap XXI:28; Ap XXVII:53; VII/VIII:28; SC Preface:21; LC I:82, 94, 
182, 306, 313; LC I:108, 115, 181; II:30. Stelle SD XII:29. Stück Ap Preface:18; IV:5, 87; XV:43; XXI:1; 
XXII:98; XXIV:46. Stücklein LC III:113. Summa Ap Preface:6. Teil Ap XXIV:54. Titel Ap XIII:16. vor 
LC I:46. Wege Ap XX:4. wo SD III:29.  
 Even though the authoritative language of the various documents differs, the foregoing German 
list is based only on the use of the Latin words given; searches were not made going from the German to 
the Latin. One should note further, however, that even where a German word is originally used, the authors 
nevertheless may well be intending the Latin equivalent.  
 Moreover, there are a number of places where the specific work in The Book of Concord in which 
the words occur is quoting another source, as in the following examples: Ap XXIV:31 (Bible); Tr 62 
(Jerome); SD III:29 (twice, Luther WA 40I:240); VII:97, 99, 100 (four times), 103 (all seven in ¶97-103 
from Luther, WA 26:335ff); VIII:39 (Luther, WA 26:319); 82, 83, 84 (twice) (all four in ¶82-84 from 
Luther, WA 26:332, 333). 
40 The longer list, with some variations between the Tappert (Tap) and Triglotta (Trig) translations 
noted, follows in alphabetical order. argument Ap XXIV:52 Tap. article AC XXVI:4; XXVIII:52; Ap 
Preface:17 Tap; Tr 38 Tap; SD III:29 (twice), 86. as LC I:54. (this) commandment LC I:180 Tap. 
connection Ap IV:369. corner Ap XIII:13 Tap. declaration Ap XXVII:11 Trig, 12 Trig. doctrine Ap IV:2 
Tap, 3 Tap, 5 Tap, 310 Tap; XII:3 Tap, 10 Tap, 90 Tap, 98 Tap; XXIV:46 Tap. estate Ap XV:19. here Ap 
I:4 Tap, 35 Tap; IV:154 Tap, 378 Tap; XX:5; XXVII:20 Tap; Tr 22 Tap; SA Preface 19 Trig; LC I:56, 180 
Trig, 195, 200, 206, 261; II:26, 64 (Tap adds “in the Creed”); III:55, 72; IV:12, 47; V:28; SD I:15 Trig, 31 
Trig, 49 Tap; VI:15; VII:66, 111 Trig, 128 Trig; VIII:38, 39. hereby SD VII:113 Trig. herewith SD III:67. 
instead Ap XXIII:23; LC I:181 Trig; LC III:75; SD I:11 Trig; VII:119 Trig. matter Ap XVI:13 Tap; LC 
III:53 Trig, 118. nowhere Ap XXI:40. one Ap XXIV:53 Tap. occasion LC I:203 Tap. opportunity: LC 
I:203 Trig, 328. passage Ap II:3, 31; IV:83 Tap, 107, 154 Trig, 155, 171 Trig, 207, 220 Trig, 221 Trig 
(twice), 222 Trig, 224 (thrice) Trig, 226, 235 Trig, 238 Trig, 244, 245 Trig, 259, 264 Trig, 266, 272, 273 
Trig, 274, 280 (twice), 282, 284 (twice), 286 (five times), 305, 306, 310 Trig, 343, 371, 372, 376 (twice), 
388; VIII/VIII:19; XII:36, 59; XX:4 Trig; XXI:40 Trig; XXII:7 (twice); XXIII:32, 68 Trig; XXIV:31, 34 
(twice), 52 Trig & K-W but Tap seems better, 53, 53 Trig, 66; XXVII:3, 12, 19, 40, 45 (twice), 65, 66; 
XXVIII:8, 21; LC I:167 Tap, 278 Tap; Ep VII:25; SD II:27, 81 Trig; V:7. petition LC III:113 (could be 
“passage”, but the German Stücklein suggests petition is better), 118 Tap. place: AC XII:5; Ap Preface:14 
Tap; I:4 Trig, 43, 51 Trig; IV:, 208, 273 Tap, 342; XII:51 Trig; XIII:13 Trig, 16 Trig; XXIV:31; XXVII:20 
Trig; XXVIII:17; SA II:iv:8; Tr 26, 38 Trig, 62 Tap; SC Preface:18, 21; LC I:82, 94, 167 Trig, 278 Trig, 
313; II:48; V:37, 48; Ep VII:32, 34; VIII:8, 8 Tap, 29, 30, 33; SD I:49 Trig; II:29 Tap; IV:26; VII:75, 97, 
99 (“space or p.”), 103, 119 Trig, 122, 126; VIII:10, 28, 82, 84 (twice), 92; X:9, 30; XI:2, 96; XII:8 (twice; 
second Trig “p. or room”, Tap “room nor scope”). point Ap Preface:6, 14 Trig, 18 Tap; I:35 Trig; XXI:40 
Tap, 42 Tap; LC V:53; SD I:31 Tap; VII:128 Tap. position Ap XIII:16 Tap; SD XII:29 Trig. private parts 
LC I:275. question Ap XVI:2 Tap. rank SD XII:29 Tap. relation/thing/sphere LC III:73. replace/place of 
Ap XXI:28; XXVII:53; LC I:23, 46, 181 Trig, 182; LC II:30. representative LC I:108 Tap. room Ap 
XII:51 Tap; SD VIII:28 Trig. space SD VII:99, 100 (four times), 119 Tap; SD VIII:83. statements Ap 
IV:238 Tap; XX:4 Tap; XXIII:68 Trig; XXVII:11 Tap, 12 Tap. station Tr 62 Trig. stead Ap VII/VIII:28 
(vice et loco, Tap “place and stead”, Trig “stead and place”); LC I:108 Trig, 115 Trig. subject: Ap IV:87 
Tap, 171 Tap; XV:49 Tap; XXVIII:6 Tap. theme Ap XXIV:54. thing LC III:53 Trig. this LC I:53. topic Ap 
Preface:17 Trig, 18 Trig; IV:2 Trig, 3 Trig, 5 Trig, 83 Trig & K-W, 87 Trig, 378 Trig; XII:, 3 Trig, 10 Trig, 
90 Trig, 98 Trig; XV:43, 49 Trig; XVI:2 Trig, 13 Trig; XX:11 Trig; XXI:1 Trig, 40 Trig, 42 Trig; XXIV:9 
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Latin in The Book of Concord, to which the focus now turns. (Note that not all Latin uses 
are necessarily reflected in the German or English, especially depending on which 
English translation is consulted.) 
 All the words in question can be said to have various senses related to “place”, the 
most basic meaning of the Greek , , . Latin dictionaries indicate the following 
meanings for locus, loci: “place, territory/locality/neighborhood/region; position/point; 
aim point; site; seat, rank, position; soldier’s post; quarters; category; book passage, 
topic; part of the body; female genitals (pl.); grounds of proof”. As noted earlier, 
meanings given for locum, loci are similar: “place, territory/locality/neighborhood/region; 
position/point; aim point; site; seat, rank, position; soldier's post; quarters; category; book 
passage, topic; region, places (pl.); places connected with each other”. Finally, the adverb 
loco can mean “for, in the place of, instead of”.41 To greater and lesser extents, many of 
these are found in The Book of Concord. The following subsections deal with these uses. 
“In place of” 
 What may be the least found use of these three words in The Book of Concord is 
“in place of”, “instead of”, or “behalf of”, although even this use is found frequently 
enough to span across earlier and later documents and those written in Latin and 
translated from German to Latin.42 
“Place” 
 A far more common use of the words in The Book of Concord is to refer to a 
“place” of one form or another.43 These “places” can be “when or where” something 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trig, 14 Trig, 46 Trig, 54 Trig; XXVII:52; XXVIII:6 Trig; SC Preface 20 Trig. text Ap IV:218, 219 Tap, 
221 and 221 Tap (twice), 224 (thrice) Tap, 220 Tap, 235 Tap, 245 Tap, 264 Tap. there SD II:44 Trig. 
where SD III:29 Trig. wherever SD VIII:84. words SD II:81 Tap. (these) writings SD II:44 Tap. 
41 “loco” from William Whitaker, Words by William Whitaker, 1993-2007. Available: 
http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe. Accessed 2006 July 11. 
42 in place of Ap XXI:28; XXVII:53; LC I:23, 46, 54, 182; II:30; SD III:42. instead Ap XXIII:23; 
LC I:149, 151; III:75; SD I:11; VII:119. behalf of Ap VII/VIII:28; LC I:108, 115. 
43 Ap Preface 14 & 18 (arguably dogmatic); IV:208; XII:51; XIII:13, 16; XV:19; XXIV:31; 
XXVIII:17 (proper place); SA II:iv:8; Tr 26, 62; SC Preface:18, 21; LC I:82, 94, 116, 155, 219, 224, 227, 
240, 258, 284, 300, 306, 313; II:48; III:25, 56, 58, 68, 70, 73 (arguably two kingdoms), 120; V:37, 48; Ep 
R&N:2 (arguably a passage of writing); VII:32, 34; VIII:8 (twice), 29, 30, 33; SD I:57; II:21; VII:2, 75, 97, 
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might take place, they can be physical space, and they can be “places” of a more 
figurative type.44 As with determining uses of the word throughout this treatment, in 
some cases the precise use is somewhat debatable. Again note that these uses are found in 
earlier and later documents and in those written both in Latin and translated to Latin.  
“Passage” 
 A slightly more frequent use of the words is to refer to a passage or passages of 
writings. A handful of these uses refer to writings of those the confessors’ claim for their 
side,45 while another handful of these uses refer to passages or loci of the writings of the 
confessors’ opponents.46 However, the vast majority of such references are to Holy 
Scripture. In some of these uses the context makes it clear that it is to a “place” of 
Scripture that reference is being made,47 although in other places the modifier “of 
Scripture” makes the reference specific.48 As with the other uses, these “passage” uses 
are found in both earlier and later documents and in both those written both in Latin and 
translated to Latin.49  
 Of the uses that refer to passages, several specify that the passage being referred 
to “testifies” to something in the context of a larger argument. First, consider the 
following passage from the Apology’s Original Sin locus. 
                                                                                                                                                 
99 (twice), 100 (four times), 103, 119, 122, 126; VIII:10 (twice), 23, 28, 82, 83, 84 (thrice), 92; X:9, 30; 
XI:96 (arguably dogmatic space); XII:8 (twice), 29. 
44 Even this use of the words can be philosophically influenced, as in SD VII:97. See also SD I:57, 
where the word is used in the definition of “substance”. 
45 Cyprian AC XXII:5. The Augsburg Confession Ap II:3. Luther SD II:44; IV:26; SD VII:91. 
46 Ap Preface:14 (Confutation loci); XX:4 (Confutation passage); XXIV:9; XXIII:68; XXVII:19 
(Confutation passage); SD VIII:39 (Zwingli arguably locus). 
47 Ap II:31 (explicit in the German original); IV:83 (though Trig & K-W render “topic”), 107, 154, 
155, 207, 218, 219, 220, 221 (thrice) , 222, 224 (thrice), 226, 231, 235, 238, 244, 245, 259, 264, 266, 272, 
273, 274, 280 (twice), 281, 282, 284 (twice), 286 (five times), 305, 306, 343, 371, 372, 376 (twice), 388; 
VII/VIII:19; XII:36; XXII:7 (twice); XXIII:32; XXIV:31, 34 (twice), 53 (twice), 66; XXVII:3, 11, 12, 18, 
45 (twice), 65, 66; XXVIII:8, 21; LC I:278, 279; SD II:27, 81; XI:2 (where Scripture is the subject of the 
verb), 67. 
48 Scripturae Ap XXIV:66; XXVII:40; LC I:167; Ep VII:25 (explicit only in the Latin translation); 
SD IV:17 (explicit only in the Latin translation). Sacrae Scripturae SD V:7. 
49 In discussing Ramus and the time after the invention of the printing press, Ong discusses how 
books became receptacles for content, the places of which could be indexed (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the 
Decay of Dialogue, 313-314 ). 
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 Has argutias satis apparet in scholis natas esse, non in consilio 
Caesaris. Quamquam autem haec cavillatio facillime refelli possit: tamen 
ut omnes boni viri intelligant, nos nihil absurdi de hac causa docere, 
primum petimus, ut inspiciatur germanica confessio; haec absolvet nos 
suspicione novitatis. Sic enim ibi scriptum est: Weiter wird gelehret, daß 
nach dem Fall Adae alle Menschen, so natürlich geboren werden, in 
Sunden empfangen und geborn werden, das ist, daß sie alle von Mutterleib 
an voll böser Lüst und Neigung sind, keine wahre Gottesforcht, kein 
wahren Glauben an Gott von Natur haben können. Hic locus testatur nos 
non solum actus, sed potentiam seu dona efficiendi timorem et fiduciam 
erga Deum adimere propagatis secundum carnalem naturam. Dicimus 
enim, ita natos habere concupiscentiam, nec posse efficere verum timorem 
et fiduciam erga Deum. 
 Es ist leichtlich zu merken und abzunehmen, daß solche cavillatio 
von Theologen, nicht von des Kaisers Rat herkommet. Wiewohl wir nu 
solche neidische, gefährliche, muthwillige Deutungen wohl wissen zu 
verlegen, doch, daß alle redlichen und ehrbare Leute verstehen mügen, 
daß wir in dieser Sache nichts Ungeschicktes lehren, so bitten wir, sie 
wollen unsere vorige deutsche Konfession, so zu Augsburg überantwortet, 
ansehen; die wird gnug anzeigen, wie wir nichts Neues oder Ungehörtes 
lehren. Denn in derselbigen ist also geschrieben: „Weiter wird gelehret, 
daß nach dem Fall Adä alle Menschen, so natürlich geboren werden, in 
Sunden empfangen und geboren werden, das ist, daß sie alle von Mutter 
Leibe an voll böser Lust und Neigung sind, keine wahre Gottesfurcht, 
keinen wahren Glauben an Gott von Natur haben können.” In diesem 
erscheinet genug, daß wir von allen, so aus Fleisch geboren sind, sagen, 
daß sie untüchtig sind zu allen Gottes Sachen, Gott nicht herzlich fürchten, 
ihme nicht glauben, noch vertrauen können. 
 These quibbles have obviously come from the schools, and not 
from the emperor’s council. This sophistry is easy to refute. But to show 
all good men that our teaching on this point is not absurd, we ask them 
first to look at the German text of the Confession. This will exonerate us 
of the charge of innovation, for is says: “It is also taught that since the fall 
of Adam all men who are born according to the course of nature are 
conceived and born in sin. That is, all men are full of evil lusts and 
inclinations from their mothers’ wombs and are unable by nature to have 
true fear of God or true faith in God.” This passage testifies [Hic locus 
testatur] that in those who are born according to the flesh we deny the 
existence not only of actual fear and trust in God but also of the possibility 
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and gifts to produce it. We say that anyone born in this way has 
concupiscence and cannot produce true fear and trust in God.50 
Later the Apology’s treatment of Original Sin continues the argument on the basis of 
Holy Scripture. 
Nam Paulus interdum expresse nominat defectum, ut 1 Cor. 2: Animalis, 
homo non percipit ea, quae Spiritus Dei sunt. Alibi concupiscentiam 
nominat efficacem in membris et parientem malos fructus. Plures locos 
citare de utraque parte possemus; sed in re manifesta nihil opus est 
testimoniis. Et facile iudicare poterit prudens lector, has non tantum culpas 
actuales esse, sine metu Dei et sine fide esse. Sunt enim durabiles defectus 
in natura non renovata.  
Denn Paulus nennet die Erbsunde unter Zeiten mit klaren Worten einen 
Mangel göttlichen Lichts usw. 1. Korinth. 2.: „Der natürliche Mensch aber 
vernimmt nichts vom Geiste Gottes.” Und an andern Orten nennet er es 
böse Lust, als zu den Römern am 7., da er sagt: „Ich sehe ein ander Gesetz 
in meinen Gliedern usw.“ Welche Lust allerlei böse Früchte gebieret. Ich 
könnte hie wohl viel mehr Sprüche der Schrift vorbringen von beiden 
diesen Stücken; aber in dieser öffentlichen Wahrheit ist es nicht noth. Ein 
jeder Verständiger wird leichtlich sehen und merken, daß also ohne 
Gottesfurcht, ohne Vertrauen im Herzen sein sind nicht allein actus oder 
wirklich Sunde, sondern ein angeboren Mangel des göttlichen Lichtes und 
alles Guten, welcher da bleibt, so lange wir nicht durch den Heiligen Geist 
neu geboren und durch den erleucht werden.  
For Paul sometimes mentions the deficiency, as in I Cor. 2:14, “The 
unspiritual man does not receive the gifts of the Spirit of God.” Elsewhere 
(Rom. 7:5) he mentions lust at work in our members and bringing forth 
evil fruit. We could quote many passages [Plures locos citare ... 
possemus] on both parts of our definition, but on so clear an issue there is 
no need of evidence [testimoniis]. The wise reader will easily be able to 
see that when the fear of God and faith are lacking, this is not merely 
actual guilt but an abiding deficiency in an unrenewed human nature.51 
The confessors clearly give passages as testimonies even while claiming that the matter is 
clear enough not to need the evidence (evidence of this practice will continue to be seen 
below). The Apology’s article on Justification has a similar passage. 
                                                 
50 Ap II:2-3, BKS, 146; Tappert, 100-101. (Emphasis added.) 
51 Ap II:30-31, BKS, 153; Tappert, 104. (Emphasis added.) 
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 Itaque doctrina poenitentiae, quia non solum nova opera praecipit, 
sed etiam promittit remissionem peccatorum, necessario requirit fidem. 
Non enim accipitur remissio peccatorum nisi fide. Semper igitur in his 
locis de poenitentia intelligere oportet, quod non solum opera, sed etiam 
fides requiratur, ut hic Matth. 6.: Si dimiseritis hominibus peccata eorum, 
dimittet et vobis Pater vester coelestis delicta vestra. Hic requiritur opus et 
additur promissio remissionis peccatorum, quae non contingit propter 
opus, sed propter Christum per fidem. Sicut alibi multis locis testatur 
Scriptura. Actuum 10: Huic omnes prophetae testimonium perhibent, 
remissionem peccatorum accipere per nomen eius omnes, qui credunt in 
eum. Et 1 Ioh. 2.: Remittuntur vobis peccata propter nomen eius. Eph. 1.: 
In quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem eius in remissionem 
peccatorum. Quamquam quid opus est recitare testimonia? Haec est ipsa 
vox evangelii propria, quod propter Christum, non propter nostra opera, 
fide consequamur remissionem peccatorum. Hanc evangelii vocem 
adversarii nostri obruere conantur male detortis locis, qui continent 
doctrinam legis aut operum. Verum est enim, quod in doctrina 
poenitentiae requiruntur opera, quia certe nova vita requiritur. Sed hic 
male assuunt adversarii, quod talibus operibus mereamur remissionem 
peccatorum aut iustificationem.  
 Because the doctrine of penitence not only demands new works but 
also promises the forgiveness of sins, it necessarily requires faith. Only 
faith accepts the forgiveness of sins. In passages about penitence we 
should understand that faith is required, not merely works, as in Matt. 
6:14, “If you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also 
forgive you.” Here a work is required and a promise of the forgiveness of 
sins is added, depending not on the work but on Christ through faith. So 
the Scriptures testify in many other places. Acts 10:43, “To him all the 
prophets bear witness that every one who believes in him shall receive 
forgiveness of sins through his name.” I John 2:12, “Your sins are 
forgiven for his sake.” Eph. 1:7, “In him we have redemption through His 
blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses.” Why recite passages? This is the 
essential proclamation of the Gospel, that we obtain forgiveness of sins by 
faith because of Christ and not because of our works. Our opponents try to 
silence this proclamation of the Gospel by twisting those passages which 
teach about the law or of works. It is true that in teaching penitence works 
are required, since a new life is certainly required; but here our opponents 
maliciously maintain that by such works we merit the forgiveness of sins 
or justification.52 
                                                 
52 Ap IV:272-274, BKS, 214; Tappert, 148. The German “paraphrase” of the Apology does not 
include this particular passage. (Emphasis added.) 
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The discussion of the interpretation of the “passage” evidence continues later in Apology 
IV, with a hint of distaste for philosophy even as its method of reasoning from given 
evidence is used. 
... Fit autem regeneratio fide in poenitentia. 
 Nemo sanus iudicare aliter potest, nec nos aliquam otiosam 
subtilitatem hic affectamus, ut divellamus fructus a iustitia cordis, si 
tantum adversarii concesserint, quod fructus propter fidem et mediatorem 
Christum placeant, non sint per sese digni gratia et vita aeterna. Hoc enim 
reprehendimus in adversariorum doctrina, quod talibus locis scripturae seu 
philosophico seu iudaico more intellectis abolent iustitiam fidei et 
excludunt mediatorem Christum. Ex his locis ratiocinantur, quod haec 
opera mereantur gratiam, alias de congruo, alias de condigno, quum 
videlicet accedit dilectio, id est, quod iustificent et, quia sint iustitia, digna 
sint vita aeterna. Hic error manifeste abolet iustitiam fidei, quae sentit, 
quod accessum ad Deum habeamus propter Christum, non propter opera 
nostra, quae sentit nos per pontificem et mediatorem Christum adduci ad 
patrem et habere placatum patrem, ut supra satis dictum est. Et haec 
doctrina de iustitia fidei non est in ecclesia Christi negligenda, quia sine ea 
non potest officium Christi conspici, et reliqua doctrina iustificationis 
tantum est doctrina legis. Atqui nos oportet retinere evangelium et 
doctrinam de promissione propter Christum donata. 
 Non igitur litigamus in hoc loco de parva re cum adversariis. ... 
… Such a new birth comes by faith amid penitence. 
 No sane man can judge otherwise. We are not trying to be overly 
subtle here in distinguishing the righteousness of the heart from its fruits, 
if only our opponents would grant that the fruits please God because of 
faith and the mediator Christ but in themselves are not worthy of grace 
and eternal life. This is what we condemn in our opponents’ position, that 
by interpreting such passages of the Scriptures in either a philosophical or 
a Jewish manner they eliminate from them the righteousness of faith and 
Christ, the Mediator. From these passages they reason that works merit 
grace by the merit of congruity or, if love is added, by the merit of 
condignity; that is, that they justify, and because they are righteousness 
that they are worthy of eternal life. This error obviously destroys the 
righteousness of faith, which believes that we have access to God not 
because of our works but because of Christ, and that through his priestly 
mediation we are led to the Father and have a reconciled Father, as we 
have said often enough. This teaching about the righteousness of faith dare 
not be neglected in the church of Christ; without it the work of Christ 
cannot be understood, and what is left of the doctrine of justification is 
nothing more than the teaching of the law. We are therefore obliged to 
 
114 
hold fast to the Gospel and the teaching of the promise given for Christ’s 
sake. 
 It is no minor matter about which we are arguing here with our 
opponents. …53 
In the case of the Mass, the Reformers in Apology XXIV:53 also attack their opponents 
for twisting passages (locos; Sprüche) from Hebrews, from where the Reformers 
themselves draw their “main proofs” (praecipua testimonia; Sache sonderlich).54 Thus, 
passages of Holy Scripture referred to as loci are in some ways regarded as evidence used 
in arguments. And, as the last extended quotation from Apology IV demonstrated, the 
gathering together of such related evidence and arguments in one place is the essence of 
the loci method.55 The focus thus now turns from loci as “passages” to those uses in The 
Book of Concord of the Latin words being considered where “articles” or their 
components seem to be in view.56 
                                                 
53 Ap IV:375-377, BKS, 230-231; Tappert, 164-165. (The closing sentence of ¶374 and the 
opening sentence of ¶378 are also included.) (Emphasis added.) For the German equivalent and further 
discussion of this passage relative to Scotus’s “formal distinction”, see below, beginning on p.392. 
54 Ap XXIV:53, Tappert, 259; BKS, 365. (The Triglotta translates, “chief testimonies”.) Notably, 
the paragraph immediately following refers to the “theme” (loco, Teil) of the Epistle to the Hebrews of the 
Old Testament priesthood and sacrifices not meriting forgiveness but symbolizing Christ’s meritorious 
sacrifice (Ap XXIV:54, Tappert, 259; BKS, 365). On a larger scale, Ap IV:5 says, “All Scripture should be 
divided into these two chief doctrines, the law and the promises” (Universa scriptura in hos duos locos 
praecipuos distribui debet: in legem et promissiones; Die ganze Schrift beide altes und neues Testaments 
wird in die zwei Stück geteilt und lehret diese zwei Stück, nämlich Gesetz und göttliche Verheißungen) 
(Tappert, 108; BKS, 159). The distinction between law and Gospel is not a locus in the Apology, although 
it is in the Formula. 
55 Significantly reflecting the loci method, the locus of Good Works (Ap XX:4-5) is another 
example of a place for assembling testimonies, such as passages from Scripture and the Fathers (see below 
at n.80, p.125). Confer also Ap IV:171; SD VIII:86. 
56 The nearly equal dual uses of the word may reflect Melanchthon’s own somewhat schizophrenic 
uses. Citing Siegfried Wiedenhofer (Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei 
Philipp Melanchthon, 2 vols. [Frankfort: Peter Lang, 1976]), Wengert observes how Melanchthon can use 
loci “as storehouses for arguments to be used in oratory, as general meanings or topics of a speech or text, 
or as the basic principles of content which stand behind a speech or text.” Wengert also notes that in 
Melanchthon’s 1519 De rhetorica and 1521 Loci communes the word loci is defined as “underlying themes 
or principles of a work” but that in Melanchthon’s 1523 Annotationes in Johannem the word locus is a 
synonym for “verse” or “text” containing “a single theological idea”. (Timothy J. Wengert, Philip 
Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem in Relation to its Predecessors and Contemporaries, Travaux 
d'humanisme et Renaissance no. 220 [Geneve: Librairie Droz S. A., 1987], 183, 189.) Melanchthon’s 
contributions to The Book of Concord, again, are dated as follows: 1530 Augsburg Confession, 1531 
Apology of the Augsburg Confession, and 1537 Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope. 
 
115 
“Article” or its parts 
 The uses of the Latin locus, loci and locum, loci to refer to an article or its 
components are about as frequent as both the uses to refer to other sorts of places and the 
uses to refer to passages.57 Of the uses to refer to an article or its components, however, 
there are only a handful of occurrences where the words refer to an article’s components. 
What may be the clearest example regarding an article’s components comes in the 
Apology’s treatment of Ecclesiastical Power, where Melanchthon writes the following, 
referring back to the corresponding article in the Augsburg Confession and to the 
Confutation’s response. 
 Cum autem nos in confessione, in hoc articulo, varios locos 
complexi simus, adversarii nihil respondent, nisi episcopos habere 
potestatem regiminis et coercitivae correctionis, ad dirigendum subditos in 
finem beatitudinis aeternae, et ad potestatem regiminis requiri potestatem 
iudicandi, definiendi, discernendi et statuendi ea, quae ad praefatum finem 
expediunt aut conducunt. Haec sunt verba confutationis, in quibus docent 
nos adversarii, quod episcopi habeant auctoritatem condendi leges utiles 
ad consequendam vitam aeternam. De hoc articulo controversia est.  
 Auch antwortet die Confutatio nicht auf unsere Gründe, sondern 
stellet sich recht päbstlich, sagt von großer Gewalt der Bischofe und 
beweiset sie nicht, spricht also, daß die Bischofe Gewalt haben zu 
herrschen, zu richten, zu strafen, zu zwingen, Gesetz zu machen, dienlich 
zum ewigen Leben. Also rühmet die Confutatio der Bischofe Gewalt und 
beweiset sie doch nicht. Von diesem Artikel ist nun der Streit: ob die 
Bischofe Macht haben Gesetze zu machen außer dem Evangelio, und zu 
gebieten dieselbigen zu halten als Gottesdienst, dadurch ewiges Leben zu 
verdienen.  
 In this article of the Confession we included various subjects. But 
our opponents’ only reply is that the bishops have the power to rule and to 
correct by force in order to guide their subjects toward the goal of eternal 
                                                 
57 Although apparently done only by way of an English translation, Gerald Wittmaier previously 
examined the uses of the terms “article” and “article of faith” in the Lutheran Confessions. (Wittmaier 
refers to the Latin articulus and artus, but seemingly only as “terms that give significance to the English 
equivalent” [p.2].) Wittmaier found an intimate connection between articles as individual members of one 
body of doctrine, and he also highlighted an emphasis on an article’s revelation by God in His Word, 
reference to human salvation, connection to other articles, and necessity of faith for understanding it. 
Wittmaier further discussed the importance of justification as the chief article that binds others together. 
(Gerald Wittmaier, “How are the terms ‘Article’ and ‘Article of Faith’ used in the Augsburg Confession 
and Apology,” Concordia Theological Seminary, 1971.)  
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bliss, and that the power to rule requires the power to judge, define, 
distinguish, and establish what is helpful or conducive to the 
aforementioned goal. These are the words of the Confutation, by which 
our opponents inform us that bishops have the authority to create laws 
which are useful for attaining eternal life. That is the issue in 
controversy.58 
Not only are the various subtopics of the “article” on Ecclesiastical Power called loci, but 
the two parts of penitence, contrition and faith, can also be so referred in the article on 
Penitence. 
 Boni viri facile iudicare possunt plurimum referre, ut de 
superioribus partibus, videlicet contritione et fide conservetur vera 
doctrina. Itaque in his locis illustrandis semper plus versati sumus, de 
confessione et satisfactionibus non admodum rixati sumus.  
 Gottesfürchtige, ehrbare, fromme, christliche Leute können hie 
wohl merken, daß viel daran gelegen ist, daß man de poenitentia, von der 
Reue und dem Glauben, ein rechte, gewisse Lehre in der Kirchen habe und 
erhalte. Denn der große, unsaglich, ungehört Betrug vom Ablaß usw., item 
die ungeschickte Lehre der Sophisten hat uns genug gewitzigt, was großen 
Unrats und Fährlichkeit daraus entstehet, wenn man hie feihl schlächt. 
Wie hat manch fromm Gewissen unterm Pabsttum hie so in großer Arbeit 
den rechten Weg gesucht und unter solchem Finsternis nicht funden. 
Darum haben wir allzeit großen Fleiß gehabt von diesem Stück klar, 
gewiß richtig zu lehren. Von der Beicht und Genugtuung haben wir nicht 
sonders gezankt. 
 Good men can easily judge the great importance of preserving the 
true teaching about contrition and faith, the two parts of penitence we have 
discussed above. [For the great fraud of indulgences, etc., and the 
preposterous doctrines of the sophists have sufficiently taught us what 
great vexation and danger arise therefrom if a foul stroke is here made. 
How many a godly conscience under the Papacy sought with great labor 
the true way, and in the midst, of such darkness did not find it!] We have 
therefore concentrated on the explanation of these doctrines and thus far 
have written nothing about confession and satisfaction.59 
                                                 
58 Ap XXVIII:6, BKS, 398; Tappert, 282. (Emphasis added.) 
59 Ap XII:98, BKS, 272; Tappert, 197. (Emphasis added.) (The English translation of the German 
addition is provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 281.) Another possible interpretation of this 
paragraph could have “contrition and faith” be one topic under the treatment of Penitence and “confession 
and satisfaction” another subject under the same article. 
 
117 
There are also other uses of locus, loci and locum, loci to refer to what may be subjects 
underneath a larger topic.60 
 There are some uses of the Latin words to refer to subjects that are larger topics of 
their own right but that do not appear as loci in specific writings of The Book of Concord. 
One, the training of the young, is a larger topic that is not of itself explicitly theological 
but is nevertheless referred to as a locus.61 Another, that is theological, is the highest 
worship of the Gospel being the desire to receive forgiveness of sins, a locus that is said 
to provide a great deal of comfort.62 Still another is the so-called two-kingdoms doctrine, 
which comes up in the article on Political Order but may be somehow distinct from it.63 
A final example is the possible division of the Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the 
Pope into three topics as presented at its outset.64 
 The vast majority of the uses of locus, loci and locum, loci to refer to larger 
topics, however, refer to larger topics that do appear as loci in the writings of The Book of 
Concord or their precipitating documents. For example, articles of the Confutation, which 
essentially followed the organizational scheme of the Augsburg Confession, are referred 
to as loci in some cases by the Apology, which responded to the arguments of the 
Confutation. The Apology’s article on the Invocation of the Saints provides one example. 
 Ita insidiose scripta est confutatio non tantum in hoc loco, sed fere 
ubique. Nullus est locus, in quo a dogmatibus suis discernant manifestos 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Significantly, earlier in the same article on Penitence, contrition and faith are called “chief parts of 
penitence” (praecipua membra, Stücke) (Ap XII:52, Tappert, 189; BKS, 261). 
60 In LC III:5, the duty to pray is “the first thing to know” (soll nämlich das erste sein, daß man 
wisse; hoc quidem primo loco recensendum est) (Tappert, 420; BKS, 663). In LC V:53, Christ’s command 
to “Do this” is “the first point” (Das soll nu das erste sein; Hoc primo quidem loco dictum est) in exhorting 
people to receive the Sacrament (Tappert, 453; BKS, 718).  
 Furthermore, if the six main parts of the Catechisms are regarded as loci, then that the individual 
commandments, articles of the Creed, and petitions of the Lord’s Prayer are also referred to as loci provides 
other examples of loci as subpoints of a larger locus. See also the discussion in the text below, p.129. 
61 SC Preface 19, 20. Confer/compare Ap XV:43. 
62 Ap IV:310. 
63 Ap XVI:2; compare ¶13. Certainly AC XVI makes no explicit mention of the two kingdoms, as 
Ap XVI does. Ap XV:43 may also be informative on this matter. 
64 Although the Treatise usually has other headings—“Testimony of Scriptures”, “Testimony from 
History”, “Arguments of Opponents Refuted”, “The Marks of the Antichrist”, and “The Power and 
Jurisdiction of Bishops” (although compare K-W)—Melanchthon initially presents “three articles” of false 
teaching (Tr 1-4) to which he later refers almost as if they could be intended divisions (Tr 38; cf. 22). 
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abusus. Et tamen apud ipsos si qui sunt saniores, fatentur multas falsus 
persuasiones haerere in doctrina scholasticorum et canonistarum, multos 
praeterea abusus in tanta inscitia et negligentia pastorum irrepsisse in 
ecclesiam. 
 Also voll Hinterlist und gefährlichs Betrugs ist ihr ganze 
Confutatio, nicht allein an diesem Ort, sondern allenthalben. Sie stellen 
sich, als sein sie gar goldrein, als haben sie nie kein Wasser betrübt. Denn 
an keinem Ort unterscheiden sie von ihren dogmatibus oder Lehre die 
öffentlichen Mißbräuche. Und doch, viel unter ihnen sind so ehrbar und 
redlich, bekennen selbst, daß viel Irrtum sind in der scholasticorum und 
Canonisten Bücher, daß auch viele Mißbräuche durch ungelehrte Prediger 
und durch so großen schändlichen Unfleiß der Bischöfe eingerissen sein in 
der Kirchen. 
 At this point, and almost everywhere else, the Confutation is a 
deceitful document. [They pretend that they are as pure as gold, that they 
have never muddled the water.] Nowhere do they distinguish between 
their teaching and obvious abuses. Yet anyone in their party with a little 
sense would admit that the teachings of the scholastics and canonists 
contain many false opinions and that the ignorance and negligence of the 
pastors permitted many abuses to creep into the church.65  
The foregoing quotation is significant first for its close uses of locus with dogmatibus, 
which latter word derives from the same original Greek word, , , , as 
ultimately does the English word “dogmatics”.66 (In this place, the Triglotta translates 
                                                 
65 Ap XXI:40, BKS, 326; Tappert, 235. (Emphasis added.) (The English translation of the German 
addition is provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 355.) 
 There are a number of other occurrences of the words in The Book of Concord that refer to the loci 
of the opponents’ Confutation. Especially significant is Melanchthon’s Preface to the Apology where he 
refers to “the main points” (capita locorum; Summa der Argument) of the Confutation’s argumentation (Ap 
Preface:6, BKS, 142; Tappert, 98). Confer Ap Preface:14; XXIV:9; and possibly also XX:4 and XXVII:19, 
where locum and loco, respectively, both could be taken narrowly to refer to specific statements or broadly 
to refer to the whole article. 
66 OED, 4:929. The Greek word , ,  can be used in early Christian writings to refer 
to the teaching of philosophers and false prophets whose doctrines lead to destruction in hell, although it is 
said not to be used in that sense in the New Testament (“ , , ,” Walter Bauer, William F. 
Arndt, F. Wilbur Gingrich and Frederick W. Danker, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and 
Other Early Christian Literature, Second ed. [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979], 201; 
hereafter, BAGD). The word originally was used for philosophical opinions and principles, came to mean 
official decrees, and was used of Old Testament and New Testament religious teaching as divine 
philosophy (Gerhard Kittel, “δóγμα,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964], 
230-232). 
 Another passage where locus, loci is combined with dogma, dogmatis is in the Formula, where the 
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and somewhat transliterates, rendering “dogmas”.) The second significance of the 
foregoing quotation is its statement that broadens from the locus of the Invocation of the 
Saints to all the loci of the Confutation. The Latin Nullus est locus that Tappert translates 
“Nowhere” significantly could be translated “At no locus” or “At no topic”.67 The 
Reformers’ opponents in the Confutation do not admit their errors, which forces 
Melanchthon essentially to follow its organization and to refute the opponents’ errors 
locus for locus. 
 In fact, in prefacing his Apology, Melanchthon indicates the doctrine is organized 
by loci. 
 Neque enim negari potest, quin multi loci doctrinae christianae, 
quos maxime prodest exstare in ecclesia, a nostris patefacti et illustrati 
sint; qui qualibus et quam periculosis opinionibus obruti olim iacuerint 
apud monachos, canonistas et theologos sophistas, non libet hic recitare. 
 Habemus publica testimonia multorum bonorum virorum, qui Deo 
gratias agunt pro hoc summo beneficio, quod de multis necessariis locis 
docuerit meliora, quam passim leguntur apud adversarios nostros. 
 Denn es können die Widersacher selbs nicht verneinen noch 
läugnen, daß viele und die höhesten, nötigsten Artikel der christlichen 
Lehre, ohne welche die christliche Kirch samt der ganzen christlichen 
Lehre und Namen würden vergessen und untergehen, durch die Unsern 
wieder an Tag bracht sein. Denn mit was zänkischen, vergeblichen, 
unnützen, kindischen Lehren viel nötige Stücke vor wenig Jahren bei 
Mönchen, Theologen, Canonisten und Sophisten untergedrückt gewesen, 
will ich hie diesmal nicht erzählen; es soll noch wohl kommen. 
 Wir haben (Gott Lob) Zeugnis von vielen hohen, ehrlichen, 
redlichen, gottfürchtigen Leuten, welche Gott von Herzen danken vor die 
unaussprechlichen Gaben und Gnaden, daß sie in den allernötigsten 
Stücken der ganzen Schrift von uns viel klärer, gewisser, eigentlicher, 
richtiger Lehre und Trost der Gewissen haben, denn in allen Büchern der 
Widersacher immer funden ist. 
 For we have undoubtedly brought into view many articles of 
Christian doctrine that the Church sorely needs. We need not describe here 
                                                                                                                                                 
confessors write of desiring concord “that will not give place to the smallest error” (dem wenigsten Irrtumb 
nichts eingeräumt; nulli etiam falso dogmati locus concedatur) (SD XI:96, Tappert, 632; BKS, 1091). 
67 Where the Latin uses essentially the same word, loco and locus, the German uses in both places 




how they lay hidden under all sorts of dangerous opinions in the writings 
of the monks, canonists, and scholastic theologians. 
 Many good men have testified publicly and thanked God for this 
great blessing, that on many points our Confession’s teaching is better that 
that which appears everywhere in our opponents’ writings.68 
Not only does the Apology use loci in this way but also the Augsburg Confession, the 
Treatise, The Small and Large Catechism, and the Formula of Concord. Thus, again, 
earlier and later documents have such occurrences, representing the principal authors of 
the documents in The Book of Concord. And, in these documents their authors refer to a 
wide variety of topics as loci.69  
 The chief locus is Justification, a designation made already in the Augsburg 
Confession and continued through the Apology and the Formula. The Augsburg 
Confession’s article on the Authority of Bishops or Ecclesiastical Power says the 
following. 
Dann es muß je der furnehme Artikel des Evangeliums erhalten werden, 
daß wir die Gnad Gotts durch den Glauben an Christum ohn unser 
Verdienst erlangen und nicht durch Gottesdienst, von Menschen 
eingesetzt, verdienen. 
For the chief article of the Gospel be maintained, namely, that we obtain 
the grace of God through faith in Christ without our merits; we do not 
merit it by services of God instituted by men. 
Necesse est retineri praecipuum evangelii locum, quod gratiam per fidem 
in Christum gratis consequamur, non per certas observationes aut per 
cultus ab hominibus institutos. 
                                                 
68 Ap Preface:17-18, BKS, 144; Tappert, 99. (Emphasis added.) 
69 Aside from those mentioned in the text’s ensuing discussion the list follows. Original Sin Ap 
I:4, 35, 51; IV:171 (confer Adamsunde); SD I:11, 39, 49. Human Traditions Ap XV:49. Invocation of 
Saints Ap XXI:1 (note the philosophical context), 40, 42. The Mass Ap XXIV:14. Distinction of Foods AC 
XXVI:4. Monastic Vows Ap XXVII:20, 52. Second Commandment LC I:53, 56. Fourth Commandment LC 
I:166. Fifth Commandment LC I:180, 195. Sixth Commandment LC I:200, 206. Apostolic Creed LC II:63. 
Second Article LC II:26. Second Petition LC III:55. Fourth Petition LC III:72. Seventh (Last) Petition LC 
III:113, 118. Baptism LC IV:12. Infant Baptism LC IV:47. Lord’s Supper LC V:28; SD VII:66, 111, 113, 




It is necessary to preserve the chief article of the Gospel, namely, that we 
obtain grace through faith in Christ and not through certain observances or 
acts of worship instituted by men.70 
The Apology’s article on Justification similarly calls it “the main doctrine of 
Christianity” (praecipuus locus; dem höchsten fürnehmsten Artikel) and says the 
Reformers’ opponents “confuse this doctrine miserably” (misere contaminant hunc 
locum; haben sie diesen edlen hochnötigen, fürnehmsten Artikel … jämmerlich 
befudelt).71 Articles other than those on justification also refer to justification as the 
“chief doctrine of the Gospel” (praecipuum evangelii locum; dieser großen, hohesten, 
allerwichtigen Sachen).72 And, there are other places where the topic of justification is 
referred to as a locus.73 
 The chief or main locus of Justification is closely related to the locus of 
Penitence, as the Apology’s article on Penitence states. 
 Sed quia adversarii nominatim hoc damnant, quod dicimus 
homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum, addemus paucas 
quasdam probationes, ex quibus intelligi poterit remissionem peccatorum 
contingere non ex opere operato propter contritionem, sed fide illa 
speciali, qua unusquisque credit sibi remitti peccata. Nam hic articulus 
praecipuus est, de quo digladiamur cum adversariis, et cuius cognitionem 
ducimus maxime necessariam esse Christianis omnibus. Cum autem supra 
de iustificatione de eadem re satis dictum videatur, hic breviores erimus. 
Sunt enim loci maxime cognati, doctrina poenitentiae et doctrina 
iustificationis. 
 Dieweil aber die die Widersacher diesen klaren, gewissen, 
trefflichsten Artikel ohne alle Scheu und Scham namhaftig verdammen, da 
wir sagen, daß die Menschen Vergebung der Sünden erlangen durch den 
Glauben an Christum, so wollen wir des etliche Gründe und Beweisung 
setzen, aus welchen zu verstehen sei, daß wir Vergebung der Sünden nicht 
erlangen ex opere operato oder durch das getane Werk, durch Reü oder 
                                                 
70 AC XXVIII:52, BKS, 129; Tappert, 89. (Emphasis added.) 
71 Ap IV:2, 3, Tappert, 107; BKS, 159. SD III:6 favorably cites Ap IV:2-3 but uses a slightly 
different wording: fürnehmbste der ganzen christlichen Lehr; His … articulus … praecipuus est; “the chief 
article of the entire Christian doctrine” (BKS, 916; Tappert, 540). 
72 Ap XII:3, Tappert, 182; BKS, 252-253. Confer Ap XII:10: praecipuo evangelii loco; 
Häuptartikel der christlichen Lehre; “chief doctrine of the Gospel” (BKS, 254; Tappert, 184).  
73 Ap IV:378 ; SD III:67. SD III:29 is also a significant passage referring to the locus of 
Justification; it is dealt with in the text below at n.83, p.127. 
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Leid usw., sondern allein durch den Glauben, da ein jeder für sich selbst 
glaubet, daß ihm Sünde vergeben sein. Denn dieser Artikel ist der 
fürnehmste und nötigste, darum wir mit den Widersachern streiten, 
welcher auch der nötigst ist allen Christen zu wissen. So wir aber hieroben 
im Artikel de iustificatione von demselben genugsam gesagt, so wollen 
wir desto kürzer hier dasselbe handeln. 
 Our opponents expressly condemn our statement that men obtain 
the forgiveness of sins by faith. We shall therefore add a few proofs to 
show that the forgiveness of sins does not come ex opere operato because 
of contrition, but by that personal faith by which each individual believes 
that his sins are forgiven. For this is the chief issue on which we clash with 
our opponents and which we believe all Christians must understand. Since 
it is evident that we have said enough about this earlier, we shall be briefer 
at this point. For the doctrine of penitence and the doctrine of justification 
are very closely related.74  
The two loci are so closely related that, in the Apology’s treatment of the Mass, 
Melanchthon appears to refer to Penitence as the chief locus of the faith. 
 Adversarii in Confutatione miras tragoedias agunt de desolatione 
templorum, quod videlicet stent inornatae arae sine candelis, sine statuis. 
Has nugas iudicant esse ornatum ecclesiarum. Longe aliam desolationem 
significat Daniel, videlicet ignorationem evangelii. Nam populus obrutus 
multitudine et varietate traditionum atque opinionum nullo modo potuit 
complecti summam doctrinae christianae. Quis enim unquam de populo 
intellexit doctrinam de poenitentia, quam adversarii tradiderunt? Et hic 
praecipuus locus est doctrinae Christianae. 
 Die Widersacher ziehen den Daniel an, der da sagt: „Es werden 
Greuel und Verwüstung in der Kirchen stehen“, und deuten dieses auf 
unsere Kirchen, derhalben daß die Altar nicht bedeckt sein, nicht Lichter 
darin brennen und dergleichen. Wiewohl es nicht wahr ist, daß wir solche 
äußerliche Ornament alle weg tun, dennoch, so es schon also wäre, redet 
Daniel nicht von solchen Dingen, die gar äußerlich sind und zur 
christlichen Kirchen nicht gehören, sondern meinet viel ein andere, 
greulichere Verwüstung, welche im Pabsttum stark gehet, nämlich von 
Verwüstung des nötigsten, größten Gottesdiensts, des Predigtamts und 
Unterdrückung des Evangelii. Denn bei den Widersachern predigt man das 
mehrer Teil von Menschensatzungen, dadurch die Gewissen von Christo 
auf eigene Werk und Vertrauen geführet werden; so ists gewiß, daß 
                                                 
74 Ap XII:59, BKS, 263; Tappert, 190. (Emphasis added.) Penitence is also referred to as a locus in 
Ap XII:90; XV:43. 
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unterm Pabsttum die Predigt von der Buß oder de poenitentia, wie die 
Widersacher davon gelehret, niemands verstanden hat, und das ist doch 
das nötigest Stück der ganzen christlichen Lehre. 
 In the Confutation our opponents wring their hands over “the 
desolation of the temples” and the altars standing unadorned, without 
candles or statues. They call these trifles the ornament of the churches. 
[Although it is not true that we abolish all such outward ornaments; yet, 
even if it were so, Daniel is not speaking of such things as are altogether 
external and do not belong to the Christian Church.] Daniel describes a 
vastly different desolation, ignorance of the Gospel. The people were 
swamped by the many different traditions and ideas and could not grasp 
the sum of Christian doctrine. [For the adversaries preach mostly of 
human ordinances, whereby consciences are led from Christ to confidence 
in their own works.] Who among the people has ever understood our 
opponents’ doctrine of penitence? Yet this is the principal doctrine of the 
Christian faith.75 
The key to understanding these apparently contradictory statements may be suggested by 
the passage from the Apology’s article on Penitence cited above, where contrition and 
faith are referred to both as parts of Penitence and yet as loci themselves.76 The faith that 
is part of penitence (or repentance) subjectively appropriates as its content that which is 
included in the locus of Justification as objective righteousness: “that for his sake our sin 
is forgiven and righteousness and eternal life are given to us” (daß uns umb seinen willen 
die Sunde vergeben, Gerechtigkeit und ewiges Leben geschenkt wird).77 In much the 
same way, the locus of Justification entails that subjective appropriation of repentant faith 
as the way by which “we receive forgiveness of sin and become righteous before God by 
grace, for Christ’s sake, through faith” (wir Vergebung der Sunde bekommen und vor 
Gott gerecht werden aus Gnaden, umb Christus willen, durch den Glauben).78 
 While Justification is so closely joined with Penitence as to carry the “chief 
locus” designation, Justification is to be distinguished from the locus of Good Works, 
                                                 
75 Ap XXIV:44-46, BKS, 363; Tappert, 258. (Emphasis added.) (The English translations of the 
German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 399, 401.) 
76 Apology XII:98. See at n.59. 
77 ACG IV:2, Tappert, 30; BKS, 56. 
78 ACG IV:1, Tappert, 30; BKS, 56. 
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even though there is an ontological relationship between the two loci.79 The Apology’s 
article on Good Works twice refers to itself as a locus. In one case Melanchthon writes 
the following. 
 Non ferenda est igitur blasphemia tribuere honorem Christi nostris 
operibus. Nihil pudet iam istos theologos, si talem sententiam in ecclesia 
audent ferre. Neque dubitamus, quin optimus Imperator ac plerique 
Principum hunc locum nullo modo fuerint in confutatione relicturi, si 
essent admoniti. Infinita hoc loco testimonia ex scriptura, ex patribus 
citare possemus. Verum et supra satis multa de hac re diximus. Et nihil 
opus est pluribus testimoniis illi, qui scit, quare Christus nobis donatus sit, 
qui scit Christum esse propitiationem pro peccatis nostris. Esaias inquit: 
Posuit Dominus in eo iniquitates omnium nostrum. 
 Darum ist es eine greulich Gotteslästerung, die Ehre Christi also 
unsern Menschenwerken zu geben. Und wir vertrößten und versehen uns 
zu Kaiserl. Majestät und auch andern Fürsten dieser kaiserlichen, 
fürstlichen Tugend, daß sie so öffentliche Unwahrheit und Ungrund, 
dadurch für aller Welt Gott und das Evangelium gelästert wird, in keinem 
Weg würden in der Konfutation, wenn sie verwarnet wären, gelassen 
haben. Denn daß dieser Artikel gewißlich göttlich und wahr ist, und das 
dies die heilige göttliche Wahrheit sei, künnten wir hie gar nahe unzählige 
Sprüche der Schrift fürbringen, auch aus den Vätern. Und ist gar nahe 
keine Syllabe, kein Blatt in der Bible, in den fürnehmsten Büchern der 
Heiligen Schrift, da das nicht klar gemeldet wäre. Wir haben oben auch 
viel von diesen Stücken gesagt, und gottfürchtige, fromme Herzen, die da 
wohl wissen, warum Christus geben ist, die da nicht für aller Welt Güter 
und Königreiche entbehren wollten, daß Christus nicht unser einiger 
Schatz, unser einiger Mittler und Versöhner wäre, die müssen sich hie 
entsetzen und erschrecken, daß Gottes heilig Wort und Wahrheit so 
öffentlich von armen Menschen verachtet und verdammt wird. Esaias der 
Prophet sagt: „Der Herre hat auf ihnen gelegt unser aller Sünde.“  
 Therefore the blasphemy of attributing the honor of Christ to our 
works is intolerable. These theologians have lost all sense of shame if they 
dare to smuggle such a notion into the church. We are sure that His Most 
Excellent Imperial Majesty and many of the princes would have refused to 
let this statement of the Confutation stand if their attention had been called 
to it. Here we could quote endless passages from Scripture and from the 
Fathers, [that this article is certainly divine and true, and this is the sacred 
and divine truth. For there is hardly a syllable, hardly a leaf in the Bible, in 
the principal books of the Holy Scriptures, where this is not clearly stated.] 
                                                 
79 The relationship is well-detailed in Chapter V. 
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but we have already said enough on this subject. There is no need for 
proofs to anyone who knows that Christ was given to us to be a 
propitiation for our sins. [Godfearing, pious hearts that know well why 
Christ has been given, who for all the possessions and kingdoms of the 
world would not be without Christ as our only Treasure, our only 
Mediator and Redeemer, must here be shocked and terrified that God’s 
holy Word and Truth should be so openly despised and condemned by 
poor men.] Isaiah says (53:6), “The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of 
us all.”80 
The other place where the Apology’s article on Good Works refers to itself as a locus 
comes a few paragraphs later. 
Sed supra de tota re diximus. Inde lector sumat testimonia. Nam hanc non 
disputationem, sed querelam indignitas rei nobis expressit, quod hoc loco 
diserte posuerunt se improbare hunc nostrum articulum, quod remissionem 
peccatorum consequamur non propter opera nostra, sed fide et gratis 
propter Christum. 
Wir haben hie oben davon genug gesagt; da mag ein jeder Sprüche der 
Schrift, so diese Lehre gründen, suchen. Denn an diesem Ort hat mich 
bewegt so heftig zu klagen die greuliche, unverschämte, übermachte, 
fürgefaßte Bosheit der Widersacher, da sie mit klaren Worten setzen, daß 
sie diesen Artikel verwerfen, daß wir Vergebung der Sunde erlangen nicht 
durch unser Werk, sondern ohn Verdienst, durch den Glauben an 
Christum. 
But we spoke about all these matters above. The reader can find the 
references there. For the shameful treatment of this topic has compelled us 
to register a complaint rather than compose a point-by-point refutation. 
For they clearly have gone on record as rejecting our teaching that we 
receive the forgiveness of sins not on account of our works but by faith 
and freely on account of Christ.81  
Both of these passages from this article of the Apology that refer to the article on Good 
Works as a locus are thus also significant for what they show of the purpose and use of 
loci. 
                                                 
80 Ap XX:4-5, BKS, 314; Tappert, 227. (Emphasis added.) (The English translations of the 
German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 339.) On loci as places for 
assembling testimonies, confer above at n.55, p.114. 
81 Ap XX:11, BKS, 315; K-W, 236 (confer Triglotta, 341). (Emphasis added.) In this case, Tappert 
(228) did not translate the relevant phrase and less-felicitously translated the concluding phrase. 
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 The more significant reference to the locus of Good Works, however, comes in 
the Solid Declaration’s treatment of Justification. This key passage is itself an extended 
quotation from Luther’s 1535 commentary on Galatians.82 
Wir gebens wohl zu, das man von der Liebe und guten Werken auch 
lehren solle, doch also, das es geschehe, wenn und wo es vonnöten ist, als 
nämlich, wenn man außerhalb dieser Sachen von der Rechtfertigung von 
Werken sunst zu ton hat. Hie aber ist dieses die Häuptsach, darmit man zu 
ton hat, daß man frage, nicht, ob man auch gute Werke ton und lieben 
solle, sunder wodurch man doch gerecht für Gott und selig werden mäge? 
Und da antworten wir mit S. Paulo also: daß wir „allein durch den 
Glauben“ an Christum gerecht werden, und nicht durch des Gesetzes 
Werk oder durch die Liebe, nicht also, das wir hiemit die Werk und Liebe 
gar verwerfen, wie die Widersacher uns mit Unwahrheit lästern und 
schuld geben, sondern auf daß wir uns allein von der Hauptsachen, darmit 
man hie zu ton hat, nicht auf einen andern, frembden Handel, der in diese 
Sachen gar nichts gehöret, abführen lassen, wie es der Satan gerne haben 
wollt. Derhalben, alldieweil und solang wir in diesem Artikel von der 
Rechtfertigung zu tun haben, verwerfen und verdammen wir die Werk, 
sintemal es umb diesen Artikel also geton ist, das er keinerlei Disputation 
oder Handlung von den Werken nicht leiden kann. Darumb schneiden wir 
in dieser Sache alle Gesetz und Gesetzeswerk kurz ab. 
Concedimus, de caritate et bonis operibus etiam docendum esse, sed suo 
tempore et loco, quando scilicet quaestio est de bonis operibus extra hunc 
articulum de iustificatione. Hic autem status causae et caput est, de quo 
agitur, ut scilicet quaeratur, non, an bona opera sint facienda et caritas 
exercenda sit, sed qua re iustificemur et vitam aeternam consequamur. Hic 
respondemus cum Paulo: sola fide in Christum nos pronuntiari iustos, non 
operibus legis aut caritate. Non quod opera aut caritatem reiiciamus, ut 
adversarii nos falso accusant, sed quod a statu causae in alienum 
negotium, quod ad hanc quaestionem prorsus non pertinet, abstrahi nos et 
implicari nolumus; id quod tamen Satanas maximopere molitur et quaerit. 
Itaque cum iam versemur in loco communi et articulo de iustificatione, 
reiicimus et damnamus opera. Is enim locus nequaquam patitur aut 
admittit disputationem de bonis operibus. Abscindimus igitur hoc 
proposito simpliciter omnes leges et omnia opera legis. 
We certainly grant that we must teach about love and good works too. But 
it must be done at the time and place where it is necessary, namely, when 
we deal with good works apart from this matter of justification. At this 
point the main question with which we have to do is not whether a person 
                                                 
82 WA 40I:40-688, Aland #229; AE 26:1-461, translated by Jaroslav Pelikan. 
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should also do good works and love, but how a person may be justified 
before God and be saved. And then we answer with St. Paul that we are 
justified alone through faith in Christ, and not through the works of the 
law or through love—not in such a way as if we thereby utterly rejected 
works or love (as the adversaries falsely slander and accuse us) but so that 
we may not be diverted (as Satan would very much like) from the main 
issue with which we here have to do into another extraneous matter which 
does not belong in this article at all. Therefore, while and as long as we 
have to do with this article of justification, we reject and condemn works, 
since the very nature of this article cannot admit any treatment or 
discussion of works. For this reason we summarily cut off every reference 
to the law and the works of the law in this conjunction.83  
Not only are the specific Latin expression loco communi (“commonplace”) and the 
references to the nature of the article and to “disputation” significant here,84 but more 
significant is the distinction made between the “place” for teaching about justification 
and the “place” for teaching about good works. Although there are elsewhere in The Book 
of Concord a number of other references to the appropriateness of places for certain 
arguments,85 this distinction between justification and good works (sanctification) is by 
far the most important. While the logical distinction the Reformers make between 
justification and sanctification is discussed further elsewhere,86 here it is important to 
                                                 
83 SD III:29, BKS, 923-924; Tappert, 544. (Emphasis added.) The wording is not exactly the same, 
but see WA 40I:24017-26; confer AE 26:137. As indicated below (n.216, p.398), this Luther passage is cited 
by Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus, 2 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing 
House, 1989), II:619. Furthermore, the passage is a crucial one for the justification-sanctification 
distinction, as discussed in Chapter V. 
84 By the time this passage was written, of course, Melanchthon had published several works using 
the loci method and titled them so. Chemnitz, one of the principal authors of the Formula, lectured on 
Melanchthon’s loci and had a similar work of his own posthumously published (see further the discussion 
below, beginning on p.396). 
85 Ap I:43; IV:342, 369; SD VIII:30. Note well the philosophical expressions in the surrounding 
context of Ap I:43 and IV:342. 
86 See Chapter V.  
 Scholars debate whether humanism led the Reformers to emphasize sanctification more than 
justification or spiritualize the presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar. Kittelson (“Humanism in 
the Theological Faculties,” 154 n.48) cites Gerhard Ritter, “Die geschichtliche Bedeutung des deutschen 
Humanismus,” Historische Zeitschrift 127 (1923): 450-451; the original German of Moeller, “The German 
Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation,” 59-60 (about p.37 in the English); and Spitz and 
Societies, Religious Renaissance 292. Kittelson disagrees with Ritter, Moeller, and Spitz. The Kittelson 
citation of Ritter does not appear to be accurate. Moeller, whom Kittelson says “depends” on Ritter 
(Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 139 n.2.), does briefly discuss the two topics but does 
not cite Ritter. Spitz, at the page cited from his Conclusion, simply asserts the claim in passing without any 
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note the role that the loci method plays in the distinction and, as with the use of the loci 
method in general, to observe that what will shortly be seen to be a philosophical tool is 
put in use of the Gospel.87 To be sure, that the earlier and later authors of the writings 
contained in The Book of Concord considered their works to be organized according to 
the loci method is clear from how they referred to the different parts of the works, and 
from the overall organization of the works, which is the next topic here.  
 organizational structure used by The Book of Concord 
 While The Book of Concord itself is organized according to the different 
documents of which it consists, even without the foregoing examination there really can 
be little doubt that those documents contained in The Book of Concord are themselves 
organized topically. That the  or loci method is used is demonstrable by even a 
casual examination of the writings contained in The Book of Concord.88 The Apostolic 
and Nicene Creeds, the first two of the three Ecumenical Creeds that predate the 
Reformation, have articles corresponding to the three Persons of the Trinity: Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit. (Even that division Luther can perceive as relating to creation, 
redemption, and sanctification.89) The third Ecumenical Creed, the Athanasian, deals both 
with the nature of the Trinity—the distinctions between the Persons and the unity of the 
substance—and the nature and works of the Incarnation. Of the Reformation writings, the 
Augsburg Confession is organized into 28 topical articles, 21 treating matters of faith and 
doctrine and 7 treating matters in dispute. The Apology of the Augsburg Confession’s 23 
articles generally correspond to the Augsburg Confession’s articles. Covering some of the 
same points as the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, Martin Luther’s Smalcald 
Articles has some 21 articles. An appendix to the Augsburg Confession, the Treatise on 
                                                                                                                                                 
support, although he does cite both Moeller and Ritter for other reasons in another place (for example, 
p.354 n.15). 
87 Another example of loci in service of the Gospel is found in Ap XV:43, where sermons are said 
to deal with “topics” (locis; Stücke) such as penitence, faith, and the like (Tappert, 221; BKS, 305). Confer 
the discussion below about locis being homiletical for Melanchthon (see at n.101). 
88 A complete listing of the usual headings for the various documents is included in the Appendix, 
“The Book of Concord by Structure and Content”. 
89 See the discussion below, beginning on p.337. 
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the Power and Primacy of the Pope treats its major topic according to the testimony of 
Scripture, the testimony of history, refutations of the opponents’ arguments, and two 
related subtopics, the marks of the Antichrist and the power and jurisdiction of bishops.90 
The Small and Large Catechisms are organized according to the six chief parts of 
Christian Doctrine, to the first three of which—the Ten Commandments, the Apostolic 
Creed, and the Lord’s Prayer—Luther added parts on Holy Baptism, the Office of the 
Keys and Confession, and the Sacrament of the Altar.91 (Within especially the first three 
parts, each subpart—commandment, article, and petition—essentially become loci of 
their own.92) The later Formula of Concord has 12 topical articles also covering some of 
the same points as the earlier confessional writings.93  
 Thus, considering both how the authors of the writings contained in The Book of 
Concord refer to their divisions and how the writings themselves are organized, the 
topical organization of the works contained in The Book of Concord is clear. 
 method’s philosophical background 
 Such topical organization is said to be inherently philosophical in nature. The 
works contained in The Book of Concord were not the only Reformation-era works to be 
organized by topic or commonplace. Philip Melanchthon, the author of the 1530 
Augsburg Confession, organized his earlier major theological work, Loci Communes, by 
the same method.94 Melanchthon’s Loci and others like it provide the primary basis for 
the work of both Quirinus Breen, who demonstrates that the  method comes from 
                                                 
90 Those divisions given in the text are the usual divisions, but an examination of the work itself 
suggests there are three central questions being addressed (see Tr 1-4 and subsequent references to such 
divisions, such as Tr 22 and 38). Confer n.64 above, p.117. 
91 See, for example, Bente, §84-85, pp.64-65. The extent to which Luther added the part on the 
Keys and Confession is somewhat debated, as in Bente, §112-113, pp.87-88. 
92 See also the discussion in n.60 above, p.117. 
93 The use of the loci method can be theologically problematic. There is somewhat of a 
contemporary controversy over whether the confessional writings are completely authoritative in all their 
teaching or only on those matters given a specific locus or article. In addition, the division of the Bible’s 
one teaching, or doctrine, into many loci can be said to contribute to a false notion that there are many 
doctrines. 
94 There are some details on the editions of Melanchthon’s Loci below, beginning on p.252. 
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philosophy, and James M. Kittelson, who locates the method within humanism and 
suggests possible implications of its use. 
The work of Quirinus Breen 
 Quirinus Breen traced Melanchthon’s loci method in at least some senses back to 
Aristotle’s Topics.95 Breen regarded both as innovative works, writing that Aristotle’s 
Topics was intended to systematize dialectics (logic) in an original way and that Philip 
Melanchthon’s 1521 Loci communes, highly praised by Luther, was a first for what Breen 
calls “Protestant” theology. Although Breen regarded both as innovative and in some 
senses related, Breen also found some discontinuities. Breen wrote that Aristotle’s Topics 
was to apply only to probable statements and thus provide only probable conclusions, as 
opposed to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics that was intended to deal with certain 
knowledge. In part due to what Breen called ignorance of Aristotle’s Analytics, Breen 
wrote that Greek and Roman schools lost the distinction between probable and certain 
knowledge, and Breen illustrated this point with the example of Cicero, who held that 
only probable knowledge was possible and thus made greater use of the loci in attempting 
to discover what he regarded as the only kind of knowledge.96 While Breen claims that 
during the Middle Ages some of the distinction between probable and certain knowledge 
was recovered and that those regarded as orthodox kept the dialectics of probable 
propositions out of matters of faith, renaissance authors Rudolph Agricola and Erasmus, 
according to Breen, both approached knowledge more in Cicero’s manner than in 
Aristotle’s manner and influenced Melanchthon in this regard.97  
                                                 
95 Quirinus Breen, “The Terms ‘Loci Communes’ and ‘Loci’ in Melanchthon,” Church History 
16.4 (1947). On many of Breen’s statements about the loci method’s background, confer Ong, Ramus, 
Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. (Some specific page references to Ong’s work are made in the notes 
that follow.) 
96 Ong wrote that Aristotle and Cicero thought of loci communes as “common to all subjects, 
providing arguments for anything at all” (citing Aristotle Rhetoric i.2[1358a], ii.18[1391b] and Cicero De 
inventione ii.14. sec. 47ff.), but Ong noted that by the time of the Reformation the distinction between 
“private” and “common” places “generally amounted to little in theory or practice”, making “place” and 
“commonplace” interchangeable (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 116). 
97 With Breen, confer the discussion of Peter of Spain’s Summulae logicales and its importance to 
Ramus and Agricola in Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 60-61. Ong similarly places 
Peter of Spain’s De locis on a line stretching from Aristotle through Themistius and Boethius to Agricola 
 
131 
Agricola sought by the loci to reconstitute all knowledge; Erasmus (in 
addition to that) sought more particularly to reinterpret Christianity by loci 
belonging to ethics. … In a sense Melanchthon is their most illustrious 
pupil. As a worker in the topical tradition the pupil has outshone his 
masters.98 
To further understand Melanchthon’s “illustrious” use of the loci method, the relationship 
between dialectic and rhetoric must be briefly explored.  
 The relationship between dialectic and rhetoric depended on who used them. 
Breen wrote that Aristotle knew dialectics and rhetoric were related but kept them 
separate and did not think rhetoric itself could attain knowledge.99 Orators, Breen wrote, 
used the dialectical method of topica to dig out and arrange their subject matter, which 
subject matter was polished by rhetoric. Thus, at least for some, Breen wrote, the 
dialectical topos or locus, called inventio, was to be distinguished from rhetorical 
inventio. Dialectic was separate from rhetoric for Aristotle and others in the Middle Ages, 
but not necessarily for Melanchthon.100  
                                                                                                                                                 
and Ramus (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 63). On Ramus’ criticism of Aristotle’s 
Topics, however, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 174. 
98 Breen, “‘Loci Communes’ and ‘Loci’,” 202. For more on Agricola’s use of the loci and the 
relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 102-104. 
For Melanchthon following Agricola, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 158-160. Hill 
says, “topical methods of writing became known to the occidental theologians through the writings of John 
of Damascus” (Charles Leander Hill, “Prolegomena,” The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521] 
[Boston: Meador, 1944], 55). Melanchthon’s dedicatory letter at the beginning of the 1521 loci is said to 
show Argicola’s influence in being both critical of John of Damascus for too much philosophy and of Peter 
Lombard for not enough Scripture; see Philipp Melanchthon, The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon 
[1521], trans. Charles Leander Hill (Boston: Meador, 1944), 66-67. 
99 Aristotle is said to have seen rhetoric more or less as tailoring a message to an audience, 
knowing which dialectical arguments a particular audience will find persuasive. Rhetorical arguments for 
Aristotle were said to be “just arguments in another type of dress”. (See further the discussion of inductive 
and deductive methods that follow in Chapters III and IV, respectively.) As for rhetorical loci, Aristotle’s 
list of topoi in Rhetoric II.23 is said to be “mostly traceable” to Aristotle’s Topics. (Robin Smith, “Logic,” 
The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995], 63-64. Confer Jonathan Barnes, “Rhetoric and poetics,” The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 269-272.) 
100 Ong notes how Peter of Spain’s loci provides maxims that somewhat correspond with 
Aristotle’s axioms and that function “in the dialectical or even literary or rhetorical sense” (Ong, Ramus, 
Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 63-65). And, Ong notes the significant connection between ratio 
(“reason”) and the loci: “Here in the thirteenth century, when the goddess of reason makes her most 
definitive appearance in scholastic philosophy in the most distinctive and influential of all scholastic 
manuals, she is supported not on the pillars of science, but on the topics or arguments of a merely probably 
dialectic or rhetoric” (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 65). 
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 Based on the changing titles of Melanchthon’s work, its content, and 
Melanchthon’s treatises on the loci method, Breen understood Melanchthon at least 
initially to intend his loci communes as a rhetorical work, although Breen saw 
Melanchthon and his loci become more dialectical over time. However, even as 
Melanchthon’s use of loci moved towards dialectics, Breen concluded that for 
Melanchthon, as for Cicero, dialectic always served rhetoric, or, in Melanchthon’s case, 
homiletics.101 Moreover, Breen wrote that Melanchthon distinguished between dialectics 
as judging on the basis of logic and dialectics as providing an index of things to 
investigate (as a physician investigates what may cause a rapid pulse under the locus “on 
effects”) or to select (as done with religious doctrine that has already been searched out 
“and needs only to be selected, arranged, defined, and so on”). Thus, Breen wrote that 
Melanchthon kept both dialectics as logic and dialectics as loci on the same level, which 
was contrary to how Aristotle understood the fit of loci and more in keeping with Cicero, 
even if, unlike Cicero, Melanchthon could grant that some knowledge was certain. So, 
Breen ultimately concluded that despite the term loci and the method itself going back to 
Aristotle, Melanchthon’s specific use and understanding of loci did not.102 Nevertheless, 
Melanchthon’s use of the loci method is still at its core inherently philosophical. The 
philosophical  or loci method itself was given rebirth by the humanists of the 
Renaissance, as further documented by James M. Kittelson. 
                                                 
101 On the claim of the relationship between rhethoric and dialectics for Melanchthon, compare 
Kusukawa, “Lutheran Method,” 338. On dialectics serving rhetoric in the Apology, see Arand, 
“Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument,” 284-287. 
102 Petersen traces Melanchthon’s loci through Cicero to Aristotle’s  (Peter Petersen, 
“Aristotelisches in der Theologie Melanchthons,” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 164 
[1927]: 149), but, Breen seems to dismiss Petersen’s claim by saying Melanchthon uses Cicero’s loci, 
without really considering the implication that even Cicero’s loci are in one way or another traced back to 
Aristotle (as Breen himself traces them) (Breen, “‘Loci Communes’ and ‘Loci’,” 205). 
 In the end, Breen noted that Melanchthon preserved Aristotle for theological and other curriculum 
primarily because of Aristotle’s dialectics and rhetoric, and Breen then also interestingly noted the 
following: “Once in theology, Aristotle may give forth, to a generation that knows him better, things that 
may alter the Melanchthonian concept of theology. It may have its uses that Melanchthon had not too 
carefully examined his Trojan horse.” (Breen, 209.) 
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The work of James M. Kittelson 
 Generally in keeping with Breen’s conclusion, James M. Kittelson found the loci 
method inherently humanistic.103 Kittelson, as to some extent Breen, saw that the 
Reformers used a loci method that was based more on rhetoric than on dialectic.104 
Regarding the Reformers’ use, Kittelson described the loci method in the following way. 
This method drew primarily upon classical rhetoric for proper procedure 
in both the acquisition and impartation of the wisdom (sapientia) that 
governs life. As such, it assumed that useful oration or essay both 
addressed the whole person and covered all the loci, topoi, or issues that 
were central to the question at stake. Naturally enough, one or another of 
the aspects of the good life—whether love, the onset of old age, civic duty, 
or even evangelical theology—were this method’s proper subjects. Hence, 
the core of religious faith could be broken down into topoi that could be 
learned at least in the sense of being memorized.105 
Although recognizing they were intended for different audiences and purposes, Kittelson 
pointed to Melanchthon’s Loci communes and Luther’s Catechisms as examples of 
                                                 
103 Five Kittelson essays from 1984-1999 are cited in the following. There is a good degree of 
overlap and repetition among them, but each essay is not cited in every place it could be. Generally the 
essays with the more detailed discussion and additional details are cited. 
 In discussing Melanchthon, Ong suggests the humanist rejection of scholasticism by name and the 
humanist emphasis on pedagogy is in keeping with the substance of scholasticism, if only amplified by a 
greater consideration for the needs of their pupils (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 158, 
159). 
104 James M. Kittelson, “Luther's Impact on the Universities—and the Reverse,” Concordia 
Theological Quarterly 48 (1984): 159. Confer James M. Kittelson, “Luther the Educational Reformer,” 
Luther and Learning: The Wittenberg University Luther Symposium, ed. Marilyn J. Harran (Cranbury, NJ: 
Associated University Presses, 1985), 108-109. Wengert, however, sees loci communes as a “bridge for 
Melanchthon between rhetoric and dialectics”, functioning in dialectics as a major proposition of a 
syllogism and thus relating to dialectics’ status and thus rhetorics’ scopus, what Melanchthon sometimes 
calls the summa (Wengert, Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem, 171, 174 ). In places such as p.183, 
Wengert draws on Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei 
Philipp Melanchthon, I:373-379. 
105 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 154-155. Confer James M. Kittelson, 
“The significance of humanist educational methods for Reformation theology,” Lutherjahrbuch 66 (1999): 
227. Ong discusses the various definitions of loci in the period immediately leading up to the time of 
Agricola and Ramus (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 116-121). Freedman traces lines 
from Ramus through Melanchthon and into the schools beyond, noting their curricula and the confessional 
lines that influenced them, discussing along the way figures significant to the “second generation” of 
Reformers (Joseph S. Freedman, “The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c. 
1570-c.1630,” Renaissance Quarterly 46.1 [1993]). 
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Reformation works organized on the basis of  or loci.106 Kittelson cited the loci 
method used by theologians as an example of how humanism and its methods triumphed 
in form and sometimes also content in Lutheran universities of the late Reformation 
period.107 
 Kittelson perceived a shift at the time of the Reformation from using the Bible as 
the place to find Christ to using the Bible as a place to find doctrine, and he saw a similar 
shift from teaching Bible commentary to teaching the Bible according to the loci method. 
Kittelson illustrated this observation with the case of Johann Marbach, a Wittenberg 
doctoral student in the 1540s, who went on to teach at Strasbourg. Kittelson determined 
that Melanchthon’s lectures on John were a basis for Marbach’s own lectures on John 
according to the loci method, and Kittelson connected the doctrine of election taught by 
Marbach in connection with John 12:40 to the Formula of Concord some thirty years 
later.108 Kittelson’s conclusion regarding the impact of the loci method differed from the 
impact other authors identified: 
A movement [presumably humanist pedagogy] and a method [presumably 
the loci method] that was at its base anti-dogmatic and whose practitioners 
were certainly no friends of professional theologians provided the means 
by which biblical commentaries could speak to theological issues as the 
occasion required. Thus, the method itself did not lead directly to 
“theologizing” the biblical text, nor did the use of loci as such “turn the 
texts into a theological textbook”, as Wengert and others maintain. 
                                                 
106 Kittelson, “Educational Reformer,” 109. Confer Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological 
Faculties,” 155. Wengert also writes of the Loci Communes as giving “the proper theological framework 
from which to approach the Scripture” (Wengert, Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem, 168). As 
mentioned above (in the discussion of the background of the Small Catechism that begins on p.73), 
Luther’s Catechisms had some long-standing medieval precedents and were hardly Luther’s innovation 
prompted by humanism. 
107 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 148. 
108 Kittelson, “Luther's Impact,” 29-31. Confer Kittelson, “Educational Reformer,” 109-110; 
James M. Kittelson, “Learning and Education: Phase Two of the Reformation,” Die dänische Reformation: 
vor ihrem internationalen Hintergrund, eds. Leif Grane and Kai Hørby (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1990), 159; Kittelson, “Significance of Humanist Educational Methods,” 229-236. 
 A colleague of Marbach’s, Johannes Pappus was also examined by Kittelson, who found Pappus 
to evoke the humanistic core of the late Reformation, in terms of formal education, career pursuit, and 
proficiency. Marbach and Pappus each had their respective battles with Johannes Sturm (1507-1589), the 
rector of Strasbourg’s Gymnasium (Latin school, or secondary school), keeping their theological faculty 
relatively independent from the greater institution and a greater form of humanism. (Kittelson, “Humanism 
in the Theological Faculties.”) 
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Instead, humanist pedagogy provided the means for testing new doctrinal 
statements against the Biblical texts and led, in this instance [that of 
Marbach], to the rejection of the Reformed conception of the eternal 
decree. The loci method thus made clear that the Scriptures had both 
utility and teeth.109 
Luther’s 1520 Address to the Christian Nobility did call for the Bible to replace the usual 
theological textbook, Lombard’s Sentences,110 but Luther did not reduce the role of the 
content of the Bible to something that only mattered to academics, as will be discussed 
below. 
 While Kittelson’s documenting the use of the loci method from Melanchthon 
forward is helpful, a problem with this aspect of Kittelson’s analysis, however, is that he 
does not address the inextricable connection between the content of the Bible and its 
presentation according to loci.111 The Bible presents a teaching about Jesus Christ with 
various aspects that can truly be approached either exegetically, as one encounters it in 
the text itself, or systematically, as centered on its various topics.112 Moreover, the 
content of the Bible is knowable and expressible and to be the object of a believer’s faith 
                                                 
109 Kittelson, “Significance of Humanist Educational Methods,” 235-236. (Emphasis original.) 
Kittelson cites Wengert, Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem, 191. Wengert, however, did not 
actually maintain that the loci method turned the text “into a theolgocial textbook”; Wengert wrote that 
Melanchthon’s desire to find unifying principles in John’s Gospel and the opposing desire to denote 
theological themes within its various sections “threaten between them to turn the Gospel into a theological 
textbook”, although Wengert admits “the seeds for the ‘theologization’ of the biblical text by Protestant 
interpreters have been planted by Melanchthon’s use of a loci method of exegesis.” (Wengert, 
Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem, 190-191.) 
110 WA 6:461-462; Aland #7; AE 44:204-207. Confer Kittelson, “Luther's Impact,” 25. Ong 
discusses how the loci works replaced Lombard’s Sentences, and he traces a similar development in 
medicine (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 315 ). 
111 Kittelson does suggest a logical syllogism showing why the loci method was used for teaching 
the Scriptures (Kittelson, “Educational Reformer,” 109). Wengert, however, in the case of the Annotationes 
in Johannem, discusses Melanchthon’s view that, both the Gospel writer and Jesus were using rhetorical 
and dialectical techniques and that the loci present are not “invented” but “discovered” in the text 
(Wengert, Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem, 169, 170-173, 177-182). 
112 Kittelson writes that the loci method turned exegesis into a type of systematics as if exegesis 
ceased to exist on its own (Kittelson, “Luther's Impact,” 29). Compare Grane’s statement: “The loci method 
invited the inclusion of portions of Lutheran doctrine in exegesis” (Leif Grane, “Teaching the People—the 
Education of the Clergy and the Instruction of the People in the Danish Reformation Church,” Die dänische 
Reformation: vor ihrem internationalen Hintergrund, eds. Leif Grane and Kai Horby [Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990], 174). 
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and confession. Kittelson’s failure to address this matter leads to another criticism of his 
treatment of the loci method. 
 Kittelson further argued that the loci-method contributed to “concern for true 
doctrine” that became equated with “right belief”. Kittelson argued that a related 
tendency was to regard faith less as fiducia (“trust”) and more as assensus 
(“agreement”),113 to produce “a religion that was at least as much a matter of the head as 
of the heart”.114 Kittelson wrote that loci-based works became statements of doctrine 
somewhat independent of the whole of theology, and thus Kittelson found some truth in 
Nicolai Grundtvig’s statement that the Small Catechism helped separate doctrine and 
life.115 Kittelson went so far as to write, “In a curious—but true—irony, humanism itself 
gave Luther’s heirs the methods with which to become highly contentious and to make of 
Lutheranism a very doctrinal and therefore cerebral version of Christianity.”116 He 
continued, “the humanistic method so eagerly employed by the Reformers to teach ‘life-
giving’ doctrine undercut its very life-giving character.”117 Finally, Kittelson favorably 
quoted Leif Grane’s remark regarding the era of Melanchthon as a time of an attack on 
Christianity.118 
 As for Grundtvig’s assessment of the Small Catechism, his comments are 
described by at least one modern writer as a part of Romanticism’s criticism of 
                                                 
113 Kittelson, “Luther's Impact,” 32-33. 
114 Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 156; confer Kittelson, “Phase Two of the 
Reformation,” 163. Earlier Kittelson had commented, “True religion had become as much a matter of the 
mind (or the memory) as of the heart” (Kittelson, “Luther's Impact,” 32). Later Kittelson wrote that at the 
hands of these humanists “true religion became a matter of learning in the sense that the head led the heart” 
(Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 157). As will be seen in Chapter IV, the Reformers 
view the mind and the heart as working in tandem. 
115 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 155, 156. Kittelson does not give a 
citation for the Grundtvig statement, and this author was unable to locate a statement resembling 
Kittelson’s paraphrase, although at least one passage was located where Grundtvig referred to an imagined 
antithesis between soul and body and the notion that mastering the Small Catechism and assigned Scripture 
passages would assure one of eternal life (Nicolai Frederick Severin Grundtvig, “The School for Life,” 
trans. Ernest D. Nielsen, N. F. S. Grundtvig: Selected Writings, ed. Johannes Knudsen [Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1976], 152). 
116 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 154. 
117 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 155. 
118 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 155. Kittelson cited Grane, “Teaching the 
People,” 168 (p.184 in the edition consulted for this dissertation). 
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memorization as an educational approach.119 That same modern writer, however, while 
claiming Luther was opposed to mimesis, overlooked Luther’s support of imitatio in the 
case of the text of the Small Catechism.120 Memorization and imitation, moreover, were 
themselves humanistic devices traceable back to Aristotle and his critique of Plato.121 
Although Kittelson connects memorization with the loci method,122 the two do not 
necessarily go hand in hand.123 
 Likewise, where Kittelson claimed that an educated clergy and its indoctrinating 
people were the goals of the Reformation, 124 he seems to have overlooked the 
inextricable connection between doctrine and the saving faith in He Whom that doctrine 
proclaims. Kittelson rightly connected the events of Luther’s parish visitation and the 
production of the Small Catechism for teaching, giving as proof two quotations from 
Luther’s preface to that work.125 However, Kittelson did not quote or even acknowledge 
the key link between the conditions he found upon visiting and the exhortation he gives 
                                                 
119 Peter Kemp, “Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 38.2 
(2006): 181. 
120 Kemp, “Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics,” 181. SC Preface, 8-13. 
121 Kemp, “Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics,” 175-176, 177, 179-180. Confer Kittelson, who 
questions Gerald Strauss’ cause and effect relationship between the Reformation’s poor regard for fallen 
humanity and the choice of memorization as a method (Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 157-
158). Kittelson cites as an example Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the 
Young in the German Reformation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 176-177. 
122 Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 159-160. 
123 On Ramus and memory, for example, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 
280. 
124 On the matter of the educated clergy, see, for example, Kittelson, “Phase Two of the 
Reformation,” 154-156. On the matter of indoctrination, although Kittelson disagreed with at least 
Strauss’s approach, Kittelson agreed with Strauss that “The Reformation quickly became a process of 
education or (to use [Strauss’s] term) ‘indoctrination’ first and foremost.” (Kittelson, “Phase Two of the 
Reformation,” 150). 
 A slightly more recent study of the first and second generations of Lutheran pastors is that of 
Susan Karant-Nunn, who considered the Ernestine lands. Karant-Nunn takes issue with some aspects of 
usual Reformation histories, and she argues that, in the time period she studied, the faculty in Wittenberg 
had little influence on clergy outside of large city parishes. Her evidence did not suggest to her that rural 
parishioners were even attracted by or essentially knew Lutheran doctrine. She admits some people may 
have had heartfelt faith, however. (Susan Karant-Nunn, Luther's Pastors: The Reformation in the Ernestine 
Countryside, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 69, part 8 [Philadelphia: The 
American Philosophical Society, 1979].) 
125 Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 152. Kittelson cites SC Preface:1-2, 6 (see BKS, 
501-502; Tappert, 338). 
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for teaching the Catechism: the people should have belief they can confess and live 
according to.  
... sollen doch alle Christen heißen, getauft sein und der heiligen 
Sakrament geniessen, können wider Vaterunser noch den Glauben oder 
zehn Gebot, leben dahin wie das liebe Viehe und unvernünftige Säue und, 
nu das Evangelium kommen ist, dennoch fein gelehrnt haben, aller 
Freiheit meisterlich zu missebrauchen. 
Et tamen omnes sancto illo Christi nomine appellantur et nobiscum 
communibus utuntur sacramentis, cum orationem Dominicam, symbolum 
apostolicum et decalogum non modo non intelligant, sed ne verba quidem 
referre possint. Quid multis moror? nihil omnino a bestiis differunt. Jam 
autem cum evangelium passim doceatur, illi vel maxime Christianorum 
libertate fruuntur. 
Although the people are supposed to be Christian, are baptized, and 
receive the holy sacrament, they do not know the Lord’s Prayer, the 
Creed, or the Ten Commandments, they live as if they were pigs and 
irrational beasts, and now that the Gospel has been restored they have 
mastered the fine art of abusing liberty.126 
For Luther education is a means to an end, whereas Kittelson seems to have seen it as an 
end unto itself.127 Something that is believed in the heart is to find expression on the lips 
in the form of a confession of faith, which obviously then must be known in the mind.128 
And, even Kittelson, referring to his own work on Strasbourg, Scott Hendrix’s work on 
Oldenbourg, and Bruce Tolley’s work on Württemberg, admits that evidence suggests 
people did believe the doctrine they were taught.129 
 Finally, the argument regarding the separation of head-knowledge and heart-faith 
must be further addressed. Kittelson seems to have overlooked the fact that systematic 
theological works such as Thomas’ Summa had been around for some time. Moreover, 
                                                 
126 SC Preface:3, Tappert, 338; BKS, 502. 
127 For example, “The Reformation therefore became an educational process very quickly and it 
did so at its very core.” (Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 153.) 
128 See, for example, Romans 10:9-10. Kittelson admits that Lutheranism “was put forth as a 
knowable religion even for ordinary people” (Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 161, 163). 
Further, he at least admits Luther thought that the Holy Spirit was active in the reading and meditation on 
the Catechism and that the mind might even lead the heart (Kittelson, “Luther's Impact,” 35, and Kittelson, 
“Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 156, citing SC Longer Preface:9). 
129 Kittelson, “Phase Two of the Reformation,” 161.  
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Luther intended at least his smaller Catechism to be not only a textbook but also a 
devotional tool, a fact Kittelson admits in at least one of his essays.130 To be sure, not 
everyone had the depth of personal experiences Luther had, however.131 Kittelson 
distinguished between formal theological essays and works of a more pastoral character, 
but he noted that while they did not appear together “the doctrinal work informed the 
pastoral.”132 Indeed, theological study is necessary for pastoral work such as preaching 
and applying law and Gospel one-on-one at bedsides and the like. The Book of Concord 
follows Luther in expecting that a faithful pastor is going to be able to both feed (pasture) 
his sheep and protect them from wolves by a more formally theological  
(apology, defense) of the faith.133 For the confessors, the  or loci method traceable 
back to Aristotle served that end of feeding and protecting the flock and thus provides 
another example of philosophy in its ministerial role.134 
Summary of /loci method 
 The writings contained in The Book of Concord are organized by the theological 
commonplaces, a method of organization that is traced back to Aristotle and his Topics 
and that thus is at its core philosophical. Although Aristotle may have intended for his 
Topics to systematize logic and pertain only to probable statements and conclusions, in 
time the Topics were applied to the task of investigating and sequencing all types of 
knowledge for rhetoric. The Reformers’ use of the loci method seems to have followed 
                                                 
130 Kittelson, “Educational Reformer,” 111. Kittelson does acknowledge that the result was 
unintentional (Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 156). On the Catechism as a devotional 
tool, see LC Longer Preface 3, 9, 11, 19. 
131 This is briefly discussed by Moeller, “The German Humanists and the Beginnings of the 
Reformation,” 37. 
132 Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 155. Confer Breen’s observation that 
Melanchthon’s loci were intended to serve pastoral work (Breen, “‘Loci Communes’ and ‘Loci’,” 204). 
133 See Luther’s 1522 comment to this effect while preaching on 1 Peter 5:2 (WA 12:389; Aland 
#Pr. 369; AE 30:135, translated by Martin H. Bertram), cited by the Formula’s Solid Declaration, R&N:14. 
134 There is some irony in the Reformers being charged of emphasizing the head and not the heart. 
For example, in Ap IV:38 the Reformers accuse the scholastics of treating faith merely as knowledge. The 
Reformers, on the other hand, in some places, for example in the German of Ap IV:141, make a very 
careful effort to join the heart’s faith that accepts God’s promises for the sake of Christ with the individual 
consciences’s logical conclusion that God has surely forgiven him or her. (See further below, n.240, p.301, 
where faith in the heart is both conjoined and distinguished from the mind drawing conclusions.)  
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the later trend and stayed in service of rhetoric by indexing and arranging the Bible’s 
teaching. The use of this philosophical loci method and some applications of 
memorization fit with humanism and took a prominent role in education at many 
different levels, and it was used in service of the Reformation to teach people what they 
were to believe and thereby be saved. 
Chapter II summary 
 Chapter II has presented the evidence for both the Reformers’ second-order 
regard for “logic” and their use of the  or loci method for organizing their works 
contained in The Book of Concord. In the case of the second-order regard for “logic”, 
where the earlier Reformers wrote of their opponents’ bad logic, the later Reformers 
wrote of their good logic, even within the theological realm. Such uses of second-order 
references to logic are consistent within the Reformation era, even as they are consistent 
with those in the preceding period, such as Augustine and Ockham, who held that logic 
had a role to play in theology, albeit a limited one. For the Reformers, logic’s place was 
definitely behind Holy Scripture and could only be used rightly by redeemed reason. 
 Since the second-order data regarding logic was not completely negative, there 
may be little surprise that the earlier and later Reformers almost without question 
organized their writings by  or loci, a first-order use of philosophy. The division of 
their writings into “topics” or “places” allows the Reformers to concentrate on what is for 
them the chief article, justification by faith. Morevoer, such division allows them to 
stipulate what is proper for discussion at locus and what is not (such as teaching about the 
necessity of love and good works needing to be done apart from the teaching about 
justification). Again generally consistent with the preceding tradition drawing on 
significant philosophical figures, although somewhat adapting the method to make its 
application consistent with Scripture, the Reformers make such a supra-sentential use of 
philosophy in service to theology at the same time as and in spite of their second-order 
repudiation of philosophy that was seen in Chapter I. Chapters III and IV make clear how 
the Reformers’ first-order supra-sentential uses of philosophy include reasoning by 




Use of Inductive Argumentation 
Examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, that is, according 
to sure and clear passages of Scripture, not against the rule or the 
passages. 
 —Apology XXVII:60 
Generally in keeping with inductive reasoning as described by philosophers such as 
Aristotle, The Book of Concord both uses examples to establish general principles or 
rules and uses those general principles to interpret other examples. Similarly, The Book of 
Concord uses analogy to argue inductively to and from general principles. The general 
principles themselves can also be used for deductive arguments, as will be seen in 
Chapter IV.1 This chapter considers the inductive dialectical and rhetorical arguments of 
example and analogy. For this consideration, the following subsection initially offers 
information on the philosophical background of these methods, and later subsections 
proceed through a more detailed examination of their uses, both positively for the 
Reformers’ own positions and negatively against their opponents’ positions. (In the case 
of example, there is also a subsection addressing the Reformers’ explicit principles for 
the use of example.) 
Philosophical background of example and analogy 
 For Aristotle, induction, whether under the heading of dialectics or rhetoric, 
argues from known specific particulars to general universal conclusions; the general 
universals are then in turn used in deduction to conclude something about a specific 
particular.2 This procedure is clear in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he explicitly 
says induction is used for acquiring universals and first principles (also called primitives 
                                                 
1 On the two types of reasoning in Aristotle, see Smith, “Logic.” 
2 For general treatments, see Lloyd, Aristotle, 125-127; Timothy A. Robinson, Aristotle in Outline 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 116; and Smith, “Logic,” 29-33. 
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or immediate principles).3 In Aristotle’s Metaphysics, without calling it “induction”, he 
traces the process from sensation to memory to experience to science or art, the 
knowledge of universal propositions, and he illustrates the process with the case of a 
certain medicine or therapy benefiting someone who suffers from a certain disease.4 The 
process is similar and specifically called “induction” in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, 
although there illustrated with the development of concepts such as that of “human 
beings” or a certain animal.5 Also in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle goes so far as to 
say that without induction there can be no view or perception of universals.6 Perhaps in 
part because induction provides the universals to be used in deduction and perhaps in part 
because induction makes up a form of argument of its own, Aristotle’s line between 
induction and deduction is not always clearly and firmly drawn, with inductions 
sometimes being presented syllogistically and being reduced to deductive forms.7 With 
those considerations in mind, Aristotle certainly can be taken to suggest that induction 
belongs most properly to dialectics,8 but he also can speak of induction in connection 
with rhetoric, which he sees as an offshoot of dialectics, anyway, with all people using 
                                                 
3 EN VI.3, 1139b14-35, Barnes, II:1799. Confer APo. I.1, 71a8-9, Barnes, I:114; Top. VIII.1, 
156a5-7, Barnes, I:262. 
4 Metaph. I( ).1, 980a22-982a2, Barnes, II:1552-1553. 
5 APo. II.19, 99b31-100b7, Barnes, I:165-166. Another example of induction leading to a 
generalization can be found in APr. II.23, 68b8-36, Barnes, I:109-110. 
6 APo. I.18, 81a38-81b9, Barnes, I:132. (On which, confer Lloyd, Aristotle, 126.) See also APo 
I.31, 88a4-17, Barnes, I:144; APo. II.13, 97b7-36, Barnes, I:161-162. Although Aristotle is said to have 
assumed the validity of induction (Lloyd, Aristotle, 127), induction has its problems, which are said not to 
have been given serious attention until after Aristotle’s death (Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction, 
94). 
 Topics VIII.8 seems to suggest the universal can be secured “by means either of induction or of 
likeness” (160a38-39, Barnes I:270; E. S. Forster translates  with “similarity” [710, 711]), and 
Topics VIII.1 distinguishes induction from likeness, which resembles it, thusly: “in induction it is the 
universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, whereas in arguments from likeness, what is 
secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall” (156b13-16, Barnes, I:263; Forster translates 
 and  with “similars” [682, 683]). (Aristotle, “Topica,” trans. E. S. Forster, The Loeb 
Classical Library, ed. G. P. Goold [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960], vol. Aristotle II.) There is 
more on analogy in the text below, beginning on p.143. 
7 Robinson, Aristotle in Outline, 116; Lloyd, Aristotle, 125. As an example, Robinson gives APr. 
II.23, 68b15-25 (Barnes, I:109). Topics VIII may be an attempt to systematize both kinds of arguments. 
8 Top. I.2, 101a25-101b4, Barnes, I:168; Top. I.12, 105a10-19, Barnes I:174-175. 
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both dialectics and rhetoric to some extent.9 Both induction and deduction are uniquely 
applied in persuasion; Aristotle said, “Induction is more convincing and clear … and is 
applicable generally to the mass of men; but deduction is more forcible and more 
effective against contradictious people.”10 
 The dialectical method of argumentation known as induction is equated by 
Aristotle to the rhetorical method of persuasion known as example (as deduction is 
equated to enthymemes).11 Although under the heading of rhetoric Aristotle refers back 
to his discussion of induction while discussing example, he also states it simply: “When 
we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in 
dialectic, example in rhetoric.”12 The purpose of example is not surprisingly also like that 
of induction: to provide a general proposition which can be the basis for deduction or 
enthymemes.13 And, like in dialectics, in rhetoric the inductive example can be subsumed 
under the classification of the deductive enthymeme.14 Arguments by example can be 
refuted by a counter-example, “a single negative instance”, Aristotle said, although he 
also said one could argue that the counter-example “is dissimilar, or that its conditions 
are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other”.15 Thus, example is more 
formally treated as a method of argumentation than that of which is treated here next, 
namely analogy. 
 Analogy apparently is for Aristotle another way of arguing inductively, to go 
from particulars to a universal.16 Some universal principles of a specific science are 
                                                 
9 Rh. I.1, 1354a1-6, Barnes, II:2152; Rh. I.2, 1356a25-26, Barnes II:2156. 
10 Top. I.12, 105a16-18, Barnes, I:175. Confer Top. VIII.2, 157a18-20, Barnes, I:264. 
11 APo. I.1, 71a9-11, Barnes, I:114. Confer Smith, “Logic,” 64; Irwin and Fine, Aristotle: 
Selections 568. 
 On deduction and enthymemes, confer Rh. I.1, 1354a14, Barnes, II:2152; 1355a5-14, Barnes, 
II:2153-2154. On the use of commonplaces in enthymemes, see Rh II.22, 1395b23, Barnes, II:2224. On 
enthymemes, see also n.34 below, p.204. 
12 Rh. I.2, 1356b2-15, Barnes, II:2156. 
13 Rh. II.25, 1402b15-18, Barnes, II:2236. 
14 Rh. II.25, 1402b13, Barnes, II:2236. 
15 Rh. II.25, 1403a6-10, Barnes, II:2237. Confer Smith, “Logic,” 31. 
16 Analogy ( , “right relationship”, “proportion”, or “agreement”) is related to 
homonymy. Confer above, where it was noted that Aristotle in one place said likeness resembled induction 
but was distinguished from it (see n.6, p.142). 
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common to those in other sciences, Aristotle said, by analogy.17 Analogy comes into play 
when “no single definition usefully explains the nature of the thing or property, but it is 
not a case of pure homonymy without any connection”.18 Analogy is frequently 
employed, then, in excerpting anatomies and divisions of animals.19 Aristotle also 
frequently uses analogy to find something in common between different abstract things, 
such as different “goods” all being “one by analogy”.20 The purpose here, however, is not 
to trace out every illustration of Aristotle’s use of analogy but to see how he uses it to 
reason. In Physics, analogy helps Aristotle discover the underlying nature of substance. 
 The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the bronze 
is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before 
receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature to 
substance, i.e. the ‘this’ or existent.21 
Analogy can function not only as a tool of discovery but also as a way of demonstrating a 
point.22 And, Aristotle’s analysis of actuality in Metaphysics contextually connects 
induction and analogy. 
Actuality means the existence of the thing, not in the way which we 
express by ‘potentially’; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of 
Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it 
                                                 
17 APo. I.10, 76a38, Barnes, I:124. Confer accidents being analogous across categories of being as 
discussed in Metaph. XIV( ).6, 1093b16-20, Barnes, II:1728. 
18 Irwin and Fine, Aristotle: Selections, 566. Homonymy technically occurs when things share a 
name but not identical definitions or accounts, although there can be “extreme” homonymy with little in 
common and “moderate” homonymy with more in common (Irwin and Fine, Aristotle: Selections, 588). 
See Cat. I.1, 1a1-6, Barnes, I:3; Top. I.15, 106a1-8 and 107a3-12, Barnes, I:176 and 178. In the case of the 
last example,  is translated by Barnes “homonymous” and by Forster “equivocal” 
(Aristotle, “Topica,” 314, 315). Confer and compare also Apostle’s translation of Categories and his 
discussion of this phrase (Aristotle, “Aristotle's Categories and Propositions,” trans. Hippocrates G. 
Apostle, [Grinnell, IA: The Peripatetic Press, 1980], 1, 51 ). 
19 APo. II.14, 98a20-22, Barnes, I:162. Empedocles is said to have been the first to notice the 
analogous relationship between animals such as hand to claw and hair to feather or scale (Robert J. 
Hankinson, “Philosophy of Science,” The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. 
McGrade [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003] 124). 
20 EN I.6, 1096b27-29, Barnes, II:1733. See also the more general discussion of different things 
being one or the same by analogy and having the same causes, principles, and elements by analogy in 
Metaph. V( ).6, 1016b31-1017a2, Barnes, II:1605; Metaph. V( ).9, 1018a12-14, Barnes, II:1607; Metaph. 
XII( ).4, 1070a31-35 and 1070b16-19, Barnes, II:1691. 
21 Ph. I.7, 191a9-12, Barnes, I:326. Generally this dissertation quotes Aristotle in English only, 
referring to Greek and Latin only as needed. 
22 Thus, there is both a dialectical and rhetorical aspect to analogy. 
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might be separated out, and even the man who is not studying we call a 
man of science, if he is capable of studying. Otherwise, actually. Our 
meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not 
seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy,— that 
as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is the 
waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes 
shut but has sight, and that which is shaped out of the matter to the matter, 
and that which has been wrought to the unwrought. Let actuality be 
defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. 
But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by 
analogy—as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement 
to potentiality, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.23 
So, analogy can be for Aristotle a means of discovery and a method of leading to a 
universal principle like induction.  
 Aristotle’s discussion and use of analogy is said to be behind various medieval 
theological discussions. For example, in view of Aristotle’s Categories, Sophistical 
Refutations, and Metaphysics, God’s attributes were said to be analogous to those of 
human beings. In the thirteenth century writers distinguished between three types of 
analogies: analogies of proportionality, analogies of attribution, and analogies of 
limitation or participation. In the fourteenth century the focus is said to have shifted more 
to “the nature of the concepts that corresponded to the words used,” though some, such as 
Duns Scotus, rejected analogy.24 Against Meister Eckhart and Henry of Ghent, Scotus is 
said to have wanted being predicated of both God and creatures univocally. Others, such 
as Cajetan, resolved the matter by speaking of being by an analogy of proportionality.25 
                                                 
23 Metaph. IX( ).6, 1048a30-1048b9, Barnes, II:1655 (emphasis original). 
On a common middle term in analogy, see APo. II.17, 99a16, Barnes, I:164. 
24 E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” The Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGrade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 85-89. Maimonides is said 
to have denied knowledge of God by analogy (Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “Jewish Philosophy,” The Cambridge 
Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGrade [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 
132). On the Metaphysics as interpreted by Arabic commentators fueling the thirteenth-century Oxford 
dispute over supposition and appellation that involved Roger Bacon, see Alain de Libera, “The Oxford and 
Paris traditions in logic,” The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, 
Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 182, 184. 
25 Stephen P. Menn, “Metaphysics: God and being,” The Cambridge Companion to Medieval 
Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGrade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 162-166. Confer John F. 
Wippel, “Essence and existence,” The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman 
Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 406 n.101. 
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Another controversy that involved “analogy” was between Albert the Great and Avicenna 
over the nature of motion.26 
 Thus both example and analogy have their origins in philosophical dialectics and 
rhetoric, and at least analogy was used in some controverted matters in the medieval 
period. With that background detailed, attention is now given to the uses by the authors 
of the works in The Book of Concord first of example and then of analogy.27 
Example 
 The Book of Concord’s uses of example are discussed in this section under the 
headings of uses for the Reformers’ positions, uses against their opponents’ positions, 
and their expressed principles for the use of example. The uses considered here are those 
where what is being given as an example is specifically called an example in either the 
work’s authoritative language or its translation (Latin exemplum, exempli; German das 
Exempel).28 Not all of the uses of the words for “example” refer to what we would think 
of as examples,29 nor are the actual examples all easily classified as for the Reformers’ 
positions or against their opponents’ positions.30 Moreover, some of the uses of 
“example”, many in the Large Catechism, make an illustration without specifically taking 
                                                 
26 James A. Weisheipl, “The interpretation of Aristotle's Physics and the science of motion,” The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan 
Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 528. 
27 A more contemporary presentation of “Analogy and Probable Inference” can be found in 
chapter 11 of Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 11th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2002), 423-447. 
28 The idea that what is being given as an example is actually an example is often present in both 
the authoritative language versions of the works and their translations, even if what is being given as an 
example is only explicitly called an example in one. There are undoubtedly other examples of examples 
that are not called an example in either version of the works in The Book of Concord. 
29 For instance, reference is made to a copy of the Confutation in Ap Preface:2 and XXIII:68 and 
to the Symbola essentially as a rule of faith in SD R&N:1. 
30 An arguably “neutral” use is in the Large Catechism’s treatment of the First Commandment, 
where Saul and his eventual successor as king, David, are used as contrasting examples of wealth having an 
unfavorable impact and poverty having a beneficial one (LC I:44). One of the more subjective uses of 
“example” is the use in the article on Both Kinds discussed below (see at n.46, p.149). Of course, one 
mimght say that an example for the Reformers’ position in a matter of dispute would by its very nature be 
an example against their opponents’ position; presumably examples on which they would agree are not 
being discussed at all. 
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the Reformers’ or their opponents’ side.31 That there are nearly 100 total uses is not 
surprising. Both Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon were familiar with and used the 
pedagogical techniques of medieval Latin schools, including exempla for patterns of 
human strengths and weaknesses, although the use in The Book of Concord also relate to 
exempla as stories illustrating theological doctrine.32 And, where some examples were 
arguably neutral, the vast majority of examples used are either for the Reformers’ 
positions or against the positions of their opponents. 
For Reformers’ positions 
 In the Reformers’ supporting their positions, they at times refer to Bible passages 
as examples,33 but other cases are individuals or groups of people or things referred to by 
category. In part to show how someone or something can be an example of more than one 
point, this subsection examines the Reformers’ use of examples for their own positions in 
what can be considered chronological order of the examples being used, starting with Old 
                                                 
31 The Large Catechism gives a number of examples in connection with the Ten Commandments: 
LC I:5 gives common examples of failing to keep First Commandment; LC I:184 (Latin: Exempli causa) 
gives an envious neighbor as an example of a reason to be at enmity and sin against the Fifth 
Commandment; LC I:225 (Latin: Exempli causa) gives the example of servants stealing by damaging or 
permitting damage and thereby sinning against the Seventh Commandment; LC I:239 (in the Latin only) 
refers to other examples beyond that of the ancient Romans punishing offenders and giving warning so as 
to stave off sins against the Seventh Commandment; LC I:282 refers to church discipline of a gossip 
sinning against the Eighth Commandment as a warning to others (Latin: exemplum); a few lines later, in LC 
I:284, the Latin refers to public punishment as exemplis monitus (“example of warning”); LC I:301 gives 
fighting for an inheritance as an example of lawsuits produced by coveting and thus sins against the Ninth 
and Tenth Commandments; in LC I:306 Luther discusses men who can trick husbands out of their wives, 
such as King Herod who coveted his brother’s wife and took her, but Luther trusts people will not find such 
examples of sins against the Ninth and Tenth Commandment amongst his readers; LC III:102 refers to 
other people as bad examples that lead believers into temptation and thus motivate them to pray the Sixth 
Petition of the Lord’s Prayer; SC V:23 has people confess their being a bad example; and SD XI:11 refers 
to the example of those who did not persevere in the faith wrongfully leading to thoughts of God 
predestining both to salvation and damnation. 
 Exemplis monitus seems to be a technical term from civil law that may have its origins in the 
early-CE writing of Valerius Maximus (his sections 7.3 and 7.8, for example). The concept seems also to 
have come into the German as wahrnendes beispiel and have been current in Aesop. 
32 See Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. 
Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 57-61. See also LC I:44 for what may be a reference to secular 
histories used in schools. Curtius also traces exemplum to the  (“paradigm”) of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric. 
33 For example, SD VII:36 (Latin: exempli [BKS, 983]). This particular passage from the Formula 
also demonstrates the Reformers’ hermeneutic of Scripture interpreting Scripture. Other places where 
Scriptures serve as “examples” are discussed below in the text. 
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Testament figures, proceeding to New Testament figures, and concluding with examples 
from the New Testament church essentially after the period of the New Testament itself. 
The subsection concludes with a summary of the loci addressed.  
 Old Testament examples used by the Reformers begin with the beginning. Adam 
is used in the Apology’s article on Penitence as an example of someone having contrition 
resulting from the rebuke of the law and receiving forgiveness of sins by faith in God’s 
promises.34 Adam’s son Abel’s sacrifice is given in the Apology’s article on Justification 
as an example of a sacrifice righteous by faith and one that invites others to believe.35 
Following Paul’s use (presumably in Romans 9:17), the Reformers in the Solid 
Declaration’s article on Election use the Egyptian pharaoh of the exodus as an example of 
God offering grace and salvation up to a point at which the person’s obduracy then leads 
God to harden the person’s heart.36 In the Augsburg Confession’s article on the Saints, 
David’s good works are held up to the emperor as an example to follow, even as in the 
same paragraph the good works of the saints in general are said to be an example for 
everyone else.37 David is used further in the Apology’s article on Penitence as an 
example of someone who had contrition brought about by the law and followed it with 
saving faith in the Gospel promises.38 Similarly, the Ninevites, presumably at the time of 
the prophet Jonah, are given in the same article as an example of how penitence—
namely, contrition, faith, and good fruits—can mitigate public and private punishments.39 
                                                 
34 Ap XII:55; BKS, 262 (Et exempla ostendunt similiter has duas partes; Und die Exempel, wie die 
Heligen sind fromm worden, zeigen auch die obgedachten zwei Stücke an …). Rendering “These two parts 
also appear in the lives of the saints”, Tappert (189) does not translate literally; the Triglotta is better, “And 
the examples show likewise these two parts” (265; confer K-W, 195, “These following examples similarly 
demonstrate these two parts”). Confer Ap XII:53-54. 
35 Ap IV:202, BKS, 198 (German: die andern durch sein Exempel und Bekenntnis zu gläuben 
reizet). Confer also the deed and word distinction born out in the other examples of examples that follow, 
such as at n.49, p.150. 
36 SD XI:86. See the passage below and what it says about what can and cannot be reasoned, at 
n.249, p.311. 
37 AC XXI:1. 
38 Ap XXII:56. Confer ¶53-54 and ¶55 discussed above in n.34, p.148, and note the additional use 
of Exempel in the German of ¶57 (BKS, 262). 
39 Ap XXII:166; confer 164. 
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And finally, in the Apology’s article on Justification, Daniel is referred to as an example 
of the voice of faith confessing the worthlessness of works.40 
 Like the Old Testament examples, New Testament examples used by the 
Reformers to support their own positions also take in a range of people and loci, also 
using the same individuals or things for more than one point. The woman in Luke 7:36-
50 (who at a Pharisee’s banquet washed Jesus’ feet with her tears, wiped them with her 
hair, and poured perfume on them) is given in the Apology’s article on Justification as an 
example both that moved Christ to chide the Pharisee and with which Christ reproved 
him.41 She is also used in the Apology’s article on Penitence as another example of the 
two parts of penitence, contrition and faith, the respective results of God’s two works in 
human beings (terrifying and justifying), which further correspond to the two parts of 
Scripture, law and Gospel.42 In the Apology’s article on Human Traditions, the 
Reformers point to Christ’s excusing His apostles when they violated traditions in order 
to give the Pharisees an example of how the traditions were useless acts of worship.43 
One of those apostles, Peter, who was forgiven after denying Jesus, is used in the 
Apology’s article on the Invocation of the Saints as an example of the right honor given 
to the saints by strengthening the faith of believers.44 In the Apology’s article on 
Justification, Paul’s conversion is given as an example of the church’s testimonies that 
faith comforts, justifies, and quickens.45 In the Augsburg Confession’s article on Both 
Kinds, the Corinthians’ communion practice as described by Paul provides the Reformers 
an example of a whole congregation receiving both the bread/body and the wine/blood.46 
                                                 
40 Ap IV:337, with reference to 331. 
41 Ap IV:154. 
42 Ap XII:57. Confer ¶53-55 and n.34 above, p.148. 
43 Ap XV:36, BKS, 304 (exemplum; Gegenexempel). 
44 Ap XXI:5. 
45 Ap IV:63, BKS, 173 (German: Dieses ist je einfältig und klar geredt; so wissen fromme Herzen, 
daß es also ist; so sind die Exempel, daß es mit allen Heiligen so gegangen von Anbeginn, in der Kirchen 
verhanden, wie an der Bekehrung Pauli und Augustini zu sehen ist). Note that Augustine’s conversion, 
outside the New Testament canon, is used in the German of this passage as an equal example. 
46 ACL XXII:3, BKS, 85 (Latin: Et ne quis possit cavillari, quod hoc ad sacerdotes tantum 
pertineat, Paulus ad Corinthios exemplum recitat, in quo apparet totam ecclesiam utraque specie usam 
esse). In the Apology’s article on Two Kinds, the Reformers point out that their opponents cannot provide a 
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In the discussion of apostolic rites in the Apology’s article on the Church, the Reformers 
first refer to Paul’s and the other apostles’ writings over their examples and then refer to 
the example of their rites and instruction as communicating.47 Similarly, in the Apology’s 
article on Human Traditions the Reformers refer to the apostles’ “precept and example” 
(docendo et exemplis) as opposing the teaching that traditions justify.48 Likewise, in the 
Solid Declaration’s article on Church Usages, the Reformers point not only to Paul’s 
instruction to the congregations in Rome regarding yielding on adiaphora (so-called 
“matters of indifference”) but also the example of his doing so.49 Finally, the authors of 
the Solid Declaration’s article on Election point to Paul’s example of not exploring or 
explaining everything on the topic of election.50  
 The Reformers’ examples supporting their own positions in The Book of Concord 
are also drawn from the New Testament church although past the time of the New 
Testament itself. The authors of the works in The Book of Concord cite “the example of 
the church” to support their position on a number of different points, such as in the 
Augsburg Confession’s article on Both Kinds.51 Similarly, the Augsburg Confession’s 
article on the Mass in support of the Reformers’ position cites “the example of the church 
as seen from the Scriptures and the Fathers”.52 In the Apology’s article on Human 
Traditions, the Reformers likewise point to the church Fathers and how they used human 
                                                                                                                                                 
comparable example of one kind (Ap XXII:7). What examples or the lack thereof mean is discussed further 
below in the text. 
47 Ap VII/VIII:40. 
48 Ap XV:34, Tappert, 220; BKS, 304. The German does not have a direct equivalent. 
49 SD X:9. Confer above, n.35, p.148. 
50 SD XI:64, BKS, 1081 (Latin: docet divus Paulus suo ipsius exemplo). Confer the discussion in 
the text below, beginning on p.313. 
51 ACL XXII:10, Tappert, 50; BKS, 86 (Haec vero consuetudo non solum contra scripturam, sed 
etiam contra veteres canones et exemplum ecclesiae recepta est). The setting parallel of the “ancient 
canons” and “the example of the church” may be significant, as may be the absence of the example of the 
church from the German edition of AC XXII, which mentions “God’s command” and “the ancient canons” 
(Gottes Gebot ... die alten Canones). Confer below, n.52. The “example of the church” is a technical term; 
for example, customs can be said to be the foundation of law, canons to be the expression of customs, and 
the example of the church to be the foundation of new canons. 
52 ACL XXIV:40, Tappert, 60-61; BKS, 95 (exemplum ecclesiae, ex Scriptura et patribus). In this 
case (confer above, n.51), the German simply refers to what existed “in the church from ancient times” (in 
der Kirche vor alters). 
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rites as an example of doing things decently and in good order.53 In the Smalcald 
Articles’ locus on Ordination and Vocation, the Reformers cite “the examples of the 
ancient churches and Fathers”.54 The Solid Declaration’s article on Original Sin cites 
specific Fathers as examples of those using the Latin terms for substance and accident in 
scholarly discourse at this locus.55 
 The single largest type of example cited by the Reformers in support of their 
positions (and, as will be seen below, against their opponents’ positions) is the example 
of the saints, and most of those come in the Apology’s article on the Invocation of the 
Saints. 56 In that article, the Reformers positively refer to the saints as examples of God’s 
mercy.57 The works of the saints are also there said to be examples to people in their 
public or private lives to confirm their faith and imitate the saints’ works.58 In the same 
place the Reformers encourage recalling saints as examples of “faith or fear or the 
administration of public affairs.”59 The Reformers said the saints, apart from faith, were 
                                                 
53 Ap XV:20. Confer the discussion in the text below, beginning on p.155, where examples are 
cited in support of diversity in rites. The tension between examples supporting the use of one rite for good 
order and examples supporting the diversity of rites was lived out in Christian freedom in the past and 
continues to present a challenge for the present and future. 
54 SA III:x:3, Tappert, 314; BKS, 458 (die alten Exempel der Kirchen und der Väter; veteran 
exempla ecclesiae et partum). 
55 SD I:54, BKS, 862 (Latin: exemplum). The use of such terms as “substance” and “accident” are 
sub-sentential uses of philosophy and, therefore, are outside the scope of the dissertation, with its focus on 
the supra-sentential uses. 
56 The discussion in the text of the use of the examples regarding the saints against the opponents 
begins on p.161. Another significant type of example is that of the Church, just discussed, which relates 
closely to the analogy of faith and the analogy of the Word of God (see in the text below, beginning on 
p.171). 
57 Ap XXI:4. Confer ¶36. 
58 Ap XXI:36. Confer Ap XXI:6 where the Reformers encourage imitation of the saints’ faith and 
other virtues (ceterarum virtutum), with the German specifying following the example of their patience 
(ihrer Geduld Exempel nachfolgen) (BKS, 318). Confer also the Reformers giving David as an example for 
the emperor to imitate, which was noted above at n.37, p.148. 
59 Ap XXI:36, Tappert, 234; BKS, 325 (Huiusmodi exempla, quae vel fidem vel timorem vel 
administrationem reipublicae continent, proderat recitari; Solch Exempel des Glaubens, da man lernet 
Gott fürchten, Gott vertrauen, daraus man recht siehet, wie es gottfürchtigen Leuten in der Kirchen, auch 
in großen Sachen der hohen weltlichen Regiment ergangen, die hätte man fleißig und klar von den Heiligen 
schreiben und predigen sollen). 
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examples of works righteousness (both in Old Testament and Reformation times),60 
which went to the very core of the Reformers’ chief locus of justification by faith in Jesus 
Christ as the sole mediator and redeemer. 
 Thus, the Reformers use examples to support their own positions on a wide range 
of loci. Many of those relate directly to the chief locus of justification: original sin, faith, 
penitence, human traditions, works, saints, and election. The loci of ordination, both 
kinds, and the mass relate less-directly to justification but relate nevertheless in that they 
pertain to how the forgiveness of sins is distributed. As attention now turns to the 
Reformers’ use of example against their opponents, the debate will be seen to take place 
at many of these same loci. 
Against opponents’ positions 
 Where the Reformers’ use of example to support their positions is surveyed above 
roughly in chronological order of the examples themselves, the Reformers’ use of 
example against their opponents’ positions in this subsection is surveyed according to 
points at issue. As noted, examples are used for the Reformers’ positions and against their 
opponents’ positions at some of the same loci, but especially those “Articles about 
Matters in Dispute” (the Augsburg Confession’s and Apology’s articles XXII-XXVIII), 
although the disputed articles are not limited to those in that grouping.61 
 Examples explicitly come up four times in the articles on the Marriage of Priests. 
The Augsburg Confession’s article refers to common complaints about examples of 
unchaste priests.62 The Apology’s article on the same locus dismisses the Confutation’s 
                                                 
60 Ap IV:211; XV:24. Confer also: “The history of the people of Israel is a type of what was to 
happen in the church of the future” (Et res gestae in populo Israel sunt exempla eorum, quae in ecclesia 
futura fuerunt) (Ap IV:395, Tappert, 167; BKS, 233). Tappert’s translation in this case is perhaps felicitous, 
since what seems to be meant is more the sense of the Greek  referring to a type than the kind 
of arguing by example on which this subsection is focusing. 
61 Knowing how many of these “examples” were initially raised by the opponents would 
interesting, but tracing out their first use with any degree of certainty is difficult, since they may hve been 
introduced outside the Augsburg Confession, the Confutation, and the Apology. 
62 ACL XXIII:1, BKS, 86 (de malis exemplis sacerdotum, qui non continebant).  
 Similar is the reference to examples of bad popes, although, at least in the following case, for 
different reasons: Nec est ad pontifices transferendum, quod ad veram ecclesiam pertinet, quod videlicet 
sint columnae veritatis, quod non errent. Quotusquisque enim curat evangelium, aut iudicat dignum esse 
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argument for a celibate priesthood on the basis of the example of Old Testament priests 
separated from their wives only while serving.63 Moreover, the Reformers refer to 
examples of consciences troubled over the legitimacy of marriage,64 and they say that 
public officials should use “warning examples” inviting people to marry.65 
 On the locus of the Mass the Reformers also discuss examples in arguing against 
their opponents’ positions. On this locus, the Reformers say that Sacrament of the Altar 
“is not the vain celebration of a show or a celebration for the sake of example, the way 
plays celebrate the memory of Hercules or Ulysses” (Nam meminisse Christi non est 
otiosa spectaculi celebratio aut exempli causa instituta, sicut in tragoediis celebratur 
memoria Herculis aut Ulyssis; Denn solches zu Christi Gedächtnis tun, ist nicht ein solch 
Ding, das allein mit Geberden und Werken zugehet, allein zu einer Erinnerung und zu 
                                                                                                                                                 
lectione? Multi etiam palam irrident religiones omnes, aut si quid probant, probant illa, quae humanae 
rationi consentanea sunt; cetera fabulosa esse arbitrantur et similia tragoediis poetarum. (“Nor should that 
be transferred to the popes which is the perogative of the true church: that they are pillars of the truth and 
that they do nor err. How many of them care anything for the Gospel or think it worth reading? Many 
openly ridicule all religions, or if they accept anything, accept only what agrees with human reason and 
regard the rest as mythology, like the tragedies of the poets.”) Darum soll man die Sprüche, so von der 
rechten Kirchen reden, nicht auf die Päbste oder Bischofe deuten, nämlich daß sie Säulen der Wahrheit 
sein, item daß sie nicht irren können. Denn wie viel findet man wohl oder wie viel sind bisanher funden 
unter Bischöfen, Päbsten usw., die sich des Evangelii mit Ernst und herzlich angenommen oder das wert 
geachtet hätten ein Blättlin, einen Buchstaben darinnen recht zu lesen? Man weiß wohl leider viel Exempel, 
daß ihr viel in Welschland und sonst sein, welche die ganze Religion, Christum und das Evangelium 
verlachen und öffentlich für ein Spott halten. Und lassen sie ihnen etwas gefallen, so lassen sie ihnen das 
gefallen, das menschlicher Vernunft gemäß, das ander alles halten sie für Fabeln. (“Therefore one should 
not apply the sayings about the true Church to the popes or bishops, namely that they are pillars of the 
truth, that is, that they cannot err. For how many does one find, or, better, how many are found up to now 
among bishops, popes, etc., who have dedicated themselves to the Gospel with ernestness and sincerity or 
that have regarded it worth their time to read correctly one little page or one letter therein? One 
unfortunately no doubt knows many examples, that there are many in Italy and elsewhere, who mock the 
whole religion, Christ, and the Gospel and hold them for laughing stock in public. And, if it pleases them to 
accept some, so they accept those that agree with human reason, everything else they regard as fables.”) 
(Ap VII/VIII:27, BKS, 240; English translation from the Latin, Tappert, 173; English translation from the 
German, this author’s, with reference to Triglotta, 235.) Elsewhere the Reformers say that examples show 
how the popes are more impudent than the canons that put them above councils and their decrees (Tr 49). 
63 AP XXIII:41, with reference to ¶27. On the Confutation, see Reu, ed., The Augsburg 
Confession: A Collection of Sources *365-*366; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts 124. 
64 Ap XXIII:47. Just whose consciences are in view and exactly how they were troubled about the 
legitimacy of marriage are unclear. 
65 Ap XXIII:55, Triglotta, 379 (“examples”, Tappert, 247); BKS, 344 (exemplis munire 
coniugium; zu verbieten, auch mit Worten, Werken und Exempeln die Leute zu dem Ehestande vermahnen). 
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einem Exempel, wie man in Historien Alexandri und dergleichen gedenkt usw.).66 Later, 
to argue against their opponents’ understanding of the mass as a sacrifice, the Reformers, 
after citing some Bible passages, say they do not need to provide “further proofs” 
(pluribus testimoniis) and refer to ancient examples of the use of the word “liturgy” 
( ), which examples they say “anyone who reads the Greek authors can find” 
(ubique obvia sint legentibus graecos scriptores).67 Similar to what will be seen below68 
in the case of the Invocation of the Saints, the Reformers at this locus also argue that their 
opponents do not have an “the command of God and the example of Scripture” (mandato 
Dei … exemplo scripturae; Gottes Wort … alle Schrift) to support the application of the 
mass to the dead.69 Finally, and perhaps most significantly at this locus, the Reformers 
say their opponents err in reasoning by example from the Old Testament sacrifices to 
sacrifices beyond Christ’s death in the New Testament. 
 Tota via errant, qui fingunt sacrificia levitica coram Deo meruisse 
remissionem peccatorum, et hoc exemplo sacrificia applicanda pro aliis in 
novo testamento requirunt praeter mortem Christi. Haec imaginatio 
simpliciter obruit meritum passionis Christi et iustitiam fidei, et corrumpit 
veteris et novi testamenti doctrinam, et pro Christo alios mediatores et 
propitiatores nobis efficit pontifices et sacrificulos, qui quotidie vendunt 
operam suam in templis. 
 It is completely erroneous to imagine that the Levitical sacrifices 
merited the forgiveness of sins before God and that by analogy there must 
be sacrifices in the New Testament besides the death of Christ that are 
valid for the sins of others. This notion completely negates the merit of 
Christ’s suffering and the righteousness of faith, it corrupts the teaching of 
both the Old and New Testament, and it replaces Christ as our mediator 
and propitiator with priests and sacrificers who daily peddle their wares in 
the churches.70 
                                                 
66 Ap XXIV:72, Tappert, 262; BKS, 370. 
67 Ap XXIV:83, Tappert, 264; BKS, 372. The German translation lacks this more academic 
discussion of grammaticam, owing likely more to the intended audience for the translation than to the lack 
of the German words to translate the discussion. 
68 See the discussion in the text, beginning on p.161. 
69 Ap XXIV:89, Tappert, 265-266; BKS, 373. 
70 Ap XXIV:57, Tappert, 260; BKS, 366. The German version lacks this more philosophical 
analysis of the opponents’ argument by example. Tappert’s translation “by analogy” may be a bit 
misleading, especially given the Latin original (compare “by this example”, Triglotta, 405; “from this 
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Again, even here at the locus of the Mass is at stake the chief locus, justification by faith 
in the merits of Christ alone. 
 The locus of the Power of Bishops (or Ecclesiastical Power) is another place 
where the Reformers use examples against their opponents’ positions. This locus is also 
among the Articles about Matters in Dispute. The opponents claimed to have authority to 
introduce ceremonies and make binding rules concerning foods, days, and the like. In the 
Augsburg Confession’s article on Ecclesiastical Power, the Reformers respond to their 
opponents’ supporting their argument with the example of the apostles commanding 
people to abstain from blood and what has been strangled and the example of the holy 
day being changed from Saturday to Sunday.71 While the Reformers’ greater argument on 
this locus is that what their opponents are doing is contrary to the Gospel (primarily the 
chief locus of justification), the Reformers do respond to their opponents’ examples. In 
the case of the apostles’ command regarding blood, the Reformers explain circumstances 
why that particular example does not lead to the universal principle their opponents claim 
it leads to: it was only given for a time.72 In the case of the change in the holy day, the 
Reformers explain that it was done for good order, and they say in fact that example 
supports the general principle of Christian liberty.73 When facing diversity in practice, the 
Reformers argue for uniformity on the basis of good order, but when facing the command 
for uniformity they argue from historical examples that there can be diversity.74 
 Another of the Articles about Matters in Dispute where argument by example is 
used is that of Monastic Vows. Against their opponents’ position, the Reformers cite 
examples from the lives of Anthony and others who kept vocations on the same level and 
understood that justification was not due to a particular calling.75 The opponents, to 
                                                                                                                                                 
example”, K-W, 268), although, as was seen above, in the discussion that begins on p.141, arguing by 
example and analogy are related in that they are both inductive forms. 
71 AC XXVIII:32, 33. 
72 AC XXVIII:65. The Reformers similarly argue that their opponents err in reasoning from the 
example of the law of Moses (AC XXVIII:40). 
73 AC XXVIII:60. See also the role of Christian liberty in regards to the discussion of examples in 
connection with the dating of Easter in relationship to Passover (Ap VII/VIII:43). 
74 A passage on the latter point is AC XXVI:45. Confer above, n.53, p.151. 
75 Ap XXVII:38. 
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support their position on poverty being needed for perfection, refer to Jesus’ statement to 
the rich young man in Matthew 19:21: 
NA26: 
 
Vulgate: si vis perfectus esse vade vende quae habes et da pauperibus et 
habebis thesaurum in caelo et veni sequere me 
Luther Bibel: Willst du vollkommen sein, so gehe hin, verkaufe, was du 
hast, und gib's den Armen, so wirst du einen Schatz im Himmel haben; 
und komm und folge mir nach! 
KJV: If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the 
poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me 
The Reformers, however, say both that the opponents distort the meaning of the passage 
by citing only the part of it dealing with poverty and that the example supports the 
universal need for obedience in one’s calling not the universal calling of apostleship with 
its accompanying poverty. 
Imo iniuriam faciunt textui, qui truncatum allegant. Perfectio est in hoc, 
quod addit Christus: Sequere me. Exemplum obedientiae in vocatione 
propositum est. Et quia vocationes dissimiles sunt, ita haec vocatio non est 
omnium, sed proprie ad illam personam, cum qua ibi loquitur Christus, 
pertinet, sicut vocatio David ad regnum, Abraham ad mactandum filium 
non sunt nobis imitandae. Vocationes sunt personales, sicut negotia ipsa 
variant temporibus et personis; sed exemplum obedientiae est generale. 
Perfectio erat futura illi iuveni, si huic vocationi credidisset et obedivisset. 
Ita perfectio nobis est obedire unumquemque vera fide suae vocationi. 
... denn sie tun dem Text Gewalt, daß sie ihn nicht ganz anziehen. 
Vollkommenheit stehet in diesem Stück, da Christus spricht: Folge mir 
nach. Und darinne stehet eins jeden Christen Vollkommenheit, daß er 
Christo folge, ein jeder nach seinem Beruf, und sind doch die Beruf 
ungleich, einer wird berufen zu einem Regenten, der ander zu eim 
Hausvater, der dritt zu einem Prediger. Darum, obschon jener Jüngling 
beruft ist, daß er verkaufen sollt, betrifft sein Beruf nicht andere, wie 
Davids Beruf, daß er König werden sollt, nicht alle betrifft; Abrahams 
Beruf, daß er sein Sohn opfern sollt, betrifft nicht andere. Also sind die 
Beruf ungleich, aber der Gehorsam soll gleich sein, und darin stehet 
Vollkommenheit, so ich in meinem Beruf gehorsam bin, nicht so ich mich 




… they do violence to the text when they quote it in a mutilated form. 
Perfection consists in that which Christ adds, “Follow me.” This sets forth 
the example of obedience in a calling. Since callings vary [one is called to 
rulership, a second to be father of a family, a third to be a preacher], this 
calling is not for everyone, but only for the person with whom Christ is 
talking here. Thus, the call of David to rule, or of Abraham to sacrifice his 
son, are not for us to imitate. Callings are personal, just as matters of 
business themselves vary with times and persons; but the example of 
obedience is universal. It would have been perfection for this young man 
to believe and obeyed this calling. So it is perfection for each of us with 
true faith to obey his own calling. [Not that I should undertake a strange 
calling for which I have not the commission or command of God.]76 
That their opponents err by identifying the wrong universal while reasoning by example 
from particulars to a universal is significant. Also significant is that in this same place, 
while speaking of perfection via poverty, the Reformers dismiss the examples of 
philosophers, regarding getting rid of wealth, as irrelevant to Christian perfection.77  
 The Reformers not only objected to vows of poverty, but they also objected to 
vows of celibacy. The Reformers’ opponents argued such vows could not be broken, but 
                                                 
76 Ap XXVII:48-50, BKS, 391-392; Tappert, 277. The English translations of the German 
additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 437. Note that the first German addition 
provides an illustration from each of the three “estates”: father of a family, ruler of a kingdom, and 
preacher in the Church. (Another Book of Concord application of the three “estates” can be seen in the 
Table of Duties that is part of Luther’s Small Catechism.) 
 The Reformers’ discussion of the Matthew 19:21 passage begins in ¶45. 
  For more on the philosophical background of perfection and the Reformers’ discussion of it, see 
Jayson S. Galler, “A sham, pretense, and hypocrisy? Poverty in The Book of Concord of 1580,” 12th 
Annual ACMRS (Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies) Interdisciplinary Conference 
(Tempe, AZ: 2006). Such sub-sentential use of philosophy is outside this dissertation’s scope, which 
focuses on the supra-sentential uses.  
77 Sinamus philosophos Aristippum praedicare, qui magnum auri pondus abiecit in mare. Talia 
exempla nihil pertinent ad christianam perfectionem. (“Let the philosophers praise Aristippus for throwing 
a great weight of gold into the sea. Such examples have nothing to do with Christian perfection.”) Es 
mügen aber die Cynici, als Diogenes, der kein Haus haben wollt, sondern lag in einem Faß, solche 
heidnische Heiligkeit rühmen; christliche Heiligkeit stehet viel auf höheren Sachen, denn auf solcher 
Heuchelei. (“Cynics like Diogenes, who would have no house, but lay in a tub, may commend such 
heathenish holiness. Christian holiness rests more on higher matters than such hypocrisy.”) (Ap XXVII:46, 
BKS, 391; English from Latin, Tappert, 277; English from German, this author’s adaptation of the 
Triglotta, 435). The editors of the BKS refer to Diog. Laert. II, 77, and they note that Aristippus, the 
founder of the Hedonist school in the 5-4th century before the Common Era, threw the gold into the sea to 
keep pirates from getting it (BKS, 391 n.2; confer Tappert, 277 n.2; K-W, 285 n.561). In Plato’s Phaedo, 
Echecrates asks if (apparently this same) Aristippus was present at Socrates’ death, and Phaedo tells 
Echecrates that Aristippus and Cleombrotus were in Aegina (Plato, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Symposium, 




the Reformers opposed that position on the basis of the particular counterexample of the 
popes granting dispensations for the breaking monastic vows by the king of Aragon and 
others.78 Thus, the Reformers essentially suggest such dispensations should be given to 
others, and the Reformers give the examples of those who fled to monasteries without 
understanding that God was to be served by keeping His commands and not those of 
human beings.79 Still, despite their objections to monastic vows, the Reformers favorably 
cited the example of the monk Bernard against their opponents’ position that the 
monastic way of life made someone righteous before God.80 (Surely the Reformers used 
Bernard as an example in this case thinking his example would have additional weight 
because he was a monk.) 
 A different aspect of the example of St. Bernard as it was used by some Roman 
Catholics, however, was for the Reformers an indicator of their opponents’ poor 
                                                 
78 Nota est enim historia de rege Aragonum revocato ex monasterio; nec desunt exempla nostril 
temporis (“Well known is the case of the king of Aragon, who was recalled from a monastery, and there is 
no want of examples in our time”) (ACL XXVII:25-26, BKS, 114; Tappert, 74-75). The German does not 
specifically suggest the argument by example. 
 After the Reformers mentioned the king of Aragon in AC XXVII:25-26, their opponents argued in 
the Confutation that the counterexample had limited application due to its exceptional circumstances (CR 
27:173-174; Reu, 379*; K-N, 136). 
79 AC XXVII:56-57. 
80 Ap XXVII:70, BKS, 396. The Latin reads Et necesse est sanctos viros, qui in his vitae 
generibus vixerunt, abiecta fiducia talium observationum didicisse, quod remissionem peccatorum propter 
Christum gratis haberent, quod propter Christum per misericordiam consecuturi essent vitam aeternam, 
non propter illos cultus, quod Deus tantum approbet cultus suo verbo institutos qui valeant in fide. (“Holy 
men who followed this way of life must have come to reject any confidence in such observances, learning 
that they had forgiveness of sins freely for Christ’s sake, that for Christ’s sake by mercy they would attain 
eternal life and not for the sake of such services, and that God is pleased only with services instituted by 
His Word and done in faith.”) The German, however, is more specific: Darum fromme Leute, so im 
Klosterleben selig worden und erhalten sind, die haben endlich müssen dahin kommen, daß sie an allen 
ihrem Klosterleben verzagt, alle ihre Werk wie Kot veracht, alle ihre heuchlische Gottesdienst verdammt 
und sich und die Zusage der Gnade in Christo fest gehalte haben, wie man des denn von S. Bernhard ein 
Exempel hat, daß er gesagt: Perdite vixi, „Ich hab sündlich gelebt.“ Denn Gott will keine andern 
Gottesdienste haben, denn welche er selbst aufgericht durch sein Wort. (“Therefore godly persons who 
were saved and continued to live in monastic life had finally come to this, namely, that they despaired of 
their monastic life, despised all their works like dung, condemned all their hypocritical service of God, and 
held fast to the promise of grace in Christ, as in the example of St. Bernard, saying, Perdite vixi, ‘I have 
lived in a sinful way.’ For God will have no other services than those which He Himself instituted through 
His Word.”) (English translation from Latin, Tappert, 281; English translation from German, this author’s 
adapted from the Triglotta, 443.) 
 The Rechabites in Ap XXVII:59 (twice) and 63 are another much-contested example being used 
inductively at the locus of Monastic Vows. 
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understanding of penitence.81 Penitence is another locus, although one technically outside 
the Articles about Matters in Dispute, where examples are at issue in the Reformers’ 
refutation of their opponents’ positions. The Reformers insist that penitence, namely, 
contrition and faith, brings about the forgiveness of sins and not punishments or assigned 
“penance” or “satisfactions”, what their opponents regarded as the third part of 
penitence.82 The opponents give the example of David, among others, but the Reformers 
refute such examples by saying the punishment did not merit forgiveness, and they give 
as a counter-example the woman of Luke 7 who had contrition and heard absolution 
without Christ specifying any satisfactions.83 While their opponents saw satisfactions as a 
meritorious part of penitence (or repentance), the Reformers said it was a relic of the 
older practice of public penitence, where the lapsed were chastised as an example.84 The 
Reformers criticize the scholastics for seeing the particular practice of satisfactions, 
missing their purposes (one of which was for an example), and then reasoning to the 
wrong conclusion that the satisfactions placated God.85 The error in reasoning by 
example is explicit in one passage. (Note in the following that “example” is being used in 
two senses, a problem Tappert’s English translation ameliorates by only using “example” 
for one sense, thereby losing the explicit indication that the opponents are attempting to 
refute by counter-example). 
                                                 
81 SA III:iii:17 
82 See the Confutation’s twelfth article in Reu, ed., The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of 
Sources, *355-*357; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 113-114. Note that in the case of 
David, the Confutation’s reference to 2 Kings 12 refers to what is, in most modern Bibles, the book of 2 
Samuel. 
83 Ap XII:57. The German makes the abundance of counter-examples explicit: Und es sind auch 
wohl Exempel, da solche sonderliche Strafen nicht dazugetan werden, sondern diese zwei Stücke gehören 
allzeit fürnehmlich zu einer rechten Buße (“And there are also, to be sure, examples where such special 
punishments are not added, but these two pieces have always belonged to a justified penitence.”) (BKS, 
262; this author’s translation). 
84 Ap XII:113. To support this position, the Reformers refer to the gloss on the decree, and the 
editions specify Gratian, Decretum, II, chap. 24, q.3, c.18 (BKS, 275 n.2; Tappert, 199 n.5; and K-W, 206 
n.338). Confer Ap XII:121, where the Reformers again refer to the gloss, this time, on the canons, and the 
German at least specifies the language of Exempel (BKS, 277). (In the case of this second reference the 
Gratian citation is broadened to include distinction 19.) 
85 Ap XII:120. Confer Ap XII:167, where again the purpose of satisfactions as an example is 
explicit, although the error in reasoning is only implicit. 
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 Obiiciunt de Adam, de Davide, qui propter adulterium punitus est. 
Ex his exemplis faciunt universalem regulam, quod singulis peccatis 
respondeant propriae poenae temporales in remissionem peccatorum. Prius 
dictum est sanctos sustinere poenas, quae sunt opera Dei, sustinent 
contritionem seu terrores, sustinent et alias communes afflictiones. Ita 
sustinent aliqui proprias poenas a Deo impositas, exempli causa. Et hae 
poenae nihil pertinent ad claves, quia claves neque imponere neque 
remittere eas possunt, sed Deus sine ministerio clavium imponit et remittit. 
 Nec sequitur universalis regula: Davidi propria poena imposita est, 
igitur praeter communes afflictiones alia quaedam purgatorii poenae est, in 
qua singulis peccatis singuli gradus respondent. 
 Sie werfen uns Exempel für von Adam und David, welcher um 
seines Ehebruchs willen gestraft ist. Aus den Exempeln machen sie eine 
Regel, daß itzliche Sünde müsse ihr gewisse zeitliche Strafe haben, ehe 
die Sunde vergeben werden. Ich habe vor gesagt, daß die Christen Trübsal 
leiden, dadurch sie gezüchtiget werden, so leiden sie Schrecken im 
Gewissen, manchen Kampf und Anfechtung. Also legt unser Herr Gott 
auch etlichen Sundern eigene Peen und Strafe auf zu einem Exempel. Und 
mit den Peenen hat die Gewalt der Schlüssel nichts zu tun, sondern allein 
Gott hat sie aufzulegen und zu lösen, wie er will. 
 Es folgt auch gar nicht, ob David ein eigen Strafe aufgelegt ist, daß 
darum über die gemeine Kreuz und Trübsal aller Christen noch eine Pein 
des Fegfeuers sei, da ein itzliche Sunde ihre Grad und Maß der Pein hat. 
 In rebuttal they bring up the case of Adam, and also of David, who 
was punished for his adultery. From these instances [exemplis] they 
construct the universal rule that for the forgiveness of sins there must be 
temporal punishments corresponding to particular sins. We have said 
before that the saints suffer penalties which are the work of God, like 
contrition or terrors of conscience, as well as other common troubles. 
Some of them suffer punishments which God imposes on them, only for 
the sake of example [exempli]. These penalties have nothing to do with the 
power of the keys because the keys can neither impose nor remit them; 
God imposes and remits them apart from the administration of the keys. 
 From the particular penalty imposed on David it does not follow as 
a universal rule that over and above our common troubles there is a special 
penalty in purgatory, where the particular punishment fits the particular 
crime.86 
                                                 
86 Ap XII:155-156, BKS, 286; Tappert, 207. (Emphasis added.) The Triglotta’s English translation 
has its own problems with the double sense of “example”, losing the sense of the warning example by 
turning it into an illustrating “example” (Triglotta, 301). 
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Note well the specific language of reasoning by induction: “particular” and “universal 
rule”. A few paragraphs later the Reformers favorably cite what they say is Gregory’s 
understanding of David’s punishment as an example.87 
 Though also not placed amongst the “Articles about Matters in Dispute”, the 
locus of the Invocation of the Saints is also the place for the greatest number of the 
Reformers’ uses of example against their opponents’ positions. The Reformers’ biggest 
concern with their opponents’ position on the invocation—and one made repeatedly—is 
that, “Neither a command nor a promise nor an example can be shown from Scripture for 
the invocation of the saints” (Cum autem neque praeceptum neque promissio neque 
exemplum ex Scripturis de invocandis sanctis afferri possit; So man nun weder Gebot 
noch Zusage noch Exempel aus der Schrift mag fürbringen).88 (Note well that here 
Scriptural examples appear to be given the same weight as commands or promises from 
Scripture.89) The opponents claim the general “example of the church” but the Reformers 
                                                 
87 Ap XII:161. The BKS editors point out that Melanchthon mixed up a citation at this point, and 
the BKS editors further identify the correct source of the passage cited as Augustine, De paccatorum meritis 
et remissione (On the Merits and Remission of Sins) II, c.34, 56 MSL 44, 183f. CSEL 60, 1257 (BKS, 287 
n.1; confer Tappert, 208 n.2; K-W, 216 n.367, where the NPNF citation is given as ser. 1, 2:475). 
88 Ap XXI:10, Tappert, 230; BKS, 318. Confer the following: “what precept or example can our 
opponents produce from Scripture” (Ap XXI:18, Tappert, 231; BKS, 320, quod possunt adversarii 
praeceptum, quod exemplum ex scripturis afferre; können die Widersacher kein Gottes Gebot, kein 
Exempel der Schrift bringen); “neither God’s promise nor a command nor an example from Scripture” (Ap 
XXI:21, Tappert, 232; BKS, 321, neque promissionem Dei neque mandatum neque exemplum Scripturae; 
Gebot noch Verheißung noch Exempel in der Schrift); “Let him produce one example or precept from 
Scripture” (Ap XXI:24, Tappert, 232; BKS, 321, Proferat exemplum ex Scripturis, aut praeceptum; Er 
bringe doch ein Wort, ein einig Exempel aus der heiligen Schrift); “they have neither a Word of God nor an 
example from Scripture” (Ap XXI:31, Tappert, 233; BKS, 323, neque verbum Dei, neque exemplum 
scripturae habeant; keinen Gottes Befehl haben, kein Gottes Wort noch Exempel altes oder neues 
Testaments haben); “It is neither commanded nor recommended, nor does it have any example in the 
Scriptures” (SA II:ii:25, Tappert, 297; BKS, 424, ist auch nicht geboten noch geraten, hat auch kein 
Exempel der Schrift; Non etiam est mandata nec consilio nec exemplo nec testimonio Scripturae nititur). 
(Confer the lacking of an example in the case of Two Kinds, above n.46, p.149.) These passages use related 
technical terminology with rich backgrounds. “Precepts”, for instance, are given to a particular group, and 
“examples” are ways of teaching things such as precepts. 
89 There are other passages within the article on the Invocation of the Saints where the Reformers 
raise the question of the standard of proof without asking for examples. The following is one of the most 
demanding: “Why should it be defended if it has no command or proof in the Word of God (nullum 
mandatum aut testimonium ex verbo Dei; keinen Gottes Befehl noch Wort haben)? In fact, there is no proof 
(testimonium; Gewisses) for it either in the Fathers of the church.” (Ap XXI:33, Tappert, 233; BKS, 323.) 
Confer note 88 above, p.161. 
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claim the opponents do not have it; they innovate.90 The opponents claim the example of 
Cyprian, but the Reformers refute it.91 Similarly, the Reformers object to invoking Mary; 
instead, the Reformers say, she wants to have her example followed.92 The example the 
Reformers claim that their opponents have for saints’ spheres of influence is the example 
of pagan gods and goddesses,93 knowledge of which no doubt came with the theologians’ 
upbringing in Latin schools. Moreover, the Reformers find other secular influence in the 
examples connected with the saints, with Latin-school pedagogy also in view. 
Sed histriones quidam nulla neque fidei neque rerumpublicarum 
regendarum scientia praediti confinxerunt fabulas imitatione poematum, in 
quibus tantum insunt superstitiosa exempla de certis precibus, certis 
ieiuniis, et addita sunt quaedam ad quaestum facientia. Cuiusmodi sunt 
miracula de rosariis et similibus ceremoniis conficta. Neque opus est hic 
recitare exempla. Exstant enim legendae, ut vocant, et specula 
exemplorum et rosaria, in quibus pleraque sunt non dissimilia veris 
natrationibus Luciani.  
Solch Exempel des Glaubens, da man lernt Gott fürchten, Gott vertrauen, 
daraus man recht siehet, wie es gottesfürchtigen Leuten in der Kirchen, 
auch in großen Sachen der hohen weltlichen Regiment ergangen, die hätte 
man fleißig und klar von den Heiligen schreiben und predigen sollen. Nun 
haben etliche müßige Mönche und lose Buffen (welche nicht gewißt, wie 
große und schwere Sorge es ist, Kirchen oder sonst Leute regieren,) 
Fabeln erdichtet, zum Teil aus der Heiden Büchern, da nichts denn 
Exempel sind, wie die Heiligen hären Hemde getragen, wie sie ihre sieben 
Zeiten gebetet, wie sie Wasser und Brot gegessen, und haben das alles 
gericht auf ihre Kretschmerei aus den Wallfahrten Geld zu marken; wie 
denn sind die Wunderzeichen, welche sie vom Rosenkranze rühmen, und 
wie die Barfüßermönche von ihren hölzernen Körnern rühmen. Und ist hie 
nicht groß Not Exempel anzuzeigen, ihre Lügenlegenden sind noch 
vorhanden, daß mans nicht verneinen mag. 
But the inventors of these fables, which imitate the epics and bring only 
superstitious examples of certain prayers, fasts, and other profitable 
ceremonies, are clowns who know nothing about either faith or public 
affairs [where there are nothing but examples as to how the saints wore 
                                                 
90 Ap XXI:13, Tappert, 230; BKS, 319 (ecclesia exemplum). 
91 Ap XXI:2. The BKS editors cite the Confutation and give corresponding Cyprian citations. 
92 Ap XXI:27. The German version specifies her example of “faith and humility” (ihres Glaubens 
und ihrer Demut) (BKS, 322). 
93 Ap XXI:32, BKS, 323 (ex ethnicis exemplis). 
 
163 
hair shirts, how they prayed at the seven canonical hours, how they lived 
upon bread and water]. There is no point in listing here the miracles they 
have invented about rosaries and similar ceremonies, or the legends, as 
they call them, and the mirrors and the rosaries, all of which contain many 
things that resemble the “true stories” of Lucian.94 
Even with moderation, the Reformers say that teaching of the invocation of the saints 
would be a dangerous example.95  
Expressed principles regarding examples 
 Aside from the already observed principles implicit in the reformer’s use of 
inductive reasoning by example, there are several places in The Book of Concord where 
the Reformers explicitly express their principles for such reasoning. In the Apology’s 
article on Monastic Vows, the Reformers succinctly say principles cannot be induced 
from examples apart from consideration of justification by faith. 
Ceterum exempla iuxta regulam, hoc est, iuxta Scripturas certas et claras, 
non contra regulam seu contra scripturas interpretari convenit. 
Certissimum est autem observationes nostras non mereri remissionem 
peccatorum aut iustificationem. 
Nu die Verständigen und Gelehrten wissen wohl, daß man alle Exempel 
nach der Regeln, das ist, nach der klaren Schrift, und nicht wider die Regel 
oder Schrift soll auslegen oder einführen. ... so ist es gewiß, daß sie ihre 
Weise und Zeremonie nicht darum gehalten haben, dadurch Vergebung 
der Sünden oder ewiges Leben zu verdienen ...  
Besides, examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, that is, 
according to sure and clear passages of Scripture, not against the rule or 
the passages. It is a sure thing that our observances do not merit the 
forgiveness of sins or justification.96 
                                                 
94 Ap XXI:37, BKS, 325; Tappert, 232. The English translation of the German additions are 
provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 353, 355; the Triglotta is a little more literal than Tappert 
even in its translation of the Latin, rendering, “Nor is there need here to recite examples” and “mirrors of 
examples”. The “mirrors of examples” likely refer to the collections and catalogs of moralized anectdotes 
that were provided to preachers, said to be medieval precursors to more-modern novels, fairy tales, and 
dramatic plots (Gerald Robert Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England: A Neglected Chapter in 
the History of English Letters & of the English People [New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961], 149-209). 
95 Ap XXI:33, BKS, 323 (exemplum sit periculosissimum; ist das Exempel fährlich). 
96 Ap XXVII:60-61, BKS, 394; Tappert, 279. Another place where examples are invalidated by the 




The Reformers find nothing inherently wrong with the use of such inductive reasoning. 
Moreover, they call for detailed teaching of the people, illustrating their call with 
examples of examples.97 Examples, they say, are better for the fools, which may recall 
Aristotle’s statements noted above about using examples for the crowd.98  
 In one passage from the Apology’s article on Justification, where the Latin gives a 
faith-based counter-example to criticize their opponents’ error in inductive reasoning by 
analogy, there is an addition to the German version of the Apology, in which the 
Reformers use a concrete counter-example to point out their opponents’ faulty analogy. 
First is the authoritative text. 
 Huc pertinet et sententia Christi Luc. cap. 17: Cum feceritis omnia, 
quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite: servi inutiles sumus. Haec verba clare 
dicunt, quod Deus salvet per misericordiam et propter suam 
promissionem, non quod debeat propter dignitatem operum nostrorum. 
Sed adversarii mirifice ludunt hic in verbis Christi. Primum faciunt 
 et in nos retorquent. Multo magis, inquiunt, dici posse: Si 
credideritis omnia, dicite, servi inutiles sumus. Deinde addunt opera 
inutilia esse Deo, nobis vero non esse inutilia. Videte, quam delectet 
adversarios puerile studium sophistices. Et quamquam hae ineptiae 
indignae sint, quae refutentur, tamen paucis respondebimus.  
est vitiosum. Primum enim decipiuntur adversarii in vocabulo fidei, quod 
si significaret nobis notitiam illam historiae, quae etiam in impiis et 
diabolis est, recte ratiocinarentur adversarii fidem inutilem esse, cum 
dicunt: Cum credideritis omnia, dicite: servi inutiles sumus. Sed nos non 
de notitia historiae, sed de fiducia promissionis et misericordiae Dei 
loquimur. Et haec fiducia promissionis fatetur nos esse servos inutiles, imo 
haec confessio, quod opera nostra sint indigna, est ipsa vox fidei, sicut 
apparet in hoc exemplo Danielis, quod paulo ante citavimus: Non in 
iustificationibus nostris prosternimus preces etc. Fides enim salvat, quia 
apprehendit misericordiam seu promissionem gratiae, etiamsi nostra opera 
sint indigna. Et in hanc sententiam nihil laedit nos : Cum 
credideritis omnia, dicite: servi inutiles sumus, videlicet, quod opera 
                                                 
97 SC Preface:18: und immer viel Exempel aus der Schrift; da Gott solche Leute gestraft und 
gesegenet hat, einführen; Sunt autem haec sacrarum literarum histories illustranda, ubi Deus vel graves 
poenas a transgressoribus hujus praecepti exegit vel illorum, qui servarint, omnia coepta mirabiliter 
fortunavit (“Always adduce many examples from the Scriptures to show how God punished and blessed”) 
(BKS, 505; Tappert, 340). In one sense, the Reformers are simply encouraging a teaching method by which 
they themselves were most likely taught in Latin schools, only making it clear that the source material is 
not to be classics but the Scriptures. 
98 See above at n.10, p.143. 
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nostra sint indigna; hoc enim eum tota ecclesia docemus, quod per 
misericordiam salvemur. 
 Here Christ’s statement (Luke 17:10) also applies, “When you 
have done all that is commanded you, say, ‘We are unworthy servants.’” 
These words clearly say that God saves through mercy and because of his 
promise, not as a payment which he owes to us for our good works. They 
argue that if we are unworthy though we have done everything, much 
more must we say that we are unworthy though we have believed 
everything. Then they add that works are worthless to God, but that to us 
they are worth something. Look how this childish sophistry delights our 
opponents! Though these absurdities do not deserve a refutation, we shall 
nevertheless give a brief answer. The argument is defective. 
 For one thing, our opponents are deceived with regard to the term 
“faith.” If it meant the knowledge of history that the wicked and demons 
also have (James 2:19), their argument that faith is worthless would be 
correct when they say: “When we have believed everything, say, ‘We are 
unprofitable servants.’” We are not talking about a knowledge of history, 
however, but about trust in God’s promise and his mercy. This trust in the 
promise confesses that we are unworthy servants. Indeed, this confession 
that our works are worthless is the very voice of faith, as is evident from 
the example of Daniel referred to above, “For we do not present our 
supplications before thee on the ground of our righteousnesses,” etc. Faith 
saves because it takes hold of mercy and the promise of grace, even 
though our works are worthless. On these grounds we are not bothered by 
the argument, “When you have believed everything, say, ‘We are 
unworthy servants.’” For our works are worthless, and with the whole 
church we teach that we are saved by mercy.99 
The refutation of the opponents’ claims continues in the Latin for five more numbered 
paragraphs, one of which will be seen below.100 Although the German version runs 
roughly parallel at the beginning of the paragraph, it quickly diverges over the 
explanation of the defective argument and ends up being relatively shorter than the whole 
of the Latin. (The German version also noticeably drops the Greek technical term 
“antistrophe”.101) 
                                                 
99 Ap IV:334-338, BKS, 225-226; Tappert, 158-159. In contrast to Tappert, the Triglotta preserves 
the “antistrophe” as a technical term (Triglotta, 215). Compare the K-W translation of the octavo edition, 
where they render the Greek word word as “retortion” (K-W, 168). 
100 See Ap IV:339 at n.136 below, p.183. 
101 In Greek drama an “antistrophe” referred to the chorus returning and the song that accompanied 
the movement; the word also referred to “the second of a pair of movements or stanzas in an ode” that had 
the same meter as the strophe that came before (John A. Cuddon, “antistrophe,” The Penguin Dictionary of 
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 Hie haben die Widersacher ihre große Kunst trefflich bewiesen 
und den Spruch Christi verkehrt: Wenn ihr alles getan habt, so sprecht: 
Wir sind unnütze Knechte. Ziehen ihn von Werken auf Glauben, sagen, 
vielmehr, wenn wir alles gläuben, sind wir unnütze Knechte. Das sind je 
schändliche Sophisten, die die tröstliche Lehre vom Glauben so gar 
verkehren. Sagt, ihr Esel, wenn einer da liegt am Tode und fühlet, daß er 
kein Werk hat, das für Gottes Gericht gnug sei, und kann auf kein Werk 
vertrauen, was wollt ihr demselben raten? Wollt ihr ihm auch sagen, wenn 
du schon gläubest, so bist du doch ein unnützer Knecht, und hilft dich 
nicht? Da müsse das arm Gewissen in Verzweifelung fallen, wenn es nicht 
weiß, daß das Evangelium den Glauben eben darum fordert, dieweil wir 
untüchtige Knechte sind, und nicht Verdienst haben. Darum soll man sich 
hüten vor den Sophisten, so die Worte Christi also lästerlich verkehren. 
Denn es folget nicht: Die Werke helfen nicht, darum hilft der Glaube auch 
nicht. Wir müssen den großen Eseln ein groß Exempel geben. Es folget 
nicht: Der Heller hilft nicht, darum hilft der Gülden auch nicht. Also wie 
der Gülden viel höher und stärker ist denn der Heller, soll man verstehen, 
daß Gläuben viel höher und stärker ist denn Werk. Nicht, daß Glaube helfe 
um seiner Wirdigkeit willen, sondern darum, daß er auf Gottes 
Verheißung und Barmherzigkeit vertrauet. Glaub ist stark, nicht um seiner 
Wirdigkeit willen, sondern von wegen der göttlichen Verheißung. Und 
darum verbeut Christus hie vertrauen auf eigene Werk; denn sie können 
nicht helfen. Dagegen verbeut er nicht Vertrauen auf Gottes Verheißung. 
Ja er fordert dasselbig Vertrauen auf Gottes Verheißung eben darum, 
dieweil wir untüchtige Knechte sind und die Werke nicht helfen können. 
Derhalben ziehen die Bösewichte die Worte Christi unrecht von Vertrauen 
eigener Würdigkeit auf Vertrauen göttlicher Zusage. Damit ist ihre 
Sophisterei klar verlegt und aufgelöset. Der Herr Christus wolle die 
Sophisten, so sein heiliges Wort also zerreißen, bald zuschanden machen. 
Amen. 
 Here the opponents have masterfully demonstrated their great art 
and perverted the saying of Christ: “When you have done everything, then 
say, ‘We are worthless servants.’” They conclude from works to faith, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Literary Terms and Literary Theory, Fourth ed. [New York: Penguin Books, 1998], 46). Lewis and Short 
confirm that the Latin term refers to the chorus or a rhetorical figure (Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, 
133). Liddell and Scott, however, note that the Greek term, which is what Melanchthon uses, can refer to 
“strophic correspondence” (as it seems to mean here in Ap IV:334-337), but they also indicate that in 
Aristotle’s usage the term can refer to an inversion, as in a logical conversion of terms (APr. 25a40), a 
retortion (APr. 61a22), and a change into the opposite (APr. 38a3, 39a28) (Liddell and Scott, A Greek-
English Lexicon, 163-164). 
 Although they give no citation from Melanchthon’s works, the K-W editors observe the following: 
“Melanchthon uses the Greek term antistrophe, which, according to his own works on rhetoric and 
dialectics, represents an inversion of an argument, turning some case or evidence against an argument into 
something that favors it” (K-W, 168 n.219). 
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saying instead, “If we have believed everything, we are worthless 
servants.” These are really shameful sophists, who pervert so much the 
consolatory teaching of faith. What do you say, you asses, when someone 
lies there near death and feels that he has no work good enough for God’s 
judgment and can trust no work—what do you advise him? Will you also 
say to him, “Even if you already believe, then you are yet a worthless 
servant, and it will not help you”? There the poor conscience must fall into 
despair, if it does not know that the Gospel requires faith for the very 
reason that we are good-for-nothing servants and have no merits. 
Therefore one should guard himself from sophists, who therefore 
blasphemously reverse the words of Christ. Because it does not follow: 
Works do not help; therefore, faith also does not help. We must give the 
big asses a big example. It does not follow: The farthing does not help; 
therefore, the florin also does not help. Just as the florin is much higher 
and stronger than the farthing, one should understand that faith is much 
higher and stronger than work. Not that faith helps because of its worth, 
but for this reason, that it trusts in God’s promise (ordination) and mercy. 
Faith is strong, not because of its worth, but because of the divine promise. 
And therefore Christ here forbids trusting one’s own works, because they 
cannot help. On the other hand, He does not forbid trusting in God’s 
promise. Indeed, He demands the same trust in God’s promise precisely 
for these reasons, that we are good-for-nothing servants and works cannot 
help. For this reason, the scoundrels unjustly conclude the words of Christ 
from trust in one’s own worth to trust in God’s pledge. Therewith is their 
sophistry clearly disproved and undone. May the Lord Christ soon destroy 
the sophists who so rip up His holy Word. Amen.102 
Even as the Reformers ridicule their opponents’ faulty analogy, the Reformers provide an 
example of a similarly faulty analogy to argue the general principle that the opponent’s 
analogy was faulty. Note how the Reformers’ verbs strikingly concretize abstract 
reasoning. 
 That the Reformers provide implicit and explicit principles for the use of 
induction by example is significant. The Reformers are clearly conscious of the method 
and its application. The chief article of justification by faith is their primary principle for 
interpreting other examples, and they also give concrete analogies to further make their 
                                                 
102 Ap IV:334-337, BKS, 225-226; the English translation is this author’s adaptation of the 
Triglotta, 215. The Triglotta translates großen Eseln as “uncultured men” and groß Exempel as “homely 
illustration”, but the paragraph seems more intended to ridicule the opponents than bring down the teaching 
to the level of the common person. 
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case in keeping with such primary principle—all just part of The Book of Concord use of 
induction by example. 
Summary of “example” use 
 The Reformers, earlier and later, make fairly wide use of example both in support 
of their own positions and against their opponents’ positions. The Reformers, although 
surely influenced by their Latin-school upbringing, generally do not use the examples 
usually found in the schools, which examples they somewhat denigrate. Instead, Bible 
passages, Old Testament and New Testament Biblical figures, and other various people 
and groups of things serve the Reformers as examples on a wide range of loci, regardless 
of whether the particular example is supporting the Reformers’ positions or being used 
against those of their opponents, who in at least some cases appear to have introduced the 
examples into the discussion. An apparent favorite example is the woman of Luke 7, who 
was used in a number of different contexts, and the topic where explicit examples came 
up the most was that of the saints. When dealing with counter-examples raised against 
their own teaching or raising counter examples against their opponents’ teaching, the 
Reformers proceed much as Aristotle indicated, nearly two millennia before, and in some 
cases turn their opponents’ examples into their own, with no indication that they are 
breaking with the method of using examples that has preceded them. The Reformers state 
that teaching helps interpret examples and that examples themselves have a role in 
teaching (word and deed, as it were). Yet, no example can be understood apart from or in 
conflict with the universal principles they induce, such as the chief locus of justification 
by faith or Christian liberty, and from which deductions proceed. When properly 
understood, a Biblical example has in some cases essentially the same weight as a 
command or promise from God’s Word, and apart from God’s command or promise the 
lack of even an example thus can be, for the Reformers, enough to completely undermine 
a point of their opponents’ teaching. The Reformers’ regard for the example of the church 
is notable, if for no other reason, for what that regard says about the usual sola scriptura 
(“scripture alone”) strereotype. Since the Reformers use inductive examples dialectically 
and rhetorically (both homiletically and pedagogically) and in some cases explicitly state 
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their guidelines for doing so, that the Reformers also use analogy inductively is of little 
surprise. 
Analogy 
 Reasoning by example was not the only form of induction used by the authors of 
the documents in The Book of Concord; they also used analogy. Although used to a lesser 
extent than example, the Reformers, as is seen in this subsection, similarly use analogy 
both in support of their own positions and against their opponents’ positions. The cases of 
induction by analogy considered here generally were indicated in the text of the various 
works by the Latin words analogium, analogii; similitude, similitudinis; and typus, typi; 
the works generally used the German equivalents gleich and related cognates, as well as 
Gleichnis, Anleitung, and Figur.103 
 Although this section concentrates primarily on explicit places where the 
Reformers indicate by way of the words just mentioned that they are arguing by analogy, 
there are a number of other places—generally indicated by the use of the Latin similis, 
simile, similior -or -us, simillimus -a -um—where argument by analogy may be implicit. 
In some of these cases the reasoning appears to be from the particular to the general, 
although in other cases the reasoning is from the general to the particular, as a principle is 
applied.104 A case especially worthy of note is when, at the locus of Election, the authors 
of the Solid Declaration indicate that people are to observe God’s just punishment of 
                                                 
103 Not every use of every word referred to argument by analogy. For example, the Reformers also 
used similitude, similitudinis to refer to other things: the likeness of God (Ap II:18, 19, 21); similarity of 
rites or uniformity of observances (Ap VII/VIII:31, 45); and the parables of Jesus (Ap VII/VIII:19; Tr 8). 
 Ap VII/VIII:34 deals with whether similar rites must be used and in the process makes use of an 
interesting “analogy” regarding dressing after the style of the French in comparison to the style of the 
Germans to at least illustrate its point. 
104 Application is made from and to similar testimonies or passages (Ap IV:103, 124, 155, 161, 
259, 215, 371); similar works (Ap IV:203, 208; XII:163); similar acts of worship, rites, or related things 
(Ap IV:283; XV:21, 42; XXI:37; XXIII:29; XXIV:34, 50; XXVII:27, 55); similar dispositions (Ap 
XII:168); similar arguments (Ap XXII:14); similar vices and virtues (Ap XIII:54; XXVII:36); similar 
public expenses (Ap XXIV:81 [twice]); and similar ways of thinking, errors, or written expressions (Ap 
XXIV:96; SA III:i:10; Tr 33; Ep XII:30; SD I:20, 26, 45; III:59; VIII:62). The heaviest uses of the Latin 
word with this sense obviously is in Melanchthon’s Apology, with only the last grouping showing up in the 
Latin translations of Luther’s Smalcald Articles and the later Formula of Concord. 
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those who reject His Word, find themselves to be similar, and reason that they might 
better receive God’s grace. 
 Dann weil unsere Natur, durch die Sünde verderbet, Gottes Zorn 
und der Verdammnus wirdig und schuldig, so ist uns Gott weder Wort, 
Geist oder Genade schuldig, und wenn ers aus Gnaden gibt, so stoßen wirs 
oft von uns und machen uns unwirdig des ewigen Lebens, Act. 13. Und 
solch sein gerechtes, wohlverschultes Gericht läßt er schauen an etzlichen 
Ländern, Völkern und Personen, auf daß wir, wann wir gegen ihnen 
gehalten und mit ihnen verglichen, desto fleißiger Gottes lautere, 
unvordiente Genade an den „Gefäßen der Barmherzigkeit“ erkennen und 
preisen lernen. 
 Cum enim natura nostra peccato corrupta et idcirco irae divinae et 
aeternae damnationis rea sit, Deus nobis prorsus nihil debet neque ullo 
iure tenetur, ut nobis verbum suum et spiritum sanctum largiatur atque 
gratia et favore nos prosequatur. Quid? quod saepe etiam ea dona, quae 
ipse nobis ex gratia largitur, repudiamus nosque aeterna vita indignos 
reddimus. Iustum igitur suum iudicium, quod hominum impietas meretur, 
conspiciendum in quibusdam regnis, populis, personis proponit, ut nos 
cum illis collati et quam simillimi illis deprehensi, tanto accuratius Dei 
immensam misericordiam (quae nulli merito nostro debetur) in vasis 
misericordiae agnoscere et celebrare discamus. 
 Since our nature is corrupted by sin and is worthy and deserving of 
God’s wrath and condemnation, God owes us neither his Word, nor his 
Spirit, nor his grace; in fact, when he does graciously give us these we 
frequently cast them from us and make ourselves unworthy of eternal life 
(Acts 13:46). But God permits us to behold his righteous and well 
deserved judgment over certain lands, nations, and people, so that, as we 
compare ourselves with them and find ourselves in the same 
condemnation, we may learn the more diligently to recognize and praise 
God’s pure and unmerited grace toward the “vessels of mercy.”105 
The preceding passage is also significant in that it expects people are able to reason 
inductively by analogy. Other places in The Book of Concord argue by analogy much 
more explicitly, and it is to some of those places that attention now turns: first to those 
supporting the Reformers’ positions, second to those opposing their opponents’ positions. 
                                                 
105 SD XI:60, BKS, 1081; Tappert, 626. 
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For Reformers’ positions 
 This subsection, considering the use of reasoning by analogy for the Reformers’ 
positions, begins with what is called the “analogy of faith”, or the “analogy of God’s 
Word”, or the “rule of faith”.106 The analogy of faith may be a case of a universal 
principle being applied to the particulars, but the precise universal principle in play has 
only come about through reasoning by analogy from all the relevant particulars. The 
Epitome of the Formula of Concord’s article of the Person of Christ in introducing the 
affirmative theses says it sets out “To explain and to settle this controversy according to 
our Christian faith” (Solchen Streit zu erklären und nach Anleitung unsers christlichen 
Glaubens hinzulegen; Ad explicandam hanc controversiam et iuxta analogiam fidei 
nostrae Christianae),107 and the Solid Declaration’s equivalent article similarly sets out 
“to explain this controversy in a Christian way according to the Word of God and in 
accordance with our plain Christian creed, and to settle it definitely by God’s grace” 
(Diese Zwiespalt christlich vormöge Gottes Worts nach Anleitung unsers eingältigen 
christlichen Glaubens zu erklären und durch Gottes Gnade gänzlich hinzulegen; Ut 
autem haec controversia pie iuxta verbi Dei et fidei nostrae analogiam declaretur et per 
gratiam Dei componatur).108 The absence in the first case of an expressed desire to 
proceed in a Christian way, or of “the Word of God”, or of the help of God’s grace is not 
to be taken as suggesting a different standard, but, rather, the authors of the Formula are 
taken to indicate that, in order to proceed in a Christian way, the explaining and settling 
of the controversies must be based on the Word of God as understood by the analogy of 
faith expressed in true creeds (or symbols) ancient and modern.109  
                                                 
106 The “example of the church” is closely related; see the discussion above, beginning on p.150. 
107 Ep VIII:4, Tappert, 487; BKS, 805. The Triglotta translates Anleitung “guidance” and notes the 
translation of the Latin “analogy” in square brackets (Triglotta, 819). 
108 SD VIII:5, Tappert, 592; BKS, 1019. The Triglotta again translates Anleitung “guidance” and 
notes the translation of the Latin “analogy” in square brackets (Triglotta, 1017). Confer SD VIII:60, BKS, 
1035; Tappert, 602 (nach der Schrift; ex analogia verbi Dei; “According to the Scriptures”). 
109 The difference between “Christian creed” and “Christian faith” here is only in Tappert’s 
translation; the Triglotta, in contrast, renders Glaubens as “faith” consistently between these paragraphs of 
the Epitome and Solid Declaration (Triglotta, 819 and 1017; confer K-W, 509 and 616).  
 In Ep VIII:19 and SD VIII:88, although “analogy” is not used in either place, the sense is the 
same: in introducing the negative theses “God’s Word” and “our simple Christian Creed” are named in the 
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 That “analogy of faith” is the same as “analogy of the Word of God” can be seen 
in how the authors of the Formula use “analogy of the Word of God”. The title of the 
Formula of Concord’s Solid Declaration says the controversies are “resolved and settled 
according to the Word of God and the summary formulation of our Christian doctrine” 
(nach Anleitung Gottes Worts und summarischen Inhalt unser christlichen Lehre 
beigelegt und verglichen; ad normam et analogiam verbi Dei et compendiariam 
Christianae nostrae doctrinae formulam et rationen, decisionem atque 
conciliationem).110 The use in the Latin here of norma, normae (“standard” or “pattern”) 
is significant, for the nearly-immediately following “Rule and Norm” section explains 
both how Scripture norms everything and how the confessional writings themselves, once 
normed, also function as norms.111 
 Although the Lutheran Confessions in no place specifically set out to treat of the 
origin of this expression “analogy of faith”, some Lutheran theologians find sedes 
                                                                                                                                                 
Epitome, and “the prophetic and apostolic writings”, “the orthodox creeds,” and “our Christian Augsburg 
Confession” are named in the Solid Declaration. (See K-W, 512 n.65, for a defense of translating “creed” at 
least, apparently, in that place; the BKS, which is the basis for so many notes in English editions, noticeably 
lacks a similar note.) Confer also the use of Anleitung and analogiam in SD IV:6, BKS, 939; the use of 
Anleitung (the Latin is has rationes) to refer to Scriptures, the ancient creeds, and the other works in The 
Book of Concord in Ep R&N:6, BKS, 769; and the use of analogiam in SD III:8, BKS, 917.  
110 Tappert, 501; BKS, 829. The Triglotta translates “according to the analogy of God’s Word” 
(Triglotta, 845). The title of the Epitome similarly uses Anleitung (secundum Verbi Dei) (BKS, 767). Confer 
also the first paragraph of the Preface to the Solid Declaration: “By the special grace and mercy of the 
Almighty, the teaching concerning the chief article of our Christian faith (which had been hideously 
obscured by human doctrines and ordinances under the papacy) was once more clearly set forth on the basis 
of the Word of God and purified by Dr. Luther, of blessed memory, and the popish errors, abuses, and 
idolatry were condemned” (Nachdem aus sonderen Gnaden und Barmherzigkeit des Allmächtigen die 
Lehre von den fürnehmsten Artikuln unserer christlichen Religion (welche durch Menschenlehre und 
satzungen unter dem Papstumb greulich verfinstert gewesen) durch Doktor Luthern, seliger und heiliger 
Gedächtnus, wiederumb aus Gottes Wort erläutert und gereiniget, die päpstische Irrtumb, Mißbräuch und 
Abgötterei gestraft ... ; Immensa Dei Optimi Maximi bonitate atque miseratione factum est, ut doctrina de 
praecipuis Christianae nostrae religionis articulis, quae opinionibus et traditionibus humanis durante 
papatu horribiliter obscurata fuerat, opera D. Lutheri, piae sanctaeque memoriae, rursus secundum 
praescriptum et analogiam Verbi Dei sincere explicaretur et repurgaretur, pontificii vero errores, abusus 
et idolomaniae graviter redarguerentur) (Tappert, 501; BKS, 829-830). 
111 See, for example, its title, “The Summary Formulation, Basis, Rule, and Norm, Indicating how 
all Doctrines should be judged in Conformity with the Word of God and Errors are to be Explained and 
Decided in a Christian Way” (Von dem summarischen Begriff, Grund, Regel und Richtschnur, wie alle 
Lehr nach Gottes Wort geurteilt und die eingefallne Irrungen christlich erkläret und entscheiden werden 
sollen; de compendaria doctrinae forma, fundamento, norma atque regula, ad quam omnia dogmata iuxta 
analogiam verbi Dei diiudicanda et controversiae motae pie declarandae atque decidendae sunt) (Tappert, 
503; BKS, 833). 
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doctrinae (“seat of doctrine”) for it both in Scripture and in the Confessions. A verse 
from Romans 12, numbered either as 6 or 7, is sometimes given as a Scripture passage 
for the origin of the idea:  
NA26: 
 
Vulgate: habentes autem donationes secundum gratiam quae data est nobis 
differentes sive prophetiam secundum rationem fidei 
Luther Bibel: Hat jemand Weissagung, so sei sie dem Glauben gemäß. Hat 
jemand ein Amt, so warte er des Amts. Lehrt jemand, so warte er der 
Lehre. 
KJV: Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, 
whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith 
secundum rationem fidei and in Luther’s 1545 German Bible as dem Glauben 
gemäß, as “in agreement with (in proportion to) the faith”.113 The faith, with which the 
prophesying agrees by analogy, is the body of doctrine, known by its technical Latin term 
as fides quae creditur (“faith that which is believed”).114 The Confessions envision the 
                                                 
112 Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 431-432 n.1170; Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 357-358 n.160. 
(Pieper cites C. F. W. Walther’s essay on Confessional subscription.) The verse as given in the text above 
is Romans 12:6, but in the German the versification is slightly different so that the key phrase is in verse 7 
(Pieper, for example, cites Romans 12:7). 
113 BAGD, s.v. “ ”, 57.  
114 BAGD, s.v. “ ”, 664; confer Rudolf Bultmann, “πιστεύω κτλ.,” trans. Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968), 6:213. Compare Kittel, who says  here “is not 
the regula fidei of the objective content of Christian faith or the doctrine of faith (quae creditur), although 
Kittel recognizes that objective view as “old and widespread”, and he cites those who hold it (Gerhard 
Kittel, “αναλογία,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964], 1:347). 
Similarly Sanday and Headlam state that the objective view of faith was that of “most of the Latin Fathers 
and many later commentators” (whom they cite), but they find that objective genitive to be inconsistent 
with the meaning of  in verse 3 and that it “gives a sense to  which it will not bear” 
(Wiliam Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the 
Romans, The International Critical Commentary, eds. S. R. Driver, A. Plummer and Charles A. Briggs, 5th 
ed. [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902], ad loc Romans 12:6, 356-357). Cranfield, their successor in the 
International Critical Commentary series, however, while acknowledging both the view of Bultmann and 
others Cranfield cites and also the view of Kittel, Sanday and Headlam, and others Cranfield cites, takes yet 
a slightly different view, making the standard more of a subjective one for each individual (Charles E. B. 
Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, The International Critical 
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general principle, by which other things—such as examples—are to be interpreted, to be 
derived by analogy from the many particular clear passages of Holy Scripture. Pieper, for 
example, points to the following passage from the Apology to the Augsburg 
Confession:115 
Ceterum exempla iuxta regulam, hoc est, iuxta scripturas certas et claras, 
non contra regulam seu contra scripturas interpretari convenit. 
... die Verständigen und Gelehrten wissen wohl, daß man alle Exempel 
nach der Regeln, das ist, nach der klaren Schrift, und nicht wider die Regel 
oder Schrift soll auslegen oder einführen. 
… examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, that is, 
according to sure and clear passages of Scripture not against the rule or the 
passages.116 
Once established, the rule and its normative force are lived out in teaching and 
practice.117 
 How does the analogy of the faith get applied in a specific case? In the case of the 
Solid Declaration’s article on Original Sin, the Reformers set out to present their position 
and explain the controversy according to the analogy of the faith.118 After discussing the 
controversy as it involved the use of the terminology “substance” and “accident” at this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commentary, eds. J. A. Emerton, C. E. B. Cranfield and G. N. Stanton, 2 vols. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1979], ad loc Romans 12:6, 620-621). Luther, in his 1515-1516 glosses on Romans, rules out the subjective 
interpretation and says of the , “the proportion, or the proper degree, that is, so that it does not go 
beyond the faith and its rubrics” (proportionem, comparationem, i.e. ne excedat fidem et regulas eius) 
(Luther, ad loc Romans 12:6, AE 25:106, translated by Jacob A. O. Preus; Aland #646; WA 56:119). 
Confer the scholia (AE: 25:444-446; WA 56:451-454). 
115 Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 437-438; Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 361-362. 
116 Ap XXVII:60, BKS, 394; Tappert, 279. (This passage was cited with greater length above at 
n.96, p.163.) 
117 The following addition to the German translation of the Apology’s article on Human Traditions 
is, by way of Anleitung, potential evidence of this application of the analogy of the faith to the practice of 
the faith: “On the other hand, to teach absolute freedom has also its doubts and questions, because the 
common people need outward discipline and instruction” (Wiederum schlechthin die Freiheit lehren, hat 
auch sein Bedenken und seine Frage, nachdem das gemeine Volk äußerlicher Zucht und Anleitung bedarf) 
(Ap XV:49; Triglotta, 329; BKS, 306-307). 
118 SD I:3 (nach Gottes Wort; iuxta verbi Dei analogiam); 4 (nach Gottes Wort; secundum verbi 
Dei analogiam), BKS, 846. 
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locus,119 the Reformers conclude that the terms can be used if their use is in keeping with 
the general principle of the faith.  
 Dergestalt denn [auf solche Weise wird] durch das Wort accidens 
die Erbsünde nicht verkleinert, wenn es nach Gottes Wort also erklärt 
wird, in maßen D. Luther in seiner lateinischen Auslegung über das dritte 
Kapitel des ersten Buchs Mose wider die Verkleinerung der Erbsünde mit 
großem Ernst geschrieben hat ... 
 Hac facta explicatione, per vocabulum accidentis peccatum 
originis haudquaquam extenuatur, cum videlicet illud iuxta Verbi Dei 
analogiam ita declaratur, quemadmodum D. Lutherus in Latino suo 
commentario in caput tertium Geneseos contra extenuationem peccati 
originalis magno zelo disseruit. 
 Thus the term “accident” does not in any way minimize original 
sin if the term is explained in harmony with the Word of God, just as Dr. 
Luther in his Latin exposition of Genesis 3 likewise writes earnestly 
against a minimizing of original sin.120 
Applying the analogy of faith, however, did not allow every particular use the Reformers 
considered. 
 In the case of the Formula of Concord’s articles on Free Will, the Reformers 
similarly set out to resolve the controversy “according to the Word of God” (nach 
Anleitung Gottes Worts; iuxta verbi Dei analogiam).121 But, in this case the Reformers 
reject two formulas expressing the idea that a free human will participates in conversion 
because those formulas do not agree with the analogy of faith. 
... ist aus hievorgesetzter Erklärung offenbar, daß sie der Form gesunder 
Lehre nicht ähnlich, sunder derselben zuwider und demnach, wann von 
der Bekehrung zu Gott geredt, billich zu meiden. 
                                                 
119 Such sub-sentential use of philosophical terms certainly has bearing on the use of philosophy in 
The Book of Concord but is outside this dissertation’s scope that focuses on the supra-sentential uses of 
logic and argumentation. 
120 SD I:61, BKS, 865; Tappert, 519. The Luther work referred to is WA XLII:12338-1255 (BKS, 
865 n.1; confer Tappert, 519 n.7; K-W, 542 n.50, which gives the broader range of WA 42:120, 25-136, 20; 
LW 1:160-82). Significantly, as the Formula recognizes, Luther in his exposition of Genesis 3 does not talk 
about the use of the term “accident”. On this passage from the SD and the sources behind it, confer above 
n.33, p.103. 
121 SD II:6, Tappert, 521; BKS, 873. 
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... ex proposita declaratione manifeste apparet formae sanorum verborum 
ea non esse analoga, sed cum illa pugnare et idcirco, cum de conversione 
ad Deum agitur, merito vitanda esse. 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that this position does not 
conform to the form of sound doctrine but rather opposes it and therefore 
is rightly to be avoided in the discussion of man’s conversion to God.122 
Clearly the analogy of faith applies to both form and content of the teaching, and the 
teaching is lived out in both words and practice.123 
 The Reformers relate the teaching import of the analogy of faith to their own 
writings, such as those in The Book of Concord written especially for teaching. A passage 
demonstrating this point is in the Formula of Concord Epitome’s article on the Person of 
Christ (especially the Latin), as the Reformers explain how Christ’s so-called session at 
the right hand of God allows Him to be truly and essentially present in His Supper. 
 Doher er auch vormag, und ihm ganz leicht ist, sein wahrhaftigen 
Leib und Blut im heiligen Abendmahl gegenwärtig mitzuteilen, nicht nach 
der Art oder Eigenschaft der menschlichen Natur, sondern nach Art und 
Eigenschaft göttlicher Rechte, saget D. Luther aus unserm | christlichen | 
Kinderglauben; welche Gegenwärtigkeit nicht irdisch, noch kapernaitisch, 
gleichwohl wahrhaftig und wesentlich ist, wie die Wort seines Testaments 
lauten: „Das ist, ist, ist mein Leib“ etc. 
 Inde adeo, et quidem facillime, corpus suum verum et sanguinem 
suum in sacra coena praesens distribuere potest. Id vero non fit secundum 
modum et proprietatem humanae naturae, sed secundum modum et 
proprietatem dextrae Dei, ut Lutherus secundum analogiam fidei nostrae 
Christianae in catechesi comprehensae loqui solet. Et haec Christi in sacra 
coena praesentia neque physica aut terrena est neque Capernaitica, interim 
tamen verissima et quidem substantiaIis est. Sic enim verba testamenti 
Christi sonant: Hoc est, est, est corpus meum etc. 
 Therefore he is able and it is easy for him to impart to us his true 
body and blood which are present in the Holy Supper, not according to the 
mode or property of the human nature but according to the mode and 
property of God’s right hand, as Dr. Luther says on the basis of our 
Christian faith as we teach this to our children. This presence is not 
                                                 
122 SD II:86, Tappert, 538; BKS, 909. This passage is arguably a use of analogy against the 
opponents’ position, but, as noted previously, on matters in dispute a use for the Reformers’ position is also 
a use against their opponents’ position. 
123 The application of general principles or rules can also be seen in Ap IV:185, 269, 277, 278 
(German), 371 (German); Ap XVI:12; and SD I:33. 
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mundane or Capernaitic although it is true and essential, as the words of 
Christ’s testament declare, “This is, is, is my body,” etc.124 
Again, the analogy of faith is invoked by the Reformers and specifically said to allow 
some use of philosophical terms, and not just for the so-called experts. Terminology is 
also at issue at the close of the Epitome, where the analogy of faith and the Catechism are 
again conjoined. 
 Dies ist die kurz und einfältige Erklärung der streitigen Artikul, 
| so | ein Zeitlang von den Theologen Augsburgischer Confession 
widerwärtig disputiert und gelehret worden. 
 Daraus ein jeder einfältiger Christ nach Anleitung Gottes Worts 
und seines einfältigen Catechismi vernehmen kann, was recht oder unrecht 
sei, do nicht allein die reine Lehre gesetzt, sondern auch derselbigen 
widerwärtige irrige Lehre ausgesetzt, verworfen und also die eingefallene 
ärgerlichen Spaltungen gründlich entscheiden seind. 
 Haec brevis est et simplicissima articulorum controversorum 
explicatio, de quibus inter theologos Augustanae Confessionis aliquandiu 
disceptatum et discrepantibus inter se sententiis disputatum est. Et ex hac 
declaratione homo pius quantumvis simplex secundum analogiam verbi 
Dei et Catechismi simplicem doctrinam deprehendere potest, quid verum 
sit, quid falsum. Non enim tantummodo sincera doctrina diserte est 
recitata, verum etiam contraria et falsa doctrina repudiata est et reiecta, et 
controversiae illae, offendiculorum plenae, solide sunt decisae atque 
diiudicatae. 
 This is a brief and simple explanation of the various articles which 
for a time the theologians of the Augsburg Confession have been 
discussing and teaching in mutually contradictory terms. From it, under 
the guidance of the Word of God and the plain Catechism, every simple 
Christian can understand what is right and what is wrong, since we have 
not only set forth the pure doctrine but have also exposed the contrary 
errors. In this way the offensive controversies that have developed receive 
a basic settlement.125 
                                                 
124 Ep VIII:17, BKS, 808; Tappert, 489 (emphasis original). (The BKS editors indicate the Luther 
writings referenced as WA XXVI:326ff.; XXIII:131ff. [confer Tappert, 489 n.2; K-W, 511 n.62, which 
narrows the page range and gives the corresponding AE equivalents 37:214-216, 55-59]). Confer SD 
VIII:23. 
125 Ep XI:22, BKS, 821; Tappert, 497. Note well that though numbered as part of the article on 
Election, this paragraph is more of a conclusion to the first eleven articles of the Epitome. 
 On this whole discussion of the analogy of faith, confer possibly also the uses of Anleitung in the 
Preface to The Book of Concord (numbered according to the German paragraphs), ¶5 (BKS, 743 line 25; 
“harmony” in Tappert, 4), ¶9 (BKS, 747 line 5; “direction” in Tappert, 6), and ¶20 (BKS, 756 line 30; 
“guidance” in Tappert, 12). 
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The Reformers use the analogy of faith, created by analogy from all the sure and clear 
passages of Scripture, to settle controversies, but that is not the Reformers’ only use of 
analogy. 
 For three different specific points, the Formula of Concord uses analogies that 
have more of an explanatory force. In the case of the Solid Declaration’s article on the 
Lord’s Supper, the authors quote Luther at length, where he is discussing Christ’s 
spiritual mode of presence that does not occupy space but nevertheless goes wherever He 
wants. By way of “some imperfect illustrations” (grobe Gleichnis; crassa similitudine) 
Luther likens it unto the penetration of vision and light, the transmission of musical 
sound and heat, and “many more like these” (dergleichen viel mehr; multae 
comparationes).126 Similar is the use of analogy in the Formula of Concord’s article on 
the Person of Christ. The Reformers there follow the church Fathers who explained the 
union of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ with the analogy 
(Gleichnus; similitudine) of fire and metal in glowing iron and of soul and body in a 
human being.127 And, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is itself used by the 
Reformers, again after the precedent of church Fathers, as an explanatory analogy 
(Gleichnus; similitudine) for the sacramental union of the essences of Christ’s body and 
blood with the essences of bread and wine.128 These three specific uses of analogy 
significantly all follow precedents (that is, they are not the later authors innovating), and 
the greater explanatory force of the analogy is not to the exclusion of its nature as 
induction.  
 What is a more obvious example of arguing by way of analogy is a very practical 
case in Martin Luther’s Large Catechism. Luther says the command to pray should make 
one prize one’s personal prayers, and to support his position he reasons by analogy (or 
                                                 
126 SD VII:100, Tappert, 586; BKS, 1007. This particular extended quotation is from  
WA 26:335-336, Luther’s 1528 Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (AE 37:222-223). 
127 Ep VIII:9, Tappert, 488; BKS, 806. Confer SD VIII:18 and 64, BKS, 1023 and 1038. The BKS 
editors point out with citations that Augustine attributes the analogy of glowing iron to Justin Martyr and 
that Origen is apparently the first to use the analogy of soul and body (BKS, 1023 n.1; confer Tappert, 594 
n.5; K-W, 619 n.260 and 261). 
128 SD VII:37, Tappert, 575; BKS, 963. The sacramental presence, incidentally, is of the spiritual 
mode (SD VII:100). 
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“illustration”; Gleichnis; similitudinem) from the Fourth Commandment, where 
children’s obeying their parents is revered because of God’s command. Essentially the 
argument is that prayer is like obeying one’s parents, and, since obeying one’s parents is 
highly regarded because of God’s command, therefore prayer is highly regarded because 
of God’s command.129 Clearly the Reformers use some analogies in support of their 
positions, but they also use others against their opponents’ positions. 
Against opponents’ positions 
 The previous subsection showed how the Reformers use inductive reasoning by 
analogy to support their own positions, and it hinted at the Reformers’ use of the same 
method against their opponents, whether Roman Catholics in the earlier documents or 
pseudo-Lutherans in the later ones. This subsection discusses more at length the 
Reformers’ use of analogy against their opponents’ positions. 
 Especially against their later opponents the Reformers in several places object to 
their opponents referring the bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Altar as analogies of 
Christ’s corresponding body and blood. One of those objections, coming in a list of 
condemned positions, touches on linguistic theory. 
… daß im Abendmahl dem Glauben allein die Kraft, Wirkung und 
Verdienst des weit abwesenden Leibs Christi ausgeteilet werde, und wir 
also seines abwesendes Leibs teilhaftig werden, und daß auf diese jtzt 
erzählte Weise unio sacramentalis, das ist, sakramentliche Vereinigung, zu 
verstehen sei de analogia signi et signati, das ist, wie Brot und Wein mit 
dem Leib und Blut Christi ein Gleichnis haben. 
Quod in Coena Domini fidei tantummodo virtus, operatio et meritum 
longe absentis corporis Christi distribuantur et communicentur, ut hac 
ratione absentis corporis Christi participes fiamus. Et quod iuxta hunc 
modum unio sacramentalis sit intelligenda, videlicet de analogia signi et 
signati, quatenus nimirum corpus et sanguis Christi cum pane et vino 
aliquid similitudinis habent. 
… that in the Supper there is distributed to faith only the virtue, operation, 
and merit of the far-distant body of Christ, and that in this way we partake 
of his absent body. Accordingly the term “sacramental union” is to be 
understood in terms of the relation between the sign and that which is 
                                                 
129 LC III:12-13, Tappert, 422; BKS, 664-665. 
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signified—in other words, only as bread and wine have a similarity with 
the body and blood of Christ.130 
Though not so much an example of argument by analogy, this use shows that analogy has 
its limits. 
 One of the more striking uses comes in the case of their opponents’ argument for 
celibacy on the basis of its purity. The Reformers harshly criticize and then reverse their 
opponents’ argument by analogy from the Old Testament priesthood intended to support 
celibacy to instead support marriage and intercourse.131 
Et huc allegant ceremonias legis mosaicae, quod cum in lege tempore 
ministerii sacerdotes separati fuerint ab uxoribus, in novo testamento 
sacerdos, cum semper orare debeat, semper debeat continere. Haec inepta 
similitudo allegatur tamquam demonstratio, quae cogat sacerdotes ad 
perpetuum coelibatum, cum quidem in ipsa similitudine coniugium 
concedatur, tantum ministerii tempore consuetudo interdicitur. Et aliud est 
orare, aliud ministrare. Orabant sancti tunc quoque, cum non exercebant 
publicum ministerium, nec consuetudo cum coniuge prohibebat, ne 
orarent. 
Und dazu ziehen sie an die Priester im Gesetz Mosis. Denn sie sagen, 
wenn die Priester haben im Tempel gedienet, haben sie sich ihrer Weiber 
müssen enthalten; darum, so im neuen Testament die Priester allezeit 
beten sollen, sollen sie sich auch allezeit keusch halten. Solch ungeschickt 
närrisch Gleichnis ziehen sie an als ein ganz klaren gewissen Grund, 
dadurch schon erstritten sei, daß die Priester schuldig sein, ewige 
Keuschheit zu halten, so sie doch, wenn auch das Gleichnis hie tügte oder 
sich reimte, nichts mehr damit erhalten, denn daß die Priester sich ihrer 
Weiber allein eine Zeit lang enthalten sollten, nämlich wenn sie 
Kirchendienst fürhätten. Auch so ist ein ander Ding beten, ein ander Ding, 
in der Kirche priesterlich Amt tun. Denn viel Heilige haben wohl gebetet, 
wenn sie gleich nicht im Tempel gedienet, und hat sie eheliche 
Beiwohnung daran nicht gehindert. 
For this they refer to the ceremonies of the Mosaic law which prescribed 
that during the period of their ministration the priests of the Old Testament 
were to be separated from their wives; since the priests of the New 
Testament must pray continually, they must also preserve perpetual 
                                                 
130 SD VII:117, BKS, 1013; Tappert, 589-590. (The BKS editors note a number of writings of the 
Reformers’ opponents where such position was taken.) Confer Ep VII:28; SD VII:115. 
131 On the opponents’ use of this analogy, see article XXIII of the Confutation (CR 27:138-139 
[confer BKS, 339 n.1]; Reu, ed., The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources, *365-*366; Kolb and 
Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 124.) 
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continence. This clumsy analogy is presented as a proof to force perpetual 
celibacy on priests, though, in this very analogy marriage is permitted and 
intercourse is forbidden only during the time of ministration. Besides, 
prayer is one thing and ministration another. The saints prayed even when 
they were not carrying on their public ministry, and marital intercourse did 
not keep them from praying.132 
The opponents’ “clumsy” attempt at analogy ends up supporting the Reformers’ position 
by their demonstrating that there is no support for a generalization from a limited aspect 
of the Old Testament priesthood’s life to the whole of the New Testament priesthood’s 
life. 
 Another place where the Reformers’ opponents attempt to reason by analogy from 
the Old Testament and are similarly criticized harshly by the Reformers is in the 
Apology’s article on Penitence, where the Reformers criticize the examination that was 
part of their opponents’ practice of confession, which practice their opponents ostensibly 
supported elsewhere by an analogy from Proverbs 27:23.133 Notice how the Reformers 
essentially ridicule their opponents’ basic skills of reading and interpretation. 
 Et ridiculum est huc transferre dictum Salomonis: Diligenter 
cognosce vultum pecoris tui. Nihil enim dicit Salomon de confessione, sed 
tradit oeconomicum praeceptum patrifamilias, ut utatur suo et abstineat ab 
alieno, et iubet eum res suas diligenter curare; ita tamen, ne studio 
augendarum facultatum occupatus animus abiiciat timorem Dei aut fidem 
aut curam verbi Dei. Sed adversarii nostri mirifica metamorphosi 
transformant dicta Scripturae in quaslibet sententias. Hic cognoscere 
significat eis audire confessiones, vultus non externam conversationem, 
sed arcana conscientiae. Pecudes significant homines. Sane bella est 
interpretatio et digna istis contemptoribus studiorum eloquentiae. Quodsi 
velit aliquis per similitudinem transferre praeceptum a patrefamilias ad 
pastorem ecclesiae, certe vultum debebit interpretari de externa 
conversatione. Haec similitudo magis quadrabit. 
 Und es ist närrisch und kindisch gnug bei Verständigen, den 
Spruch Salomonis, da er am 27. sagt: „Diligenter cognosce vultum pecoris 
tui“, das ist, „habe acht auf deine Schafe usw.“ an dem Ort von der 
Beichte oder Absolution einführen. Denn Salomon redet da gar nichts von 
                                                 
132 Ap XXIII:27, BKS, 338-339; Tappert, 243. Confer Ap XXIII:41 (see above at n.63, p.153). 
133 The corresponding twelfth article of the Confutation (CR 27:109-114; Reu, 355*-356*;  




der Beicht, sondern gibt ein Gebot den Hausvätern, daß sie sollen mit dem 
Ihren zufrieden sein und sich fremdes Guts enthalten, und befiehlt mit dem 
Wort, ein jeder solle seines Viehes und Güter fleißig wahrnehmen, doch 
soll er aus Geiz Gottes Furcht, Gottes Gebot und Wort nicht vergessen. 
Aber die Widersacher machen aus der Schrift schwarz und weiß, wenn 
und wie sie wollen, wider alle natürliche Art der klaren Worte an dem Ort: 
Cognosce vultum pecoris etc. Da muß cognoscere Beicht hören heißen. 
Vieh oder Schafe muß da Menschen heißen. Stabulum, achten wir, heißt 
auch eine Schule, da solche Doctores und Oratores inne sein. Aber ihnen 
geschiehet recht, die also die heilige Schrift, alle gute Künste verachten, 
daß sie so grob in der Grammatik fehlen. Wenn jemands an dem Ort je 
Lust hätten, ein Hausvater, davon Salomo redet, mit einem Seelhirten zu 
vergleichen, so müßt vultus da nicht arcana conscientiae, sondern den 
äußerlichen Wandel bedeuten. 
 It is silly to transfer here the saying of Solomon (Prov. 27:23), 
“Know well the condition of your flocks.” Solomon is not talking about 
confession. He is merely giving a bit of domestic advice to the head of a 
household, telling him to pay diligent attention to his own property and 
leave other people’s alone, but warning him not to be so preoccupied with 
the increase of his holdings that he neglects the fear of God or faith or his 
concern for God’s Word. By a marvelous transformation, our opponents 
make passages of Scripture mean whatever they want them to mean. [They 
produce from the Scriptures black and white, as they please, contrary to 
the natural meaning of the clear words.] According to their interpretation, 
“know” here means to hear confessions, “condition” means the secrets of 
conscience and not outward conduct, “flocks” means men. [Stable, we 
think, means a school within which there are such doctors and orators. But 
it has happened aright to those who thus despise the Holy Scriptures and 
all fine arts that they make gross mistakes in grammar.] The interpretation 
surely is a neat one, worthy of these men who despise grammar. But if 
anybody wants by analogy to apply the commandment given a father to 
the pastor of a church, he should surely interpret “condition” as meaning 
outward conduct. That at least would be more consistent.134 
Again in this case the Reformers are not objecting to the use of analogy per se, but they 
are objecting to the whether the two things being compared are actually analogous and if 
so what the induction means. 
                                                 
134 Ap XII:106, BKS, 273; Tappert, 197. (The English translations of the German additions are 
provided in square brackets as from Triglotta, 283.) There is no stable anywhere near Proverbs 27:23; 
clearly the Reformers are making sport of their opponents’ exegesis. 
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 The opponents’ attempt at induction by analogy from a New Testament verse at 
the locus of Justification is said by the Apology’s article on that topic similarly to be 
“unwarranted”. In Luke 17:10 Jesus says, “So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all 
those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done 
that which was our duty to do” (KJV; NA26: 
). The Reformers say their opponents err in arguing by analogy from 
Christ’s words to a conclusion that denigrates faith.135 
Sed si ex simili ratiocinari volunt: cum feceris omnia, noli confidere 
operibus tuis, ita cum credideris omnia, noli confidere promissione divina: 
haec non cohaerent. Sunt enim dissimillima. Dissimiles causae, dissimilia 
obiecta fiduciae sunt in priore propositione et in posteriore. Fiducia in 
priore est fiducia nostrorum operum. Fiducia in posteriore est fiducia 
promissionis divinae. Christus autem damnat fiduciam nostrorum operum, 
non damnat fiduciam promissionis suae. Non vult nos de gratia et 
misericordia Dei desperare, arguit opera nostra tamquam indigna, non 
arguit promissionem, quae gratis offert misericordiam. 
 Likewise, the argument from analogy is unwarranted: from the 
statement, “When you have done everything, do not trust in your works,” 
to the statement, “When you have believed everything, do not trust in the 
divine promise.” The two statements are not analogous since the causes 
and objects of trust in the first are unlike those in the second. In the first, 
trust is a trust in our own works; in the second, trust is a trust in the divine 
promise. Christ condemns trust in our own works; he does not condemn 
trust in his promise. He does not want us to despair of God’s grace and 
mercy. He denounces our works as worthless, but he does not denounce 
the promise that offers mercy gratis.136  
Again, the similarity of the items in the analogy is questioned by the Reformers. One 
might say the homonymy in this case is so extreme as to make a proportional relationship 
nonexistent. 
                                                 
135 The argument begins in Ap IV:334ff.; the German does not follow the authoritative Latin; 
confer the discussion above (see above at n.102, p.167). 




 The Apology’s article on the Mass is a final illustration of how the Reformers use 
induction by analogy to argue against their opponents’ positions. At this locus, there are 
two central and explicit analogies first raised by the Reformers’ opponents that are then 
refuted by the Reformers and turned to support the Reformers’ own position.137 The first 
regards the daily sacrifice of the Old Testament being analogous to the need for a daily 
sacrifice in the New, and the second regards the Old Testament priesthood being 
analogous to that of the New. 
 In discussing the first, that of the Old Testament’s daily sacrifice being analogous 
to the need for a daily sacrifice in the New Testament, the Reformers variously refer to 
their opponents argument as “allegory” (allegoriis; Allegorien) and “type” (typus; Figur), 
but the force of the argument is an inductive argument reasoned by analogy. 
 Allegant et iuge sacrificium quod sicut in lege fuit iuge 
sacrificium, ita missa debeat esse iuge sacrificium novi testamenti. Bene 
cum adversariis agitur, si patimur nos vinci allegoriis. Constat autem, 
quod allegoriae non pariunt firmas probationes. Quamquam nos quidem 
facile patimur missam intelligi iuge sacrificium, modo ut tota missa 
intelligatur, hoc est, ceremonia cum praedicatione evangelii, fide, 
invocatione et gratiarum actione. Nam haec simul coniuncta sunt iuge 
sacrificium novi testamenti, quia ceremonia propter haec instituta est, nec 
ab his divellenda est. Ideo Paulus ait: Quoties comedetis panem hunc, et 
poculum Domini bibetis, annuntiate mortem Domini. Illud vero nullo 
modo sequitur ex hoc typo levitico, quod ceremonia sit opus ex opere 
operato iustificans aut applicandum pro aliis, ut mereatur eis remissionem 
peccatorum etc. 
 Auch so ziehen die Widersacher an das iuge sacrificium, das ist, 
das tägliche Opfer, und sagen, wie im Gesetz Mosi sei gewesen ein täglich 
Opfer, also sei die Messe iuge sacrificium des neuen Testaments. Wenn 
die Sache mit Allegorien auszurichten wäre, so würde jedermann 
Allegorien finden, ihm dienlich. Aber alle Verständige wissen, daß man in 
solchen hochwichtigen Sachen vor Gott gewiß und klar Gottes Wort haben 
muß, und nicht dunkele und fremde Sprüche herzu ziehen mit Gewalt. 
Solche ungewisse Deutungen halten den Stich nicht für Gottes Gericht. 
                                                 
137 See article XXIV of the Confutation (CR 27:146-157 [confer BKS, 360 n.1-2]; Reu, ed., The 
Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources, *369-*373; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and 
Contexts, 127-131.) 
 Another explicit analogy regarding the mass being a sacrifice because Paul mentions an altar 
(parabola altaris per similitudinem a Paulo) that is also briefly treated, but only in the authoritative Latin 
(Ap XXIV:84; BKS, 372), was apparently not raised by the opponents in the confutation itself. 
 
185 
Wiewohl wir wollten den Widersachern zu Gefallen noch die Messe wohl 
iuge sacrificium oder täglich Opfer nennen lassen. wenn sie die ganze 
Messe, das ist, die Ceremonien mit der Danksagung, mit dem Glauben im 
Herzen, mit dem herzlichen Anrufen göttlicher Gnade iuge sacrificium 
nenneten; denn das alles zusammen möchte iuge sacrificium des neuen 
Testaments heißen. Denn die Ceremonia der Meß oder des Abendmahls ist 
um des alles willen aufgericht; denn sie ist um des Predigens willen 
eingesetzt, wie Paulus sagt: „So oft ihr das Brot esset und den Kelch 
trinket, sollt ihr den Tod des Herrn verkündigen.“ Das folget aber gar nicht 
aus der Figur des täglichen Opfers, daß die Messe sei ein solch Opfer, das 
ex opere operato Gott versühne, oder das man für andere halten oder tun 
könne, ihnen Vergebung der Sünde zu erlangen. 
 They cite refer to the daily sacrifice: as there was a daily sacrifice 
in the Old Testament, so the Mass ought to be the daily sacrifice of the 
New Testament. Our opponents will really achieve something if we let 
them defeat us with allegories, but it is evident that allegory does not 
prove or establish anything [that in matters so highly important before 
God we must have a sure and clear word of God, and not introduce by 
force obscure and foreign passages; such uncertain explanations do not 
stand the test of God’s judgment]. We are perfectly willing for the Mass to 
be understood as a daily sacrifice, provided this means the whole Mass, 
the ceremony and also the proclamation of the Gospel, faith, prayer, and 
thanksgiving. Taken together, these are the daily sacrifice of the New 
Testament; the ceremony [of the Mass, or the Lord’s Supper] was 
instituted because of them and ought not be separated from them. 
Therefore Paul says (1 Cor. 11:26), “As often as you eat this bread and 
drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death.” From the Levitical analogy 
it does not follow at all that there must be a ceremony that justifies ex 
opere operato or that merits the forgiveness of sins when applied to 
others.138 
The Reformers at a minimum say their opponents have again failed to recognize what is 
analogous between the two, with the opponents limiting the sacrifice to ceremony, but the 
Reformers taking it more broadly, with an emphasis on the preaching of the Gospel.139 
(As much as the Reformers might be taken, in the paragraph just quoted, to denigrate the 
nature of the argument, they ultimately claim this one for themselves, as will be seen.) 
                                                 
138 Ap XXIV:35, BKS, 360; Tappert, 256. (The English translations of the German additions are 
provided in square brackets as from Triglotta, 397.) The only other mention of allegoria, allegoriae is in 
Ap XXI:35 where the Reformers refer to the symbolism through allegory (ut significaret per allegoriam; 
hat wöllen anzeigen) of a painting of St. Christopher (BKS, 324). 
139 See especially the preceding paragraph, Ap XXIV:34. 
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 Et typus apte pingit non ceremoniam solam, sed etiam 
praedicationem evangelii. In Numer. cap. 28 tres ponuntur partes istius 
cotidiani sacrificii, crematio agni, libatio et oblatio similae. Lex habebat 
picturas seu umbras rerum futurarum. Ideo in hoc spectaculo Christus et 
totus cultus novi testamenti pingitur. Crematio agni significat mortem 
Christi. Libatio significat, ubique in toto mundo credentes illius agni 
sanguine aspergi per evangelii praedicationem, hoc est, sanctificari, sicut 
Petrus loquitur: In sanctificationem spiritus, in obedientiam et 
aspersionem sanguinis Iesu Christi. Oblatio similae significat fidem, 
invocationem et gratiarum actionem in cordibus. Ut igitur in veteri 
testamento umbra cernitur, ita in novo res significata quaerenda est, non 
alius typus tamquam ad sacrificium sufficiens.  
 Und wenn man iuge sacrificium oder das tägliche Opfer recht 
ansieht, so malets ab und bedeut nicht allein die Ceremonien, sondern 
auch die Predigt des Evangelii. Denn im 4. Buch Mosi am 28. werden 
gesetzt drei Stücke, die zu demselben täglichen Opfer gehörten. Erstlich 
ward geopfert ein Lamm zu einem Brandopfer und ward Wein darauf 
gossen. Danach ward auch geopfert ein Kuche mit Semmelmehl und Öl 
gemenget. Das ganze Gesetz Mosi ist ein Schatten und Figur Christi und 
des neuen Testaments, darum so wird Christus darin abgemalet. Das 
Lamm bedeutet den Tod Christi. Wein darauf gießen bedeutet, daß in aller 
Welt alle Gläubigen von des Lamms Blut besprengt werden durch das 
Evangelium, das ist, daß sie geheiliget werden. wie Petrus sagt 1. Petr. 1: 
„Durch Heiligung des Geistes im Gehorsam und Besprengung des Blutes 
Jesu Christi.“ Der Kuch bedeutet das Anrufen und die Danksagung in aller 
Gläubigen Herzen. Wie nu im alten Testament der Schatten ist und die 
Bedeutung Christi oder des Evangelii. also ist im neuen Testament 
dasselbige Evangelium und die Wahrheit, welche durch die Figur bedeut 
ist, zu suchen. und ist nicht erst ein neu typus oder Figur zu suchen, das sie 
möchten oder wollten sacrificium nennen. 
 This analogy symbolizes not only the ceremony but the 
proclamation of the Gospel. Num. 28:4ff. lists three parts of this daily 
sacrifice, the burning of the lamb, the drink offering, and the offering of 
flour. The Old Testament had pictures or shadows of what was to come; 
thus this depicted Christ and the whole worship of the New Testament. 
The burning of the lamb symbolizes the death of Christ. The drink 
offering symbolizes the sprinkling, that is, the sanctifying of believers 
throughout the world with the blood of that Lamb, by the proclamation of 
the Gospel, as Peter says (1 Pet. 1:2); “Sanctified by the Spirit for 
obedience to Jesus Christ and for sprinkling with his blood.” The offering 
of flour symbolizes faith, prayer, and thanksgiving in the heart. Therefore, 
as we discern the shadow in the Old Testament, so in the New we should 
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look for what it represents and not for another symbol that seems to be a 
sacrifice.140  
The Reformers state that the real daily sacrifice is the commemoration of Christ’s death, 
the proclamation of and faith that receives the Gospel. The Old Testament ceremonies, 
the Reformers continue, point to the spiritual worship and the heart’s daily sacrifice 
brought about by the Holy Spirit. 
Ex his satis apparet typum de iugi sacrificio nihil contra nos facere, sed 
magis pro nobis, quia nos omnes partes significatas iugi sacrificio 
requirimus. Adversarii falso somniant solam ceremoniam significari, non 
etiam praedicationem evangelii, mortificationem et vivificationem cordis 
etc. 
Aus dem erscheinet nu genug, daß das Gleichnis vom iuge sacrificio oder 
täglichem Opfer nichts wider uns ist, sondern vielmehr für uns. Denn wir 
haben klar angezeigt, daß alles, was zum täglichen Opfer im Gesetz Mosi 
gehöret hat, muß ein wahr, herzlich Opfer, nicht opus operatum bedeuten. 
Der Widersacher Traum ist falsch, da sie wähnen wollen, es werde allein 
das schlechte, äußerliche Werk und Ceremonia bedeut, so doch der Glaube 
im Herzen, das Predigen, Bekennen, Danksagung und herzliches Anrufen 
die rechten täglichen Opfer sein und das Beste an der Messe, sie nennens 
gleich Opfer oder anders. 
From this it is clear that the analogy of the daily sacrifice does not refute 
but supports our stand because we require all the actions that it 
symbolizes. [We have clearly shown all the parts that belonged to the 
daily sacrifice in the law of Moses, that it must mean a true cordial 
offering, not an opus operatum.] Our opponents imagine that it symbolizes 
the ceremony alone and not preaching the Gospel, being put to death and 
being made alive [which is the best part of the Mass, whether they call it a 
sacrifice or anything else].141 
So, the Reformers took an analogy their opponents’ used to support their position and, by 
way of an allegory that illuminated the analogy, turned the argument to support their own 
position. The Reformers do something similar with the next analogy to be considered. 
 The second central and explicit analogy in the Apology’s article on the Mass 
regards the Old Testament priesthood being analogous to that of the New. Like the 
                                                 
140 Ap XXIV:36-37, BKS, 361; Tappert, 256-257. 
141 Ap XXIV:40, BKS, 361-362; Tappert, 257. (The English translations of the German additions 
are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 397.) 
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previous case, this analogy was raised by the Reformers’ opponents in the Confutation as 
an argument supporting the opponents’ position. 
 Allegant et ex epistola ad Ebraeos: Omnis pontifex ex hominibus 
assumptus pro hominibus constituitur in his, quae sunt ad Deum, ut offerat 
dona et sacrificia pro peccatis. Hinc ratiocinantur, cum in novo testamento 
sint pontifices et sacerdotes, sequitur, quod sit et sacrificium aliquod pro 
peccatis. Hic locus vel maxime movet indoctos, praesertim cum illa 
pompa sacerdotii et sacrificiorum veteris testamenti offunditur oculis. 
Haec similitudo decipit imperitos, ut iudicent oportere ad eundem modum 
apud nos exsistere aliquod ceremoniale sacrificium, applicandum pro 
peccatis aliorum, sicut in veteri testamento. Neque aliud est ille cultus 
missarum et reliqua politia papae, quam evitica politia male intellecta.142 
 Auch so ziehen sie an aus der Epistel zu den Ebräern am 5. 
Kapitel. „Ein itzlicher Hoherpriester, der aus den Menschen genommen 
wird, der wird gesetzt für die Menschen gegen Gott, auf daß er opfere 
Gaben und Opfer für die Sünde.“ Da schließen sie: nachdem im neuen 
Testament Bischofe sein und Priester, so folget, daß auch ein Opfer müsse 
sein für die Sunde. Dieses nu möcht am meisten die Ungelehrte und 
Unerfahrene bewegen, sonderlich wenn sie ansehen das herrliche 
Gepränge im Tempel und Kirchen, item die Kleidung Aaronis, da im 
Alten Testament auch viel Schmuck von Gold, Silber und Purpur 
gewesen, denken sie, es müsse im neuen Testament gleich also ein 
Gottesdienst, solche Ceremonien und Opfer sein, da man für anderer Leute 
Sunde opfere, wie im alten Testament. Denn der ganze Mißbrauch der 
Messen und päbstlichen Gottesdienst ist nirgend herkommen, denn daß sie 
haben wollen den Mosis Ceremonien nachfolgen und haben es nicht 
verstanden, daß das neue Testament mit andern Sachen umgehet und daß 
solche äußerliche Ceremonien, ob man sie zu Kinderzucht braucht, sollen 
ihr Maß haben. 
 They also quote the Epistle to the Hebrews (5:1), “Every high 
priest chosen from among men is appointed to act on behalf of men in 
relation to God, to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins.” From this they 
conclude that since the New Testament has priests and high priests, it must 
also have some sort of sacrifice for sins. This is a very convincing 
argument for the ignorant, especially when the pomp of the Old Testament 
priesthood [the garments of Aaron, since in the Old Testament there were 
many ornaments of gold, silver, and purple] and sacrifices is spread before 
their eyes. The analogy deceives them, and they think that we should have 
                                                 
142 A variant in the text of the Latin makes the last phrase after quam read:  leviticae 
politiae male intellectae (“false zeal in behalf of the misunderstood Levitical polity”) (BKS, 365, Triglotta, 
403; confer K-W, 268, “false zeal arising from a misinterpretation of the Levitical order”). 
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some ceremony or sacrifice for sins, just the Old Testament did. The 
services of the Mass and the rest of the papal order are nothing but a 
misinterpretation of the Levitical order. [They have not understood that 
the New Testament is occupied with other matters, and that, if such 
ceremonies are used for the training of the young, a limit must be fixed for 
them.]143  
 
Note well how the Reformers said this particular argument (locus!) by analogy is 
convincing for “the ignorant” (imperitos; Ungelhrte und Unerfahrene). Next, the 
Reformers discuss their opponents’ twisting passages from Hebrews and the proper 
understanding of those passages and the Epistle.144 Then, on the basis of the correct 
understanding of the passages, the Reformers turn the argument to support their own 
position. 
 Cum igitur in veteri testamento sacrificia non mererentur 
reconciliationem nisi similitudine quadam, (merebantur enim 
reconciliationem politicam,) sed significarent venturum sacrificium: 
sequitur unicum esse sacrificium Christi, applicatum pro aliorum peccatis. 
Nullum igitur reliquum est in novo testamento sacrificium applicandum 
pro peccatis aliorum praeter unum Christi sacrificium in cruce. 
 So nu im alten Testament durch die Opfer niemands hat erlangt 
Vergebung der Sunde, denn allein sie haben bedeut das einige Opfer 
Christi: so folget, daß allein ein einiges Opfer ist, nämlich Christus, 
welcher für aller Welt Sunde bezahlt und gnug getan hat. Derhalben ist im 
neuen Testament fürder auch kein ander Opfer zu machen, dadurch die 
Sunde bezahlet werden, denn allein der einige Tod Christi, so am Kreuz 
einmal geopfert ist.  
 The Old Testament sacrifices, therefore, did not merit 
reconciliation—unless by a analogy, since they merited civil 
reconciliation—but only symbolized the coming sacrifice. From this it 
follows that only the sacrifice of Christ can be valid for the sins of others, 
and there is no other sacrifice left in the New Testament except the one 
sacrifice of Christ on the cross.145 
                                                 
143 Ap XXIV:52, BKS, 364-365. (The English translations of the German additions are provided in 
square brackets as from the Triglotta, 403.)  
144 Ap XXIV:53-55, which was previously discussed briefly above at n.54, p.114. 
145 Ap XXIV:56, BKS, 366; Tappert, 259-260. The following paragraph continues to discuss this 




Again the overriding general or universal principle of justification only by faith in the 
merits of Christ—what is essentially a central part of the analogy of faith for the 
Reformers—affects how other particulars are understood and thus can function in 
analogies purportedly based on them. Also again, the Reformers, inductively reasoning 
by analogy, have successfully turned their opponents’ argument in favor of the 
Reformers’ own position. At the same time they acknowledge the power of reasoning by 
analogy, especially in the case of non-experts, and so make use of it themselves. 
Summary of “analogy” use 
 The earlier and later Reformers thus in The Book of Concord show evidence of 
reasoning inductively by analogy on a wide variety of loci, though to a somewhat lesser 
extent than they show evidence of reasoning inductively by example. A greater number 
of the uses of analogy are in Melanchthon’s Apology of the Augsburg Confession, but 
such may simply be due to it being the longest of the works in The Book of Concord. 
None of the medieval controversies involving analogy arises in The Book of Concord, 
and the Reformers do not follow Duns Scotus in rejecting analogy. Instead, common 
people are expected to be able to use analogy in understanding God’s will for their own 
lives and in understanding the Reformers’ arguments for their own positions and their 
arguments against their opponents’ positions. The “analogy of the Christian faith” is an 
important principle produced by the sure and clear (certas et claras) passages of the 
Word of God, which analogy then has normative force, along with The Book of 
Concord’s individual works, for interpreting other passages of Holy Scripture and 
permitting or prohibiting particular expressions of the faith (some including philosophical 
terminology), as in the cases of Original Sin and Free Will, respectively. Analogy has its 
limits for the Reformers, and, while they object to its use by their opponents in 
minimizing Christ’s presence in His Supper, the Reformers in other cases, in keeping 
with the tactic Aristotle discussed, attack the degree of analogy or the inducted 
conclusion, especially when the conclusion goes against the chief article of the faith. 
And, in still other cases, the Reformers take the analogies their opponents use and turn 
them to support the Reformers’ own positions. The Reformers are quick to attack their 
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opponents’ analogies and use analogy for themselves because they recognize its power 
for the non-experts. 
Chapter III summary 
 The Reformers use the inductive methods both of reasoning by example and of 
reasoning by analogy. Given the nature of the works contained in The Book of Concord 
as apologetic (offering a defense of the faith), at some level telling whether the use of 
these methods of reasoning is strictly dialectical or rhetorical is impossible. In fact, the 
use of these methods is probably both dialectical and rhetorical, even as Aristotle 
recognized that all people use both dialectics and rhetoric. The Reformers, earlier and 
later ones, use both example and analogy similarly, both in support of their own positions 
and against those of their opponents, and on wide-ranging loci.146 The Reformers saw as 
especially damaging to their opponents’ positions the lack of example, essentially 
equivalent to a command or promise from Scripture. When their opponents did offer an 
example or analogy, the Reformers countered in an Aristotelian manner, and in many 
cases the Reformers also turned their opponents’ arguments in their favor. The Reformers 
generally did not denigrate these inductive methods but recognized their power, 
especially on those who are not formally trained in logic or theology. In fact, the 
Reformers can be understood to see inductive reasoning as a necessary part of learning 
and recognizing God’s grace (a necessity that can also be said of deduction, as will be 
seen below). The Reformers used these inductive methods to their advantage, at no place 
explicitly breaking with the preceding traditions of their use. Both of the inductive 
methods work from the particular examples to the universal principles, thus providing 
universal principles from which deductive reasoning operates. Such universal principles 
included the analogy of faith (in some ways like the example of the church or the analogy 
                                                 
146 Although the use of example and analogy might be said to be more frequent on controversial 
loci such may be due to the more extended treatment of these loci and possibly also to the opponents’ 
bringing up a particular example or analogy and thereby making the Reformers address it. In the case of 
example, anyway, there was a great deal of overlap between the loci where the Reformers used example to 
support their positions and the loci where the Reformers used example against their opponents’ positions. 
Still, many of the Reformers’ uses against their opponents’ positions did come at the loci of the so-called 
“Articles about Matters in Dispute”. 
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of the word of God and including the Reformers own writings), justification by faith, and 
Christian liberty. As with Aristotle, so, too, with the Reformers the line is not always 
perfectly clear between example and analogy, nor is the line always clear between 
induction and deduction, to which attention now turns in Chapter IV.147 
                                                 
147 To some extent, a theologian might argue that the actual content of the faith will come before 
the individual passages can be closely considered. For example, while the analogy of faith or of Scripture is 
in theory the sum total of all the clear passages of Holy Scripture, an individual believer brought to faith by 
the Holy Spirit working through the Word of God is not necessarily going to read all the particular clear 
passages and inductively conclude the analogy of faith, even though to a greater or lesser degree those very 
passages led the believer to the universal principle. Rather, the individual believer will more likely come to 





Use of Deductive Argumentation 
Hence if anyone so sets forth this teaching concerning God’s gracious 
election that sorrowing Christians can find no comfort in it but are driven 
to despair, or when impenitent sinners are strengthened in their malice, 
then it is clearly evident that this teaching is not being set forth according 
to the Word and will of God but according to reason and the suggestion of 
the wicked devil. . . . it is certain that any interpretation of the Scriptures 
which weakens or even removes this comfort and hope is contrary to the 
Holy Spirit’s will and intent. We shall abide by this simple, direct, and 
useful exposition which is permanently and well grounded in God’s 
revealed will, we shall avoid and flee as abstruse and specious questions 
and disputations, and we reject and condemn all those things which are 
contrary to these true, simple, and useful expositions. 
 —Solid Declaration XI:91-93 
Chapter III gave evidence of the authors of the works contained in The Book of Concord 
making use of inductive reasoning within certain limits, and this Chapter will similarly 
give evidence of the use of deductive reasoning, again within certain limits. Given the 
authors’ positive second-order regard for logic, which was seen in Chapter II, there is 
little surprise that the authors also make supra-sentential use of philosophy by reasoning 
deductively in the forms of syllogistic arguments. While some elements of such 
deductive reasoning have already been seen, this Chapter examines the Reformers’ 
deductive reasoning more closely by consideration of the philosophical background of 
syllogisms; of Melanchthon’s method regarding “sophistries”; of expressions, formulae, 
and propositions; and of passages from The Book of Concord that more or less make 
formal syllogistic arguments, making observations about their use along the way.  
Philosophical background of syllogisms 
 To have a better understanding of The Book of Concord’s use of the deductive 
method in the form of syllogistic arguments, an overview of the syllogism and its 
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philosophical background is necessary.1 By a general defiinition, a  
(syllogism) is “a valid deductive argument having two premises and a conclusion”, 
although the term “syllogism” can be applied more narrowly to what others might call a 
pure “categorical syllogism”, cases “where both premises and the conclusion are 
categorical propositions which have between them three, and only three, terms.”2 
Categorical propositions have both quantity (that is, they are universal or particular) and 
quality (that is, they are affirmative or negative). Moreover, the three terms themselves 
have technical terms and conventional general placement in the syllogism, with further 
conventions regarding placement within the particular premises. Consider the following 
usual example. 
(Major premise) All human beings (middle term or “M”) are mortal (predicate or “P”). 
(Minor premise) Socrates (subject or “S”) is a human being (M). 
(Conclusion) Socrates (S) is mortal (P).3 
Each premise contributes one term to the conclusion and shares a common term with the 
other premise. The major premise comes first and contributes the predicate (or “major 
term”, in this case “is mortal”) to the conclusion, and the minor premise comes second 
and contributes the subject (or “minor term”, in this case “Socrates”) to the conclusion. 
The shared term that does not appear in the conclusion is the “middle term” (in this case, 
“human being”).4 
 That categorical propositions have both quantity and quality was noted above, and 
those aspects relate to the distribution of the subject or predicate of the individual 
                                                 
1 Much of the background in this section came to medieval students through the sixth-century 
“Christian philosopher” Boethius and through those commenting on him, until works such as Aristotle’s 
Prior Analytics were “rediscovered” (details follow in the text). Melanchthon’s logic textbooks, such as the 
second edition of 1528 and the third edition of 1547, naturally included the basics of syllogisms 
(Melanchthon, De dialectica libri quatuor, 112-136; CR 13:595-611). 
2 “Syllogism,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1972), 5:75-76. For trouble translating Aristotle’s use of the word with our word “syllogism”, 
see Smith, “Logic,” 30. Aside from categorical propositions (consisting of subject, copula, and predicate), 
there are also molecular ones (consisting of a pair of propositions connected by a term from a list that 
usually included such connectors as “and”, “or”, and “if”). See, for example, Alexander Broadie, 
Introduction to Medieval Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 15-16. 
3 Though the example given is the usual example of a syllogism, there are reasons why it is not 
particularly Aristotelian (Robinson, Aristotle in Outline, 33). 
4 “Syllogism,” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 368-369. 
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proposition. The medieval notion of “distribution” refers to whether a term refers to all or 
part of a class or set of things. The quantity determines the distribution of the 
proposition’s subject, and the quality determines the distribution of the proposition’s 
predicate. If a proposition is universal, its subject is distributed (for example, “All human 
beings are mortal”), otherwise it is not. If a proposition is negative, its predicate is 
distributed (for example, “Some human beings are not lawyers”), otherwise it is not. 
Thus, propositions can have both subject and predicate distributed (for example, “No 
human beings are trustworthy”), one or the other (as in the previous examples), or neither 
(for example, “Some human beings are sick”). For a syllogism to be valid, the middle 
term must be distributed in at least one premise, and, if either term is distributed in the 
conclusion, it must be distributed in the premises.5  
 Syllogisms are generally classified in two ways: according to the figure of the 
syllogism and the validity of the combined forms of the premises and conclusion. First, 
the location of the middle term relative to the subject or predicate in the corresponding 
premises leads to the classification of syllogisms according to the four “figures” shown in 
Table 2 (the conclusion is the same in every case). Second, the propositions, both 
premises and conclusion, are distinguished as follows, according to whether they affirm 
or negate something about universals or particulars. 
                                                 
5 Daniel Bonevac, Simple Logic, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Austin: Harcourt Brace College 
Publishers, 1999), 198-200; Copi and Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 186-188. 
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Table 3 gives types and examples of the four kinds of propositions.6 The proposition type 
of the major premise, minor premise, and conclusion taken together produce a three-letter 
type for the syllogism. Of the 256 possible combinations of figures and propositions, only 
15 are generally regarded as valid (that is, the form is such that, if the two premises are 
true, the conclusion is taken as true, based on the form of the syllogism alone). The three-
letter types of those valid forms, or “moods”, are known by names that use the 
corresponding three vowels and have consonants that indicate how the form might be 
reduced to the first figure, which figure, at least for Aristotle, had what Henrik Lagerlund 
calls “an axiomatic character”. Table 4 lists, according to the four figures, the names for 
the moods of syllogisms generally regarded as valid in medieval times and still regarded 
as valid today.7 
                                                 
6 Where the use of letters to stand for subjects and predicates in propositions goes back to 
Aristotle, the use of the letters to designate the types of propositions dates from medieval times (Smith, 
“Logic,” 34). “A” and “I” are the first vowels of affirmo, and “E” and “O” are the vowels in nego (Broadie, 
Introduction to Medieval Logic, 64). 
 Where Aristotle formed his premises along the lines of “A belongs to all B”, Boethius is said to 
have changed the form to “All A is B” (see Lloyd, Aristotle, 116-117; Smith, “Logic,” 34). 
7 “Syllogism,” Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 368-369; Bonevac, Simple Logic, 182-183. With 
Bonevac, confer Copi and Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 217-247. As the sources detail, Aristotle held 
other moods to be valid, and the medievals, by not distinguishing the first and fourth figures (following 
Aristotle), apparently omitted others that are regarded as valid today. The table’s listing for Figure 4 
follows Bonevac and Copi; The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy’s listing is inexplicably inconsistent.  
 A verse dating back to 1200 helped medieval students memorize the valid moods (Bonevac, 
Simple Logic 185). 
 Bonevac writes that Aristotle did not distinguish between the first and fourth figures and did not 
distinguish between major and minor premises the way later logicians do. Bonevac gives the example of 
Peter of Spain as someone who regarded the first premise as the major premise, and Bonevac says John 
Philoponus in the sixth century was the first to connect the major premise with the conclusion of the 
predicate, although his definition reportedly did not become generally accepted until the 17th century. 
(Bonevac, Simple Logic, 185 n.1). But, compare Henrik Lagerlund (Medieval Theories of the Syllogism, 
2004, Metaphysics Research Lab, Available: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-syllogism, 2006 
February 2 2006), who ostensibly gives Aristotle’s Greek terms for the “major” and “minor” “extremes”, 
and Smith (“Logic,” 36) who says Aristotle called them major and minor premises and connected them 
with the predicate and subject of the conclusion (as well as the corresponding premises, at least in the first 
figure). Neither Lagerlund nor Smith cites a particular passage from Aristotle in reference to this particular 
claim. 
 In Aristotle’s Prior Analytics I.4, the following Greek words for the various parts of syllogisms do 
seem to be in use:  (“term”),  (“extreme”),  (“major”),  (“minor”),  
(“middle”), and  (“conclusion”) (APr. 26a4-30, Aristotle, “Prior Analytics,” trans. Hugh 
Tredennick, The Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962], 210-211; confer 
Aristotle, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Sixth Printing, with 
Corrections ed., 2 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995], I:42). 
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Table 2: Four “figures” of syllogisms 
Proposition Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 
Major premise M-P P-M M-P P-M 
Minor premise S-M S-M M-S M-S 




Table 3: Four “kinds” of propositions 
Identifier Type Example 
A universal affirmative All human beings are mortal. 
I particular affirmative Some human beings are sick 
E universal negative No human beings are trustworthy. 
O particular negative Some human beings are not lawyers. 
 
Table 4: Valid moods of syllogisms 
Figure 1 Barbara (AAA), Celarent (EAE), Darii (AII), Ferio (EIO) 
Figure 2 Cesare (EAE), Cambestres (AEE), Festino (EIO), Barocho (AOO) 
Figure 3 Disamis (IAI), Datisi (AII), Bocardo (OAO), Ferison (EIO) 
Figure 4 Camenes (AEE), Dimaris (IAI), Fresison (EIO) 
 
 While the scheme just outlined was not precisely followed by Aristotle or every 
philosopher since him, the system does in essence go back to Aristotle, although logic 
was certainly discussed before him.8 Historians frequently divide medieval logic into 
logica vetus (old logic) and logica nova (new logic), reflecting in part what ancient 
logical works from Aristotle were available. Old logic, from Boethius (c.480-525) to 
Abelard (1079-1142) relied on Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation (also called 
Propositions) and on Porphyry’s Isagogue (or Introduction) to Aristotle’s Categories.9 
                                                 
8 Aristotle himself recognized that, in contrast to rhetoric and other arts, he was the first to 
systematically treat of logic: “Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the 
work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. For the training given by 
the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the practice of Gorgias. For he used to hand out 
speeches in the form of question and answer, which each supposed would cover most of the arguments on 
either side. And therefore the teaching they gave their purpils was rapid but unsystematic. For they used to 
suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products … Moreover, on the 
subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of deduction we 
had absolutely nothing else of an earlier date to mention, but were kept at work for a long time in 
experimental researches.” (SE 34, 183b34-184b2, Aristotle, ed., Complete Works of Aristotle, I:314.) 
Confer Smith, “Logic,” 27, 64-65. 
9 One relevant note here on Boethius, Palmer traces various editions of his De Consolatione 
Philosophiae through northern European schools and vernacular texts, noting that the University of Erfurt, 
which Luther attended, called for a four-month lecture on the text (Nigel F. Palmer, "Latin and Vernacular 
in the Northern European Tradition of the De Consolatione Philosophiae," Boethius: His Life, Thought and 
Influence, ed. Margaret Gibson [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981], 380). 
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Although Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, which contains the development of his theory of the 
syllogism, was known at that time through secondary sources, it did not reappear until the 
middle of the twelfth century in the West. At first there was not much “new” about the 
new logic, which is dated from the late-twelfth century until the Renaissance. Medieval 
commentaries on the Prior Analytics did not add much to Aristotle’s systems, although 
they made some small changes and in some cases systematized it differently. Not until 
John Buridan in the mid-fourteenth century were there significant changes in how people 
understood logic. Notably, one of Luther’s teachers, Jodocus Trutfetter wrote a book 
based on the work of Buridan.10 
 Aristotle, as mentioned, took first-figure syllogisms essentially as self-evident and 
often would prove the other figures by reducing them to the first. To that end, Aristotle 
developed conversion rules, such as those for per accidens (accidental) and simpliciter 
(simple) conversions. Aristotle also proved the other figures by reduction ad impossibile 
(reduction to the impossible) and ekthesis (“explanation” or “exposition”). Medieval 
logicians generally followed Aristotle in these methods, although they simplified and 
refined Aristotle’s method.11 
 Those methods of practicing logic were passed down from one generation to the 
next in classrooms beginning in Latin schools and continuing up through universities.12 
                                                 
10 Lagerlund, Medieval Theories of the Syllogism. Confer Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” 75-
77. More specifically on Boethius, see Eleonore Stump, Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of 
Medieval Logic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). More specifically on the 14th-century, see 
Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic. 
11 Lagerlund, Medieval Theories of the Syllogism. Confer Smith, “Logic,” 37-39. 
 For other accessible overviews of Aristotle’s logic, see Lloyd, Aristotle, 116-122; Robinson, 
Aristotle in Outline, 30-42; and Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction, 46-52. 
12 By examining school textbooks and school regulations and curricula, Dilwyn Knox traces the 
late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century teaching of rhetoric in “Latin schools of German-speaking 
Protestant Europe” and found such instruction “responded to contemporary pedagogical exigencies”. In his 
study of Lutheran town of Krems, Knox found dialectic and rhetoric were taught in the last of five class 
levels, when students were more than thirteen years old. Knox claims school officials delayed rhetoric and 
dialectic until that point because they did not consider students to be rational enough prior to that age. Knox 
notes that the practice elsewhere was similar and that in some cases Melanchthon’s simplified rhetoric and 
his dialectic were used (longer, Knox says, than most scholars think). Theory was not as important as 
practice, Knox says, and the schools apparently put all the traditional exercises behind preparing the 
students to put dialectic and rhetoric into practice in such professions as ecclesiastical preachers. And, 
Knox says that, while available measures of the instruction’s success suggest it varied, the instruction was 
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Logic was one of the traditional seven liberal arts that was further broken down into two 
categories: the lower division trivium or arts of language, consisting of grammar, logic, 
rhetoric; and the upper division quadrivium or mathematical sciences, consisting of 
arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music.13 (Where Aristotle might have made a 
distinction between logic for demonstrations in proofs and logic for dialectical arguments 
“in debates and exchanges between persons”,14 dialectic in the broad sense is said to have 
been understood as logic until the 13th-century.15) Where initially instruction centered on 
Aristotle’s texts and Porphyry’s Isagogue, other manuals or textbooks for use in logic 
instruction were soon produced.16 Charles B. Schmitt gives three reasons for textbooks 
replacing Aristotle’s own works. 
(1) a dissastisfaction with the philosophical content of the works; (2) a 
realisation that Aristotle’s mode of exposition was not ideal for 
pedagogical purposes; and (3) a recognition that, even if Aristotelian 
philosophy was valid, it did not cover all areas of knowledge it was 
desirable to include.17 
A transitional stage from Aristotle’s own works to such textbooks provided an 
introduction to the texts and commentary on the texts. For example, Jacques Lefèvre 
d’Étaples’ Introductiones exposed Northern Europe to Italy’s humanistic approach to 
Aristotle.18 Despite some expressed hostility to Aristotle, his philosophy nevertheless 
became foundational to Lutheran education as put forth by Melanchthon.19 Schmitt writes 
that Melanchthon “set the trend in textbooks and expositions”.20  
                                                                                                                                                 
definitely taken seriously. (Dilwyn Knox, “Order, Reason and Oratory: Rhetoric in Protestant Latin 
Schools,” Renaissance Rhetoric, ed. Peter Mack [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994].) 
13 See, for examples, Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” 73; Broadie, Introduction to Medieval 
Logic, 1. 
14 Smith, “Logic,” 28. 
15 Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” 79. Confer Stump, Dialectic and Its Place, 2-3. 
16 Charles B. Schmitt, “The Rise of the Philosophical Textbook,” The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler and Jill Kraye (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 792-793. 
17 Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 793. 
18 Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 795.  
19 Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 797. 
20 Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 797. 
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 How much of a role Aristotle and the preceding tradition played in Melanchthon’s 
textbooks depended on the topic. In the case of his 1549 Initia doctrinae physicae, 
Melanchthon is said to have based his work solidly on Aristotle, rejecting “the 
cavillationes of late medieval scholasticism”. Melanchthon’s 1553 Liber de anima is said 
notably to have relied on the Greek text of Aristotle’s work, quoting heavily in Greek, 
and to base the discussion of the immortality of the soul more on Scripture than on the 
preceeding 300 years’ worth of philosophical writings. In his 1538 Philosophiae moralis 
epitome and 1550 Ethicae doctrinae elementa, Melanchthon combined Aristotelian and 
Christian content, each with its respective area of independence. Moreover, each book 
took what can be called catechetical form, with questions framing the discussion.21 
 More relevant here are Melanchthon’s works on rhetoric and dialectics, or logic. 
The first editions of Melanchthon’s textbooks on those topics came first, perhaps in part 
due to Melanchthon’s understanding that rhetoric and dialectics aided in the 
understanding of Scripture. That purpose central to the Reformation’s cause may be why 
those works also went through dozens of printings.22 Significantly, the later editions of 
                                                 
21 Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 797-798. Confer Kusukawa, “Lutheran Method,” 350-351. 
Knox, however, says Melanchthon’s rhetoric and dialectic textbooks were not initially catechetical but 
were only made so later by his students, sometimes with Melanchthon’s expressed permission (Knox, 
“Order, Reason and Oratory,” 70).  
 On Melanchthon’s philosophical books, confer Kusukawa, “Uses of Philosophy in Reformation 
Thought”; she comments, “Melanchthon’s philosophy as set forth in his textbooks seems like an odd 
mixture of humanist learning and traditional scholastic ideas” (Sachiko Kusukawa, “Lutheran uses of 
Aristotle: a comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon,” Philosophy in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle, eds. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa 
[Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999], 146). 
 Schmitt, in a final comment on the elementary nature of some of the period’s philosophical 
textbooks makes mention of a 1599 work of John Case (c.1540-1600) with a significant title: Ancilla 
philosophiae (Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 804.) Case’s works were reportedly often reprinted in 
Germany. 
22 Kusukawa, “Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought,” 144-145. Kusukawa notes: 
“Melanchthon’s Compendiaria dialectices ratio went through 22 imprints between 1520 and 1545; De 
rhetorica 12 imprints between 1519 and 1537; Institutiones rhetoricae 24 imprints between 1519 and 1533; 
Elementa rhetorices 36 imprints between 1529 and 1599; Dialectica/De dialectica libri quatuor 40 
imprints between 1525 and 1544; Erotemata dialectices, 23 imprints, between 1547 and 1560” (Kusukawa, 
“Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought,” 145 n.7; Kusukawa cites Ralph A. Keen, A Checklist of 
Melanchthon Imprints Through 1560 [St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1988]). Confer Jardine, 
who writes of the dialectic texts: “Between 1520 and the turn of the century these went through a 
staggering ninety-one editions” (Jardine, “Humanism and the teaching of logic,” 801; Jardine cites Wilhelm 
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Erotemata dialectices were increasingly textbooks on Aristotelian logic and treated 
syllogisms more extensively.23 Given human beings’ fallen state, Melanchthon denied 
philosophy the roles of discovering the Gospel message and affirming theological 
doctrine’s truth, though he allowed philosophy to confirm God’s providential plan. 
Similarly, certainty gained from syllogisms was distinct from certainty that believers had 
from divine revelation.24 Still, Melanchthon could put philosophy to work in the defense 
of the Gospel.25 Sachiko Kusukawa summarizes the matter this way: 
Melanchthon had also shown how philosophy, as a universal knowledge 
(i.e. not specific to faith) could be used to defend points that were 
perceived (by him) to be crucial to the survival of Luther’s cause. Those 
points had become crucial, not as logical extensions of Luther’s ideas, but 
for historical reasons, as Catholics and other Protestants developed their 
own positions that seemed to be wrong-headed or downright pernicious.26 
Just how Melanchthon put philosophy to work in that Catholic-Protestant context is seen 
in this chapter.27 
                                                                                                                                                 
Risse, Bibliographia Logica: Verzeichnis der Druckschriften zur Logik mit Angabe ihrer Fundorte [Band 1. 
1472-1800], Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965]). 
23 Kusukawa, “Lutheran Method,” 346-347. 
24 Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses of Aristotle,” 145-147. 
25 Kusukawa cites Melanchthon’s 1545 charge to the Wittenberg philosophy faculty: “since this 
philosophical assembly should also be a part of the Church of God, we wish all who are received into this 
college to embrace the pure teaching of the Gospel which our church teaches unanimously and univocally 
with the universal church of God. They should recognise God and His Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and teach 
philosophy in such a way that they do not corrupt the teaching of the Gospel nor with curiosity or 
obtuseness, either sow, prove or defend abusive and prophane opinions against God…” (Kusukawa, 
“Lutheran Method,” 351; Kusukawa cites Urkundenbuch der Universität Wittenberg, Teil 1. [1502-1611], 
ed. Walter Friedensburg [Magdeburg: Selbstverl. der Historischen Kommission, 1926], 268.) 
26 Kusukawa, “Lutheran Uses of Aristotle,” 147. 
27 Unlike Melanchthon, Luther did not write a systematic treatment of logic. Although, as has been 
seen, Luther did have things to say about logic. Considering Luther’s practice, Knuuttila notes that, while 
Luther did not hold all the principles of philosophy to be true in theology, Luther nevertheless used logic in 
theology, although he denied “logical consequences priority to revealed truths”. Knuuttila concludes Luther 
gave philosophy (or, in this case, logic) no more than “a limited handmaid role in theology”, but Knuuttila 
also curiously says, “[Luther’s] view of logic and revelation was not influential among Lutherans.” (Simo 
Knuuttila, “The Question of the Validity of Logic in Late Medieval Thought,” The Medieval Heritage in 
Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory: 1400-1700, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen, 
The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy [Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2003], 134-137.) As will be seen, the evidence in The Book of Concord would not 
necessarily seem to bear out Knuuttila’s claim regarding Luther’s influence on other Lutherans. 
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 Melanchthon’s logical writings are said to have been influenced by the humanist 
logic of De inventione dialectica (1515) by Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485) and “to bear 
no trace of specifically medieval doctrines and developments”.28 Lisa Jardine 
characterizes Melanchthon’s work on logic as follows: 
His Erotemata dialectices (1547) preserves the key characteristics of 
Agricola’s and Valla’s dialectical approach. It provides an attenuated 
treatment of syllogistic, which is not allowed an important place in the text 
as a whole. Treatment of the predicables and categories is minimized 
(doing little more than familiarise the student with the terminology), 
demonstration gets cursory treatment, and there is a bare reference to the 
parva logicalia, the treatises presenting the innovations of terminist logic, 
with the statement that all the problems the parva logicalia are supposed 
to tackle are the province of the grammarian and do not arise at all if the 
precepts of grammar are carefully applied.29 
Jardine recognizes that the rise of humanist logic did not mean the complete fall of 
scholastic logic, and, amid claims that humanist dialectics “perverted the purpose of 
scholastic logic”, Jardine concludes that, at least at the time of her essay, the verdict is 
still out on whether humanism’s influence impoverished or enriched the scholastic logic 
tradition.30 
 A shift from ascertaining validity and truth of an argument to using an argument 
to persuade accompanied the decline of medieval logic and the rise of humanistic logic, 
                                                 
28 E. Jennifer Ashworth, “The eclipse of medieval logic,” The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 791. Confer Jardine, “Humanism and the teaching of logic,” and Lisa Jardine, 
“Humanistic Logic,” The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, eds. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin 
Skinner, Eckhard Kessler and Jill Kraye (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Kusukawa 
(“Lutheran Method,” 338) somewhat negatively refers to Jardine’s characterization elsewhere of 
Melanchthon’s dialectics as “hybrid” (Jardine, “Humanistic Logic,” 192), although Kusukawa herself 
writes of them as “a hybrid of Aristotelian demonstration and Ciceronian dialectics” and says that Jardine 
does not explicitly say that there. Kusukawa provides a listing of a number of essays on the potential 
sources of Melanchthon’s rhetoric and dialectics (Kusukawa, “Lutheran Method,” 339 n.7, 353 n.67). 
29 Jardine, “Humanism and the teaching of logic,” 801-802. “On the chronology of Melanchthon’s 
various texts on dialectic”, Jardine in n.23 on p.801 refers to Cesare Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell' 
umanesimo: "invenzione" e "metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo, I Fatti e le idee; saggi e biografie 
(Milano: Feltrinelli, 1968). Jardine’s later statement regarding the parva logicalia refers in n.24 on p.802 to 
the 1555 Wittenberg edition of the Erotemata dialectices. 
30 Jardine, “Humanism and the teaching of logic,” 807. The quoted phrase is from Jardine’s 
quotation (p.805) of E. Jennifer Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-medieval Period, Synthese 
Historical Library (Reidel, 1974), 9. 
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dated by at least one author around the time of the presentation of the Augsburg 
Confession in 1530.31 For Melanchthon rhetoric and dialectics were at least originally 
inseparable.32 He recognized two kinds of argument: necessary arguments and contingent 
arguments. The contingent arguments, called dialectical by Aristotle, were regarded as 
only probable, and the necessary arguments were certain and a part of demonstration, the 
use of which Melanchthon said should not be limited to arithmetic and geometry.33 
Especially in rhetoric’s use of dialectical reasoning not all of the premises of a syllogism 
would necessarily be expressed.34 Moreover, not every argument needed such a 
developed form; some were “easier” to refute, such as those to which attention now turns.  
Melanchthon’s method regarding “sophistries” 
 In the Preface to the Apology, Melanchthon describes his method: he has not 
taken up all his opponents’ sophistries (cavillationes; Ränke) for that “would be an 
endless task”, but rather he has dealt with “the main arguments” (praecipua argumenta; 
höchsten Gründe),35 some of which “main arguments” are thus nevertheless regarded as 
“sophistries”. Realize that as Melanchthon criticizes the specific arguments of his 
opponents he is at the same time impicitly affirming good argumentation. This section 
proceeds by observing Melanchthon’s method on a number of different loci. 
 The locus of Original Sin provides a good opportunity to survey a number of such 
references. At the outset, though Melanchthon can describe some of the central issues as 
“quibbles” (argutias; cavillatio) or “sophistry” (cavillatio; Deutungen), he says they are 
                                                 
31 Ashworth, “The eclipse of medieval logic,” 787, 790-791, 795-796. On the change itself, confer 
Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic, 139. 
32 Kusukawa, “Lutheran Method,” 338. 
33 Kusukawa, “Lutheran Method,” 344. 
34 Barnes points out that while English logic textbooks sometimes use the word “enthymeme” as a 
term for a deductive syllogism with one or more premises suppressed, Aristotle does not use the word that 
way, although Barns says Aristotle nevertheless “thinks that orators will and should suppress premisses in 
their arguments” (Barnes, “Rhetoric and poetics,” 269 n.14). 
35 Ap Preface:15, BKS, 143; Tappert, 99. Ränke is used elsewhere only at LC I:302 in reference to 
tricks of getting property one covets.  
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easy to refute (facillime refelli possit; wohl wissen zu verlegen).36 Further into the Article, 
after citing Bible passages to help make his point, Melanchthon says, “No quibbling can 
overthrow these proofs” (Haec testimonia nulla cavillatione everti possunt; da vermag 
kein Gloß, kein listiges Fündlein nichts wider; diese Sprüche werden alle Teufel, alle 
Menschen nicht mögen umstoßen).37 Then, at the conclusion of the Article, Melanchthon 
confidently states, “This, we believe, will satisfy His Imperial Majesty about the childish 
and trivial quibbling with which our opponents have slandered our article” (de puerilibus 
et frigidis cavillationibus, quibus adversarii articulum nostrum calumniati sunt; wider 
das lose, kindische, ungegründt Fürbringen der Widersacher, durch welch sie der unsern 
Artikel ohne Ursache ganz unbillig anfechten).38 Note how the German more literally 
says the opponents have afflicted the Article without reason. Melanchthon, however, in 
connection with Penitence admits, in reference to Scripture, that “nothing can be said so 
simply that some quibbler cannot pervert it” (Nihil tam simpliciter dicitur, quod non 
queat depravari cavillando; so klar kann man nichts reden oder schreiben, man kann ihm 
mit Worten ein ander Nasen machen).39  
                                                 
36 Ap II:2, Tappert, 100; BKS, 146. Ap II:2 has the only use in the German of cavillatio. The 
German Deutung is also used with this sense of a sophistical or uncertain “interpretation” in Ap VII/VIII:3 
and in Ap XXIV:35, which is discussed below at n.138, p.185. Elsewhere, the word is used positively of 
Old Testament symbolism (Ap XXIV:53; Tr 32), of the signification of Baptism (LC IV:73, 74, 78), and of 
the literal meaning of Christ’s words regarding His Supper (SD VII:48, 52, 113). 
37 Ap II:40, Tappert, 105; BKS, 155. The German Fündlein (“little find”) is also used in Ap 
XII:15, where it seems to be an addition to the text; in Ap XXIII:6 (discussed below at n.63); in LC I:227 
where it appears in connection with sins of deceptive stealing; in LC I:305 where it appears in connection 
with a man coveting another man’s wife and manipulating circumstances to obtain her, and in SA II:ii:8 
discussed below, n.41, p.207. The German Glosse (“gloss” or “annotation”) and the Latin gloss are used 
here and in AC XXII:3 (see below at n.54, p.213) and Ap IV:109 (see below at n.42, p.207) negatively of 
the Reformers’ opponents’ interpretations. However, the Reformers often use the words in reference to 
Gratian’s Decretals (AC XXV:12; Ap IV:282; Ap VII/VIII:11; Ap XII:113, 121) or commentaries on 
Lombard (Ap IV:65), though the word can refer to general published Kommente (Ap XI:9). Melanchthon 
can also use them to refer to explanations or solutions the Reformers offer (Ap IV:184), and Luther can use 
them to refer to the Apostolic Creed’s communio sanctorum as an appositive for sanctam ecclesiam 
catholicam (LC II:49). The authors of the Formula use them in regards to Luther’s interpretation (SD 
IV:27), his followers’ explanation (SD IV:28), and in contrast to a literal understanding (SD VIII:46). 
38 Ap II:51, Tappert, 106-107; BKS, 157. 
39 Ap XII:84, Tappert, 194; BKS, 269. The German’s reference to making “another nose” may 
reflect what is called a scholastic commonplace of authority being a “wax nose” being bent either direction 
without breaking, or the German’s reference may reflect a statement attributed (by, among others, former 
Cardinal Ratzinger) to medieval philosophers and theologians that “reason has a wax nose” that can be 
“pointed in any direction, if one is clever enough”.  
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 Melanchthon makes a similar statement regarding their confession of the Church 
in Augsburg Confession VII and VIII. 
Profecto verum est, quod aiunt: Nullum remedium esse adversus 
sycophantae morsum. Nihil tam circumspecte dici potest, ut calumniam 
evitare queat. Nos ob hanc ipsam causam adiecimus octavum articulum, 
ne quis existimaret nos segregare malos et hypocritas ab externa societate 
ecclesiae, aut adimere sacramentis efficaciam, quae per hypocritas aut 
malos administrantur. Itaque hic non est opus longa defensione adversus 
hanc calumniam. Satis nos purgat articulus octavus. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 James Luther Adams (“Conceptions of Natural Law from Troeltsch to Berman,” The Weightier 
Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and Religion, eds. John Jr. Witte and Frank S. Alexander, American 
Academy of Religion Studies in Religion [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988]), without any citation, attributes a 
statement about the Bible being a “wax nose” for Protestants to Spanish Cardinal Merry del Val (1865-
1930), which, even if demonstrable, is way too late to influence Melanchthon’s 1531 use here in the 
Apology. The Oxford English Dictionary says the “nose of wax” expression, presumably in English, 
referring to the “writhing of Scripture” was very common from 1580-1700 and goes back to Tyndale in 
1533 (OED, 20:10-13), which is also too late to influence Melanchthon’s use here and does not address its 
origin outside of English. 
 However, Alan of Lille (d. 1203) is early enough. In his De Fide catholica, book I, chapter 30, a 
chapter about proving the immortality of the human soul by Gentile philosophers, Lille writes, Sed quia 
auctoritas cereum habet nasum, id est in diversum potest flecti sensum, rationibus roborandum est (“But 
because authority has a wax nose, that is, is able to be bent into different senses, it ought to be reinforced 
by reason”) (Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne [Paris & Turnout: 
Migne, 1859-1963], 210:332-333 ). Writing about John Wycliffe (c.1330-1384) and commenting on the 
manipulation or management of authoritative passages from the Bible and other sources, Kantik Ghosh 
refers to Lille’s statement (Kantik Ghosh, The Wycliffite Heresy: Authority and the Interpretation of Texts, 
netLibrary ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 5-6). Lille is said to have held that reason 
could not understand the mystery of faith but nevertheless made use of reason. (Other published references 
to the “wax nose” expression also attribute it to Alan of Lille, for example, Gilles Rico, “‘Auctoritas 
cereum habet nasum’: Boethius, Aristotle, and the music of the spheres in the thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries” Citation and Authority in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Culture: Learning from 
the Learned, eds. Suzannah Clark and Elizabeth Eva Leach [Rochester, NY: Woodbridge, 2005].) The 
expression in some way may go back even further to Aristotle himself, who wrote in his Metaphysics that 
after transposition the nature of wax remains but not its form (Metaph. V[ ]:26, 1024a4-5; Barnes, 
II:1617). Aristotle’s Metaphysics also discusses the definitions of things that entail their matter, such as 
“snub” being “a concave nose” (Metaph. VI[ ]:1, 1025b28-1026a6; Barnes, II:1620) and whether only 
substance is definable (Metaph. VII[ ]:5, 1030b14-1031a14; Barnes, II:1627-1628). 
 The English word “sincere” is sometimes said to come from the Latin sine cera “without wax”, 
but the Oxford English Dictionary says “There is no probability” in that explanation (OED, 15:508). 
 The use in the Latin of depravo, depravare, depravavi, depravatus in Ap XII:84 is typical of the 
use of this word in the Latin originals and translations in The Book of Concord. The Reformers use the verb 
to write of their opponents twisting Scripture (Ap IV:253, 286; Ep VIII:39; SD VII:32, 56, 119), the 
Augsburg Confession (Ap II:1; SD VII:1), the teaching of repentance (Tr 44), principles of the faith (SD 
VII:88), the Church Fathers (Ap IV:380), the writings of Luther (SA Preface:5; SD VII:31), and people 
with their false teaching (SD II:46). The verb is also used to write of original sin’s corruption of the human 
nature (SA III:ii:4; Ep I:1, 25; SD I:2, 53, 60; SD II:17, 87), of human sin against the Eighth 
Commandment (LC I:262), and of humans perverting the means of grace (SD XI:41). Generally the 
German equivalent is verderben.  
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Da sehen wir, daß wahr ist, wie man sagt, daß man nicht so deutlich reden 
kann, böse Zungen könnens verkehren. Wir haben eben darum und aus 
dieser Ursach den achten Artikel dazu gesetzt, daß niemands darf 
Gedanken fassen, als wollten wir die Bösen und Heuchler von der 
äußerlichen Gesellschaft der Christen oder Kirchen absondern, oder als 
wäre unsere Meinung, daß die Sakrament, wenn sie durch Gottlose 
gereicht werden, ohne Kraft oder Wirkung sein. Darum darf diese falsche, 
unrechte Deutung keiner langen Antwort; der achte Artikel entschüldigt 
uns genugsam. 
 The saying is certainly true that there is no defense against the 
attack of slanderers. Nothing can be said so carefully that it can avoid 
misrepresentation. That was why we added the eighth article, to avoid the 
impression that we separate evil men and hypocrites from the outward 
fellowship of the church or deny efficacy to the sacraments which evil 
men or hypocrites administer. Thus we do not need to defend ourselves at 
any length against this slander. The eighth article exonerates us enough.40  
The criticism of the opponents in this case is evident: Melanchthon says they 
misrepresent the Reformers. And, Luther in the Smalcald Articles’ treatment of the Mass 
specifically points out how “false human opinion and imagination” (falschem 
Menschendunkel und Fundlin; opinioni et figmento humano) lacks “God’s Word” (ohne 
Gottes Wort; absque Verbo Dei).41 Thus, in a sense, the Reformers essentially equate 
“tricks”, “weak arguments”, “false interpretations”, and opinions without the support of 
Holy Scripture, and they have to deal with such on more than the locus of Original Sin.  
 Sophistries and quibbles are also raised at the related locus of Justification, where 
salvation only by faith in the merits of Christ is the primary focus. The Reformers see 
many passages attributing justification to faith and denying it to works, but the opponents 
are said to interpret passages dealing with justification by faith by way of “a piece of 
sophistry” (cavillum, ein sophistische Gloß), namely “faith fashioned by love” (fide 
formata), which can be attributed to Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologica.42 
                                                 
40 Ap VII/VIII:2-3, BKS, 234; Tappert, 168-169. Deutung is used to refer to things positively 
signified, such as Christ’s priesthood and passion and Baptism (Ap XXIV:53; Tr 32; LC IV:73, 74, and 
78), and of things needing no interpretation, such as Christ’s words regarding His body and blood (SD 
VII:48, 52, and 113). Regarding its use in Ap XXIV:35, see above at n.138, p.185. 
41 SA II:ii:8, Tappert, 294; BKS, 419. 
42 Ap IV:109 (107-110), BKS, 182-183; Tappert, 123. Summa theologica, II, 1, q.113, a.4 ad 1 
(BKS, 182 n.3; Tappert, 123 n.8; K-W, 138 n.116). (The Summa citations indicate the part, the questio, the 
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Melanchthon, however, makes a number of replies: that his opponents do not understand 
how mortal sin drives out faith, that the opponents’ position abolishes the Gospel and 
returns to the law, that the opponents leave forgiveness at best unsure, that true love 
cannot take place at all without forgiveness being granted first, and that the Reformers 
also teach that faith should be followed by love.43 The last portion of the Apology’s 
article on Justification (¶183-¶400, more than half of the article by the usual paragraph 
numbers) is generally given the subheading “Reply to the Opponents’ Arguments”, and 
we find in that section reference to a goodly number of sophistries.44 There, Melanchthon 
again addresses the “opponents’ quibble” based on James 2:19 about the wicked 
believing (Nam quod adversarii cavillantur multos impios ac diabolos etiam credere) and 
repeats in a different way his earlier statement that faith is more than idle knowledge.45 
More “quibbles” over the interpretation of a passage in the same section of this same 
locus center on Luke 17:10. Melanchthon presents the opponents’ arguments that if deeds 
are worthless faith must be more worthless and that though works are worthless to God 
they have value to people.46 Then Melanchthon declares: 
Videte, quam delectet adversarios puerile studium sophistices. Et 
quamquam hae ineptiae indignae sint, quae refutentur, tamen paucis 
respondebimus.  est vitiosum. 
Look how this childish sophistry delights our opponents! Though these 
absurdities do not deserve a refutation, we shall nevertheless give a brief 
answer. The argument is defective.47  
                                                                                                                                                 
question within that quaestio, the article, and then whether it is the response, objection, body, or end.) 
According to K-W, scholastic theologians using Aristotelian terms and concepts, held that assent to 
historical truths about Jesus, what they regarded as faith, was “”material” that needed to be given the proper 
“form” by love (K-W, 138 n.116). 
43 Ap IV:110-116, Tappert, 123. 
44 For more on the structure of Apology IV, see the discussion in the text below, beginning on 
p.232. 
45 Ap IV:303, Tappert, 154; BKS, 219. (The German version lacks a direct equivalent.) James 2:19 
reads, “Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble” (KJV). 
An earlier statement about faith being more than idle knowledge is in Apology IV:249, and there is another 
one in Ap IV:337 and Ap XII:45. 
46 Ap IV:335 (334-343), Tappert, 159. 
47 Ap IV:336, BKS, 225; Tappert, 159. (The German lacks this precise critique of the argument.)  
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Melanchthon then goes on to give counterarguments; first, that again faith is more than 
historical knowledge but trust in God’s promise, for which Melanchthon adduces another 
passage, Daniel 9:18. A second counterargument is Melanchthon’s attack on the 
opponents’ false argument by analogy.48 Melanchthon strikingly concludes this second 
counterargument and this particular matter of Luke 17:10 thusly: 
Sed adversarii suo more faciunt, contra fidei doctrinam detorquent 
sententias pro fide traditas. Verum haec spinosa reiiciamus ad scholas. Illa 
cavillatio plane puerilis est, cum interpretantur servos inutiles, quia opera 
Deo sint inutilia, nobis vero sint utilia. At Christus de ea utilitate loquitur, 
quae constituit nobis Deum debitorem gratiae. Quamquam alienum est hoc 
loco disputare de utili aut inutili. Nam servi inutiles significant 
insufficientes, quia nemo tantum timet, tantum diligit Deum, tantum credit 
Deo, quantum oportuit. Sed missas faciamus has frigidas cavillationes 
adversariorum, de quibus quid iudicaturi sint homines, si quando 
proferentur in lucem, facile possunt existimare viri prudentes. In verbis 
maxime planis et perspicuis repererunt rimam. At nemo non videt, in illo 
loco fiduciam nostrorum operum improbari. 
As usual, our opponents twist against faith statements made in support of 
faith. We leave these thorny questions to the schools. It is obviously a 
childish quibble to interpret “unworthy servants” as meaning that works 
are worthless to God but worth something to us. Christ is speaking of that 
worthiness whereby God obligates himself to bestow his grace upon us, 
though it is out of place here to discuss what is worthy or worthless. 
“Unworthy servants” means “insufficient servants,” since no one fears, 
loves, or trusts God as he ought. Let us have done with these petty 
quibbings of our opponents which intelligent men can easily judge when 
they are brought to light. Everyone can see that this passage condemns 
trust in our own works.49 
Thus again for Melanchthon the opponents’ quibbling or sophistical arguments do not 
need a major syllogism constructed against them but can be refuted by returning to the 
clear words of Holy Scripture, which the opponents are said to have obscured by their 
sophistry. Still, not all of the quibbling the opponents raised comes from simply 
distorting Scripture itself. 
                                                 
48 Confer the broader context of this passage quoted above at n.99, p.165. 
49 Ap IV:341-343, BKS, 226; Tappert, 159-160. (The German lacks a similar polemical statement.) 
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 A case where the Reformers apparently are accused of wrongly letting 
philosophical thinking influence their teaching is in the Apology’s article on the Church. 
There Melanchthon takes up the “quibble” that the Reformers think of the Church as 
“some Platonic republic” and refutes it by pointing to the Church’s visible marks. 
Sunt enim membra regni diaboli. Neque vero somniamus nos Platonicam 
civitatem, ut quidam impie cavillantur, sed dicimus existere hanc 
ecclesiam, videlicet vere credentes ac iustos sparsos per totum orbem. Et 
addimus notas: puram doctrinam evangelii et sacramenta. 
 We are not dreaming about some Platonic republic, as has been 
slanderously alleged, but we teach that this church actually exists, made 
up of true believers and righteous men scattered throughout the world. 
And we add its marks, the pure teaching of the Gospel and the 
sacraments.50  
The German here is less philosophical in nature. 
Und wir reden nicht von einer erdichteten Kirchen, die nirgend zu finden 
sei, sondern wir sagen und wissen fürwahr, daß diese Kirche, darinne 
Heiligen leben, wahrhaftig auf Erden ist und bleibet, nämlich daß etliche 
Gottes Kinder sind hin und wieder in aller Welt, in allerlei Königreichen, 
Inseln, Ländern, Städten vom Aufgang der Sonnen bis zum Niedergang, 
die Christum und das Evangelium recht erkennt haben, und sagen, 
dieselbige Kirche habe diese äußerliche Zeichen: das Predigtamt oder 
Evangelium und die Sakrament.  
We are speaking not of an imaginary Church, which is to be found 
nowhere; but we say and know certainly that this Church, wherein saints 
live, is and abides truly upon the Earth; namely, that there are many of 
God’s children here and there in all the world—in various kingdoms, 
islands, lands, and cities from the rising of the sun to its setting—who 
have recognized Christ and His Gospel as right and who say that this 
Church has the following outward marks: the preaching-office or Gospel 
and the Sacraments.51 
                                                 
50 Ap VII/VIII:20, BKS, 238; Tappert, 171. 
51 Ap VII/VIII:20, BKS, 238; this author’s translation based Triglotta, 233. The translation of the 
Latin puram doctrinam evangelii et sacramenta by the German das Predigtamt oder Evangelium und die 
Sakrament is notable, recalling AC V:1 where Predigamt eingesezt (“instituting the preaching office”) is 
equated to Evangelium und Sakrament geben (“providing the Gospel and Sacraments”) (BKS, 58). 
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The Confutation had not raised this specific “platonic” allegation against the Reformers, 
though the extent to which the church was hidden or revealed was clearly at issue.52 
                                                 
52 For the Confutation’s articles VII and VIII, see Reu, ed., The Augsburg Confession: A 
Collection of Sources, *353-*354; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 110-112.  
 The specific allegation that Luther and Lutherans thought of the Church as in Plato’s “Republic” 
goes back to Thomas Murner, a Strassburg Franciscan, humanist, and ardent Reformation opponent. In 
1520 Luther wrote three major tracts that prompted three separate reponses from Murner, to whom Luther 
finally responded in 1521, where Luther brought up the platonic accusation. The following traces back the 
history of the claim.  
 Luther’s previous response to the allegation is in his 1521 Auff das ubirchristlich, ubirgeystlich 
und ubirkunstlich buch Bocks Emszers zu Leypczik Antwortt D.M.L. Darynn auch Murnarrs synsz geselln 
dedacht wirt (WA 7:621-688), translated by Eric W. Gritsch and Ruth C. Gritsch as Answer to the 
hyperchristian, hyperspiritual, and hyperlearned book by Goat Emser in Leipzig—including some thoughts 
regarding his companion, the Fool Murner (AE 39:143-224). (See BKS 238 n.1’s reference to WA 
VII:8638 and K-W, 177 n.242’s reference to WA 7:683, 8-11 and AE 39:218. See also AE 39:140-141.) 
There, in the midst of responding to Murner about his use of reason without and over Scripture, Luther 
writes: Denn bloße rationes wil ich auch nit, sie seyn zu fawl unnd tügen nichts: das wil ich dir tzeygen an 
eyner, die dich die aller feynest gedaucht hatt. Da ich die Christliuch kirch ein geystlich vorsamlung 
genennet het, spottistu meyn, also wolt ich ein kirch bawen wie Plato ein statt, die nyndert were, Und lest 
dyr deyn zufall so hertzlich wol gefallen, al habstu es sast wol troffen. Spricht: were das nit ein feyne statt, 
ßo geystlich maurenn, geystlich turn, geystlich büchßen, geystlich roß unnd als geystlich were? Und ist 
deyn endtlich meynung, die Christlich kirch mug nit on leyplich statt, rawm und gutter bestehen. Antword 
ich, lieber Murnar: Sol lich umb der Ration willen die schrifft leugnen und dich ubir gott setzen? Warumb 
anttworttistu nit auff meyne sprüch? “I do not want your mere reasoning either. It is too spoiled, and worth 
nothing. This I shall show you in regard to one argument which you thought the very best: since I had 
called the Christian church a ‘spiritual assembly,’  you mocked me as though I wanted to build a church 
just as Plato built a city which is nowhere. And you are very pleased with your idea, thinking you had hit 
the mark. You say, ‘Would it not be a nice city, with spiritual walls, spiritual towers, spiritual cannons, 
spiritual horses, and everything spiritual?’ It is your final opinion that the Christian church cannot exist 
without a physical location, space, and goods.’ My answer, dear fool Murner, is: Should I deny Scripture 
for the sake of reason and put you above God? Why do you not respond to my passages?” (WA 7:6838-18; 
AE 39:218 [the formatting and placement of the quotation marks within the quotation is given as from the 
AE but could be debated.)  
 One can tell that Luther is not afraid to use reason and logic in the dispute, for there is other 
philosophical “content” in this response to Murner (see WA 7:681-682; AE 39:216); Luther nevertheless 
calls Murner to Scripture (WA 7:682-683; AE 39:217-218). But, Luther did not place reason over 
Scripture. Luther said Murner did not deal enough with Scripture and accused Murner of putting reason 
above Scripture, directing Murner lass deyn vornunfft schlaffen und tzeyg eynen buchstaben ynn der schrifft 
“let your reason sleep and show me a single letter of Scripture” (WA 7:683-684; AE 39:219). For his part, 
Luther responded both from Scripture and with a logical an argument ad absurdum, one characteristic of 
Luther’s typical earthy fashion. Finally, with a play on Murner’s name, Luther asked rhetorically, Sihistu 
schier, meyn Murnarr, was da sey mit blosser vornunfft on schrifft Theologissiern? “Do you see now, my 
fool Murner, what it means to do theology with mere reason and without Scripture?” (WA 7:683-684; AE 
39:218-219).  
 In WA 7:683 n.1, the WA editors suggest that Luther’s previous reference to ein geystlich 
vorsamlung (“a spiritual assembly”) that prompted Murner’s comment was in WA 6:407, Luther’s 1520 An 
den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung (WA 6:404-469), translated 
by Charles M. Jacobs (revised by James Atkinson) as To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation 
Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate (AE 44:115-217). As the title might suggest, however, 
Luther in that work and at the page reference given by the WA editors, talks more about der geystlich stand 
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(“the spiritual estate”) (confer AE 44:127). Moreover, although Murner is said to have raised the 
“Republic” allegation in multiple writings, Murner’s response to that particular work of Luther’s (Thomas 
Murner, “An den Großmechtigsten und Durchlüchtigsten adel tütscher nation das sye den christlichen 
glauben beschirmen, wyder den zerstörer des glaubes christi, Martinum luther einem Verfierer der 
Einfeltigen Christen,” An den grossmächtigsten und durchlauchtigsten Adel deutscher Nation, ed. Ernst 
Voss, Neudrucke deutscher Litteraturwerke des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts, No. 153 [Halle: Max 
Niemeyer, 1899] [“To the highest and most illustrious nobility of the German nation, that they guard the 
Christian faith, against the destroyer of the faith of Christ, Martin Luther, a seducer of the simple-minded 
Christians”]) does not appear to have the comment regarding Plato that Luther seems to be addressing. 
(Confer Thomas Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften (Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation), 
Thomas Murners Deutsche Schriften mit den Holzschnitten der Erstdrucke, ed. Wolfgang Pfeiffer-Belli, 2 
vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1927-1928) 7:59-117.) 
 On the other hand, Luther’s 1520 Von dem Bapstum zu Rome: wider den hochberumpten 
Romanisten zu Leipstzck (WA 6:285-324), translated by Eric W. Gritsch and Ruth C. Gritsch as On the 
Papacy in Rome against the Most Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig (AE 39:49-104), argues at some length 
that Christ’s Church is most properly not a physical but a spiritual community or assembly, based on the 
way Scripture most properly speaks about the Church in contrast to two other ways his opponents do (WA 
6:29235-3029, AE 39:65-76). Although the AE editors (AE 39:218 n.126) refer to AE 39:75, Luther writes 
there that the Church in einen glauben vorsamlet, geistlich unnd nit leyplich (“assembled in one faith, 
spiritual and not physical”; WA 6:30036-37, AE translation slightly modified). Before that passage, Luther 
uses both ein geistlich vorsamlung, the specific expression he uses in his response to Murner (WA 6:2965-6, 
AE 39:69), and equivalent phrases, such as ein vorsamlung ym geist (“an assembly in spirit”; WA 6:2936, 
AE 39:65) and geystlichenn gemeyne (“a spiritual community”; WA 6:29626-27, AE 39:68). However, 
Murner’s response to this work, Von dem babstentum das ist von der höchsten oberkeyt Christlichs glauben 
wyder Martinum Luther (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften [Prosaschriften gegen die 
Reformation], 7:3-55) does not contain the passage to which Luther in his response apparently refers. 
Murner does, however, discuss what he says is Luther’s claim that the Christian Church can only be taken 
spiritually (7:4518-472), and he does appear to accuse Luther of ignorantia logice (“ignorant logic”) (7:5015-
17). 
 Luther’s third work to which Murner responded was his 1520 Eyn Sermon von dem newen 
Testament. das ist von der heyliges Messe (WA 6:3530378), translated by Jeremiah J. Schindel (revised by 
E. Theodore Bachmann) as A Treatise on the New Testament, that is, The Holy Mass (AE 35:75-111). 
Although this Luther work does not seem to have a reference to the “spiritual community”, it appears to be 
Murner’s response to this particular work of Luther’s (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften 
(Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation) that has the specific comments regarding Plato that Luther seems to 
be addressing. The final section before the conclusion is titled Es ist kein geistliche kirch on leibliche 
ynwoner (“There is no spiritual church without physical inhabitants”) and there Murner writes: Du 
beschreibest dir eben ein meß und ein kirchen wie im Plato selbs ein stat beschreib und ein ebenbild 
formiert wy ein iede state sein solt. es ist aber noch nie kein lut seiner beschreibung erfunden worden. 
(“You write for yourself even a Mass and a Church how Plato himself describes a city and forms an image 
how every city should be. But there has never yet been one city founded according to his description.”) 
Further down Murner writes: So würt mir als dan billich für ein antwurt gang du in dein geistliche stat in 
geistliche thürn und schüß gegen den feinden geistliche büchsen und geistliche feuer und puluer und reit 
hin uff einem geistlichen roß uff einem geistlichen sattel. mit einem geistlichen zaum. (“So for me it is an 
easy answer if you went into your spiritual city in a spiritual door and shot against the enemy with spiritual 
guns and spiritual fires and powder and ride forth on a spiritual horse on a spiritual saddle with a spiritual 
bridle.”) (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften [Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation], 6:74.) The 
introduction to this Murner work in the collection of his writings notes that while it is specifically targeted 
to the particular Luther work Murner’s title suggests that Murner nevertheless had all three of the writings 




Melanchthon may have been thinking of previous allegations or anticipating his 
opponents’ responses, as he did in other cases. 
 Already in the Augsburg Confession and continuing in the Apology Melanchthon 
tried to pre-empt sophistries the opponents might raise. In the Augsburg Confession’s 
article on Faith and Good Works, Melanchthon pre-empted a “captious” or crafty 
objection to the interpretation of Paul (Et ne quis cavilletur a nobis novam Pauli 
interpretationem excogitari) by referring to Augustine and adding a citation of pseudo-
Ambrose in the Latin.53 Similarly in the Augsburg Confession’s article on Both Kinds in 
the Sacrament, anticipating the “captious” argument that Matthew 26:27 applies only to 
priests, the Reformers adduce 1 Corinthians 11:20ff. and refer to the precedent of the 
Fathers.54 In the Apology’s article on Justification Melanchthon anticipates that “Some 
sophist may quibble” (si quis sophista cavillatur) about righteousness being in the will 
and thus not of faith, “which is in the intellect”, and so he states that both “terrors of sin 
and death” and faith are in both intellect and will.55 In addition, Melanchthon uses 
justification understood forensically and as an imputation of someone else’s 
righteousness as an answer to the medieval voluntarist-intellectualist controversy.56 
Shortly thereafter in Apology IV, Melanchthon anticipates that “Someone may quibble” 
(Si quis hoc etiam cavilletur) that faith and hope are confused; to which concern 
Melanchthon answers first that hope and faith cannot be distinguished “as they are in idle 
scholastic speculations” (in scholis distrahunt otiosis cogitationibus), and then 
Melanchthon gives a way of distinguishing the two that does not conflict with present 
forgiveness by faith.57 The way Melanchthon anticipates and dismisses such “quibbling” 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Further discussion of “platonic” things are outside this dissertation’s focus on supra-sentential 
uses of philosophy, namely logic and argumentation. 
53 AC XX:12, Tappert, 42-43; BKS, 77. 
54 AC XXII:3, Tappert, 49-50; BKS, 85 (Et ne quis possit cavillari; Und damit niemand diese 
Worte anfechten und glossieren konne). 
55 Ap IV:304, Tappert, 154; BKS, 219. The German lacks this comment. 
56 Ap IV:304-307, Tappert, 154. 
57 Ap IV:312, Tappert, 155; BKS, 220. The German version lacks a direct equivalent, although it 
contains a statement regarding a distinction between faith and hope, although without the specific criticism 
of the nature of the opponents’ argument (see BKS, 2217-10). 
 
214 
with other passages or citations of the Fathers is significant, as is the absence of much of 
such technical discussion from the German translation of the Apology, though the 
terminology of formal syllogistic arguments is used in some cases even where the 
syllogisms themselves are not. 
Expressions, formulae, and propositions 
 Technical terminology is not completely absent from the German, however. In a 
number of places, chiefly—though not exclusively—in the Solid Declaration, the German 
and the Latin of the confessional writings refer to “propositions”, and sometimes the 
Latin word for “proposition” is itself used in the German, along with Rede(n) as a 
German translation of the term.58 The German nouns Rede(n) are used, likewise 
heavily—though again not exclusively—in the Formula of Concord, to refer to teaching, 
opinions, ideas or notions, statements or sayings, assertions or propositions for debate, 
expressions, and words. Latin equivalents include dictum, dicti; doctrina, doctrinae; 
phrasis, phrasis; sententia, sententiae; sermo, sermonis; verbum, verbi; vox, vocis; and 
the like. Some of the heaviest uses of the words come at the loci of Original Sin, Free 
Will, Good Works, and the Holy Supper of Christ. The German words are used in 
favorable contexts referring to the Reformers’ own statements and expressions and those 
of others (such as God, Paul, the Bible, and even Gerson), and the words are used in 
                                                 
58 The Latin proposition, propositionis is used in both the Latin and German of Ap IV:87; SD 
IV:2, 3, 15, 22, 24, 37, 39, 40; VII:38; and VIII:35. In SD IV:2 (first use) the Latin propositiones is used by 
and then translated in the German as Reden (“sayings”), and in SD IV:3 the German uses the Latin word 
and then translates it simply Rede (“sayings”). In SD IV:15 the German word is used first and then the 
Latin technical term is used, and in all the rest the Latin word is used alone in the German original (Ap 
IV:87; SD IV:22, 24, 37, 39, 40; VII:38; VIII:35 [where the Latin praedicationes is also used]). In SD IV, 
where the term is frequently used, one observes the movement from the Latin with the more elaborate 
German translation, to the simpler German translation, to the German term followed by the Latin term, and 
finally to the Latin term alone. There are just a few other places where the Latin term proposition, 
propositionis is used in the Latin where the German does not also use the Latin term: in one the meaning is 
different (AC Preface:9, referring to the Emperor’s edict), in others the German version does not closely 
follow the Latin text (Ap IV:80, 339) or the Latin version does not closely follow the German text (SD 
IV:23), in still others the German original uses Rede(n) alone (SD I:55; VII:36; VIII:45) or translates in a 
different way (SD IV:1, Worte und Art), and in others the Latin translation uses the term where the German 
original lacks a comparable noun (SD III:12; IV:2 [second use]).  
 English translations refer to “proposition(s)” in still other places, such as where the Latin uses 
sententia, sententiae and the German version is quite different (Ap Preface:9; II:1) or where sententiam is 
rendered by the German Spruch (Ap IV:69). 
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unfavorable contexts referring to the statements and expressions of the Reformers’ 
opponents and others (such as philosophers, modern Manicheans, Chrysostom, pseudo-
Basil, and the scholastics). Many of the uses of Rede(n) come in richly philosophical 
contexts. 
 A few of the uses of Rede(n) merit closer examination to highlight a few central 
points. That there is a close connection between expressions and doctrine is worth noting. 
In the Solid Declaration’s article on the Person of Christ, the authors identify the 
following tactic of their opponents. 
... etliche solche Wort und Reden arglüstig und boshaftig, die reine Lehr 
darmit verdächtig zu machen, wider ihr eigen Gewissen verkehret haben; 
... 
... quidam vocabula et phrases illas astute et malitiose falsa interpretatione, 
contra conscientiam suam, pervertere non dubitarunt, tantum, ut piam 
doctrinam suspicionibus iniquissimis gravarent. 
Some of our opponents, against their own conscience, have maliciously 
and wickedly twisted our words and terminology in this direction in order 
to cast suspicion on the pure doctrine.59 
The Reformers are not the only ones to take note of appropriate ways of speaking and 
make necessary corrections, as they indicate in the Augsburg Confession’s article on 
Monastic Vows. 
 Es hat auch Gerson in Vorzeiten den Irrtumb der Moniche von der 
Vollkommenheit gestraft und zeigt an, daß bei seinen Zeiten dieses eine 
neue Rede gewesen sei, daß das Klosterleben ein Stand der 
Vollkommenheit sein solle. 
 Et ante haec tempora reprehendit Gerson errorem monachorum de 
perfectione et testatur, suo tempore novam hanc vocem fuisse, quod vita 
monastica sit status perfectionis. 
 In former times Gerson censured the error of the monks concerning 
perfection and indicated that it was an innovation of his time to speak of 
monastic life as a state of perfection.60 
                                                 
59 SD VIII:63, BKS, 1037; Tappert, 603. 
60 AC XXVII:60, BKS, 118-119; Tappert, 80 (translation from the German). Compare, however, 
Ap XXVII:36, where the praise of Gerson’s correction seems to be a little more tongue-in-cheek. 
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In the foregoing case, the Reformers cite favorably the former way of speaking, but not 
everything that has been said before in every place can be so favorably cited, as is clear in 
the Apology’s article on Original Sin. 
Sed in scholis transtulerunt huc ex philosophia prorsus alienas sententias, 
quod propter passiones nec boni nec mali simus, nec laudemur nec 
vituperemur. Item nihil esse peccatum nisi voluntarium. Hae sententiae 
apud philosophos de civili iudicio dictae sunt, non de iudicio Dei. Nihilo 
prudentius assuunt et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco 
dictum, non reprehendimus; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum 
peccatum originis. Et tamen hae sententiae leguntur apud scholasticos, qui 
intempestive commiscent philosophicam seu civilem doctrinam de 
moribus cum evangelio. 
Aber die Sophisten in Schulen haben zu dieser Sache wider die klare 
öffentliche Schrift geredt und aus der Philosophie ihre eigen Träume und 
Sprüche erdichtet, sagen, daß wir umb der bösen Lüste willen weder bös 
noch gut, noch zu schelten noch zu loben sind. Item daß Lüste und 
Gedanken inwendig nicht Sünde sind, wenn ich nicht ganz drein 
verwillige. Dieselbigen Rede und Worte in der Philosophen Büchern sind 
zu verstehen von äusserlicher Ehrbarkeit für der Welt und auch 
äußerlicher Strafe für der Welt. Denn da ists wahr, wie die Juristen sagen: 
L. cogitationis, Gedanken sind zollfrei und straffrei. Aber Gott erforschet 
die Herzen, mit Gottes Gericht und Urteil ists anders. Also flicken sie auch 
an diese Sache andere ungereimte Sprüche, nämlich: Gottes Geschöpf und 
die Natur könne an ihr selbst nicht bös sein. Das fecht ich nicht an, wenn 
es irgend geredt wird, da es statt hat; aber dazu soll dieser Sprüch nicht 
angezogen werden, die Erbsünde gering zu machen. Und dieselbigen 
Sprüche der Sophisten haben viel unsägliches Schadens getan, durch 
welche sie die Philosophie und die Lehre, welche äusserlich Leben für der 
Welt belangend, vermischen mit dem Evangelio, und haben doch solchs 
nicht allein in der Schule gelehret, sondern auch öffentlich unverschämt 
vor dem Volk gepredigt. 
Here the scholastics have taken over from philosophy the totally foreign 
idea that because of our emotions we are neither good nor bad, neither to 
be praised nor condemned. Or they say that nothing is sin unless it is 
voluntary [inner desires and thoughts are not sins, if I do not altogether 
consent thereto]. The philosophers said this about the civil courts, not 
about the judgment of God. [For there it is true, as the jurists say, L. 
[presumably Lex] cogitationis, thoughts are exempt from custom and 
punishment. But God searches the hearts; in God’s court and judgment it 
is different.] It is no wiser to say that [God’s creature and] nature is not 
[cannot in itself be] evil. In its place we do not object to this statement, but 
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it is not right to twist it in order to minimize original sin. Yet these ideas 
appear in the scholastics, who improperly mingle philosophical and civil 
ethics with the Gospel.61 
On the same locus, the Solid Declaration indicates from where the right way to speak 
comes. 
 Was aber die Wörter und Weise zu reden anlanget, ist das Beste 
und Sicherste, daß man das Fürbild der gesunden Wort, wie in der heiligen 
Schrift und in den obgemelten Büchern von diesem Artikel geredet wird, 
brauche und behalte. 
 Es sollen auch aequivocationes vocabuIorum, das ist, die Wörter 
und Reden, so in mancherlei Vorstande gezogen und gebraucht werden, 
Wortgezänk zu vorhüten, fleißig und unterschiedlich erkläret werden. 
 Quod vero ad vocabula et phrases attinet, utilissimum est et 
tutissimum, ut forma sanorum verborum (quibus in hoc articulo 
explicando sacrae litterae et supra commemorata scripta publica et recepta 
utuntur) usurpetur et retineatur. 
 Sed et aequivocationes vocabulorum, ad cavendas  
diligenter et diserte sunt explicandae. 
 With specific reference to vocabulary and phraseology, however, 
the best and safest procedure is to use and keep the pattern of sound 
words, as the Holy Scriptures and the above-mentioned books use them in 
treating this article. In order to avoid all contentions about words, it is 
necessary to explain carefully and distinctly all equivocal terms, that is, 
words and formulas that have two or more accepted meanings in common 
use.62 
Not only do the words Rede and Reden figure prominently in discussions of the right way 
to speak, but, as is seen in the Apology’s article on the Marriage of Priests, the right way 
to speak itself is involved in forming the propositions central to philosophical 
disputations. The locus of the Marriage of Priests is one where in the Apology 
Melanchthon does not think necessary such a dispute—the philosophical nature of which 
is clearer in the following Latin and German than the English. 
 Aliae controversiae nostrae aliquam disputationem doctorum 
desiderant: in hac ita manifesta res est in utraque parte, ut nullam requirat 
                                                 
61 Ap II:43, BKS, 155-156; Tappert, 106. English translations of the German additions are 
provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 117. Confer the discussion of this passage above at n.221, 
p.81, where the quotation is extended and the German is given a translation of its own. 
62 SD I:50-51, BKS, 860; Tappert, 517. 
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disputationem. Tantum requirit iudicem virum bonum et timentem Dei. Et 
cum defendatur a nobis manifesta veritas, tamen adversarii calumnias 
quasdam architectati sunt ad cavillanda argumenta nostra.  
 Die andern Artikel unserer Confession, wiewohl sie gewiß 
gegründt, sind dennoch so klar nicht, daß sie nicht mit einem Schein 
möchten angefochten werden. Aber dieser Artikel ist so klar, daß er auf 
beiden Seiten gar nahe keiner Rede darf; allein wer ehrbar und 
gottfürchtig ist, der kann hie bald Richter sein, und wiewohl wir die 
öffentliche Wahrheit hie nun für uns haben, noch suchen die Widersacher 
Fündlin, unser Gründe etwas anzufechten. 
 Our other controversies call for some theological discussion, but in 
this one the situation is so clear that no discussion is necessary, only the 
judgment of any honest and God-fearing man. In the face of the clear truth 
we have advanced, our opponents have thought up some subterfuges to 
satirize our position.63 
Melanchthon goes on to make six specific replies to the opponents’ cavillanda in this 
place, where no propositions were needed. At the locus of Good Works, however, 
propositions that had been advanced were at the very center of the later controversy 
addressed by the Epitome. 
 Über die Lehr von guten Werken sein zweierlei Spaltungen in 
etlichen Kirchen entstanden.: 
 Erstlich haben sich etzliche Theologen über nachfolgenden Reden 
getrennet, da der eine 1. Teil geschrieben: Gute Werke seind nötig zur 
Seligkeit; es ist unmöglich ohne gute Werk selig zu werden. Item: Es ist 
niemals jemand ohne gute Werk selig worden. Der ander aber dagegen 
geschrieben: Gute Werk seind schädlich zur Seligkeit. 
 In doctrina de bonis operibus duae controversiae in quibusdam 
ecclesiis ortae sunt: 
 I. Primum schisma inter theologos quosdam factum est, cum alii 
assererent, bona opera necessaria esse ad salutem; impossibile esse salvari 
sine bonis operibus; et: neminem unquam sine bonis operibus salvatum 
esse; alii vero docerent bona opera ad salutem esse perniciosa. 
 Two controversies have arisen in some churches concerning the 
doctrine of good works: 
 1. The first division among some theologians was occasioned when 
one party asserted that good works are necessary to salvation; that it is 
impossible to be saved without good works; and that no one has ever been 
                                                 
63 Ap XXIII:6, BKS, 334; Tappert, 240. 
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saved without good works. The other party asserted that good works are 
detrimental to salvation.64 
Elsewhere in the Formula of Concord not the wording of the propositions but their 
meaning was in dispute, as in the Epitome’s article on the Lord’s Supper. 
 Zu Erklärung dieses Streits ist anfänglich zu merken, daß zweierlei 
Sakramentierer seien. Etzliche sein grobe Sakramentierer, welche mit 
teutschen klaren Worten fürgeben, wie sie im Herzen halten, daß im 
heiligen Abendmahl mehr nicht denn Brot und Wein gegenwärtig sei, 
ausgeteilet und mit dem Munde empfangen werde. Etzliche aber seind 
verschlagene und die allerschädlichste Sakramentierer, die zum Teil mit 
unsern Worten ganz scheinbar reden und fürgeben, sie glauben auch eine 
wahrhaftige Gegenwärtigkeit des wahrhaftigen, wesentlichen, lebendigen 
Leibes und Bluts Christi im H. Abendmahl, doch solches geschehe 
geistlich, durch den Glauben. Welche doch unter diesen scheinbaren 
Worten eben die erste grobe Meinung behalten, daß nämblich nichts denn 
Brot und Wein im heiligen Abendmahl gegenwärtig fei und mit dem 
Mund empfangen werde. 
 Ad solidam huius controversiae explicationem primum sciendum 
est duo esse Sacramentariorum genera. Quidam enim sunt Sacramentarii 
crassi admodum; hi perspicuis et claris verbis id aperte profitentur, quod 
corde sentiunt, quod videlicet in coena Domini nihil amplius quam panis 
et vinum sint praesentia ibique distribuantur et ore percipiantur. Alii autem 
sunt versuti et callidi et quidem omnium nocentissimi Sacramentarii; hi de 
negotio coenae dominicae loquentes ex parte nostris verbis splendide 
admodum utuntur et prae se ferunt, quod et ipsi veram praesentiam veri, 
substantialis atque vivi corporis et sanguinis Christi in sacra coena 
credant, eam tamen praesentiam et manducationem dicunt esse 
spiritualem, quae fiat fide. Et hi posteriores Sacramentarii sub his 
splendidis verbis eandem crassam, quam priores habent, opinionem 
occultant et retinent, quod videlicet praeter panem et vinum nihil amplius 
in coena Domini sit praesens et ore sumatur.  
 In order to explicate this controversy, it is necessary to mention, 
first of all, that there are two kinds of Sacramentarians. Some are crass 
Sacramentarians who set forth in clear German words what they believe in 
their hearts, namely, that in the Holy Supper only bread and wine are 
present, distributed, and received orally. Others, however, are subtle 
Sacramentarians, the most harmful kind, who in part talk our language 
                                                 
64 Ep IV:1-2, BKS, 786; Tappert, 475 (emphasis added). With the translation of Reden as 
“controversies, confer K-W, 497; compare “divisions” (Triglotta, 797). 
 Tappert surely errs by numbering the first paragraph reproduced “1”, so the number is printed in 
the text above more in keeping with the German original and its Latin translation. 
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very plausibly and claim to believe a true presence of the true, essential, 
and living body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper but assert that this 
takes place spiritually by faith. But under this plausible terminology they 
really retain the former crass opinion that in the Holy Supper nothing but 
bread and wine are present and received with the mouth.65  
The mention of the clear words as deutschen is significant. Premises are important, but 
how they are understood is also important.66 As is seen below, the Reformers can use 
premises in syllogisms.  
 That the Formula of Concord can be taken to be more concerned about the 
meaning of words and ways of speaking or arguing is not necessarily the result of a 
greater philosophical training of its authors; rather, that particular emphasis of the 
Formula is the result of its different nature and the different purpose it served. The very 
nature of the Formula is to comment on the Augsburg Confession and settle disputes 
about words. The Augsburg Confession set forth the clear doctrine against the errors of 
the Roman Catholics and argued for the legitimacy of the Lutherans’ confession. Once 
that confession more or less was granted standing by the civil government, others tried to 
come under its umbrella of legitimacy without necessarily believing, teaching, and 
confessing the same thing. The Formula thus has a greater emphasis on expressions and 
their meanings, although the content of the faith and its expression are both concerns for 
all of the works contained in The Book of Concord. And, they all show the same supra-
sentential uses of philosophy in the way that they proceed to argue. 
Arguing passages and observations 
 That the Reformers refer to “arguments” has been noted previously,67 and, before 
turning to a closer examination of the way the Reformers proceed in a formal argument, it 
is worth noting further their references to “arguments” and “arguing”. The Latin noun 
                                                 
65 Ep VII:3-4, BKS, 796-797; Tappert, 482. Though not a use of Rede or Reden in the German 
original, the quotation makes the point that the use of the words or expressions alone is not enough. 
66 Other than the seven uses of Rede and Reden just discussed, the others (including those noted 
above where proposition, propositionis is used in the Latin) are as follows: AC XX:7; XXIII:13; Ap 
XII:141; XX:9; XXVII:4; LC Long Preface:9 (twice); III:40; Ep II:15, 16 (twice); IV:9, 17; VII:25, 41; SD 
I:45, 51, 55; II:12, 46, 82, 86 (thrice); IV:2, 3, 14, 15, 36; VII:2, 7, 35, 36 (twice), 38, 45, 76 (twice), 127; 
VIII:45, 63; XI:1.  
67 See the reference to Ap Preface:15 above at n.35, p.204. 
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argumentum, argumenti is used some 35 times, chiefly in—but not limited to—the 
writings of Melanchthon, principally the Apology to the Augsburg Confession.68 The 
Latin deponent verb argumentor, argumentari, argumentatus sum is only used nine 
times, and all but one of those are in works by Melanchthon.69 Strikingly, in a number of 
places, in earlier and later documents, the German translation or German original uses 
essentially transliterated or borrowed Latin words, das Argument and argumentieren, 
sometimes with or without a German equivalent used alongside.70 German equivalents of 
the noun include der Grund, die Ränke, der Spruch, die Ursache;71 and German 
equivalents of the verb are sagen and schließen. Although at least one word that might be 
termed a synonym for “argue” is used more discriminately,72 the uses of these words are 
                                                 
68 Melanchthon’s original uses of this Latin noun are as follows: BOC Forward:18; AC XX:2; Ap 
Preface:6, 15; IV:84, 117, 182; XII:113; XXIII:2, 6, 62, 64, 66, 70; XXIV:10, 78; XXVII:10; Tr 24. The 
uses in the Latin translation of the Formula of Concord are SD II:8; VII:91 (twice), 92, 102, 103 (twice); 
VIII:2, 52, 56. 
 Other than LC IV:59, the other seven of the eight uses in the translations of the Catechisms of 
Luther seem to either be used in senses other than “argument” (SC Preface 23; LC Preface 8; I:68; III:83; 
IV:50) or be additions to the German text (LC I:69; III:4). Some of the uses in the Latin translations that 
have senses other than “argument” render the original German words Zeichen, Anzeichen, and abzeucht. 
 The Latin noun argumentatio, argumentationis is used only twice: Ap XX:12; SD VIII:52. 
69 Ap IV:42, 67, 75; XX:13; XXII:10; XXIV:58, 84: Tr 11; SD VII:55. 
70 The only places where the German uses Argument or argumentieren where the Latin does not 
are as follows: Ap IV:318 (rendering the Latin docent); Ap XXIII:64 (rendering rationem); and Ap XXIV:9 
(also rendering rationem). 
71 Ränke is only used in Ap Preface 15 (see above at n.35, p.204). 
72 The Latin deponent verb ratiocinor, ratiocinari, ratiocinatus sum (“compute, calculate; 
consider, deliberate; argue, infer, conclude” [Cassell's Latin Dictionary, ed. D. P. Simpson (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1968), 501.]) is used 17 times, all but one of which (Ap XXVII:20) are 
either critical of opponents’ faulty reasoning or indicating a way reasoning should not proceed. Similarly 
all but one of the uses (SD XI:55) are in the Apology, and 12 of those 16 are in the “Reply to the 
Opponents’ Arguments” subsection of the article on Justification. The remaining 15 uses are as follows: Ap 
IV:222 (twice), 226, 231, 235, 246, 253, 263, 337, 339, 357, 376; XX:12 (twice); XXIV:52. In some cases 
the German version uses the same word to translate ratiocinor that it used to translate argumentor (that is, 
schließen), in other cases the German version uses different words (that is, abnehmen, folgen, and 
hinzuflicken), and in still other cases the German version either expresses the thought altogether differently 
or lacks the paragraph completely. The negative references to the opponnents’ faulty reasoning from 
Scripture and the like should by no means be taken as critical of reasoning in general. 
 Adverbs that are used with ratiocinor in the foregoing passages are notable. For example, in Ap 
IV:235 the opponents are said to “argue indiscreetly” (Triglotta, 185 [Tappert doesn’t translate the passage 
literally]; BKS, 205, imprudenter ratiocinantur, schließen … nicht recht) and in Ap IV:253 the opponents 
are said to “infer shamelessly” (Tappert, 143; BKS, 210, impudenter ratiocinantur, hinzuflicken). Although 
imprudenter is used only in that passage of The Book of Concord, impudenter is used another ten times, 
most of which similarly speak of the reformer’s opponents: of the Confutation impudently blaspheming 
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not limited to the Reformers or their opponents or any particular author or loci. 
Nevertheless, a closer examination of several of the uses of “argument” and “argue” is 
productive. 
 Closer examination of several uses of the uses of argumentum, argumenti yields 
contextual synonyms and indications of what matters to the Reformers when it comes to 
“arguments”. The first use to be considered comes in the Apology at the locus of 
Monastic Vows, where Melanchthon gives another indication of his method in contrast to 
his opponents, while introducing four responses that follow in his text. Note well the 
convergence of vocabulary related to the method. 
 Ac operae pretium est audire, quomodo cavillentur nostras rationes 
et quid afferant ad muniendam suam causam. Ideo breviter percurremus 
pauca quaedam argumenta nostra, et diluemus in his obiter cavillationes 
adversariorum. Cum autem haec tota causa diligenter et copiose a Luthero 
tractata sit in libro, cui titulum fecit: De votis monasticis, volumus hic 
librum illum pro repetito habere.  
 Es will aber hie not sein anzuzeigen, wie sie doch unser Gründe 
anfechten, und was sie fürbringen, ihre Sache zu erhalten. Darum wollen 
wir kurz verlegen, was die Widersacher fürbringen, und so nu dieser 
Handel fleißig und reichlich gehandelt ist in dem Buch Doctoris Martini 
Von den Klostegelübden, so wollen wir dasselbige Buch hie als für 
erneuert und erholet achten. 
 It is worthwhile to hear how they twist our arguments, and what 
they adduce to support their case. Therefore we shall briefly run through a 
few of our arguments, and in passing we shall refute our opponents’ 
quibbles against them. Since Luther discussed this whole issue carefully 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Ap XX:2), of the monks and scholastics impudently fabricating (Ap XXIV:31), of the pope’s kingdom 
impudently profiting by abuses (Tr 43), of the monks impudently boasting about their perfect calling (LC 
I:197), of the papal rabble seducing people about their life (LC I:213), of their impudently indulging their 
lusts (LC I:214), and of the opponents impudently defending the error that a person’s faith enacts the real, 
physical presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper (SD VII:90). The remaining two uses, both in the Latin 
translation of Luther’s Large Catechism, refer to people in general sinning both against the Second 
Commandment by slandering the truth and God’s Word (LC I:55) and against the Eighth Commandment 
by acting like a knave by telling others things they cannot prove to be true (LC I:270). 
 Confer also above, n.4, p.92. 
 In English, noun “inference” (which is related to “infer”, the word the Triglotta often uses to 
translate ratiocinor, ratiocinari, ratiocinatus sum) first had a general sense before being used as a technical 
term in Logic, where its first use pertained to the conclusion of a deductive syllogism (“mediate 
inference”); later it was used to refer to conclusions from single propositions (“immediate inference”) and 
in induction (“inductive inference”), although different logicians restrict the term either to deduction or 
induction (OED, 7:924). 
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and fully in his book called Monastic Vows, we want to be interpreted here 
as reiterating that book.73 
Clarity in discussion is crucial, as Melanchthon points out in the Apology’s article on the 
Mass. 
 Et hic causae status est, de quo ita nobis admonendi sunt lectores, 
ut Aeschines admonebat iudices, ut, perinde ac pugiles de statu inter se 
certant, ita cum adversario dimicarent ipsi de statu controversiae, nec 
sinerent eum extra causam egredi. Ad eundem modum hic adversarii 
nostri cogendi sunt, ut de re proposita dicant. Et cognito controversiae 
statu facillima erit diiudicatio de argumentis in utraque parte. 
 Und das ist die Häuptfrage in dieser ganzen Sache, davon wöllen 
wir ein jeden christlichen Leser verwarnet haben, daß er den Widersachern 
genau darauf sehe, ob sie auch bei der Häuptfrage bleiben. Denn sie 
pflegen aus der Häuptsache viel vergebliche, ungereimte Umschweife zu 
machen. Denn wenn man gleich und ungewankt bei der Häuptfrage bleibt 
und nichts Fremdes einmenget, da ist desto leichter zu urteilen auf beiden 
Seiten. 
 We want to remind our readers of the real issue. Aeschines 
reminded the Jews [sic “judges”] that both parties in a controversy must 
deal only with the point at issue and not wander off into side issues, like 
wrestlers fighting for their position. In the same way our opponents should 
be forced to discuss the point at issue. Once the real issue of the 
controversy is clear, it will be easy to evaluate the arguments both sides 
have presented.74 
In the case of the Mass, as the following paragraph goes on to say, the central point 
relates to the chief locus of justification by faith. In the Forward to The Book of Concord, 
                                                 
73 Ap XXVII:10, BKS, 380; Tappert, 270. The Book of Concord in this place gives a “deutero-
confessional” status to Luther’s 1521 De votis monasticis iudicium (Aland #755; WA 8:573-669; translated 
by James Atkinson as Monastic Vows in AE 44:243-400), other writings of Luther and of others are 
elsewhere given similar status. This status to some extent singles out and elevates such writings of the 
Reformers above their other works and the works of others. Another example is Formula IX’s mention of 
Luther’s so-called Torgau Sermon, for which see Jayson S. Galler and Susanne Hafner, “Martin Luther: 
‘The Third Sermon, On Easter Day’,” Logia XII.3 (2003): 37. 
74 Ap XXIV:10, BKS, 352; Tappert, 251. On Tappert’s error in translation confer the Triglotta, 
387, and K-W, 259. Note that the German lacks the references to Aeschines. For the reference of 
Aeschines, see Ctesiphontem 206 (BKS, 352 n.1; Tappert, 251 n.6; K-W, 259 n.494). Aeschines was 
apparently an orator in Athens, a student of Socrates, and political opponent of Demosthenes; Aeschines is 
said to have accused Ctesiphon for illegally rewarding Demosthenes, and In Ctesiphontem is one of his 
three extant speeches. 
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the authors point to God’s Word as the preferred basis for argument, especially 
discussing the Holy Supper and Person of Christ. 
... do sie bei diesem Grund unangefochten bleiben, von andern Gründen 
nicht disputieren, sondern mit einfältigem Glauben bei den einfältigen 
Worten Christi vorharren, welches am sichersten und bei dem gemeinen 
Laien auch erbaulich, der diese disputation nicht ergreifen kann. Wann 
aber die Widersacher solchen unsern einfältigen Glauben und Verstand 
der Wort des Testaments Christi anfechten und als ein Unglauben schelten 
und uns vorwerfen, als sei unser einfältiger Verstand und Glaub wider die 
Artikel unsers christlichen Glaubens und demnach falsch und unrecht: 
solle durch wahrhaftige Erklärung der Artikel unsers christlichen 
Glaubens angezeigt und erwiesen werden, daß obgemelter unser 
einfältiger Verstand der Wort Christi denselben Artikeln nicht zuwider 
seie. 
 Et sane cum hoc fundamentum ab adversariis impugnatum non 
fuerit, de aliis probandi rationibus in hoc argumenti genere non 
contendent, sed in vera fidei simplicitate verbis apertissimis Christi 
firmiter insistent, quae ratio tutissima et erudiendis imperitis hominibus 
accommodatissima est; neque enim illi ea, quae de his rebus accuratius 
disputata sunt, intelligunt.  
 At vero cum illa assertio nostra et simplex verborum testamenti 
Christi sensus ab adversariis impugnatur, et veluti impius et rationibus 
verae fidei repugnans reiicitur, denique articulis Symboli Apostolici 
(praesertim de filii Dei incarnatione, ascensione in coelum et sessione ad 
dexteram omnipotentis virtutis et maiestatis Dei) contrarius et proinde 
etiam falsus esse contenditur: vera solidaque articulorum illorum 
interpretatione demonstrandum est, nostram illam sententiam nec a verbis 
Christi neque ab articulis illis dissidere. 
When they remain unattacked on this basis, but with ingenuous faith they 
are to stay with the plain words of Christ. This is the surest and most 
edifying way as far as the common layman is concerned, for he cannot 
comprehend this discussion. But when the adversaries assail this our 
ingenuous faith and interpretation of the words of the testament of Christ 
and decry and condemn them as impiety, as if our ingenuous faith and 
interpretation contradicted the articles of our Christian Creed (especially 
those pertaining to the incarnation of God’s Son, his ascension, and his 
session at the right hand of God’s almighty power and majesty) and hence 
must be false and incorrect, we should indicate and demonstrate by a 
correct explanation of the articles of our Christian Creed that our 
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ingenuous understanding of the words of Christ as described above does 
not contradict these articles.75 
In fact, “Scriptures and arguments derived from the Scriptures” (testimoniis scripturae et 
argumentis ex scriptura sumptis; Sprüchen der Väter und der Schrift) are often said to be 
the basis for what the Reformers show or demonstrate (ostendiumus, angezeigt).76 When 
it comes to the communication of attributes related to the Person of Christ, the Solid 
Declaration even says it has “three strong and irrefutable arguments” (drei starke, 
unwiderlegliche Argument und nachfolgende Gründe; tribus firmissimis atque adeo 
invictis argumentis, quae iam recitabimus, demonstrari potest), and then provides them 
on the basis of the “unanimously accepted rule of the entire ancient orthodox church” 
(einhellige Regel der ganzen alten rechgläubigen Kirchen; regula communissima, 
maximo totius ecclesiae orthodoxae consensu approbata) and from Scripture.77 Thus, the 
Reformers hold that all sorts or arguments are to be evaluated and that those with the 
weight of Scripture as the Church (and Luther) has understood it are to be preferred, even 
when they go against reason and philosophy.78 
 With those introductory remarks regarding arguments and arguing complete, 
attention can now be directed to passages in The Book of Concord using arguments more 
or less structured in the form of syllogisms. Proceeding in the order of the passages from 
the works contained in the Confessions, the subsections that follow generally treat one or 
two such passages that help make the point about the use of such arguments as indicated 
in the subsection’s heading. Other examples of such uses of syllogistically-structured 
arguments are noted either in the text or the footnotes. The emphasis in this examination 
of these passages is more on the arguments’ form and other characteristics than 
specifically on its point, although the conclusion of the specific argument is not ignored. 
                                                 
75 Forward to The Book of Concord: 18 (numbered according to German paragraphs), BKS, 753-
754; Tappert, 10 (apparently following the insertion of the Latin). 
76 Ap IV:117, Tappert, 123; BKS, 184. The German version’s rendering might be taken as 
equating the statements of the Church Fathers with “arguments derived from the Scriptures”. 
77 SD VIII:56-59, Tappert, 601-602; BKS, 1034-1035. That the analogy of the Scriptures is 
immediately mentioned in ¶60 significantly reinforces the role of Scripture. 
78 SD II:8. (See at n.234 above, p.85.) 
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The first subsection treats of a relatively simple syllogism given in-full in The Book of 
Concord. 
Full syllogisms, as in Apology IV:67-68 
 Many of the formal deductive arguments used in The Book of Concord have to do 
with justification by faith, even if not located at the locus of Justification as is the first 
example of a full syllogism treated here.79 In the Apology’s article on Justification, 
Melanchthon defines faith80 and then presents a syllogistic argument that faith justifies. 
At cum Deo non potest agi, Deus non potest apprehendi nisi per verbum. 
Ideo iustificatio fit per verbum, sicut Paulus inquit: Evangelium est 
potentia Dei ad salutem omni credenti. Item: Fides est ex auditu. Et vel 
hinc argumentum sumi potest, quod fides iustificet, quia, si tantum fit 
iustificatio per verbum et verbum tantum fide apprehenditur, sequitur, 
quod fides iustificet. Sed sunt aliae maiores rationes. Haec diximus 
hactenus, ut modum regenerationis ostenderemus et ut intelligi posset, 
qualis sit fides, de qua loquimur. 
Nu kann man mit Gott doch je nicht handeln; so läßt sich Gott nicht 
erkennen, suchen noch fassen denn allein im Wort und durchs Wort, wie 
Paulus sagt: Das Evangelium ist eine Kraft Gottes allen, die daran 
gläuben. Item, zu den Römern am 10.: Der Glaub ist aus dem Gehör. Und 
aus dem allein sollte je klar genug sein, daß wir allein durch den Glauben 
für Gott fromm werden. Denn so wir allein durchs Wort Gottes zu Gott 
kommen und gerecht werden, und das Wort kann niemands fassen, denn 
durch den Glauben, so folget, daß der Glaube gerecht macht. Doch sind 
andere Ursachen, die sich zu dieser Sache besser reimen. Dieses hab ich 
bisher gesagt, daß ich anzeige, wie es zugehet, wie wir neu geboren 
werden, und daß man verstehen möcht, was der Glaub ist oder nicht ist, 
davon wir reden. 
But one cannot deal with God or grasp him except through the Word. 
Therefore justification takes place through the Word, as Paul says (Rom. 
1:16), “The Gospel is the power of God for salvation to every one who has 
faith,” and (Rom. 10:17), “Faith comes from what is heard.” From this we 
can prove that faith justifies. For if justification takes place only through 
the Word, and the Word is received only by faith, then it follows that faith 
                                                 
79 Ap IV:43 is another example of where the confessors argue from a premise to a conclusion at 
the locus of justification. AC XXVII:36-39 has two examples of the confessors arguing syllogistically at 
the locus of Monastic Vows, in one why such vows are null and void and in the other how the Roman 
Catholic opponents use of vows detracts from Christ and denies the righteousness of faith. 
80 Ap IV:61-64 (¶65 is an attack on his opponents’ failure to meaningfully discuss regeneration). 
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justifies. But we have more telling arguments. By what we have said so far 
we have sought to show the manner of regeneration and the nature of the 
faith [what is, or is not, faith] we have been discussing.81  
The syllogisms Melanchthon has in mind can be represented as follows, with the 
presumed premises indicated in square brackets. Note the significant role Scripture plays 
as a basis for the syllogisms. 
1)  All dealing with or grasping God (M) is that which takes place through the Word (P). 
2)  [All justification (S) is a dealing with or grasping God (M).] 
3)  All justification (S) is that which takes place through the Word (P). 
4)  [All that which takes place through the Word (M) is that by which one receives the Word (P).] 
3)  All that which justifies (S) is that which takes place through the Word (M). 
5)  All that which justifies (S) is that by which one receives the Word (P). 
5)  All that which justifies (P) is that by which one receives the Word (M). 
6)  Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one receives the Word (M). 
7)  Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P). 
The first syllogism (1-2-3) is a 1st figure syllogism with the valid mood AAA, which is 
known as Barbara. Note how Melanchthon simply states the major premise (1) and the 
conclusion (3), which leaves the minor unstated but clearly implied given the nature of 
the syllogism and the valid figures and their moods. (No figure and valid mood other than 
Barbara have the universal affirmative in both the major and conclusion, and stating one 
premise and the conclusion identifies all three of the terms—the subject, predicate, and 
the middle term). The first syllogism (1-2-3) is related to the second (4-3-5), in that the 
conclusion of the first (3) is also the minor premise of the second, which is also a 1st 
figure syllogism in the valid mood AAA, or Barbara. In the second, only the minor and 
conclusion are expressed, but, again, the major premise is easily determined. The third 
syllogism (5-6-7) is a 2nd figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE known as Cambestres. 
In the case of the third syllogism, all three premises are clearly expressed. One might 
argue that Melanchthon has taken a questionable liberty with his “proof text”, as “faith 
comes from what is heard” is not quite “the Word is received only by faith” (rendered in 
the syllogism above, 6, as “Nothing other than faith is that by which one receives the 
                                                 
81 Ap IV:67-68, BKS, 173; Tappert, 116. The English translation of the German additions provided 
in square brackets is from the Triglotta, 139. 
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Word”). Note well that the terminology used in laying out the foregoing syllogisms in the 
text of the Apology quoted is typical of that used in The Book of Concord.82 
 In the paragraph that immediately follows, Melanchthon goes on to show how 
two other propositions that—presumably his opponents would agree—must be defended 
entail the proposition (in these cases we might say “conclusion”) that “faith justifies”.83 
 Nunc ostendemus, quod fides iustificet. Ubi primum hoc monendi 
sunt lectores, quod sicut necesse est hanc sententiam tueri, quod Christus 
sit mediator, ita necesse sit defendere, quod fides iustificet. Quomodo 
enim erit Christus mediator, si in iustificatione non utimur eo mediatore, si 
non sentimus, quod propter ipsum iusti reputemur? Id autem est credere, 
confidere meritis Christi, quod propter ipsum certo velit nobis Deus 
placatus esse. Item sicut oportet defendere, quod praeter legem necessaria 
sit promissio Christi: ita necesse est defendere, quod fides iustificet. Lex 
enim non docet gratuitam remissionem peccatorum. Item: lex non potest 
fieri, nisi prius accepto spiritu sancto. Necesse est igitur defendere, quod 
promissio Christi necessaria sit. At haec non potest accipi nisi fide. Itaque 
qui negant fidem iustificare, nihil nisi legem abolito evangelio et abolito 
Christo docent. 
 Nu wollen wir anzeigen, daß derselbige Glaube, und sonst nichts, 
uns für Gott gerecht macht. Und erstlich will ich dieses hie den Leser 
verwarnen, gleichwie dieser Spruch muss und soll stehen bleiben und 
kann ihn niemand umstoßen: Christus ist unser einiger Mittler: also kann 
auch diesen Spruch niemands umstoßen: Durch den Glauben werden wir 
rechtfertig ohne Werke. Denn wie will Christus der Mittler sein und 
bleiben, wenn wir nicht durch den Glauben uns an ihn halten, als an 
                                                 
82 While sequitur generally is used by the Reformers of a logical result, there are a few exceptions: 
Ap VII/VIII:8 (referring to a following phrase); LC I:212 (roughly equivalent to “for this reason”); LC III:1 
(sequence of the Lord’s Prayer after the Ten Commandments and the Creed); LC IV:71 (the old man 
follows the inclinations of a nature without Baptism, although some logical consequence could be 
intended); SD II:6 (the explanation of free will comes next); and SD V:6 (something that follows in the 
sequence of Scripture). There are also a number of passages where sequitur indicates how love follows 
faith (such as Ap IV:292, 366 [see below at n.19, p. 323]; Ap XII:60, 82; SA III:iii:40 (cited by SD II:34); 
SD III:54). These relationship implied in these “faith therefore love” passages is discussed further in the 
text below in the section dealing with the Reformers’ logical distinction between justification and 
sanctification beginning on p.322. 
83 Just why Melanchthon picks these two propositions to claim must be defended is not 
immediately clear. The Confutation does not seem to grant them in its fourth, fifth, sixth, or twentieth 
articles (the ones Apology IV is addressing). Melanchthon had written about Christ as the mediator in 
Apology IV:18 and about the promise of Christ in Apology IV:43, but he does not seem in those places to 
have made the propositions explicit in such a way as to use them as general principles from which to argue 
support for justification by faith. The German version suggests at least one of these propositions is self-
evident in Scripture. 
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Mittler, und also Gott versühnet werden, wenn wir nicht gewiß im Herzen 
halten, daß wir um seinetwillen für Gott gerecht geschätzt werden? Das 
heißt nun glauben: also vertrauen, also sich getrösten des Verdiensts 
Christi, daß um seinetwillen Gott gewiss uns wolle gnädig sein. Item, wie 
dieses klar in der Schrift ist, daß über das Gesetz zur Seligkeit not ist die 
Verheißung Christi: also ist auch klar, daß der Glaub gerecht macht; denn 
das Gesetz predigt nicht Vergebung der Sunde aus Gnaden. Item, das 
Gesetz können wir nicht erfüllen noch halten, ehe wir den heiligen Geist 
empfanhen. Darum muß das bestehen, daß zur Seligkeit die Verheissung 
Christi vonnöten ist. Dieselbigen kann nu niemands fassen noch 
empfanhen, denn allein durch den Glauben. Darum diejenigen, so lehren, 
daß wir nicht durch den Glauben fur Gott gerecht und fromm werden, was 
tun die anders, denn daß sie Christum und das Evangelium unterdrücken 
und das Gesetz lehren? 
 Now we will show that faith [and nothing else] justifies. In the first 
place, we would remind our readers that if we must hold to the 
proposition, “Christ is the mediator,” then we must defend the proposition, 
“Faith justifies [without works].” For how will Christ be the mediator if 
we do not use him as mediator in our justification and believe that for His 
sake we are accounted righteous? But to believe means to trust in Christ’s 
merits, that because of him God wants to be reconciled to us. In the same 
way, if we must defend the proposition, “The promise of Christ is 
necessary over and above the law,” then we must defend the proposition, 
“Faith justifies.” For the Law does not teach the free forgiveness of sins. 
Again, we cannot keep the law unless we first receive the Holy Spirit. 
Therefore we must maintain that the promise of Christ is necessary. But 
this can only be accepted by faith. Therefore anyone who denies that faith 
justifies teaches only the law and does away with Christ and the Gospel.84 
The syllogisms Melanchthon has in mind can be represented as follows, with the 
unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. 
8)  Nothing other than using Christ as a mediator (M) is that which justifies (P). 
9)  [All things other than faith (i.e., only faith) (S) are other than using Christ as a mediator (M).] 
10) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P). 
                                                 
84 Ap IV:69-70, BKS, 173-174; Tappert, 116. The English translations of the German additions are 
provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 141 . 
 The Reformers in this case specifically say defending a second proposition necessarily follows 
from defending a first. There are other passages where the necessity is specifically mentioned (for 
examples, Ap IV:159; XX:15; SA III:iii:11; LC II:19 “inevitably”), but even where things are only said “to 
follow”, the context is usually such that the “necessity” of the following is nevertheless implied. 
 
230 
11) All trusting in Christ’s merits (M) is by faith (P). 
12) [All using Christ as Mediator (S) is trusting in Christ’s merits (M).] 
13) All using Christ as Mediator (S) is by faith (P). 
Contrapositive 
9)  All things other than faith are other than using Christ as our mediator. 
14) All that justifies (P) is a receiving of the promises of Christ and not the law alone (M). 
15) [Nothing other than faith (S) is a receiving of the promises of Christ and not the law alone (M).] 
10) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P). 
16) All earned forgiveness (M) is by the law alone and not by the promise (P). 
17) [Everything other than faith (S) is earned forgiveness (i.e., not free forgiveness) (M).] 
18) All other than faith (S) is by the law alone and not by the promise (P). 
Obversion 
15) Nothing other than faith is a receiving of the promises of Christ and not the law alone. 
19) All done before receiving the Spirit (M) is done by the law without the promise of Christ (P). 
20) All that is other than faith (S) is done before receiving the Spirit (M). 
18) All that is other than faith (S) is done by the law alone and without the promise of Christ (P). 
21) [All those who do away with faith (M) are those who teach the law and do away with Christ and 
the Gospel (P).] 
22) [All who deny that faith justifies (S) are those who do away with faith (M).] 
23) All who deny that faith justifies (S) are those who teach the law and do away with Christ and the 
Gospel (P). 
The two principal propositions that Melanchthon assumes his opponents will join him in 
holding are that “Christ is the mediator” (8) and that “The promise of Christ is necessary 
above the law” (14), with justification implicit in both of those propositions. In both cases 
of these major premises, Melanchthon draws the conclusion that “faith justifies” (10) by 
implying a minor premise (9 and 15, respectively), which minor premises he then 
proceeds to prove by stating major premises (11 and 16, respectively) for syllogisms 
(which themselves have implied minor premises: 12 and 17, respectively) that produce 
conclusions (13 and 18, respectively) that give the needed minor premises (9 and 15, 
respectively) by direct inference.85 The first syllogism (8-9-10) is a 1st figure syllogism in 
the valid mood EAE, which is known as Celarent, and the proof of its minor (9) is the 
second syllogism (11-12-13), which is a 1st figure syllogism in the valid mood AAA, or 
Barbara. The third syllogism (14-15-10) is a 2nd figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE, 
or Cambestres, and the proof of its minor (16-17-18) is another Barbara. Melanchthon 
does not stop there, however, in the fifth syllogism (19-20-18), which is another Barbara, 
                                                 
85 For the contrapositive, see below, n.218; for obversion, see below, n.217. 
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Melanchthon gives another proof that by obversion of its conclusion (18) supports the 
claim that faith alone receives the promises of Christ (15). Finally, the sixth syllogism 
(21-22-23, another Barbara), for which Melanchthon states only the conclusion (23) 
seems to bring together both of the principal propositions that Melanchthon assumed his 
opponents would grant to indicate that denying their implicit conclusions (that is, that 
faith justifies) is to teach the law and do away with Christ and the Gospel (23). 
 In the paragraph that follows Melanchthon elaborates on faith and its relationship 
to justification. First, with a passing reference to a Plato quote, Melanchthon explains that 
faith is more than just the beginning of justification. Then, he defines justification as an 
unrighteous man being made righteous (ex iniustis iustos effici), and he gives as 
equivalent terms being regenerated (regenerari), pronounced or accounted righteous 
(iustos pronuntiari seu reputari), and receiving the forgiveness of sins (accipiat 
remissionem peccatorum). Finally, Melanchthon anticipates the next major section of 
Apology IV, ¶75-121, which argues in greater details that forgiveness is obtained only by 
faith in Christ.86 
 One other paragraph comes before that section, however, in which Melanchthon 
treats of the word “alone” (sola; sola) and its use in connection with speaking of 
justification by faith. Melanchthon is also careful to indicate that as the Reformers write 
of justification they exclude from justification “trust in the merit of love or works” 
(fiducia meriti dilectionis aut operum; das Vertrauen auf Verdienst, auf Werk) but not in 
such a way that love and good works “did not follow” (ne sequantur; nicht folgen sollten) 
faith.87 
Proving forgiveness is by faith, as in Apology IV:75-121 
 In Alister E. McGrath’s Iustitia Dei, he wrote of three propositions that 
characterize the state of affairs between God and human beings: “1) God is righteous, 2) 
Man is a sinner, and 3) God justifies man.” The third proposition obviously does not 
                                                 
86 Ap IV:71-72, Tappert, 117; BKS, 174. The German version at this point does not follow the 
Latin precisely, omitting, for example, the Plato reference. 
87 Ap IV:73-74, Tappert, 117; BKS, 174-175. The close logical connection between justification 
and the good works that follow is the topic of Chapter V below. 
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follow from the other two, and McGrath wrote that Christians have not held the three to 
be inconsistent but have nevertheless been challenged to explain the “how” of the third 
proposition.88 Without specificially discussing the three propositions and their potential 
inconsistency, the works in The Book of Concord nonetheless treat of them and argue 
quite explicitly regarding the “how”. In both the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, 
Article I confesses God (albeit not specifically His righteousness), and Article II 
confesses the sinfulness of human beings. After Article III’s confession of the Son of 
God, Jesus Christ, Article IV confesses God’s justification of sinners by faith in Christ. 
The center of Article IV is in some ways ¶75-121, in which Melanchthon argues 
deductively that sinners obtain the forgiveness of sins (justification) only by faith. Before 
examing how Melanchthon argues there, an overview of Apology IV and its theis and 
antitheses is helpful. 
Overview of Apology IV leading into ¶75 
 Apology article IV on Justification, as its author Melanchthon describes it, 
addresses the reformer’s opponents’ condemnation of the position the Reformers had 
taken in the Augsburg Confession regarding justification. Melanchthon indicates that 
their opponents had condemned both the affirmative and negative expressions of the 
same position: 
damnant nos, quod docemus, homines non propter sua merito, sed gratis 
propter Christum consequi remissionem peccatorum fide in Christum. 
Utrumque enim damnant, et quod negamus homines propter sua merita 
consequi remissionem peccatorum, et quod affirmamus homines fide 
consequi remissionem peccatorum et fide in Christum iustificari. 
verdammen die Widersacher unser Bekenntnis, daß wir lehren, daß die 
Gläubigen Vergebung der Sunde durch Christum ohne alles Verdienst 
allein durch den Glauben erlangen, und verwerfen gar trötzlich beides. 
Erstlich, daß wir nein dazu sagen, daß den Menschen durch ihren 
Verdienst sollten die Sunde vergeben werden. Zum andern, daß wir halten, 
lehren und bekennen, daß niemand Gott versühnet wird, niemands 
Vergebung der Sunde erlanget, denn allein durch den Glauben an 
Christum. 
                                                 
88 Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, Second (in 
one volume) ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5. 
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they condemn us for teaching that men do not receive the forgiveness of 
sins because of their own merits, but freely for Christ’s sake, by faith in 
him. [They reject quite stubbornly both these statements.] They condemn 
us both for denying that men receive the forgiveness of sins because of 
their merits, and for affirming that men receive forgiveness of sins by faith 
and by faith in Christ are justified.89  
That Melanchthon sees the one position expressed in multiple ways, positively and 
negatively, and with equivalent terms is significant as this section proceeds. From the 
outset of Apology IV, Melanchthon criticizes his opponents for failing to understand 
forgiveness, faith, grace, and righteousness, which failure he says confuses the teaching 
of justification, obscures Christ’s glory, and robs people of consolation in Christ.90 As the 
article begins, there appear to be one major thesis and four major antitheses, logically 
derived from the thesis, that Melanchthon puts forth and defends. (Two of those 
antitheses can be taken as relating to justification, and two of those antitheses can be 
taken as relating to sanctification.)91 
 As mentioned but worth repeating is that various expressions are often equivalent 
in Melanchthon’s usage. For example, early in Apology IV Melanchthon writes:  
Et quia iustificari significat ex iniustis iustos effici seu regenerari, 
significat et iustos pronuntiari seu reputari. Utroque enim modo loquitur 
scriptura. Ideo primum volumus hoc ostendere, quod sola fides ex iniusto 
iustum efficiat, hoc est, accipiat remissionem peccatorum. 
                                                 
89 Ap IV:1, BKS, 158-159; Tappert, 107. (The English translations of the German additions are 
provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 121.) Just before this excerpt, the paragraph makes it 
clear that Apology IV is itself responding to the Confutation’s arguments corresponding to the AC’s 
articles IV, V, VI, and XX. For some specific passages from the Confutation, see BKS, 158-159 n.3. 
90 Ap IV:3. Confer n.210 below, p.281. 
91 While some titles for the Apology’s articles were added later, the usual headings that break 
Apology IV into subsections appear to be original (see, for example, Tappert, 27 n.2): “What is justifying 
faith” ¶48-60; “Faith in Christ justifies” ¶61-74; “We obtain the forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ” 
¶75-121; “Love and the keeping of the law” ¶122-182; and “Reply to the opponents’ arguments” ¶183-400. 
Having addressed how saving faith differs from historical knowledge in the section “What is justifying 
faith”, Melanchthon in ¶61 seems to refer to the “Faith in Christ Justifies” section with “how faith comes 
into being”, the “We obtain the forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ” section with “show that it 
justifies”, the “Love and the keeping of the law” section with “what this means”, and the “Reply to the 
opponents’ arguments” section with “answer our opponents’ objections”. Confer Jacobs, II:341-343, and 
observe there (and in the Triglotta) the sometimes-used different numbering scheme where “Love and the 
keeping of the law” and the following subsection are treated as if they were a separate article and paragraph 
numbers start anew with ¶1 (what is ¶122 in “the original arrangement of the Apology”; see, for example, 
Tappert, 124 n.9).  
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And “to be justified” means to make unrighteous men righteous or to 
regenerate them, as well as to be pronounced or accounted righteous. For 
Scripture speaks both ways. Therefore we want to show first that faith 
alone makes a righteous man out of an unrighteous one, that is, it receives 
the forgiveness of sins. 
Und nachdem das Wort iustificari auf zweierlei Weise gebraucht wird, 
nämlich, für bekehrt werden oder neu geboren, item für gerecht geschätzt 
werden, wollen wir das erst anzeigen, daß wir allein durch den Glauben 
aus dem gottlosen Wesen bekehrt, neugeboren und gerecht werden.  
As the word iustificari is used in two ways, namely, for being converted or 
newly-born, also for being reckoned righteous; we wish to show first that 
only through faith do we, from a godless creature, become converted, 
newly-born, and righteous.92 
The understanding expressed in this passage is crucial, as the Reformers see justification 
to be both an internal change and an external judgment. As a result of such an 
understanding regarding other terms also, Melanchthon in his syllogisms will freely 
substitute those other expressions for justification, as well as substituting various 
equivalent expressions for attempts to obtain forgiveness by works. 
 Before getting to the heart of the matter, Melanchthon addresses some prefatory 
matters to reveal the sources of both the Reformers’ and the opponents’ teaching. First, 
Melanchthon discusses the division of Scripture into law (such as the Ten 
Commandments) and the Gospel (such as the promises of the Messiah and the details of 
His having come).93 Melanchthon says their Roman Catholic opponents focus on the law 
and try to obtain justification by its works, but the Reformers, Melanchthon says, focus 
on the Gospel and are justified by faith in Christ. Melanchthon seems to set out to draw 
precisely this contrast, but his execution in the text itself is not as clear as it could be.94 
                                                 
92 Ap IV:72; BKS, 174; Tappert, 117; the English translation from the German is this author’s 
expansion of the Triglotta, 141.  
93 Ap IV:4-6. 
94 In ¶7 he clearly sets forth the opponents as selecting the law. Then, he draws a parallel between 
the opponents and the Reformers in ¶22-24, and in ¶25-28 he introduces the four false antitheses. Even 
while in ¶29-33 he begins to discuss the sources for the Reformers’ position in those antitheses, he does not 
seem to be finished critiquing the opponents’ position, which task he continues to do in ¶34-42. Finally, in 
¶43-47 Melanchthon addresses what the Gospel is and argues from its being given that justification is by 
faith. Compare Jacobs’ breakdown that seems more arbitrary and less driven by Melanchthon’s own 
statements in the text (Jacobs, II:341). 
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 In discussing the Roman Catholics’ focus on the law and obtaining justification 
by works, Melanchthon touches on a number of important points. Melanchthon explains 
that human reason somewhat understands the law but cannot fully keep the 
Commandments because some of them require works beyond reason’s reach.95 
Melanchthon then links the Roman Catholic scholastics with the philosophers who teach 
only “the righteousness of reason—that is, civil works” (iustitiam rationis, videlicet 
civilia opera; ein Gerechtigkeit und Frommkeit, da ein Mensch äußerlich für der Welt ein 
ehrbar Leben führet und gute Werk tut),96 indirectly indicting scholastics such as Biel and 
Bonaventure for false teaching and practice that God grants grace to people who do what 
they can.97 Then, instead of listing all the related errors, Melanchthon argues that if the 
scholastic view of righteousness is right then there is no difference between philosophy 
and “the teaching of Christ” and Christ and His righteousness and regeneration are not 
needed.98 Melanchthon then admits that his opponents require people to have some 
knowledge of Christ and a “disposition” (habitum in both Latin and German) “initial 
grace” (primam gratiam; primam gratiam, die erste Gnade99) that He merited, but 
Melanchthon argues that in the midst of the false claims about the human will and the 
related preceding and following merits Christ is buried and people look to be righteous by 
their own works.100 Next, Melanchthon specifically attacks the congruent merits and the 
condign merits (meritum congrui et meritum condigni; merito congrui und merito 
condigni, unterm gebührlichen Verdienst und rechtem ganzen Verdienst101), saying both 
                                                 
95 Ap IV:7-8. 
96 Ap IV:9, Tappert, 108; BKS, 160. (The German reads more literally, “a righteousness and piety 
where one leads an honorable life externally for the world and does good works” [this author’s 
translation].) Notably the German in this passage does not include the idea that the “righteousness of 
reason” is even a form of righteousness. 
 Melanchthon does not in ¶9 name any philosophers, but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle may well be 
in view; in ¶14-15, Aristotle, Socrates, and Zeno are named. 
97 Ap IV:9-11. 
98 Ap IV:12-16. 
99 Ap IV:17; Tappert, 109; BKS, 162. 
100 Ap IV:17-18. 
101 Ap IV:19, Tappert, 109; BKS, 163. The German version uses the Latin and translates them 
roughly as “appropriate merit” and “wholly-full merit” (this author’s translation). 
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that the opponents are “playing” (ludunt tantum; spielen und zanken sie allein mit 
Worten102) to conceal that they are Pelagians and that in the process people doubt and 
despair, unless they happen to hear the Gospel.103 Significantly, Melanchthon makes clear 
the Reformers recognize that God requires “the righteousness of reason” (iustitia 
rationis; äußerlichen Frommkeit) but refuse to praise it at Christ’s expense.104 
 Next in the text come the four false antitheses (FA) that are essentially derived 
from the major thesis, namely, that justification is by faith alone. 
FA#1: Falsum est enim, quod per opera nostra meramur remissionem 
peccatorum. 
erdicht ists und nicht wahr, daß wir durch unser Werke sollten 
Vergebung der Sunde verdienen. 
For it is false that by our works we merit the forgiveness of sins.105  
FA#2: Falsum est et hoc, quod homines reputentur esse iusti coram Deo 
propter iustitiam rationis. 
Auch ists Lüge und nicht wahr, daß ein Mensch für Gott könne gerecht 
und fromm warden durch seine Werke und äußerliche Frommkeit. 
It is false, too, that men are accounted righteous before God because of 
the righteousness of reason.106 
FA#3: Falsum est et hoc, quod ratio propriis viribus possit Deum supra omnia 
diligere et legem Dei facere, videlicet vere timere Deum, vere statuere, 
quod Deus exaudiat, velle obedire Deo in morte et aliis ordinationibus 
Dei, non concupiscere aliena etc., etsi civilian opera efficere ratio 
potest. 
Auch ist es Ungrund und nicht wahr, daß die meschliche Vernunft aus 
ihren Kräften vermügen soll Got über alles zu lieven, sein Gebot zu 
halten, ihnen zu fürchten, gewiß darauf zu stehen, daß Gott das Gebet 
erhöre, Gott zu danken und gehorsam zu sein in Trübsalen und aderm, 
                                                 
102 Ap IV:19, Tappert, 109; BKS, 163. The German version reads more literally: “they are only 
playing and quarreling with words” (this author’s translation). 
103 Ap IV:19-21. Tappert explains the original Pelagians thus: “Followers of Pelagius, who at the 
beginning of the fifth century taught that man is not sinful by nature and can be saved by an act of his own 
will aided by God’s grace” (Tappert, 29 n.3). 
104 Ap IV:22-24; Tappert, 110; BKS, 164. Again the German in this passage renders “external 
godliness”, and later in the same paragraph translates the Latin iustitiae rationis with äußerlichen Leben 
und den guten Werken. 
105 Ap IV:25, BKS, 165; Tappert, 110. 
106 Ap IV:26; BKS, 165; Tappert, 110. 
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was Gottes Gesetz gebeut, als nicht fremdes Gutes begehren usw. Denn 
das alles vermag Vernunft nicht, wiewohl sie äußerlich ehrbar Leben 
und gute Werke etlichermaßen vermag. 
It is false, too, that by its own strength reason can love God above all 
things and keep his law, truly fear him, truly believe that he hears 
prayer, willingly obey him in death and in his other visitations, and not 
covet. But reason can produce civil works.107 
FA#4: Falsum est et hoc et contumeliosum in Christum, quod non peccent 
hominess facientes praecepta Dei sine gratia. 
Auch ist es erdichtet und nicht wahr und ein Lästerung wider Christum, 
daß diejenigen sollten ohne Sunde sein, die Gottes Gebot allein 
äußerlich ehrbar Leben und gute Werke etlichermaßen vermag. 
It is false, too, and a reproach to Christ, that men who keep the 
commandments of God outside a state of grace do not sin.108 
Melanchthon immediately claims support for the Reformers’ position in the Scriptures 
and Church Fathers. He then cites a number of Bible passages and Augustine, seemingly 
intending to provide a citation of some sort in support of each false antithesis (referred to 
below as “FA#”).109 
To FA#1: Augustine from Nature and Grace that human works do not merit grace 
(citing Galatians 2:21; 5:11; 5:4; Romans 10:3; 10:4)110 
To FA#2: John 8:36 that reason cannot free from sin or merit forgiveness and 
John 3:5 that if birth of water and the Holy Spirit is necessary to enter the 
kingdom of God then the righteousness of reason does not justify111 
To FA#3: Romans 3:23 that all people by nature lack God’s righteousness112 
To FA#4: Romans 8:7-8 that the flesh (that is, the sinful human nature) is hostile 
to God and cannot on its own please God113 
Melanchthon says the support he has provided is so clear that, as Augustine says 
elsewhere, one only needs to listen to the statements attentively.114 
                                                 
107 Ap IV:27; BKS, 165; Tappert, 111. 
108 Ap IV:28; BKS, 165; Tappert, 111. 
109 For another Book of Concord example of false antitheses, see the heading between Ep III:11 
and 12 in both German and Latin, where the Latin Antithesis is used in both (BKS, 785). 
110 Ap IV:29-30. 
111 Ap IV:31. 
112 Ap IV:32. 
113 Ap IV:32. 
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 Extending off the last passage and the antithesis it supports (FA#4), Melanchthon 
goes on in ¶35 to argue that civil works done apart from God (the doing of which was 
granted leading into the four antitheses and as a part of FA#3) are sins, even if the works 
are praiseworthy before human beings.115 Melanchthon makes use of the distinction 
between the two tables of the law (Commandments 1-3 and 4-10) and says the opponents 
focus on the second, essentially arguing that even if without the Holy Spirit one might 
keep the commands of the second table, the commands of the first table are still undone. 
Melanchthon’s larger argument here is that apart from faith everything is sin before God. 
Cum igitur haereant in natura hominis contemptus Dei, dubitatio de verbo 
Dei, de minis et promissionibus, vere peccant homines etiam cum honesta 
opera faciunt sine spiritu sancto, quia faciunt ea impio corde, iuxta illud: 
Quidquid non est ex fide, peccatum est. Tales enim operantur cum 
contemptu Dei, sicut Epicurus non sentit se Deo curae esse, respici aut 
exaudiri a Deo. Hic contemptus vitiat opera in speciem honesta, quia Deus 
iudicat corda.  
It is inherent in man to despise God and to doubt his Word with its threats 
and promises. Therefore men really sin even when they do virtuous things 
without the Holy Spirit; for they do them with a wicked heart, and (Rom. 
14, 23) “whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.” Such people despise 
God when they do these things, as Epicurus did not believe that God cared 
for him or regarded or heard him. This contempt for God corrupts works 
that seem virtuous, for God judges the heart.  
So nu alle Adamskinder in so großen Sunden geboren werden, daß wir alle 
von Art Gott verachten, sein Wort, seine Verheissung und Dräuen in 
Zweifel setzen, so müssen wahrlich unser besten gute Werke, die wir tun, 
ehe wir durch den Heiligen Geist neugeboren werden, sundlich und 
verdammt Werke vor Gott sein, wenn sie gleich für der Welt schön sein; 
denn sie gehen aus einem bösen, gottlosen, unreinem Herzen, wie Paulus 
sagt Röm. 14: „Was nicht aus dem Glauben gehet, das ist Sunde.“ Denn 
alle solche Werkheiligen tun Werke ohne Glauben, verachten Gott im 
Herzen und gläuben als wenig, daß Gott sich ihrer annehme, als Epicurus 
gläubt hat. Die Verachtung Gottes inwendig muß je die Werk unflätig und 
sündlich machen, wenn sie gleich für den Leuten schön sind; denn Gott 
forschet die Herzen. 
                                                                                                                                                 
114 Ap IV:33. 
115 Ap IV:33. 
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So now all Adam’s children are born in such great sin that all of our kind 
despise God and doubt His Word, His promises, and threats, so that our 
best good deeds that we do before we are reborn through the Holy Ghost 
must truly be sinful and damned works before God, even if they seem 
beautiful before the world, because they proceed from an evil, godless, 
unclean heart, as Paul says in Romans 14: “What does not proceed from 
faith is sin.” For all such saintly doers of good works who are doing works 
without faith despise God in their hearts and believe as little about God’s 
regard for them as Epicurus did. The inner disdain for God must always 
make the works filthy and sinful, even if they seem beautiful for the 
people, because God searches the hearts.116 
Although somewhat less-obvious in the German translation, Melanchthon’s claim in ¶35 
is the implied syllogism that follows. (Melanchthon does not express the implied major 
premise.117) 
24) [Everything without the Holy Spirit (P) is not from faith (M).] 
25) “Whatever does not proceed from faith [M] is sin [S]” 
26) “Men really sin even when they do virtuous things (S) without the Holy Spirit (P)”. 
This syllogism is according to the first figure and the valid mood AAA (known as 
Barbara). 
 In the two paragraphs that follow, numbered as ¶36-42, Melanchthon, continuing 
somewhat to respond to the opponents’ arguments, seems to be addressing all the 
antitheses,118 although the statements of the opponents that he addresses are not in the 
same forms. Melanchthon begins by criticizing his opponents for claiming sinful people 
merit forgiveness by love (somewhat of a cross between FA#1 and FA#2), because 
people cannot love God without first accepting forgiveness by faith (an aspect of 
FA#3).119 Then, as a result of that discussion, Melanchthon draws the conclusion that 
human beings cannot keep the law on their own and are all under sin because all are 
outside grace (somewhat of a cross between FA#3 and FA#4), and so the law cannot 
                                                 
116 Ap IV:35, BKS, 166-167; Tappert, 112; the English from the German is this author’s 
translation. The reference to Epicurus apparently is from Cicero, Laws, I, 7, 21-22 (BKS, 166 n.2; Tappert, 
112 n.7; K-W, 126 n.70). The use of a philosophical example in this place is significant, and the German 
translation notably seems to shorten the reference to Epicurus. The statement about God searching the heart 
seems to be an allusion to Psalm 44:21; Psalm 139:23; or Jeremiah 17:10. 
117 Confer n.34 above, p.204. 
118 The false antitheses (FA) are in the text above, beginning on p.236. 
119 Ap IV:36-39. 
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justify anyone (an aspect of FA#2).120 From there, Melanchthon moves into discussion of 
the free forgiveness of sins and how making the promise conditional on human merits 
would make the promise useless.121 
 Finally in the opening section, Melanchthon writes of the Reformers’ Gospel 
source for justification by grace through faith, and from justification by the promise 
Melanchthon reasons that people cannot justify themselves. Melanchthon contrasts the 
Gospel promise and its righteousness by faith to righteousness of the law, works, and 
perfection. In the process, although without using the terms, Melanchthon explains 
objective justification (God’s being favorably disposed to all on account of Christ) and 
subjective justification (personal faith believing the objective reality and thereby 
obtaining forgiveness and justification). Melanchthon explains that faith consoles and 
encourages penitent hearts amidst terrors of conscience and thus regenerates and brings 
the Holy Spirit so good works follow. Melanchthon discusses faith as “true knowledge of 
Christ” and says there is “not a syllable” in the opponents’ teaching about it.122 
 The next major section of Apology IV (¶48-60) deals precisely with justifying 
faith as confidently accepting God’s gifts of forgiveness and justification versus historical 
knowledge that remains with mortal sin. Faith is further contrasted with righteousness of 
the law and connected clearly with the Gospel promise and Christ’s merits. Melanchthon 
makes clear that justifying faith belongs with the promise, the promise being free, and the 
merits of Christ. The fact that the promise is free for Melanchthon excludes human merits 
and points to God’s mercy, the acceptance of which, he argues, requires faith. 
Melanchthon regards faith as worship that seeks the forgiveness of sins, and he points to 
Old Testament saints who received mercy by faith and were therefore justified.123 
 In the section headed “Faith in Christ Justifies”, Melanchthon sets out to move 
past the misunderstanding of faith as historical knowledge to talk about how faith comes 
                                                 
120 Ap IV:40. 
121 Ap IV:41-42. 
122 Ap IV:43-47. 
123 Ap IV:48-60. 
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into being.124 Melanchthon points to the preaching of law (to declare sinful people in 
need of forgiveness) and the Gospel (to offer forgiveness and justification to be received 
by faith).125 Melanchthon emphasizes the Holy Spirit coming through the Word and 
Sacraments but only to those who receive Him in faith.126 The person who remains in 
faith, Melanchthon says, produces good works with the Holy Spirit’s help, while the 
person who commits a mortal sin loses faith, at least temporarily.127 With Apology IV 
leading up to ¶75 overviewed, discussion can now focus on the central argument that 
begins in that paragraph.128 
The argument in IV:75-121 
 In Apology IV:75-121, there appear to be four positions that Melanchton 
supposes his opponents grant and from which positions Melanchthon then proceeds to 
argue, more or less syllogistically, that justification is only by faith in Christ.129 The four 
positions are as follows: first, that justification requires forgiveness of sins (¶75-81); 
second, that sins are forgiven because of Christ (¶82); third, that Christ can only be 
received by faith (¶83); and, fourth, that forgiveness is promised for Christ’s sake and 
therefore can only be accepted by faith (¶84 ff.). The argument from each position in a 
sense makes its own argument, but there is also a logical progression from one position to 
the next so that together they make up a larger argument. Significantly, in these 
                                                 
124 Ap IV:61. 
125 Ap IV:62. 
126 Ap IV:63. 
127 Ap IV:64-66. 
128 On Ap IV:67-68 see above at n.81, p.227; on Ap IV:69-70 see above at n.84, p.229; on Ap 
IV:71-72 see above at n.86, p.231; on Ap IV:72 also see above at n.92, p.234; and on Ap IV:73-74 see 
above at n.87, p.231. 
 Arand argues somewhat convincingly for a classical rhetorical structure to Apology IV (Arand, 
“Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument”), but his understanding need not be taken as mutually exclusive to 
what has been outlined here; to be sure the logic is in service to Melanchthon’s greater rhetorical purpose in 
the Apology. Although he does not identify as many syllogisms as are identified in this dissertation, Arand 
helpfully draws attention to the significant vocabularly used, to the role of “testimonies” in supporting the 
arguments, and to the inverting or reversing of opponents’ arguments to the Reformers’ favor. 
129 Confer K-W, 133 n.93, for this understanding of four “admissions”, but compare Tappert, 117-
119, where the four are presented more as arguments stemming from the necessity of forgiveness in 
justification, and compare Triglotta, 143, where forgiveness of sins is presented as some first step in 
justification, which surely is not the meaning.  
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paragraphs from Apology IV, as elsewhere, Scripture and the Church Fathers provide the 
evidence.130 
 The first position from which Melanchthon argues is that, since all are sinful, 
“forgiveness of sins is supremely necessary in justification” (in iustificatione primum 
necessaria sit remissio peccatorum; für allen Dingen zu der Rechtfertigung vonnöten sei 
Vergebung der Sunde).131 Then he proceeds to the specific argument. 
Quare sic argumentamur: 
 Consequi remissionem peccatorum est iustificari iuxta illud: Beati, 
quorum remissae sunt iniquitates. Sola fide in Christum, non per 
dilectionem, non propter dilectionem aut opera consequimur remissionem 
peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem. Igitur sola fide iustificamur, ...  
Darum so schließen wir nun also: 
 Vergebung der Sunde erlangen und haben, dasselbige heißt für 
Gott gerecht und fromm werden, wie der 31. Psalm sagt: „Wohl dem, dem 
die Ubertretung vergeben ist. Allein aber durch den Glauben an 
Christum“, nicht durch die Liebe, nicht um der Liebe oder Werk willen, 
erlangen wir Vergebung der Sünde, wiewohl die Liebe folget, wo der 
Glaub ist, Derhalben muß folgen, daß wir allein durch den Glauben 
gerecht werden. 
Therefore we argue this way: 
 ... the forgiveness of sins is the same as justification according to 
Ps. 32:1, “Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven.” We obtain the 
forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ, not through love, or because of 
love or works, though love does follow faith. Therefore we are justified by 
faith alone ...132 
                                                 
130 ¶86-102 can be taken as offering Scriptural support for the fourth position (or the larger 
argument as a whole); ¶103-106 offer support from the Church Fathers; ¶107-116 somewhat return to the 
topic of what faith is and how it relates to love that shows itself in good deeds and somewhat anticipate the 
next major section of Apology IV, which deals with love and the keeping of the law; and ¶117-121 
summarize the section on justification only by faith in Christ (note again in ¶117 the mentions in the Latin 
of testimoniis scripturae et argumentis ex scriptura [“testimonies of Scripture and arguments from 
Scripture”] and in the German of Sprüchen der Väter und der Schrift [“sayings of the Fathers and the 
Scripture”] [BKS, 184; this author’s translation]). Although, ¶86 could be taken as introducing ¶87-106 as 
proof-texts for righteousness by faith. For his part, Jacobs takes ¶77-86 together as “The remission of sins 
attained by faith alone” and ¶87-106 together as “Faith the righteousness that avails before God”, listing 
¶87-102 as “Proved from Scripture” and ¶103-106 as “Confessed by the fathers” (Jacobs, II:341). 
131 Ap IV:75, Tappert, 117; BKS, 175. The logical starting point is said to be true for Scotus but 
not for Aquinas (BKS, 175 n.1; confer K-W, 133 n.94). 
132 Ap IV:75-78, BKS, 175; Tappert, 117. As noted above (n.130), the English translations differ 
on precisely where the translation of primum (“first”) belongs. Tappert surely is unjustified in placing more 
than a sentence from where it occurs. (The German lacks the word.)  
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This argument can be represented in the following syllogistic form. 
27) All forgiveness is justification. (All justification [P] is forgiveness [M].) 
28) All forgiveness is by faith alone. (Nothing that is not faith [S] obtains forgiveness [M].) 
29) Justification is by faith alone. (Nothing that is not faith [S] is justification [P].) 
This syllogism takes the standard second-figure form (with the middle terms as the 
predicate of both the major and minor premises), and the mood of the syllogism is AEE, 
the valid mood known in that figure as Cambestres. 
 Since Melanchthon more or less assumed his opponents would grant the major 
premise (27 above), Melanchthon concentrates more immediately on the minor premise 
(28). Although Melanchthon, at least in the Latin, deals with a “quibble” of his opponents 
regarding the identification of forgiveness with infused grace, he says stating the minor 
premise (28) is easy, so he proceeds to prove it as follows.133 
Sic igitur probamus minorem: Ira Dei non potest placari, si opponamus 
nostra opera, quia Christus propositus est propitiator, ut propter ipsum fiat 
nobis placatus Pater. Christus autem non apprehenditur tamquam mediator 
nisi fide. Igitur sola fide consequimur remissionem peccatorum, cum 
erigimus corda fiducia misericordiae propter Christum promissae. Item 
Paulus Rom. 5. ait: Per ipsum habemus accessum ad Patrem, et addit: per 
fidem. Sic igitur reconciliamur Patri et accipimus remissionem 
peccatorum, quando erigimur fiducia promissae misericordiae propter 
Christum. Adversarii Christum ita intelligunt mediatorem et propitiatorem 
esse, quia meruerit habitum dilectionis, non iubent nunc eo uti mediatore, 
sed prorsus sepulto Christo fingunt nos habere accessum per propria 
opera, et per haec habitum illum mereri, et postea dilectione illa accedere 
ad Deum. Annon est hoc prorsus sepelire Christum et totam fidei 
doctrinam tollere? Paulus econtra docet nos habere accessum, hoc est, 
reconciliationem per Christum. Et ut ostenderet, quomodo id fiat, addit, 
quod per fidem habeamus accessum. Fide igitur propter Christum 
accipimus remissionem peccatorum. Non possumus irae Dei opponere 
nostram dilectionem et opera nostra. 
So beweisen wir nu dieses also, daß wir durch den Glauben an Christum 
und nicht durch Werk Vergebung der Sunde erlangen. Nämlich Gottes 
Zorn kann nicht versühnet noch gestillt werden durch unsere Werke, 
sondern allein Christus ist der Mittler und Versühner, und um seinetwillen 
allein wird uns der Vater gnädig. Nu kann Christum niemands als einen 
Mittler fassen durch Werk, sondern allein, daß wir dem Wort gläuben, 
welches ihn als einen Mittler prediget. Darum erlangen wir allein durch 
                                                 
133 Ap IV:79, Tappert, 117-118. 
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den Glauben Vergebung der Sunde, wenn unser Herz getröstet und 
aufgerichtet wird durch die göttliche Zusage, welche uns um Christus’ 
willen angeboten wird. Item, Paulus zu den Römern am 5.: „Durch ihnen 
haben wir ein Zugang zum Vater“, und sagt klar dazu: „durch den 
Glauben.“ Also werden wir nu, und nicht anders, dem Vater versühnet, 
also erlangen wir Vergebung der Sunde, wenn wir aufgerichtet werden, 
festzuhalten, an der Zusage, da uns Gnad und Barmherzigkeit verheißen 
ist durch Christum. Die Widersacher, die verstehen dieses vom Mittler und 
Versühner Christo also, daß Christus uns verdiene die Liebe oder den 
habitum dilectionis, und sagen nicht, daß wir ihnen als einen einigen 
Mittler brauchen müssen, sondern stecken Christum wieder ins Grab, 
erdichten ein anders, als haben wir einen Zutritt durch unser Werk, item, 
als verdienen wir durch Werk den habitum, und können darnach durch die 
Liebe zu Gott kommen. Das heißt je Christum wieder ins Grab stecken 
und die ganze Lahre von Glauben wegnehmen. Dagegen aber lehret 
Paulus klar, daß wir einen Zutritt haben, das ist, Versühnung Gottes durch 
Christum. Und daß er anzeige, wie dasselbige geschehe, so setzt er dazu: 
durch den Glauben haben wir den Zutritt, durch den Glauben empfanhen 
wir Vergebung der Sunde aus dem Verdienst Christi, und können Gottes 
Zorn nicht stillen, denn durch Christum. So ist leicht zu verstehen, daß wir 
nicht Vergebung verdienen durch unser Werke oder Liebe. 
 We prove the minor premise as follows. Since Christ is set forth to 
be the propitiator, through whom the Father is reconciled to us, we cannot 
appease God’s wrath by setting forth our own works. For it is only by faith 
that Christ is accepted as the mediator. By faith alone, therefore, we obtain 
the forgiveness of sins when we comfort our hearts with trust in the mercy 
promised for Christ’s sake. Thus Paul says in Rom. 5:2, “Through him we 
have obtained access” to the Father, and he adds, “through faith.” In this 
way we are reconciled to the Father and receive the forgiveness of sins 
when we are comforted by trust in the mercy promised for Christ’s sake. 
Our opponents suppose that Christ is the mediator and propitiator because 
he merited for us the disposition of love. And so they would not have us 
make use of him as our mediator. Instead, as though Christ were 
completely buried, they imagine that we have access through our own 
works, by which we merit this disposition, and then, through this love, 
have access to God. Does this not bury Christ completely and do away 
with the whole teaching of faith? Paul, on the other hand, teaches that we 
have access (that is, reconciliation) through Christ. And to show how this 
happens, he adds that through faith we have access. By faith, therefore, for 
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Christ’s sake, we receive forgiveness of sins. We cannot set our own love 
and our own works over against God’s wrath.134  
Clearly not all of the premises or multiple steps in the argument are spelled out, but that 
is typical rhetorical practice. Nevertheless, this “proof” of the minor premise, that all 
forgiveness is by faith, can be illustrated as follows, with presumed premises indicated in 
square brackets.135 (Importantly, Melanchthon freely substitutes various expressions of 
what he—and no doubt also his opponents—think are equivalent: appeasing God’s wrath, 
propitiation, reconciliation, access to the Father, obtaining the forgiveness of sins.) 
30) [Nothing that is by setting forth our works (P) is by Christ (M).] 
31) All propitiation (S) is by Christ (M). 
32) No appeasing of God’s wrath (that is, propitiation) (S) is by works (P). 
33) [Everything other than accepting Christ as a mediator (P) is by works (M).] 
32) No obtaining forgiveness (that is, appeasing God’s wrath) (S) is by works (M). 
34) [No obtaining forgiveness (S) is other than by accepting Christ as mediator (P).] 
34) [No obtaining forgiveness (P) is other than by accepting Christ as mediator (M).] 
35) Everything other than by faith (S) is other than by accepting Christ as mediator (M). 
28) Nothing other than faith (that is, that is not faith) (S) obtains the forgiveness of sins (P). 
(Interestingly, in terms of form, Melanchthon stays with the second figure in all three 
syllogisms of this proof, but he uses alternates moods from EAE [Cesare], to AEE 
[Cambestre], and back to EAE [Cesare].) Even with only the minor premises and 
conclusions from only the first and last of the three syllogisms given, the other premises 
and conclusions can be deduced. Remember Melanchthon is trying to prove the minor 
premise from the earlier syllogism (28). He starts by giving the minor premise (30) and 
the conclusion (32) of the first syllogism in the proof of the original minor (28). (That 
conclusion [32] is itself the minor premise of the second syllogism, the conclusion for 
                                                 
134 Ap IV:80-81, BKS, 176; Tappert, 118. 
 Although used only in Ap IV:79 and 80 to refer to the “minor premise”, the Latin minor, minoris 
and minor -or -us are used elsewhere: of Christ’s inferiority to the Father (Athanasian Creed ¶31); of a false 
teaching regarding His lesser power (Ep VIII:35); of faults of no less importance (Ap IV:67); in quotations 
of 1 Timothy 5:9 (Ap XXVIII:66) and Genesis 25:23 (SD XI:88); to the smaller size of the Roman Catholic 
following (SA Preface ¶7); in reference to the lesser form of excommunication (SA III:viii:13); in reference 
to the Franciscans (SA III:v:3); in the title of the Small Catechism (also in SD RN 8, 11; SD I:38; II:40, 45; 
VII:10); to refer to people’s ages (SC Preface ¶7; LC Preface ¶7; LC I:259; V:85); to the no less degree of 
diligence with which right words are to be used in comparison with right doctrine (SD IV:36); in a 
quotation from Luther’s “Great Confession” (SD VII:30); in the title of Luther’s “Small Confession” 
concerning the Holy Supper (SD VII:91). 
135 As indicated above in n.34, p.204, Aristotle said syllogisms used rhetorically should not 
express every premise. 
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which [34] is needed as the major premise in the third syllogism.) Then Melanchthon 
gives the minor premise (34) and repeats the conclusion of the third syllogism (28, which 
conclusion is the to-be-proved minor premise from the earlier syllogism). The argument 
as reconstructed here is valid and plausibly what Melanchthon consciously or 
subconsciously had in mind, although without his giving the full syllogism, the proof as 
given above remains only a plausible reconstruction. 
 Before proceeding to the second and third positions Melanchthon supposes his 
opponents will grant, permit a little more consideration of the foregoing larger argument 
and the proof of its minor premise. This demonstration from the first principle that 
Melanchthon supposes his opponents will grant (that is, all forgiveness is justification, or 
all justification is forgiveness136) is highly significant. The conclusion of the argument 
(that is, that justification is by faith alone) is at the conceptual center of not only Apology 
IV but also the Reformers whole dispute with their Roman Catholic opponents. The 
demonstration is the only place in the Apology where Melanchthon specifically gives a 
complete syllogism and refers to one of its constituent parts as the “minor” and proceeds 
to “prove” the very point that is at contention (that is, that all forgiveness is by faith 
alone), notably, if the reconstruction is correct, with a series of three other syllogisms. A 
first potential criticism might be that Melanchthon’s main syllogism proves nothing at all 
but simply substitutes one equivalent expression for another. A second but related 
criticism might be that all of the equivalent substituting going on in the proof itself 
conceals the fact that Melanchthon could be taken as arguing in a circle (for example, 30 
and 33 essentially say the same thing that there is a dichotomy between human works and 
Christ, similarly 34 is essentially the conclusion of the main syllogism, that justification 
is by faith alone). A third potential criticism might be that his opponents were unlikely to 
accept some—if not all—of both the unexpressed and the expressed premises in the 
proof. For example, the opponents might argue against the unexpressed major premise 
that sets off the chain (30) that Melanchthon has made a false dichotomy, that Christ 
working in a person produces good works and that those good works are the basis for a 
                                                 
136 Whether or not justification is limited to forgiveness is another matter. 
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person’s forgiveness and justification. In response, Melanchthon might answer in two 
ways: (a) that the opponent’s claim would not apply in the case of a person’s initial 
justification because apart from grace a person’s works have no merit and cannot bring 
about forgiveness and justification, or (b) that, while a person’s justification does 
necessarily bring about good works, the works are only correlative and not the cause of 
the justification. Against the expressed minor premise of the second syllogism in the 
proof (31, that all propitiation is by Christ), the opponents might argue that the merits of 
works done either before or after grace can appease God’s wrath, or, against the 
expressed minor premise of the third syllogism in the proof (32, that no obtaining 
forgiveness is by works) they might argue that works do obtain forgiveness. Perhaps if 
Melanchthon himself had thought the proof was completely convincing he would have 
stopped after expressing it; instead, he offers other arguments for justification being only 
by faith, and he also addresses some of the very counterclaims that have just been 
suggested. 
 Melanchton’s arguments from the second and third positions Melanchton 
supposes his opponents will grant are not as elaborately developed. The second position 
is that God forgives because of the Propitiator, Christ, and that His propitiation must be 
received by faith, which necessity of faith Melanchton “proves”, though he does not call 
the process that, by referring to Romans 3:25 and Hebrews 4:14-16.137 The third position 
is that Christ can be received only by faith, which position Melanchthon supports with 
Acts 10:43, which passage itself claims the support of all the prophets, or, as 
Melanchthon puts it, “the authority of the church” (ecclesiae auctoritatem; die christliche 
Kirchen oder katholick Kirche).138 
                                                 
137 Ap IV:82, Tappert, 118. Though Melanchton only refers to parts of the Bible verses, they 
follow in full. Romans 3:25: “Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to 
declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God” (KJV). 
Hebrews 4:14-16: “Seeing then that we have a great high priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the 
Son of God, let us hold fast our profession. For we have not an high priest which cannot be touched with 
the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us therefore 
come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need.” 
(KJV) 
138 Ap IV:83, Tappert, 118-119; BKS, 177. The German version adds Denn wenn alle heilige 
Propheten zeugen, das ist je ein herrlich, groß, trefflich, stark Decret und Zeugnis (“For when all the holy 
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 The fourth position that Melanchthon supposes and then argues from is that 
forgiveness is promised for Christ’s sake, which, because of the nature of a promise and 
multiple Bible passages, leads him to the conclusion that forgiveness is accepted by faith 
alone. 
 Quarto. Remissio peccatorum est res promissa propter Christum. 
Igitur non potest accipi nisi sola fide. Nam promissio accipi non potest nisi 
sola fide. Rom. 4.: Ideo ex fide, ut sit firma promissio, secundum gratiam; 
quasi dicat: si penderet res ex meritis nostris, incerta et inutilis esset 
promissio, quia nunquam constituere possemus, quando satis meriti 
essemus. Idque facile intelligere queunt peritae conscientiae. Ideo Paulus 
ait Gal. 3.: Conclusit Deus omnia sub peccatum, ut promissio ex fide Iesu 
Christi detur credentibus. Hic detrahit meritum nobis, quia dicit omnes 
reos esse et conclusos sub peccatum; deinde addit promissionem, videlicet 
remissionis peccatorum et iustificationis, dari, et addit, quomodo accipi 
promissio possit, videlicet fide. Atque haec ratio sumpta ex natura 
promissionis apud Paulum praecipua est et saepe repetitur. Neque 
excogitari neque fingi quidquam potest, quo hoc Pauli argumentum everti 
queat. Proinde non patiantur se bonae mentes depelli ab hac sententia, 
quod tantum fide accipiamus remissionem propter Christum. In hac habent 
certam et firmam consolationem adversus peccati terrores et adversus 
aeternam mortem et adversus omnes portas inferorum. 
 Zum vierten, Vergebung der Sunde ist verheißen um Christus 
willen. Darum kann sie niemands erlangen, denn allein durch den 
Glauben. Denn die Verheißung kann man nicht fassen noch derselben 
teilhaftig werden, denn allein durch den Glauben. Röm. 4: „Derhalben 
muß die Gerechtigkeit durch den Glauben kommen, auf daß sie sei aus 
Gnaden und die Verheißung fest bleibe.“ Gleich als sollt er sagen: so 
unser Heil und Gerechtigkeit auf unserm Verdienst stünde, so wäre die 
Verheißung Gottes immer noch ungewiß und wäre uns unnütz; denn wir 
könnten nimmer des gewiß sein, wenn wir gnug verdienet hätten. Und 
dieses verstehen fromme Herzen und christliche Gewissen fast wohl, 
nähmen nicht tausend Welt, daß unser Heil auf uns stünde. Damit stimmt 
Paulus zun Galatern: „Gott hat alles unter der Sunde beschlossen, daß die 
Verheißung aus dem Glauben Jesu Christi den Gläubigen widerfahre.“ Da 
stößt Paulus allen unser Verdienst danieder; denn er sagt: wir sind alle 
schüldig des Todes und unter der Sunde beschlossen, und gedenkt der 
göttlichen Zusage, dadurch wir allein Vergebung der Sunde erlangen, und 
                                                                                                                                                 
prophets bear witness, that is certainly a glorious, great excellent, powerful decretal and testimony” 
[Triglotta, 145]).  
 Acts 10:43: “To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in 
him shall receive remission of sins” (KJV). 
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setzt noch weiter dazu, wie wir der Verheissung teilhaftig werden, nämlich 
durch den Glauben. Und dieser Grund, dieses Argument, da Paulus aus 
Art und Natur der göttlichen Verheissung schleußt, nämlich also: so 
Gottes Verheißung gewiss sein und feststehen soll, wie sie nicht feilen 
kann, so muss Vergebung der Sunde nicht aus unserm Verdienst sein, 
sonst wäre sie ungewiß, und wüßten nicht, wann wir genug verdienet 
hätten. Ja dies Argument, sage ich, und der Grund ist ein rechter Fels, und 
fast das stärkste im ganzen Paulo, und wirdet gar oft erholet und 
angezogen in allen Episteln. Es wird auch nimmermehr auf Erden ein 
Mensch etwas trachten und dichten oder erdenken, dadurch der einig 
Grund allein, wenn sonst nichts wäre, müge umgestoßen werden. Es 
werden auch fromme Herzen und christliche Gewissen sich in keinen Weg 
lassen hievon abführen, nämlich daß wir allein durch den Glauben um 
Christus Verdienstes willen Vergebung der Sunde haben. Denn da haben 
sie ein gewissen, starken, ewigen Trost wider die Sunde, Teufel, Tod, 
Hölle. Das andere alles ist ein Sandgrund und bestehet nicht in 
Anfechtungen. 
 Fourth, the forgiveness of sins is a thing promised for Christ’s 
sake. Therefore it can be accepted only by faith, since a promise can only 
be accepted on faith. In Rom. 4:16 Paul says, “That is why it depends on 
faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be guaranteed,” as 
though he were to say, “If it depended on our merits, the promise would be 
uncertain and useless inasmuch as we could never determine whether we 
had merited enough.” Experienced consciences can readily understand this 
[and would not, for a thousand worlds have our salvation depend upon 
ourselves]. Therefore Paul says (Gal. 3:22), “God consigned all things to 
sin, that what was promised to faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those 
who believe.” Here he denies us any merit, for he says that all are guilty 
and consigned to sin. Then he adds that the promise of the forgiveness of 
sins and justification is a gift, and further that the promise can be accepted 
by faith. Based upon the nature of a promise, this is Paul’s chief argument 
[a veritable rock], which he often repeats (Rom. 4:16; Gal. 3:18). Nothing 
one can devise or imagine will refute Paul’s argument. So pious men 
should not let themselves be diverted from this declaration, that we receive 
the forgiveness of sins for Christ’s sake only by faith; here they have a 
certain and firm consolation against the terrors of sin, against eternal 
death, and against all the gates of hell (Matt. 16:18). [Everything else is a 
foundation of sand that sinks in trials.]139 
                                                 
139 Ap IV:84-85, BKS, 177-178; Tappert, 119. The English translations of the German additions 
are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 145, 147. Tappert’s translation leaves something to be 
desired; the parallel nisi sola fide is not rendered in a parallel fashion: “accepted only by faith … only be 
accepted on faith”. Compare the parallel “except by faith alone” (Tappert, 145) and the parallel “in any 
other way than by faith alone” (K-W, 134). 
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Melanchthon’s argument in the preceding paragraph can be represented syllogistically as 
follows. 
36) Anything by which one accepts forgiveness (P) is that by which one accepts a thing promised 
for Christ’s sake (M). 
37) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ’s sake (M). 
38) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one accepts forgiveness (P)140 
39) Nothing by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ’s sake (P) is that which depends on 
merits (M). 
40) [Everything other than faith (S) is that which depends on merits (M).] 
37) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ’s sake 
(P). 
41) If [accepting what is promised] depended on merits (p), then the promise would be useless (q) 
42) [The promise is not useless (~q)] 
39) Accepting what is promised does not depend on our merits (~p) 
43) [All love and works (M) are things that depend on merits (P).] 
44) [Everything (that accepts what is promised) other than faith (S) is love and works (M)] 
40) [Everything other than faith (S) is that which depends on merits (P).] 
Much as with the first position Melanchthon supposed his opponents would grant, with 
the fourth he also takes that position as a major premise (36), expresses a minor (37), and 
then draws the similar conclusion (38) that only by faith can people accept forgiveness, 
that is, that justification is by faith alone. (Notably Melanchthon used a second-figure 
syllogism in the valid AEE mood known as Cambestres.) Again like with the first 
assumed position, Melanchthon then proceeds to prove the minor premise (37), although 
he does not specify that is what he is doing. While there are again three steps to the proof 
of the minor (37), the steps are relatively different (although the main syllogism in the 
proof of the minor is also a second-figure syllogism in the valid mood EAE known as 
Cesare). Melanchthon begins the proof of the minor (37) by adducing Romans 4:16 in its 
support and rephrasing the passage as the major premise (39) in the proof of the minor, 
which itself is proved using propositional logic, drawing the major premise (39) as a 
conclusion from the inference rule known as modus tollens operating on one expressed 
premise (41) and one unexpressed but implied premise (42). Melanchthon does not seem 
                                                 
140 Another way of getting to the same conclusion would be the following Barbara syllogism: 
 All by way of accepting a promise (M) is faith (P). 
 All receiving of forgiveness (S) is by way of accepting a promise (M). 
 All receiving of forgiveness (S) is faith (P). 
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to offer a proof of the minor premise (40) for the proof of the minor (37), although two 
premises (43 and 44) that would produce the minor as a conclusion of a first-figure 
syllogism in the valid AAA mood known as Barbara can easily be taken as implied. One 
potential attack on the minor (40) in the proof of the minor (37) is that faith itself could 
be considered a work, but Melanchthon argues elsewhere that being made righteous by 
faith must be understood as faith laying hold of Christ on whose account people are 
righteous.141 Other potential counter-arguments seem to be taken up within the broader 
sweep of Apology IV. In the final analysis, although Melanchthon’s argument is rational 
and depends on the nature of a promise as expressed in Scripture,142 the ultimate goal of 
his argument is the comfort of the sinner, something that ultimately God accomplishes 
only by the very faith Melanchthon is arguing justifies. 
Subsequent “arguments” regarding Justification 
 Apology IV is not the only place Melanchthon and the Reformers argue 
syllogistically in support of the chief locus of justification by faith alone. Although the 
works considered in this subsection—namely, Melanchthon’s theses for a disputation 
titled “We Are Justified by Faith and Not by Love”, Melanchthon’s Loci Communes, and 
Chemnitz’s Loci Theologici—are outside of The Book of Concord, they nevertheless 
relate quite directly to it. 
 As Melanchthon was finishing the Apology of the Augsburg Confession early in 
1531, he wrote more than three dozen theses about the relationship between justification 
and works, which theses he then printed and distributed for reactions to his arguments 
used in the teaching on righteousness. The theses were titled as if for a disputation on the 
topic “We are Justified by Faith and Not by Love”, and the three groups into which 
                                                 
141 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109; Philipp Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian 
Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, trans. Clyde L. Manschreck, Library of Protestant Thought (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1965), 167. 
142 Melanchthon does not explain why the nature of a promise presupposes faith, but one can 
easily understand why. Even between two people, one person promising to do something for the other gives 
a higher degree of expectation than the one saying he or she might do something for the other. In the case 
of God, the promise is absolutely certain, so the promise can elicit faith, and the believer can be comforted. 
Of course, Scripture is how God’s promise is communicated to people, so Melanchthon’s leap is not as 
wide as it might seem at first glance. 
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Melanchthon places the theses essentially correspond with the headings of the last three 
subsections of Apology IV. Even though not every syllogistic argument in Apology IV 
has been extracted, some of the premises used in the syllogisms extracted above from 
Apology IV nevertheless can be found among the theses.143 Moreover, the philosophical 
nature of a disputation for which the theses were ostensibly prepared at least indirectly 
has influenced the argument over justification in Apology IV. 
 There are also relevant syllogistic arguments over justification in Melanchthon’s 
Loci Communes, which Luther once praised by saying, “No better book has been written 
after the Holy Scriptures than Philip’s” (Non est melior liber post scripturam sanctam).144 
Melanchthon’s Loci essentially had four editions: the first edition from 1521-1522 
(Latin), the second edition from 1535-1543 (Latin), the third edition (Latin) of 1543, and 
the fourth edition of 1555 (German).145 In the preface to his translation of the 1543 
edition, Preus comments of the different editions, “they are quite different, both in the 
titles of the loci and in their content, as well as in length”146 The first edition notably was 
published before the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, while the second and all 
subsequent editions were published after those two works. A comparison between the 
various editions of the Loci finds the arguments related to justification in some cases 
                                                 
143 See Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 140-143. The theses are translated there 
by Charles P. Arand as found in Philipp Melanchthon, “Melanchthons loci praecipui und Theses über die 
Rechtfertigung aus dem Jahre 1531,” Abhandlungen Alexander von Oettingen zum siebenzigsten 
Geburtstag gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern, ed. Johannes Haussleiter (Munich: Beck, 1898). The 
introduction in Kolb-Nestigen refers to 38 theses, but Arand’s translation lists 39. 
 Examples of theses from the 1531 disputation similar to premises extracted from The Book of 
Concord in this dissertation follow. On thesis #5, see premises 7, 10, 29, 34, 74, and 80. On thesis 8, see 
premise 12. On thesis12, see premise 9. On thesis 14, see premise 44. And, on thesis 15, see premises 14, 
15, 16, and 18. 
144 Luther’s tabletalk recorded by Caspar Heydenreich in the winter of 1542-1543, #5511, 
translated by Theodore G. Tappert in AE 54:440; WA Tr 5:204. This sentence in Latin comes in the midst 
of an entry that is otherwise predominantly German. 
145 Confer and compare the history of Melanchthon’s Loci in Hill (“Prolegomena"), who follows 
the seven periods laid out by Georg Theodor Strobel, Versuch einer litterär Geschichte von Philipp 
Melanchthons Locis theologicis als dem ersten evangelischen Lehrbuche (Altdorf und Nürnberg: L. 
Schüpfel, Universitäts Buchhändles, 1776). 
146 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 7-8. 
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expanded and developed but in other cases also contracted.147 At the locus of Good 
Works in his 1543 Loci Communes, Melanchthon delineates eighteen different major 
arguments of his opponents regarding justification by faith, what Melanchthon identifies 
in the arguments’ introduction as “the very essence of the Gospel”.148 Melanchthon 
presents most of the arguments as complete syllogisms, although some lack the minor 
premise in keeping with the more-rhetorical use of the syllogism and others are simply 
Bible passages incorrectly understood. A listing of the eighteen arguments149 and 
Melanchthon’s point of attack follows.150  
1. Righteousness is obedience to the commandments, faith is not the work of the 
commandments, so not justified by faith (grants major, attacks shift in meaning of 
righteousness)151 
2. Impossible for knowledge alone to justify, faith is only knowledge, so impossible 
for faith alone to justify (attacks minor that faith is only knowledge)152 
3. The person without love remains in death, [presumably for the opponents a person 
with faith alone is without love, and presumably death is the opposite of being 
righteous], so impossible to say a person is righteous by faith alone (grants the 
                                                 
147 Melanchthon’s dedicatory letter to the 1521 Loci lists capita (“heads”) of “faith” and “renewal 
through Christ” but not “justification” or “sanctification”, although in the section “On Justification and 
Faith” there are some similarities to the more fully-developed arguments discussed in the text below 
(Melanchthon, The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521], 171-202). See also the 33 summary 
statements on law, Gospel, and faith (pp.215-218). As for a distinction between justification and 
sanctification, see also in the 1521 edition “On the Efficacy of Faith”, where, works are described as the 
fruits of the Spirit and signs of faith (pp.202-204). And, in the section “On the Old and New Man”, 
Melanchthon regards sanctification as not perfected (p.234), which, although his senses of the words are 
not strict, is similar to his earlier statement that justification is just begun and not completed (p.197). 
 The discussion that follows in the text follows the third edition of 1543, but the notes indicate 
some of the similarities with the first edition of 1521-1522, with the second edition that covered 1535-1543 
and has never been translated into English (found in CR 21:230 ff.), and with the fourth edition of 1555. 
148 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 107-108. 
149 In the German 1555 Loci, the number of counter-arguments is reduced to eight (Melanchthon, 
Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 163-172). 
150 Not all of the arguments are syllogistic; #9 and #10, for examples, seem more to be arguments 
by analogy. In some sections dealing with these major arguments there are other related syllogistic 
arguments, passages, etc. On the whole, confer Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, 630-639. 
151 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 108. Confer #5 in Melanchthon, Melanchthon on 
Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 167-169. 
152 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 108-109. Confer #2 in Melanchthon, The Loci communes 
of Philip Melanchthon [1521], 172-173; #1-2 in Melanchthon, Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci 
communes, 1555, 163-165. 
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argument if faith is understood as never alone and argues that the exclusive 
particle does not exclude the presence of virtues)153 
4. Righteous by faith, faith is a work, so righteous by works (argues major must be 
understood correlatively that faith lays hold of Christ on whose account people 
are righteous)154 
5. Righteous by grace, grace is infused love, so righteous by infused love (minor 
defines grace incorrectly)155 
6. Impossible to know will of God toward a person, to believe in grace is to affirm 
something about the will of God toward a person, so affirm something impossible 
when saying a person must believe he or she is in grace (grants major but only 
outside of God’s revelation and argues human reason problematic on this 
matter)156 
7. No one pleases God without attitudes from Holy Spirit, no one can affirm these 
attitudes because they are similar to virtues from human reason, so no one can 
affirm he or she pleases God (denies minor and argues affirmation is based on 
God’s Word)157 
8. Theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) are separate and distinct, if faith is 
confidence then also hope, so distinction of virtues is lost (effectively denies the 
major by arguing that virtues always joined in a correlative sense)158 
9. Evil works merit punishments, [evil works are comparable to good works and 
punishments are comparable to eternal life], so good works merit eternal life 
(contrary points are not completely comparable)159 
10. Sin is hatred of God, so righteousness is love of God (not completely parallel, 
despite what the philosophers say)160 
11. Righteousness is in will, faith is not in will, so not justified by faith (deny minor 
by arguing faith as assent is in intellect and is joined with trust in will)161 
                                                 
153 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. Confer #3 and 7 in Melanchthon, Melanchthon on 
Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 165-167, 171. 
154 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. Confer CR 21:443; #4 in Melanchthon, 
Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 167. 
155 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. 
156 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. Confer #6 in Melanchthon, Melanchthon on 
Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 169-171. 
157 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110. 
158 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110. 
159 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110. 
160 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110. 
161 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110-111. Confer CR 21:444. 
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12. James 2:24 justified by works and not faith alone (in that context faith is 
understood only as historical fact, profession of dogma without trust; similarly 
argues to justify means be approved but not in this context forgiven)162 
13. 1 Corinthians 13:2 have faith without love is nothing (like #3, Melanchthon grants 
this argument and that love must be present but denies reconciliation on love’s 
account)163 
14. Matthew 19:7 Jesus’ says keep commandments to enter life so must be possible to 
keep them and merit life by obedience (fail to distinguish law and Gospel, 
adduces many other passages)164 
15. Matthew 6:14 one who forgives is forgiven (law and promises both present but 
not linked as cause and effect, for adding of the condition would make it 
uncertain; adduces other passages such as Isaiah 1:17-18; 58:7-8; Daniel 4:27)165 
16. Greatest virtue justifies most greatly, love is greatest virtue, so love justifies most 
greatly (grants major in terms of Christ but not in terms of people; light of truth 
drives out Epicurean and academic darkness)166 
17. Luke 7:47 woman’s many sins forgiven because she loved much, so remission is 
on account of love (twofold absolution or synechdoche)167 
18. Eternal life is a reward, [rewards are owed on account of works], so eternal life is 
owed on account of works (eternal life is reward but for another reason; 
opponents very mixed up on rewards and merits affecting their interpretation of 
other passages, such as Matthew 5:12; 10:42; 2 Corinthians 5:10)168 
As with the 1531 theses discussed above being present in the extracted syllogisms, many 
of these arguments are also present in Apology IV.169  
                                                 
162 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 111. Confer #5 in Melanchthon, The Loci communes of 
Philip Melanchthon [1521], 178-182; CR 21:439-440.  
163 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 111-112. Confer #7 in Melanchthon, Melanchthon on 
Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 171; CR 21:440. 
164 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 112. Confer CR 21:438-439. 
165 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 112-113. Confer CR 21:440-441. 
166 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 113-114. Confer #8 in Melanchthon, Melanchthon on 
Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 171-172. 
167 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 114. Confer #6 in Melanchthon, The Loci communes of 
Philip Melanchthon [1521], 182. 
168 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 114-116. Confer #7 in Melanchthon, The Loci communes 
of Philip Melanchthon [1521], 198-200; CR 21:441-443. 
169 Examples of major arguments from the Loci similar to passages from Apology IV follow. On 
major argument 1, see ¶49. On major argument 2, see ¶48. On major argument 3, see ¶73-74. On major 
argument 13, see ¶118-224. And, on major argument 15, see ¶261-268. 
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 Martin Chemnitz’s Loci Theologici, a posthumously published commentary and 
expansion of Melanchthon’s Loci Communes, reproduces Melanchthon’s arguments but 
also sets up classes of arguments and shows how to respond correctly to them. Chemnitz 
offers four reasons for examining the arguments and solidly refuting them: first, to keep 
faith from uncertainty; second, to “convince the gainsayers”; third, to raise awareness of 
erring positions; and fourth, to let the antitheses illuminate points that otherwise might be 
missed.170 While Chemnitz acknowledged not only Melanchthon but also Johannes 
Aepinus (1499-1553) who effectively refuted opponents’ arguments with good 
explanations, he also thought analyzing all individual arguments was “an enormous and 
fruitless endeavor”. So, instead of setting forth and analyzing all the arguments, such as 
Melanchthon’s 18 (but not taking away anything from his and others’ work), Chemnitz 
set up eleven classes of arguments that could be applied to whatever argument the 
opponents might raise.171 Many of the classes pertain to reconciling what otherwise might 
be taken to be contradictory passages of Holy Scripture. A listing of the eleven classes 
follows, with the essence of Chemnitz’s response given in parentheses. 
1. Conversion can be thought of as having three ordered parts (faith, contrition, and 
new obedience) so faith alone is not enough (faith is the only part of conversion 
that causes justification by laying hold of the Gospel promise and thereby 
providing comfort)172 
2. Human reason argues against the righteousness of the Gospel on the basis of the 
philosophers’ and Pharisees’ thinking about civil righteousness (some passages 
speak about righteousness before human beings and others of righteousness 
before God, which righteousness before God people cannot obtain on their 
own)173 
3. According to the teaching of the law, philosophers, civil righteousness, and 
popular speech words such as “justification”, “righteousness”, “grace”, 
“imputation”, “faith”, etc. are used differently than those who support justification 
by faith would claim (Scripture, and even different authors within Scripture, use 
the words differently than in common speech)174 
                                                 
170 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:639. 
171 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:639, 649. 
172 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:639-640. 
173 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:640. 
174 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:640. 
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4. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say that justification is based on the 
way we live (some passages describe the quality or character of the justified)175 
5. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say that repentance mitigates 
punishment (some passages referring to temporal punishments are misapplied to 
eternal punishments)176 
6. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say there are rewards for deeds 
(rewards of this life must be distinguished from rewards of the next life, and 
rewards in heaven for certain deeds cannot be understood as if heaven itself were 
a reward for deeds)177 
7. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say certain deeds are righteous (faith’s 
righteousness before God is different from the righteousness of works that follows 
faith’s righteousness, works in the abstract can be said to be pleasing to God, and 
there are various reasons for why works might be said to be righteous but not on 
the merit of the work itself)178 
8. In some passages of Scripture saints seem to trust in their own works by opposing 
their own righteousness or innocence to God’s judgment (they are speaking of the 
rightness of their cause)179 
9. Some passages can be taken to say salvation depends on the individual person 
(the correct teaching of salvation not by works but freely by grace through faith is 
clear in many passages that can explain the others)180 
10. Old Testament rites and rituals seem to justify ex opere operato (they pointed to 
Christ without faith in whom no one was saved, just as with New Testament 
sacraments)181 
11. Some passages can be taken to say certain actions do away with sin (those 
passages speak not of propitiation but repentance)182 
Although Chemnitz does not delineate any connections between his eleven classes of 
arguments and the 18 specific arguments of the opponents Melanchthon detailed, there 
                                                 
175 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:640-642. 
176 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:642-644. 
177 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:644-646. 
178 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:646-647. 
179 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:647-648. 
180 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:648. 
181 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:648-649. 
182 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:649. 
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are some obvious connections, as there are similarities between Melanchthon’s refutation 
of the opponents’ arguments in Chemnitz’s Loci and Chemnitz’s refutation in SD III.183 
Summary of Ap IV:75-121’s argument 
 For the Reformers, Justification is the chief locus of the faith, and in many ways 
the locus is the center of The Book of Concord and its syllogistic reasoning, with 
Melanchthon’s Apology IV on Justification being its longest article. Although chiefly in 
Apology IV:75-121, essentially from the beginning of Apology IV to its end (as well as 
both before the Apology and after), Melanchthon uses syllogistic reasoning fully in 
keeping with the forms and terminology of the logic of the medieval tradition, even if 
showing a penchant for syllogisms in the second figure with the valid moods Cesare and 
Cambestres. In The Book of Concord as a whole and in Apology IV in particular, the 
Reformers criticize philosophy and philosophers in regards to justification and 
righteousness,184 but, somewhat ironically, at the same time—sometimes within words of 
each other—they make use of philosophy’s methods to demonstrate the truth of their 
claims. Justification, righteousness before God, forgiveness of sins—all are only by faith 
in the merits of Christ, with love, civil righteousness, and the works of the law excluded 
as a cause of justification, although necessarily occurring as a result of justification. 
Melanchthon argues from positions he expects his opponents would grant and brings in 
other evidence from Scripture and Church Fathers. In keeping with a custom that goes 
back at least as far as Aristotle, Melanchthon does not delineate every premise or 
syllogism (although plausible completions have been given); instead he leans more 
toward the rhetorical use of dialectic and demonstration. If in the end one is left thinking 
that the Reformers’ syllogisms in support of justification by faith alone are less than 
convincing, one wonders whether in the end Melanchthon and the other Reformers would 
have much of a problem with that. For Melanchthon at least,185 logical methods cannot 
discover or affirm but only confirm the message of the Gospel; the message of the 
                                                 
183 Examples of Chemnitz’s classes of arguments similar to passages from SD III follow. On class 
1, see ¶9-21, 25. On class 3, see ¶22-35. And, on class 4, see ¶45. 
184 See the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.79. 
185 See the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.199. 
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Gospel, like justification itself, can only be received by faith. If in the end the arguments 
on justification do not convince, the arguments nevertheless might still serve the other 
three of Chemnitz’s four purposes.186 
 Although this section has focused on syllogistic arguments “proving” that 
forgiveness is by faith, such use of syllogistic reasoning is but one part of the larger 
picture of The Book of Concord’s use of deductive reasoning. Although Apology IV’s 
treatment of justification continues to be treated in some of the following subsections, 
those subsections are intended to make other points and provide other parts of the larger 
picture. 
Replying to opponents’ arguments, as in Ap IV:182 
 At the end of Apology IV’s section on Love and the Keeping of the Law, 
Melanchthon succinctly states what he has been arguing in the immediately preceding 
paragraphs: that love and works of the law do not justify but nevertheless follow 
justification by faith alone. (The German version of the following paragraph is notably 
different and the syllogistic argument is at least less explicit.) 
 Ex his constat sola fide nos iustificari coram Deo, quia sola fide 
accipimus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem propter Christum, 
quia reconciliatio seu iustificatio est res promissa propter Christum, non 
propter legem. Itaque sola fide accipitur, etsi donato Spiritu Sancto 
sequitur legis impletio. 
 From this it is evident that we are justified before God by faith 
alone, since by faith alone we receive the forgiveness of sins and 
reconciliation for Christ’s sake, and reconciliation or justification is 
something promised because of Christ, and not because of the law. 
Therefore it is received by faith alone, though the keeping of the law 
follows with the gift of the Holy Spirit. 
 Aus dem allen ist klar genug, daß allein der Glaube uns für Gott 
gerecht macht, das ist, er erlanget Vergebung der Sunde und Gnade um 
Christus willen und bringt uns zu einer neuen Geburt. Item, so ists klar 
genug, daß wir allein durch den Glauben den heiligen Geist empfangen; 
item daß unsere Werk und da wir anfanhen, das Gesetz zu halten, an ihm 
selbst Gott nicht gefallen. So ich nu, wenn ich gleich voll guter Werke bin, 
wie Paulus war und Petrus, dennoch anderswo muß meine Gerechtigkeit 
                                                 
186 See above at n.170, p.256. 
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suchen, nämlich in der Verheißung der Gnade Christi, item so allein der 
Glaube das Gewissen stillet, so muß je das gewiß sein, daß allein der 
Glaub für Gott gerecht macht. Denn wir müssen allezeit dabei bleiben, 
wollen wir recht lehren, daß wir nicht um des Gesetzes willen, nicht um 
Werke willen, sondern um Christus willen Gott angenehm sein. Denn die 
Ehre, so Christo gebühret, soll man nicht dem Gesetz oder unsern elenden 
Werken geben. 
 From this it is clear enough that only faith makes us righteous 
before God, that is, it obtains the forgiveness of sin and grace for Christ’s 
sake, and brings us to a new birth. Likewise, it is clear enough that only by 
faith do we receive the Holy Spirit, likewise, that our works and where we 
begin to keep the Commandments by themselves do not please God. So 
now I, even if I am full of good works like Paul and Peter were, yet I must 
seek my righteousness elsewhere, namely in the promise of the grace of 
Christ; likewise, if only faith stills the conscience, so indeed it must be 
certain that only faith makes righteous before God. For, we must always 
remain with this, if we wish to teach correctly, that not on account of the 
law, not on account of works, but for Christ’s sake do we please God. For 
the honor, due Christ, must not be given to the law or our miserable 
works.187 
                                                 
187 Ap IV:182, BKS, 196; Tappert, 132. The English translation of the German is this author’s 
adaption of the the Triglotta, 171. In translating the Latin, Tappert loses the sense of the double quia 
construction that makes explicit the two premises from which the preceding conclusion follows (confer 
Jacobs, I:114; but compare the Triglotta, 171). In translating the German, the Triglotta refers to “inchoate 
fulfilling of the law”, and, while the word itself is not present in the German text, the idea behind the word 
is nevertheless expressed.  
 As here in Apology IV:182, the authors and translators of the works in The Book of Concord 
elsewhere make notable use of the impersonal Latin verb constat ( 3rd person singular, present active 
indicative of consto, constare, constati, constatus) for things that are “agreed, evident, understood, correct, 
or well-known” (Whitaker, Words by William Whitaker; Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, 439). 
Variously translated into English, by such words as “clearly”, the expression also refers to a wide variety of 
things, the clarity of which one might well argue, as clearly the Reformers opponents did and even the 
Reformers must have suspected, since in some cases they add the support (see examples noted in the 
following).  
 The things that are said to be clear can be grouped as follows. There are obvious interpretations of 
Scripture: Ap IV:238; XII:197. Things about the Reformers’ teaching are said to be manifestly evident: two 
parts of penitence (AC XII:2), good works required (Ap IV:140, seems to be demonstrated), and absolution 
and keys bringing comfort (XI:2). Especially things directly pertaining to justification by faith are said to 
be understood: monks taught observances make satisfaction and merit grace and justification (AC 
XXVII:38), faith alone justifies (Ap IV:182, demonstrated with syllogism), neither works nor the law 
justify (Ap IV:195, 257), obedience is distributive righteousness (Ap IV:308), promise given and Christ 
revealed because people can’t keep the law (XII:80), people have given up offices and marriages to be 
holier (Ap XV:26), and monastic vows do not pay the price for forgiveness (Ap XXVII:35). A number of 
general rules or principles are said to be well-known: that customs contrary to God’s Word are not 
approved (AC XXII:9, where support from church canons is immediately cited); how prayers end (Ap 
IV:385); wicked belong to the body of the devil (Ap VII/VIII:29); people do not remember or understand 
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sins (XI:8, according to Psalm 19:2); keys do not remove common troubles (Ap XII:154); allegories do not 
prove anything (Ap XXIV:35 discussed below at n.138); command of God to flee from idolatry, impious 
doctrine, and unjust cruelty (Tr 58); no other God apart from the God (LC I:19); Saul was a great king (LC 
I:45); Third Commandment is in force and fulfilled where one’s life and work are guided by God’s Word 
(LC I:92); people kill someone if they have the means to save the person but do not (LC I:190); Christians 
must recognize inherited and actual sin (SD I:5); and there have been different explanations of Christ’s 
descent (SD IX:1). Constat is also used in connection with things that are not known: who changed the 
practice of communing in two kinds (AC XXII:4) and when or if the Mantua council will be held (SA 
Preface:1). However, the largest group consists of uses directly against the Reformers’ opponents (Roman 
and reformed): priests were married (AC XXIII:10, examples given), there had long been complaints about 
masses (AC XXIV:10), vows displeased understanding monks (AC XXVII:10), traditions multiplied (AC 
XXVIII:37), prelates put more importance on their own authority than on the Gospel (Ap IV:390 [first 
use]), theologians mix philosophy with teaching (Ap IV:390 [second use]), cruelty towards godly men 
shows their spirit (Ap IV:399), foolish opinions about traditions crept into the church (Ap VII/VIII:32), 
poor judgment evident by thinking of Gospel as external (Ap XVI:8), invocation of saints is an innovation 
(Ap XXI:13 [see above at n.90, p.162]), both kinds instituted for church (Ap XXII:4), celibacy a 
superstition and dangerous (Ap XXIII:6 [see above at n.63, p.218]), friars multiplied private masses (Ap 
XXIV:7), no scriptural proof for masses for the dead (Ap XXIV:92 [see the discussion in the text below, 
beginning on p.297]), monastic abuses (Ap XXVII:4), twisting of Scripture (Ap XXVII:43), nothing 
commanded regarding the dead in purgatory (SA II:ii:12), no command for pilgrimages (SA II:ii:18); 
kingdom of Christ scattered all over world and not everyone is ordained or confirmed by the pope (Tr 16), 
Christ not sent to possess a worldly kingdom (Tr 31), Roman pontiffs defend godless teachings and 
practices (Tr 39), the pope rules in the church as a kingdom set upon the pretext of Scripture (Tr 40), all 
pastors have jurisdiction to excommunicate (Tr 74), Roman officials exercise arbitrariness (Tr 74), the real 
presence is true on account of Christ’s words (LC V:14, consequence connection made), Christ’s body and 
blood are not a vain thing (LC V:30), Anabaptist righteousness is a self-chosen spirituality (Ep XII:5), and 
apart from Christ people are dupes and captives of sin (SD II:43, in a Luther quote originally in German).  
 The German translation of the Latin constat and the use of constat to translate German is worth 
noting. The Latin word is used in a number of sections the German translation omits (including some that 
are more-technical in nature): Ap IV:195, 257, 308, 385, 390 [twice], 399. Where there are German 
equivalents, they are as follows: ist wahr(e) (AC XII:2; SD I:5), dies wahr (Tr 40), (je) am Tag(e) (AC 
XXVII:38; XXVIII:37; Ap XXVII:4; Tr 31, 39), ist (es) gewiss (Ap IV:140, 238; VII/VIII:29; XI:8; 
XII:80, 154; XXI:13; XXII:4; XXIV:7, 92; SA II:ii:18; Tr 16, 74), klar genug (Ap IV:182), man weiß 
(XII:137; XV:26; SA Preface:1 [nicht]), So steht (Tr 58), and so muss auch (LC IV:46). In two places in 
the Augsburg Confession the German version goes further than its equally authoritative Latin: ist es auch 
den Historien und der Väter Schriften zu beweisen (AC XXIII:10); auf mancherlei Weise (AC XXIV:10). 
The Latin constat is an addition in the majority of the cases of translated German works (SA II:ii:12; LC 
I:19, 45, 92, 190; LC V:14, 30; Ep XII:5; SD II:43 ; IX:1). Moreover, a number of those additions go 
beyond the simple use of constat, adding the following: satis (Ap XXVII:35), pro certo (LC I:19, 190), and 
pro certo sane (LC I:45).  
 Melanchthon, the only author of the works in The Book of Concord writing in Latin, used constat 
the most, and he seemed to use it rhetorically, where the degree to which something was “evident” was 
most likely in question. The Latin translators of the German works used constat, but their uses generally 
were additions with some sort of amplification for neither of which was there a corresponding statement in 
the German original.  
 Similar is the use in Ap IV:182 by the German translator of the Apology of the Augsburg 
Confession of the German expression klar genug. The expression is most often used in connection with 
justification by faith (Ap IV:67 [sumi potest], 182 [twice, the second is an addition in the German], 220 [a 
German addition], 362 [supra ostendiumus]; Ap XXIII:64 [diximus]; Ap XXVII:14 [testatur]). But, the 
phrase is also used regarding James being on the Reformers side (Ap IV:248, Ex his liquet), that the 
sacraments are efficacious when distributed by evil men (Ap VII/VIII:29, satis clare diximus), that one 
accepts the promise by faith before keeping the laws (Ap XII:87, satis perspicua), that the Gospel does not 
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Melanchthon’s argument in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows. 
32) All that justifies (P) is a thing that receives what is promised because of Christ and not because 
of the law (M). 
33) Nothing other than faith (S) is a thing that receives what is promised because of Christ and not 
because of the law (M). 
34) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P). 
The foregoing final argument in the “Love and the Keeping of the Law” section of 
Apology IV again uses a syllogism in the form of the second figure with the valid mood 
AEE known as Cambestres, although Melanchthon seems to give the argument in the text 
in the inverse order before restating the conclusion and the effect justification causes. 
Likewise, again the minor premise (46) is the critical argument, and one his opponents 
are not so likely to think is “evident” or “clear enough”.188 In short, Melanchthon’s 
practice has not changed from one section of Apology IV to the next. The German 
version of this paragraph essentially removes the premises, but the content it inserts 
addresses potential counter-arguments to the minor premise. This paragraph is not the 
only example of the German version simplifying or adding to the Apology’s Latin, as is 
the focus of the next subsection. 
The Apology’s German: simplifying and sharpening 
 As has been seen to some extent, the arguments of the Apology’s Latin original 
are often simplified in its German translation, but the German translation can also 
sometimes sharpen the Latin’s polemic. In this section, Apology IV:265-276 is an 
example of the German version’s simplifying, and Apology IV:225-228 is an example of 
the German version’s sharpening. 
 First is the example of the German version’s simplifying. In Apology IV’s section 
replying to the opponents’ arguments, the /authoritative Latin has twelve numbered 
paragraphs (¶265-276) dealing with such things as human reason admiring works and 
                                                                                                                                                 
command canonical satisfactions (Ap XII:172, hactenus ostendimus), that Paul makes it clear he is talking 
about human traditions (Ap XV:30, clare testatur), and that the Emperor wants to improve the Church (Ap 
XXI:42, a German addition). As with constat, the use of the expression seems to be more rhetorical than 
indicating a standard of proof achieved, which is not to deny that what the Reformers say is “clear enough” 
is in fact clear enough. 
188 See n.187 above, p.260. 
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thinking that they justify, potential support for such an opinion from the book of Daniel, 
general principles that must be used to properly understand passages that might be taken 
as praising works and preaching the law, and the application of those principle to specific 
passages. In the midst of this larger passage comes the following paragraph. 
 Teneamus igitur has regulas in omnibus encomiis operum, in 
praedicatione legis, quod lex non fiat sine Christo, sicut ipse inquit: Sine 
me nihil potestis facere. Item, quod sine fide impossibile sit placere Deo. 
Certissimum est enim, quod doctrina legis non vult tollere evangelium, 
non vult tollere propitiatorem Christum. Et maledicti sint pharisaei, 
adversarii nostri, qui legem ita interpretantur, ut operibus tribuant gloriam 
Christi, videlicet quod sint propitiatio quod mereantur remissionem 
peccatorum. Sequitur igitur semper ita laudari opera, quod placeant 
propter fidem, quia opera non placent sine propitiatore Christo. Per hunc 
habemus accessum ad Deum, non per opera sine mediatore Christo. 
 Whenever good works are praised and the law preached, therefore, 
we must hold fast to these rules: that the law is not kept without Christ—
as he himself has said, “Apart from me you can do nothing” (John 15:5)—
and that “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6). The 
teaching of the law is certainly not intended to abolish the Gospel of 
Christ, the propitiator. Cursed be our opponents, those Pharisees, who 
interpret the law in such a way that they attribute Christ’s glory to works 
and make of them a propitiation that merits the forgiveness of sins. It 
follows, therefore, that works are praised for pleasing God on account of 
faith, since they do not please him without Christ, the Propitiator. 
“Through him we have obtained access” to the Father (Rom. 5:2), not by 
works without Christ, the mediator.189 
Melanchthon’s arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with 
the unexpressed premise enclosed in square brackets. Note that the first argument is 
propositional logic and the second syllogistic. 
48) If our works are a propitiation that merits forgiveness of sins (p), then the teaching of the law 
would abolish the Gospel of Christ (q). 
49) The teaching of the law does not abolish the Gospel of Christ (~q) 
50) Our works are not a propitiation that merits the forgiveness of sins (~p) 
51) No work that pleases God (P) is done without Christ (M). 
52) [All not on account of faith (S) is done without Christ (M).] 
53) Nothing not on account of faith (S) is a work that pleases God (P). 
                                                 
189 Ap IV:269, BKS, 214; Tappert, 147. Cited here again, Romans 5:2 also recalls for the reader 




In this case, the two arguments do not combine to form one larger proof but demonstrate 
two somewhat-separate but nevertheless related points. First, by way of modus tollens 
again, the two premises in the propositional argument (48 and 49) lead to the conclusion 
that works do not merit forgiveness (50), thereby denying works a role in justification. 
Second, the syllogistic argument (again a second figure syllogism with the valid mood 
EAE known as Cesare), with only its major premise (51) and conclusion (53) expressed 
in the text, indicates that faith must come before works in any way please God. 
Melanchthon is allowing that there are two senses to works pleasing God: works 
propitiating God’s wrath and works giving evidence of faith. (This distinction between 
works pleasing God so as to propitiate His wrath and works pleasing God on account of 
faith is akin to the distinction between justification and sanctification discussed in 
Chapter V.) Also notable in the preceding passage from the Latin is that Scripture 
provides the “rules” for interpreting Scripture, and the particular passages so properly 
understood remove the basis for the Reformers’ opponents’ argument that works justify 
and instead support the Reformers’ own argument that works please God only because of 
faith. 
 Instead of the preceding and the others of the eleven numbered Latin paragraphs 
at this point in the authoritative text, the German version provides one much simpler 
paragraph. 
 Also ist auch auf den Spruch aus dem Evangelio zu antworten: 
„Vergebet, so wird euch vergeben.“ Denn es ist gleich eine solche Lehre 
von der Buße. Daß erste Stück an diesem Spruch fordert Besserung und 
gute Werke, das andere Stück setzt dazu die Verheißung, und man soll 
daraus nicht schließen, daß unser Vergeben uns ex opere operato 
Vergebung der Sunde verdiene. Denn das sagt Christus nicht, sondern wie 
in andern Sakramenten Christus die Verheißung heftet an das äußerliche 
Zeichen, also heftet er auch hier die Verheißung von Vergebung der Sunde 
an die äußerlichen guten Werke. Und wie wir im Abendmahl nicht 
erlangen Vergebung der Sunde ohne den Glauben ex opere operato, also 
auch nicht in diesem Werk und unserm Vergeben; denn unser Vergeben 
ist auch kein gut Werk, es geschehe denn von denjenigen, welchen von 
Gott in Christo die Sunde schon zuvor vergeben sind. Darum unser 
Vergeben, soll es Gott gefallen, so muß es nach der Vergebung, da uns 
Gott vergibt, folgen. Denn Christus pflegt die zwei also zusammen zu 
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setzen, das Gesetz und Evangelium, beide den Glauben und auch die guten 
Werke, daß er anzeige, daß kein Glaube da sei, wenn nicht gute Werk 
folgen. Item daß wir äußerliche Zeichen haben, welche uns verinnern des 
Evangelii und Vergebung der Sunde, dadurch wir getröstet werden, daß 
also mannchfältig unser Glaube geübet werde. Also sollen solche Sprüche 
verstanden werden, denn sonst wäre es stracks wider das ganze 
Evangelium, und würde unser bettelisch Werke an Christus Statt gesetzt, 
welcher allein soll die Versühnung sein, welcher je nicht zu verachten ist. 
Item wo sie sollten von Werken vestanden werden, so würde die 
Vergebung der Sunde ganz ungewiß; denn sie stünde auf einem losen 
Grunde, auf unsern elenden Werken. 
 The same answer must also be given in reference to the passage 
from the Gospel: Forgive, and you will be forgiven. For this is just such a 
doctrine of repentance. The first part in this passage demands amendment 
of life and good works, the other part adds the promise. Nor are we to 
infer from this that our forgiving merits for us ex opere operato remission 
of sin. For that is not what Christ says, but as in other sacraments Christ 
has attached the promise to an external sign, so He attaches the promise of 
the forgiveness of sin in this place to external good works. And as in the 
Lord’s Supper we do not obtain forgiveness of sin without faith, ex opere 
operato, so neither in this action, when we forgive. For, our forgiving is 
not a good work, except it is performed by a person whose sins have been 
previously forgiven by God in Christ. If, therefore, our forgiving is to 
please God, it must follow after the forgiveness which God extends to us. 
For, as a rule, Christ combines these two, the Law and the Gospel, both 
faith and good works, in order to indicate that, where good works do not 
follow, there is no faith either, that we may have external marks, which 
remind us of the Gospel and the forgiveness of sin, for our comfort, and 
that thus our faith may be exercised in many ways. In this manner we are 
to understand such passages, otherwise they would directly contradict the 
entire Gospel, and our beggarly works would be put in the place of Christ, 
who alone is to be the propitiation, which no man is by any means to 
despise. Again, if these passages were to be understood as relating to 
works, the remission of sins would be quite uncertain; for it would rest on 
a poor foundation, on our miserable works.190  
Although the German version has some discussion of reasoning, in this case it omits the 
discussion of reason itself and of its opinions regarding the justification of works, of the 
discussion of the Daniel passage, of the general principles regarding interpreting passages 
about works and the law, of the syllogism regarding works pleasing God on account of 
                                                 
190 BKS, 213; Triglotta, 197. 
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faith, and the discussion of all the other passages save the one, apparently part of Luke 
6:37, which is roughly equivalent to Matthew 6:14, which is discussed in the otherwise 
omitted Apology IV:272. There are a number of other places in Apology IV where the 
German version is notably different even by glancing at the paragraphs.191 
 An example where the German version is more pointed than the Latin is earlier in 
Apology IV, ¶225-228. Drawing a correct conclusion from a statement of Scripture is 
again the nature of the dispute, and justification by faith is again at the center of the 
contention. 
 Sed obiiciunt praeferri dilectionem fidei et spei. Paulus enim ait: 
Maior horum caritas. Porro consentaneum est maximam et praecipuam 
virtutem iustificare. Quamquam hoc loco Paulus proprie loquitur de 
dilectione proximi et significat, dilectionem maximam esse, quia plurimos 
fructus habet. Fides et spes tantum agunt cum Deo. At dilectio foris erga 
homines infinita habet officia: tamen largiamur sane adversariis, 
dilectionem Dei et proximi maximam virtutem esse, quia hoc summum 
praeceptum est: Diliges Dominum Deum. Verum quomodo inde 
ratiocinabuntur, quod dilectio iustificet? Maxima virtus, inquiunt, 
iustificat. Imo sicut lex etiam maxima seu prima non iustificat, ita nec 
maxima virtus legis. Sed illa virtus iustificat, quae apprehendit Christum, 
quae communicat nobis Christi merita, qua accipimus gratiam et pacem a 
Deo. Haec autem virtus fides est. Nam, ut saepe dictum est, fides non 
tantum notitia est, sed multo magis velle accipere seu apprehendere ea, 
quae in promissione de Christo offeruntur. Est autem et haec obedientia 
erga Deum, velle accipere oblatam promissionem, non minus λατρεία 
quam dilectio. Vult sibi credi Deus, vult nos ab ipso bona accipere, et id 
pronuntiat esse verum cultum.  
 They object that love is preferred to faith and hope since Paul says 
(I Cor. 13:13), “The greatest of these is love.” Therefore it follows that the 
greatest and the main virtue should justify. In this passage, however, Paul 
speaks specifically about love to our neighbor, and he indicates that love is 
the greatest because it has the most fruits. Faith and hope deal only with 
God, while love has infinite external duties to men. Nevertheless, we 
concede to our opponents that love of God and neighbor is the greatest 
virtue because the great commandment is, “You shall love the Lord your 
                                                 
191 Ap IV:189-201 get one short formatted paragraph in the German; 258-260 are omitted, 285-
315 is one paragraph (confer ¶303), 319-333 (four formatted paragraphs) get thirteen formatted paragraphs; 
344-355 are omitted, and 375-377 and 378-400 get one formatted paragraph. Confer below, n.201, p.275; 
n.206, p.278; n.209, p.280; and n.25, p.326. On the refocusing of the Apology for the octavo edition that 
roughly coincided with the German version, see the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.143. 
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God” (Matt. 22:27 [sic for v.37]). How will they conclude from this that 
love justifies? The greatest virtue, they say, justifies. But even as the first 
and greatest law does not justify, neither does the greatest virtue of the 
law. But that virtue justifies which takes hold of Christ, communicating to 
us Christ’s merits and, through them, grace and peace from God. This 
virtue is faith. As we have often said, faith is not merely knowledge but 
rather a desire to accept and grasp what is offered in the promise of Christ. 
This obedience toward God, this desire to receive the offered promise, is 
no less an act of worship than is love. God wants us to believe Him and to 
accept blessings from Him; this he declares to be true worship. 
 Aber hie sagen sie auch, die Liebe werde dem Glauben und der 
Hoffnung vorgezogen. Denn Paulus sagt 1 Korinth. 13.: „Die Liebe ist die 
größest unter den dreien.“ Nu sei es zu achten, daß die Tugend, so Paulus 
die größest nennet, für Gott uns gerecht und heilig mache. Wiewohl nu 
Paulus da eigentlich redet von der Liebe gegen dem Nähesten, und so er 
spricht: „Die Liebe ist die größest“, sagt er darum denn die Liebe gehet 
weit und trägt viel Früchte auf Erden. Denn Glaub und Hoffnung handeln 
allein mit Gott. Aber die Liebe gehet auf Erden untern Leuten um und tut 
viel Guts mit trösten, lehren, unterrichten, helfen, raten, heimlich, 
öffentlich. Doch lassen wir zu, daß Gott und den Nähesten lieben die 
höhest Tugend sei. Denn dies ist das höhist Gebot: „Du sollst Gott lieben 
von ganzem Herzen.“ Daraus folgt nu nicht, daß die Liebe uns gerecht 
macht. Ja, sprechen sie, die höhist Tugend soll billig gerecht machen. 
Antwort: Es wäre wahr, wenn wir um unserer Tugend willen einen 
gnädigen Gott hätten. Nu ist droben bewiesen, daß wir um Christus willen, 
nicht um unser Tugend willen angenehm und gerecht sind; denn unser 
Tugend sind unrein. Ja, wie dieses Gesetz das höhist ist: „Du sollst Gott 
lieben“, also kann diese Tugend, Gott lieben, am allerwenigsten gerecht 
machen. Denn so das Gesetz und Tugend höher ist, so wirs weniger tun 
können, darum sind wir nicht um der Liebe willen gerecht. Der Glaub aber 
macht gerecht, nicht um unsers Tuns willen, sondern allein derhalben, daß 
er Barmherzigkeit sucht und empfähet, und will sich auf kein eigen Tun 
verlassen, das ist, daß wir lehren, Gesetz macht nicht gerecht, sondern das 
Evangelium, das glauben heißt, daß wir um Christus’ willen, nicht um 
unsers Tons willen ein gnädigen Gott haben.  
 But here they also say love is preferred to faith and hope, since 
Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13:13: “Love is the greatest of these three.” 
Now it is to consider whether the virtue that Paul takes as the greatest, 
makes us righteous and holy before God. Now Paul, however, there speaks 
strictly of love to our neighbor, and so he says, “Love is the greatest”; he 
says that because love reaches far and produces much fruit on earth and 
because faith and hope deal with God alone. But love goes forth on earth 
among people and does much good, by consoling, teaching, instructing, 
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helping, and counseling privately and publicly. Of course we concede to 
our opponents that love of God and neighbor is the highest virtue, because 
this is the highest commandment: “You should love God with your whole 
heart.” From that does not follow that love makes us righteous. Yes, they 
say, the highest virtue should properly make righteous. Answer: It would 
be true, if we had a gracious God on account of our virtue. Now, it was 
proven above that on Christ’s account, not on account of our virtue, we are 
accepted and righteous; for, our virtues are impure. Yes, as this 
Commandment is the highest: “You should love God”, so this virtue, love 
of God, least of all can make righteous. So, because the Commandment 
and virtue are higher, so we can do less, therefore we are not righteous on 
account of love. But faith makes righteous, not on account of our deeds, 
but only because it seeks and receives mercy, and will count on no deed of 
its own, that is, that we teach, the law does not make righteous, but the 
Gospeltells us to believe that we will have a gracious God on Christ’s 
account, not on account of our deeds.192 
In both the Latin and the German versions the Reformers are refuting the argument of 
their opponents that 1 Corinthians 13:13 can be taken to support the opponents’ claim 
that love justifies. Both grant to the opponents that love is the greatest virtue, although 
the German elaborates on what love can do. Both say the opponents’ reasoning is flawed, 
but, where the Latin asks a rhetorical question, the German is definitive and claims to 
have already proven that people are righteous only on Christ’s account and not on the 
basis of their impure virtue. 
 The key to the differences between the translations may well be their different 
audiences.193 While the German of the Apology is often simplified and shortened, in 
                                                 
192 Ap IV:225-228, BKS, 203; Tappert, 138-139. The English of the German is this author’s 
adaptation of the Triglotta, 183. For this particular argument of the opponents, BKS, 203 n.1, refers to the 
Confutation in CR, 27:100 (confer Reu, 352*; K-N, 110). 
193 Ap XXIII:70 in two German additions warns the leaders of state and church of consequences 
on judgment day for false teaching. The Latin reads: Talibus argumentis tam vanis defendunt legem impiam 
et perniciosam bonis moribus. Talibus rationibus muniunt Principum animos adversus iudicium Dei, in quo 
Deus reposcet rationem, cur dissipaverint coniugia, cur cruciaverint, cur interfecerint sacerdotes. Nolite 
enim dubitare, quin, ut sanguis Abel mortui clamabat, ita clamet etiam sanguis multorum bonorum 
virorum, in quos iniuste saevitum est. Et ulciscetur hanc saevitiam Deus; ibi comperietis, quam sint inanes 
hac rationes adversariorum, et intelligetis in iudicio Dei nullas calumnias adversus verbum Dei consistere, 
ut ait Esaias: Omnis caro foenum, et omnis gloria eius quasi flos foeni. The German reads: Mit solchen 
schwachen, losen Gründen schützen und verteidigen sie des Pabsts Gesetz vom Zölibat, das so zu großen 
Lastern und Unzucht hat Ursach geben. Die Fürsten und Bischöfe, so diesen Lehrern glauben, werden 
wohl sehen, ob solche Gründe den Stich halten, wenn es zu der Todesstunde kommt, daß man für Gott soll 
Rechenschaft geben, warum sie frommer Leute Ehe zerrissen haben, warum sie diese gestöckt und geplöckt 
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other instances it is sharpened. Sometimes the German of the Apology omits Greek terms 
from the Latin original194 or simplifies other more-technical language.195 Consistent with 
the different audiences being the factor is the fact that in some cases Latin translations of 
German originals are made more technical.196 
Arguing over particles, as in Apology IV:281-284 
 As was seen above in the philosophical background of syllogisms,197 properly 
using particles such as “all” is significant in the sound logic. While replying to their 
opponents’ arguments, the Reformers accuse their opponents of misinterpreting that very 
particle as it comes up in a statement of Scripture.198 
                                                                                                                                                 
haben, warum sie so viel Priester erwürgt und unschüldig Blut über alles Klagen, Heulen und Weinen so 
vieler Witwen und Waisen, vergossen haben. Denn das dürfen sie ihnen nicht in Sinn nehmen. Die Zähren 
und Tränen der armen Witwen, das Blut der Unschuldigen ist im Himmel unvergessen, es wird zu seiner 
Stund als stark, als des heiligen, unschüldigen Habels Blut über sie in hohen Himmel schreien und für Gott, 
dem rechten Richter, rufen. Wenn nu Gott solche Tyrannei richten wird, werden sie erfahren, daß ihr 
Argumente Stroh und Heu sind und Gott ein verzehrend Feuer, für dem nichts bleiben kann außer göttlichs 
Wortes, 1 Petr. 1. In English: “With false arguments like these they defend a wicked and immoral law. 
With reasons like these they persuade the princes to take a position contrary to the judgment of God [the 
princes and bishops who believe this teaching will see whether their reasons will endure the test, when the 
hour of death arrives], who will call them to account for breaking up marriages and torturing [flogged and 
impaled] and killing priests [regardless of the cries, wails, and tears of so many widows and orphans]. Have 
no doubt that as the blood of Abel cried out in death (Gen. 4:10), so the blood of the many innocent victims 
of their rage will also cry out. God will avenge this cruelty. Then you will see the emptiness of our 
opponents’ arguments and understand that in the judgment of God no perversion of God’s Word will stand, 
as Isaiah says (40:6), ‘All flesh is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field’ [that their 
arguments are straw and hay, and God a consuming fire, before whom nothing but God’s Word can abide, 
1 Pet. 1, 24].” (BKS, 348-349; Tappert, 249; English translations of the German insertions provided in the 
square brackets are from the Triglotta, 383.) 
194 One example is Ap XXIII:64, where the Latin says Hanc rationem, quam ostendant velut 
maxime  supra diluimus (“We have already refuted this very specious argument”) in the Latin 
and the German says simply Das Argument haben wir hie oben verlegt (“That argument we have put off 
above”) (BKS, 346-347; Tappert, 248; English from the German is this author’s translation). , 
which literally means “fair face”, has the metaphorical meaning of “fair in outward show” or “specious” 
(Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 728), as in Aristotle’s Politics, II.5, 1263b15, Barnes, 
II:2005, where Barnes translates “specious appearance”. 
195 Compare the significantly different treatments of the arguments about the Mass from various 
related words in Ap XXIV:78-88. 
196 The Latin translation of LC IV:46 seems to be more technical, as does Ep R&N:8. 
197 See the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.193. 
198 See the citation of Luke 11:41 in article XX of the Confutation (Reu, ed., The Augsburg 
Confession: A Collection of Sources, *359; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 117), which 
article is also in view in Apology IV (Ap IV:1). Confer BKS, 215 n.2, which cites CR, 27:122. 
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 Citatur mutilatus et hic locus Lucae 11.: Date eleemosynam, et 
ecce omnia munda sunt vobis. Plane surdi sunt adversarii. Toties iam 
dicimus ad praedicationem legis oportere addi evangelium de Christo, 
propter quem placent bona opera, sed illi ubique excluso Christo docent 
mereri iustificationem per opera legis. Hic locus integer prolatus ostendet 
fidem requiri. Christus obiurgat pharisaeos, sentientes se coram Deo 
mundari, hoc est, iustificari crebris ablutionibus. Sicut papa, nescio quis, 
de aqua sale conspersa inquit, quod populum sanctificet ac mundet; et 
glossa ait, quod mundet a venialibus. Tales erant et pharisaeorum 
opiniones, quas reprehendit Christus, et opponit huic fictae purgationi 
duplicem munditiam, alteram internam, alteram externam. Iubet, ut intus 
mundentur, et addit de munditie externa: Date eleemosynam de eo, quod 
superest, et sic omnia erunt vobis munda. Adversarii non recte 
accommodant particulam universalem omnia; Christus enim addit hanc 
conclusionem utrique membro: Tunc omnia erunt munda, si intus eritis 
mundi, et foris dederitis eleemosynam. Significat enim, quod externa 
mundities collocanda sit in operibus a Deo praeceptis, non in traditionibus 
humanis, ut tunc erant illae ablutiones, et nunc est cotidiana illa aspersio 
aquae, vestitus monachorum, discrimina ciborum et similes pompae. Sed 
adversarii corrumpunt sententiam, sophistice translata particula universali 
ad unam partem: Omnia erunt munda datis eleemosynis. Atqui Petrus 
dixit: Fide purificari corda. Sed totus locus inspectus sententiam offert 
consentientem eum reliqua Scriptura, quod si corda sint mundata, et 
deinde foris accedant eleemosynae, hoc est, omnia opera caritatis: ita totos 
esse mundos, hoc est, non intus solum, sed foris etiam. Deinde cur non 
tota illa concio coniungitur? Multae sunt partes obiurgationis, quarum 
aliae de fide, aliae de operibus praecipiunt. Nec est candidi lectoris 
excerpere praecepta operum, omissis locis de fide. 
 Luke 11:41 is also quoted in a garbled form: “Give alms; and 
behold, everything is clean for you.” Our opponents must be deaf. Over 
and over we say that the Gospel of Christ must be added to the preaching 
of the law, that for his sake good works please God. Yet everywhere they 
exclude Christ and teach that we merit justification by the works of the 
law. An examination of the whole passage shows that it requires faith. 
Christ is upbraiding the Pharisees for thinking that they are cleansed 
before God and justified by frequent washings. Just as some Pope—I am 
not sure which—said that sprinkling water mixed with salt “sanctifies and 
cleanses the people,” and the gloss says that it cleanses from venial sins. 
Such were the opinions of the Pharisees, too. These Christ rejects, and in 
place of this false cleansing he puts a twofold cleanness, one internal and 
the other external. He commands that they be cleansed inwardly and then 
adds concerning the outward cleanness, “Give alms from what you have 
left over, and thus all things will be clean for you.” 
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 Our opponents misinterpret the universal particle “all.” Christ adds 
this conclusion to both clauses: all things will be clean if you are clean 
inwardly and if you give alms. He means that outward cleanness is to be 
sought in works commanded by God, not in human traditions like the 
ablutions in those days, or in our own time the daily sprinkling of water, 
the habit of the monks, the distinctions of foods, and similar pompous 
acts. Our opponents twist his meaning by sophistically transferring the 
universal particle to a single part: “All things will be clean when you have 
given alms.” Yet Peter says (Acts 15:9) that hearts are purified by faith. A 
study of the whole passage shows its agreement with the rest of Scripture; 
for if hearts are clean and then the outward giving of alms is added (that is, 
all the works of love), then men are completely clean, outwardly as well as 
inwardly. Moreover, why do they not present the whole sermon? The 
admonition has many parts, some of which command faith, others works. 
An honest reader would not pick out the commands about works and skip 
the passages about faith. 
 Auch ziehen sie an den Spruch Christi: „Gebet Almosen, so wird 
euch alles rein sein.“ Die Widersacher sein taub und haben dicke Ohren, 
darum müssen wir ihnen die Regel oft erholen, daß das Gesetz ohne 
Christo niemands für Gott fromm mache und daß alle Werk allein um 
Christus willen angenehm sein. Aber die Widersacher schließen Christum 
allenthalben aus, tun gleich, als sei Christus nichts, und lehren 
unverschamt, daß wir Vergebung der Sünden erlangen durch gute Werke 
usw. Wenn wir aber den Spruch unzerrissen ganz ansehen, so werden wir 
sehen, daß er auch vom Glauben mit redet. Christus schilt die Pharisäer, 
daß sie wollten wähnen, sie würden für Gott heilig und rein durch allerlei 
baptismata carnis, das ist, durch allerlei leibliches Bade, Waschen und 
Reinigung am Leibe, an Gefäße, an Kleidern. Wie auch ein Papst in seine 
Canones gesetzt hat ein nötig päpstlich Stücke vom Weihwasser, daß, 
wenn es mit geweihtem Salz besprengt wird, so heiligets und reiniget das 
Volk von Sunden. Und die Glosse sagt, es reinige von täglichen Sünden. 
Also hatten die Pharisäer auch Irrtüm unter sich, welche Christus strafet 
und setzt gegen die erdichteten Reinigungen zweierlei Reinigkeit, eine 
innerlich, die ander äußerlich, und vermahnet, daß sie inwendig sollen rein 
sein; das geschieht, wie Petrus sagt in Geschichten der Apostel am 15. 
durch den Glauben. Und setzt dazu von äußerlicher Reinigkeit: „Gebet 
Almosen von dem, das ihr übrig habt, so wird euch alles rein sein.“ Die 
Widersacher führen nicht recht ein das Wort alles. Denn Christus setzt den 
Beschluß auf beide Stücke, auf die innerliche und äußerliche Reinigkeit, 
und sagt: „Alles wird euch rein sein.“ Das ist, wenn ihr euch nicht allein 
leiblich badet, sondern Gott gläubet, und also inwendig rein seid und 
auswendig Almosen gebt, so wird euch alles rein sein. Und zeigt an, daß 
auch die rechte äußerliche Reinigkeit stehe in den Werken, welche Gott 
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geboten habe, und nicht in menschlichen Satzungen, als da waren 
dieselben traditiones Pharisaeorum usw. und wie bei unserer Zeit ist das 
Bespritzen und Sprengen den Weihwassers, die schneeweißen 
Mönchskleider, die Unterschied der Speis und dergleichen. Die 
Widersacher aber ziehen dies signum universale, nämlich das Wort alles, 
sophistisch allein auf einen Teil und sagen: Alles wird euch rein sein, 
wenn ihr Almosen gebet usw. Als wenn einer sagt: Andreas ist da, darum 
sein alle Aposteln da. Darum im antecedent oder vorgehend Stücke dies 
Spruchs soll beides beinander bleiben: Gläubet und Gebet Almosen. Denn 
darauf gehet die ganze Sendung, das ganze Amt Christi, darum ist er da, 
daß sie glauben sollen. Wenn nu beide Stück zusammen gefasset werden: 
gläuben und Eleemosynen geben, so folget recht, daß alles rein sei, das 
Herz durch Glauben, der äußerlich Wandel durch gute Werk. Also soll 
man die Predigt ganz fassen und nicht das eine Stück umkehren und 
deuten, daß das Herz von Sunden rein wird durch unsere Eleemosynen. Es 
sind auch wohl etliche, die da meinen, daß es wider die Pharisäer von 
Christo ironice oder spöttisch geredet sei, als sollt er sagen: Ja, lieben 
Junkern, raubet und stehlet und gehet darnach hin, gebet Almosen, so 
werdet ihr bald rein sein. Daß also Christus etwas herbe und höhnisch 
ansteche ihre pharisäische Heuchelei. Denn wiewohl sie voll Unglaubens, 
voll Geiz und alles Argen waren, so hielten sie doch ihre Reinigung, gaben 
Almosen und meinten, sie wären gar reine, zarte Heiligen. Die Auslegung 
ist dem Text daselbst nicht entgegen. 
 They also drag out the saying of Christ: “Give alms, so all things 
will be clean for you” [Luke 11:41]. Our opponents are deaf and have 
thick ears, therefore we often have to repeat the rule that the law without 
Christ makes no one godly before God and that only on Christ’s account is 
all work pleasing. But the opponents exlude Christ everywhere, as they 
like to do, and behave as if Christ were nothing, and teach shamelessly 
that we merit forgiveness of sins through good works, etc. But if we 
examine the whole saying without interruption, we will see that He also 
speaks of faith. Christ scolds the Pharisees that they will presume that they 
are holy and clean before God by all sorts of baptismata carnis, that is, by 
all sorts of baths, washings, and cleansings of the body, of vessels, and 
clothing. Just as a Pope in his canons has the sentence requiring a papistic 
writing on holy water, that, when it is sprinkled with blessed salt, so it 
sanctifies and cleanses the people from their sins. And the gloss says it 
cleanses from daily sins. The Pharisees also had such errors under them, 
which Christ rebuked and against the fictitious cleansings puts a twofold 
cleanness, one inner, the other outer, and exhorts that they should be clean 
inwardly; that happens, as Peter says in the history of the Apostles, the 
15th chapter [Acts 15:9], through faith. And then He adds on the outer 
cleanness, “Give alms from what you have remaining, so all things will be 
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clean for you.” The opponents do not rightly introduce the word “all”. For 
Christ adds on the conclusion to both parts, to the inner and outer 
cleanness, and says: “All things will be clean for you.” That is, if you do 
not merely bathe bodily, but believe God, and so be inwardly clean and 
outwardly give alms, so all things will be clean for you. And He shows 
that also the outer cleanness stands in works, which God has commanded, 
and not in human ordinances, such as the same traditiones pharisaeorum, 
etc., and in our time the sprinkling and spraying of holy water, the snow-
white monks’ clothing, the distinction of foods, and the like. But, the 
opponents sophistically drag out the signum universale, namely the word 
“all”, only from one part and say: All things will be clean for you, when 
you give alms, etc. As if one says: Andrew is there, therefore all the 
Apostles are there. Therefore in the antecedent or previous piece of the 
saying both should remain together: Believe and give alms. Then there 
goes the whole mission, the whole office of Christ, therefore He is there, 
that they should believe. Now if both pieces are combined together: 
believing and giving eleemosynen, it rightly follows that all things will be 
clean, the heart by faith, the outer conduct by good works. So one should 
combine the whole sermon and not revert and expound that one piece that 
the heart becomes clean from sins through our eleemosynen. There are 
doubtless also a few who think the meaning there, that is against the 
Pharisees by Christ spoken ironically or mockingly, as if He should say: 
Yes, my dear knights, rob and steal and then go forth, give alms, so you 
will soon be clean. In other words, Christ goads their their pharisaical 
hypocrisy harshly and ironically. For although they were full of unbelief, 
full of thriftiness, and all wickedness, so they yet kept their cleansings, 
gave alms, and supposed they were quite clean, tender saints. The 
interpretation is not contrary to the same text.199 
For their part, the Reformers argue that they properly understand the particles, and they 
claim they do not exclude works the way their opponents exclude faith.200 To be sure, the 
central point of the Latin original and point of the German version are essentially the 
same, but the German version adds the illustration concerning Andrew and the apostles as 
an example of similar faulty reasoning. The use of the Latin terms in the German, usually 
with a German equivalent, is also significant, and such problems with particles have a 
close connection with errors of logic. One can question whether what the Reformers draw 
out of the Luke passage is really present there, although as they claim, their interpretation 
                                                 
199 Ap IV:281-284, BKS, 215-217; Tappert, 149-150. The English translation of the German is this 
author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 201. 
200 See also Ap IV:73-74, above at n.87, p.231. 
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does not appear to be contrary to the text. Thus, the Reformers make syllogistic 
arguments based on biblical texts, no doubt following the precedent of arguments they 
perceived in Scripture itself. 
Finding arguments in Scripture, as in Apology IV:285 
 Continuing the section that replies to the opponents’ arguments, the very next 
passage from Apology IV on Justification is one where an argument from Scripture itself 
is described, summarizing Paul’s discussion in Romans 4, again with a view towards 
comforting consciences, especially contrasting the opponents’ teaching’s lack of comfort 
with the comfort the Reformers’ teaching provides. (Note the convergence of words used 
in this passage.) 
 Postremo hoc monendi sunt lectores, quod adversarii pessime 
consulunt piis conscientiis, cum docent per opera mereri remissionem 
peccatorum, quia conscientia colligens per opera remissionem non potest 
statuere, quod opus satisfaciat Deo. Ideo semper angitur et subinde alia 
opera, alios cultus excogitat, donec prorsus desperat. Haec ratio exstat 
apud Paulum, Rom. 4, ubi probat, quod promissio iustitiae non contingat 
propter opera nostra, quia nunquam possemus statuere, quod haberemus 
placatum Deum. Lex enim semper accusat. Ita promissio irrita esset et 
incerta. Ideo concludit, quod promissio illa remissionis peccatorum et 
iustitiae fide accipiatur, non propter opera. Haec est vera et simplex et 
germana sententia Pauli, in qua maxima consolatio piis conscientiis 
proposita est et illustrator gloria Christi, qui certe ad hoc donatus est nobis, 
ut per ipsum habeamus gratiam, iustitiam et pacem. 
 Finally, we would remind our readers that our opponents counsel 
pious consciences very badly when they teach that works merit the 
forgiveness of sins, because a conscience that seeks forgiveness through 
works cannot be sure that its work will satisfy God. It is always tormented 
and constantly invents other works and services until it despairs utterly. 
Describing this process in Rom. 4:5 ff., Paul proves that the promise of 
righteousness does not depend upon our works, because we could never be 
sure that we have a gracious God. The law always accuses. Thus the 
promise would be vain and unsure. He concludes that not works but faith 
accepts the promised forgiveness of sins and righteousness of faith. This is 
what Paul really and truly means. This offers the greatest consolation is 
faithful consciences and illumines the glory of Christ, who was surely 
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given to us that through him we might have grace, righteousness, and 
peace.201 
Melanchthon’s argument in the preceding passage of the Apology may be represented 
syllogistically as follows, with unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. (Note 
that Melanchthon roughly identifies “being sure that its work will satisfy God” and 
“being sure that we have a gracious God”—either brings peace to the conscience.) 
54) No state of depending on works (P) is a state of being sure of a gracious God (M). 
55) [All states of receiving God’s promise of righteousness (S) are states of being sure of a gracious 
God (M).] 
56) No state of receiving God’s promise of righteousness (S) is a state of depending on works (P). 
57) [All accusations of an individual’s sin (M) make the promise vain and unsure (P).] 
58) All uses of the law (S) are an accusation of an individual’s sin (M). 
59) All uses of the law (S) make the promise vain and unsure (P). 
60) All teaching that properly counsels consciences (P) is teaching that gives assurance of a satisfied 
God (M). 
61) No teaching that works merit forgiveness of sins (S) is a teaching that gives assurance of a 
satisfied God (M). 
62) No teaching that works merit forgiveness of sins (S) is teaching that properly counsels 
consciences (P). 
In this case Melanchthon is not using one syllogism to prove part of another but making 
three related points about how the teaching that works save nullifies the promise and 
leaves consciences to despair. The three syllogisms are figures and valid moods that 
already have been seen: 2nd figure Cesare (54-55-56); 1st figure Barabara (57-58-59); and 
2nd figure Cambestres (60-61-62). Significantly in Romans 4 Paul is also making an 
argument from Scripture, in his case from Genesis 15:6. The preceding passage from the 
Apology is not the only place where the Reformers find arguments in Scripture, of 
course, although more likely is their use of Scripture as support for an argument.202 In 
other cases, their arguments are supported with appeals to fundamental principles, as is 
seen in the next subsection, where the same topic of lex semper accusat is also discussed. 
Fundamental principles in a proof, as in Apology IV:291-300 
 Once a particular point is “proven” by the use of Scripture, that point itself can 
become a premise in another argument. Apology IV:291-300 illustrates how this 
                                                 
201 Ap IV:285, BKS, 217; Tappert, 150. (The German omits this section, see above, n.191, p.266.) 
202 For example, Tr 24. 
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procedure works for the Reformers. In the immediately preceding paragraphs (¶287 ff.), 
the Reformers discuss their opponents’ two possible modes of justification, one based on 
reason and the other on the law, and reject both, because both exclude Christ.203 Then, the 
Reformers argue for what is essentially a third mode, that of receiving forgiveness 
through the promise of the Gospel by faith in Christ. That Christ would not be given in 
vain seems to become a fundamental principle that figures prominently in proving their 
larger point that forgiveness, reconciliation, and victory over sin and death are received 
by faith in Christ.204 (Though the need for Christ is going to be taken as a fundamental 
principle, Melanchthon does discuss the Scriptural support for the position.205) 
 Melanchthon’s use of the fundamental principle and others comes next, and the 
concessions and qualifications he makes with a view to sanctification are significant. 
Et ex hoc fundamento facile iudicari potest, quare fidei tribuamus 
iustificationem, non dilectioni, etsi dilectio fidem sequitur, quia dilectio 
est impletio legis. At Paulus docet nos non ex lege, sed ex promissione 
iustificari, quae tantum fide accipitur. Neque enim accedimus ad Deum 
sine mediatore Christo, neque accipimus remissionem peccatorum propter 
nostram dilectionem, sed propter Christum. Ac ne diligere quidem 
possumus iratum Deum, et lex semper accusat nos, semper ostendit iratum 
Deum. Necesse est igitur nos prius fide apprehendere promissionem, quod 
propter Christum Pater sit placatus et ignoscat. Postea incipimus legem 
facere. Procul a ratione humana, procul a Moise reiiciendi sunt oculi in 
Christum, et sentiendum, quod Christus sit nobis donatus, ut propter eum 
iusti reputemur. Legi nunquam in carne satisfacimus. Ita igitur iusti 
reputamur non propter legem, sed propter Christum, quia huius merita 
nobis donantur, si in eum credimus. Si quis igitur haec fundamenta 
consideraverit, quod non iustificemur ex lege, quia legem Dei humana 
natura non potest facere, non potest Deum diligere, sed quod iustificemur 
ex promissione, in qua propter Christum promissa est reconciliatio, iustitia 
et vita aeterna: is facile intelliget necessario tribuendam esse 
iustificationem fidei, si modo cogitabit Christum non esse frustra 
promissum, exhibitum, natum, passum, resuscitatum, si cogitabit 
promissionem gratiae in Christo non frustra, praeter legem et extra legem 
factam esse statim a principio mundi, si cogitabit promissionem fide 
accipiendam esse, sicut Iohannes inquit: Qui non credit Deo, mendacem 
                                                 
203 Ap IV:287-290, Tappert, 150-151. 
204 Ap IV:291, Tappert, 151-152. See the reference in ¶294. 
205 Ap IV:292-293, Tappert, 152. 
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facit eum, quia non credit in testimonium, quod testificatus est Deus de 
filio suo, et hoc est testimonium, quod vitam aeternam dedit nobis Deus, et 
haec vita in filio eius est. Qui habet filium, habet vitam, qui non habet 
filium Dei, vitam non habet. Et Christus ait: Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere 
liberi eritis. Et Paulus: Per hunc habemus accessum ad Deum, et addit: per 
fidem. Fide igitur in Christum accipitur promissio remissionis peccatorum 
et iustitiae. Nec iustificamur coram Deo ex ratione aut lege.  
 From this fundamental article it is clear why we ascribe 
justification to faith rather than to love, though love follows faith since 
love is the fulfilling of the law. Paul teaches that we are justified not by 
the law but by the promise, which is received by faith only. We cannot 
come to God without Christ, the mediator; nor do we receive forgiveness 
of sins because of our love but because of Christ. We cannot even love an 
angry God; the law always accuses us and thus always shows us an angry 
God. Therefore we must first take hold of the promise by faith, that for 
Christ’s sake the Father is reconciled and forgiving. Later we begin to 
keep the law. Far away from human reason, far away from Moses, we 
must turn our eyes to Christ, and believe that he was given for us to be 
justified on his account. In the flesh we never satisfy the law. Thus we are 
not accounted righteous because of the law but because of Christ, whose 
merits are conferred on us if we believe in him. [¶297] If any one, 
therefore, has considered these foundations, that we are not justified by the 
Law, because human nature cannot observe the Law of God and cannot 
love God, but that we are justified from the promise, in which, for Christ’s 
sake, reconciliation, righteousness, and eternal life have been promised, he 
will easily understand that justification must necessarily be ascribed to 
faith, if he only will reflect upon the fact that it is not in vain that Christ 
has been promised and set forth, that He has been born and has suffered 
and been raised again; if he will reflect upon the fact that the promise of 
grace in Christ is not in vain, that it was made immediately from the 
beginning of the world, apart from and beyond the Law; if he will reflect 
upon the fact that the promise should be received by faith, as 1 John 5, 10 
sq. says: He that believeth not God hath made Him a liar, because he 
believeth not the record that God gave of His Son. And this is the record 
that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that 
hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life. 
And Christ says, John 8, 36: If the Son, therefore, shall make you free, ye 
shall be free indeed. And Paul, Rom. 5, 2: By whom also we have access 
to God; and he adds: by faith. By faith in Christ, therefore, the promise of 
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remission of sins and of righteousness is received. Neither are we justified 
before God by reason or by the Law.206 
In this excerpt Melanchthon more or less treats summarily arguments he has made before. 
The new arguments of the preceding paragraph may be represented syllogistically as 
follows, with the unexpressed premises provided in square brackets. Again, Melanchthon 
treats various expressions as equivalent, such as loving God and observing the law. 
(Although not discussed in further detail here, the “proof texts” from the Bible are worth 
noting.) 
63) No one who faces an angry God (M) is one who loves God (P). 
64) All who rely on the law for justification (S) face an angry God (M). 
65) [No one who relies on the law for justification (S) is one who loves God (P).] 
66) [All who are justified by the law (P) are those who observe the law (M).] 
67) No human nature/being (S) is one that can observe the law (M). 
68) No human nature/being (S) is one who is justified by the law (P).] 
69) [Justification is either by the law (p) or by the promise (q).] 
70) [Justification is not by the law (~p).] 
71) [Justification is by the promise (q).] 
72) [If justification were not necessarily ascribed to anything other than faith alone (p), the promise 
would be in vain (q).] 
73) The promise is not in vain (~q). 
74) Justification is not necessarily ascribed to anything other than faith alone (~p). 
In the case of the first syllogism above (63-64-65), which is a 1st figure syllogism in the 
valid EAE mood Celarent, Melanchthon, uncharacteristically in comparison to what has 
been observed so far, gives the two premises but does not draw the conclusion. Next, in 
¶297, Melanchthon assumes without saying so a major premise (66) that his opponents 
no doubt argued and could itself be proved from the Biblical text. Melanchthon states the 
minor (67) and draws the conclusion (68), to present a 2nd figure syllogism in the valid 
mood AEE known as Cambestres. Then, Melanchthon continues to reason that since 
justification must be either from the law or promise (69) and since it is not from the law 
(70 is really just a restatement of 68), then it must be from the promse (71), which is 
nothing more than the Gospel of forgiveness by grace through faith in Jesus Christ. The 
earlier fundamental principle that the promise of reconciliation, righteousness, and eternal 
                                                 
206 Ap IV:294-297, BKS, 218; English of ¶294-296 from Tappert, 152-153; English of ¶297 from 
Triglotta, 205. (Tappert deviates from a more literal translation of the Latin in ¶297.) The German version 
in this place is not a direct equivalent; confer above, n.191 p.266. 
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life for Christ’s sake would not be given in vain (73) is the minor premise that 
Melanchthon uses to further reason, with an unexpressed major premise (72) that 
justification cannot be ascribed to anything other than faith alone (74). All of these 
arguments together are relatively convincing, but Melanchthon seemingly could have 
gone further. 
 Returning to the first syllogism above (63-64-65), worth noting are two other 
arguments that might be made—but were not in fact made—using its conclusion (68) as a 
premise. Presumably the Reformers’ opponents would be willing to grant the other 
premise that all the justified love God (75, below), even if they would not be so willing to 
grant the two conclusions. 
75) [All who are justified (P) are those who love God (M).] 
65) [No one who relies on the law for justification (S) is one who loves God (M).] 
76) [No one who relies on the law for justification (S) is one who is justified (P).] 
65) [No one who relies on the law for justification (P) is one who loves God (M).] 
75) [All who are justified (S) are those who love God (M).] 
77) [Some who are justified (S) are not one who relies on the law for justification (P).] 
This first syllogism (75-65-76) is a 2nd figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE known as 
Cambestres, and produces a strong argument against the law justifying. One is also 
tempted to resequence the premises in order to form the second syllogism (65-75-77), 
which in its 3rd figure form EAO is the mood known as Felapto that is known to be valid 
today but was not recognized as a valid mood in medieval times.207 This second 
syllogism (65-75-77) does not make as strong of a conclusion as Melanchthon would no 
doubt like to make, saying only that some of the justified do not rely on the law for 
justification (an O statement), not that none of the justified do not rely on the law for 
justification (an E statement).208 Although Melanchthon did not go this direction in his 
arguments, nor could he have gone as far as the last syllogism (65-75-77), given the valid 
moods of the 3rd figure that were recognized in the medieval period, significantly he is 
clear both that love follows faith and that works, while excluded from justification, are 
                                                 
207 On Felapto, see, for example Bonevac, Simple Logic, 185. 
208 EAE is not a valid mood in the 3rd figure, so the only way to make this a valid argument is to 
change the nature of the statement. 
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not excluded altogether. The close connection of works following faith as an effect 
follows a cause is taken up in Chapter V. 
 As the text of Apology IV continues, all of the reasoning expressed in ¶294-297 is 
immediately regarded as an unassailable proof, with the technical term used in the Latin, 
and the proof is one again intended for the comfort of troubled consciences. 
 Haec tam perspicua, tam manifesta sunt, ut miremur tantum esse 
furorem adversariorum, ut haec vocent in dubium. Manifesta  
est, cum non iustificemur coram Deo ex lege, sed ex promissione, quod 
necesse sit fidei tribuere iustificationem. Quid potest contra hanc 
 opponi, nisi totum evangelium, totum Christum abolere quis 
volet? Gloria Christi fit illustrior, cum docemus eo uti mediatore ac 
propitiatore. Piae conscientiae vident in hac doctrina uberrimam 
consolationem sibi proponi, quod videlicet credere se certo statuere 
debent, quod propter Christum habeant placatum patrem, non propter 
nostras iustitias, et quod Christus adiuvet tamen, ut facere etiam legem 
possimus.  
 These things are so clear and evident that we are astonished to see 
how furiously our opponents deny them. The proof is obvious: Since we 
are not justified before God by the law but from the promise, justification 
must necessarily be ascribed to faith. What argument can anybody 
possibly bring against this proof unless he wants utterly to abolish Christ 
and the Gospel? Christ’s glory becomes brighter when we teach men to 
make use of him as mediator and propitiator. In this teaching, faithful 
consciences see the most complete consolation offered them. They are 
taught to believe and to rely on the sure fact that they have a reconciled 
Father because of Christ, not because of our righteousness but because 
Christ still helps us to keep the law.209 
Note that the fundamental principle of not abolishing Christ is still in play, although it 
does not enter the formal syllogism. The “proof” given in the preceding paragraph may 
                                                 
209 Ap IV:298-299, BKS, 219; Tappert, 153. The German version in this place is not a direct 
equivalent; confer n.191 above, p.266. Tappert’s English translation at the end of this Latin excerpt leaves 
some things to be desired. Pious consciences see in the teaching that they can be believe and know two 
things: that they are reconciled with the Father on account of Christ and that Christ helps them with their 
incipient keeping of the law. Translating “but because” wrongly makes the incipient keeping of the law the 
basis of the justification. (Compare the Triglotta, 205, “and that, nevertheless”.) 
 The Greek for “proof” is used only here in the Latin of Ap IV:298; demonstratio for 




be represented syllogistically as follows, with the unexpressed premise indicated in 
square brackets. 
78) [All things done by the promise (M) are ascribed to faith (P).] 
79) All justification before God (S) is something done by the promise (P). 
80) All justification (S) is necessarily ascribed to faith (P). 
As with others that have been seen so far, this syllogism is a 1st figure syllogism of the 
valid mood AAA known as Barbara. Melanchthon uses the argument in this form to 
glorify Christ and at the same time to comfort faithful consciences.210 Clearly 
Melanchton expects a person under the Holy Spirit’s guidance to use such reasoning on 
the basis of the Gospel message as comfort. 
 Whether the general principle of the necessity of using Christ in justification, 
justification by faith itself as a general principle, or some other general principle, general 
principles are used elsewhere in the works contained in The Book of Concord. In Luther’s 
Smalcald Articles, a general principle, although it is not termed such, that certain honors 
belong only to God comes into the argument over the invocation of saints, outweighing 
the fact that saints on earth and even possibly saints in heaven pray for believers.211 In the 
Solid Declaration’s article on Original Sin, one reads the following. 
 Und dieweil unter anderm auch dieses ein ungezweifelter, 
unwidersprechlicher Grundspruch in der Theologia ist, daß eine jede 
substantia oder selbständiges Wesen, sofern es eine Substanz ist, entweder 
Gott selber oder ein Werk und Geschöpf Gottes sei ...  
 Et cum sit indubitatum certissimumque axioma in re theologica, 
quod omnis substantia (quatenus est substantia) aut sit Deus ipse aut opus 
et creatura Dei ...  
 It is one of the unquestioned and irrefutable axioms in theology 
that every substance or self-subsisting essence, in as far as it is a 
substance, is either God himself or a product and creature of God.212  
                                                 
210 On the role of giving glory to Christ and comforting troubled consciences as hermeneutical 
principles in the Apology, see Arand, “The Apology as a Polemical Commentary,” 179-180. Confer Arand, 
“Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument,” 289. See also at n.90 above, p.233. 
211 SA II:ii:26; II:iv:3, Tappert, 297. 
212 SD I:55, BKS, 862; Tappert, 518. The German Grundspruch and the corresponding Latin 
axioma (both “axiom”) are used only here in The Book of Concord. Note the use of the Latin terms in the 




Elsewhere in the Solid Declaration a statement of Scripture about the purpose of 
Scripture is used to argue both against the false security and impenitence and against the 
anxiety and despair that can arise while considering the locus of election. 
 Wider diesen falschen Wahn und Gedanken soll man 
nachfolgenden klaren Grund, der gewiß ist und nicht fehlen kann, setzen, 
nämblich: weil „alle Schrift von Gott eingegeben“ nicht zur Sicherheit und 
Unbußsertigkeit, sondern „zur Strafe, Züchtigung und Besserung“ dienen 
soll, 2 Timoth. 3. 
 Contra hanc falsam opinionem et periculosas cogitationes huic 
solidissimo fundamento, quod exspectationem nostram fallere non potest, 
sed longe firmissimum est, inniti oportet, nempe: Certum est omnem 
scripturam divinitus inspiratam non ad alendam securitatem aut 
impoenitentiam, sed ad arguendum, ad erudiendum in iustitia et ad vitae 
emendationem propositam esse.  
We must oppose such false imagining and [dangerous] thoughts with the 
following clear, certain, and unfailing foundation: All Scripture, inspired 
by God, should minister not to security and impenitence but “to reproof, 
correction, and improvement” (II Tim. 3:16).213 
A final notable reference to general principles is in the Solid Declaration’s article on the 
Person of Christ, where the Reformers write of those who would not publicly confess the 
Sacramentarians’ position on the Lord’s Supper but nevertheless used “the same basic 
arguments” (ebendieselbigen Grundfest; eadem fundamenta) about Christ.214 The 
implication from this last passage is that arguments one uses is an indication of one’s 
belief, at least in some cases stronger than what one otherwise publicly confesses. 
 In short, Melanchthon reasons from fundamental principles much as Aristotle 
describes a scientific system developing. For Melanchthon, as has been seen in Apology 
IV, these principles can be points proven by the use of Scripture or points the Reformers 
have demonstrated by syllogistic arguments. Such reasoning is not without its purposes: 
glorifying Christ and comforting troubled consciences to keep them from despair—
something Melanchthon says the Reformers do better than their opponents. Of course, 
                                                 
213 SD XI:12, BKS, 1067; Tappert, 618. 
214 SD VIII:4, BKS, 1018; Tappert, 592. The only other use of Grundfest is in the quotation of 
Ephesians 1:4 found in SD XI:65. 
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Melanchthon is not the only reformer who can argue syllogistically, as begins to be seen 
in the next subsection that considers the necessity of Baptism. 
“Necessity” of Baptism, as in Apology IX:2 and LC IV:30-31 
 There are at least two places in The Book of Concord where syllogistic arguments 
are used regarding the “necessity” of Baptism. The first is in the Apology’s article on 
Baptism, where the argument is made against the Anabaptists’ claim that baptizing 
children is useless. 
Certissimum est enim, quod promissio salutis pertinet etiam ad parvulos. 
Neque vero pertinet ad illos, qui sunt extra ecclesiam Christi, ubi nec 
verbum nec sacramenta sunt, quia Christus regenerat per verbum et 
sacramenta. Igitur necesse est baptizare parvulos, ut applicetur eis 
promissio salutis, iuxta mandatum Christi: Baptizate omnes gentes. Ubi 
sicut offertur omnibus salus, ita offertur omnibus baptismus, viris, 
mulieribus, pueris, infantibus. Sequitur igitur clare infantes baptizandos 
esse, quia salus cum baptismo offertur. 
It is most certain that the promise of salvation also pertains to little 
children. It does not apply to those who are outside of Christ’s church, 
where there is neither Word nor sacrament, because Christ regenerates 
through Word and sacrament. Therefore it is necessary to baptize children, 
so that the promise of salvation might be applied to them according to 
Christ’s command (Matt. 28:19), “Baptize all nations.” Just as there 
salvation is offered to all, so Baptism is offered to all—men, women, 
children, and infants. Therefore it clearly follows that infants should be 
baptized because salvation is offered with Baptism. 
Denn es ist ganz gewiß, daß die göttlichen Verheißungen der Gnade des 
Heiligen Geistes nicht allein die Alten, sondern auch die Kinder belangen. 
Nu gehen die Verheißungen diejenigen nicht an, so außerhalb der Kirchen 
Christi sein, da weder Evangelium noch Sakramente ist. Denn das Reich 
Christi ist nirgend, denn wo das Wort Gottes und die Sakramente sind. 
Darumb ist es auch recht christlich und not die Kinder zu täufen, damit sie 
des Evangelii, der Verheißung des Heils und der Gnaden teilhaftig 
werden, wie Christus befiehlet: „Gehet hin, täufet alle Heiden.“ Wie ihnen 
nu wird Gnade, Heil in Christo, also wird ihnen angeboten die Taufe, 
beide Mannen und Weiben, Knaben und jungen Kindern. So folget gewiß 
daraus, daß man die jungen Kinder täufen mag und soll, denn in und mit 




For it is completely sure that the divine promises of the grace of the Holy 
Spirit do not only concern the old, but also children. Now, the promises do 
not concern those who are outside of Christ’s church, where there is 
neither Gospel nor sacraments. Because the kingdom of Christ is nowhere 
than where the Word and Sacraments are. Therefore it is also rightfully 
Christian and necessary to baptize the children, thereby so that they might 
receive the Gospel, the promise of salvation, and grace according to 
Christ’s command (Matthew 28:19), “Go forth, baptize all heathen.” Now, 
just as grace, salvation in Christ, is offered to them, so Baptism is offered 
to them—both men and women, children and infants. Therefore it clearly 
follows that one may and should baptize infants, because in and with 
Baptism is offered the universal grace and treasure of the Gospel.215 
The arguments in the preceding authoritative paragraph may be represented as follows, 
with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Again note that expressions 
are being equated, in this case, the promise or offer of salvation and access to Christ’s 
regeneration. 
81) No Word and Sacrament (M) is apart from the church (P).216 
82) All access to Christ’s regeneration (S) is through Word and Sacrament (M). 
83) No access to Christ’s regeneration (S) is found apart from the church (P). 
83) No access to Christ’s regeneration is apart from the church. 
substitute “offer of salvation” for “access to Christ’s regeneration” 
84) No one to whom salvation is offered is one who is apart from the church. 
obversion 
85) All those to whom salvation is offered are those who are not apart from the church. 
86) [All those to whom baptism is not offered are those who are outside the church.] 
contrapositive 
87) [All those who are not apart from the church are those to whom baptism is offered.] 
87) [All those who are not apart from the church (M) are those to whom baptism is offered (P).] 
85) All those to whom salvation is offered (S) are those who are not apart from the church (M). 
88) All those to whom salvation is offered (S) are those to whom baptism is offered (P). 
88) All to whom salvation is offered (M) are those to whom baptism is offered (P). 
89) All men/infants (S) are those to whom salvation is offered (M). 
90) All men/infants (S) are those to whom baptism is offered (P). 
The first syllogism (81-82-83) is fully expressed in the text and has the form of the 1st 
figure valid mood EAE known as Celarent. The conclusion of that argument (83) with a 
                                                 
215 Ap IX:2, BKS, 247; Tappert, 178. The English translation of the German is this author’s 
adaptation of the Triglotta, 245. 
216 “Apart from the church” or “outside of the church” is not to be understood as if someone is 
absolutely or irrevocably barred from the church. 
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substitution of “offer of salvation” for “access to Christ’s regeneration” can be restated 
(84) and then transformed by obversion to yet another equivalent restatement (85), which 
becomes an explicit minor premise in the next syllogism (87-85-88).217 The major 
premise for that syllogism (87), is the contrapositive of an implicit premise (70) that 
seems to be related to Melanchthon’s introduction of the maxim extra ecclesiam non 
salus nulla (“apart from the church there is no salvation”).218 That second syllogism 
(87-85-88; 1st figure AAA, or Barbara) gives a conclusion (88) that as a major premise 
can then be combined with a minor premise based on Matthew 28:19 (89) to produce a 
third syllogism (88-89-90; also 1st figure AAA or Barbara) that gives the conclusion 
Melanchthon wants (90). To some extent the reconstruction is unconvincing, not only 
because so much is unexpressed, but also because on a more straight-forward reading the 
text seems to want to argue something like the following. 
91) All promises of salvation (M) are offered with Baptism (P). 
92) All little children/infants (S) are those to whom the promises pertain (M). 
93) All little children/infants (S) are to be baptized (P). 
This syllogism (91-92-93) is a 1st figure syllogism in the valid mood AAA, known as 
Barbara, but seems to equivocate in both the middle and predicate terms. Another read of 
the text might see the crucial unexpressed link in Melanchthon’s argument to be 
understanding Baptism as the point of entry into the church where there is access to 
Christ’s regeneration. Furthermore, one wonders why Melanchthon did not make the 
more straightforward argument that follows (also a 1st figure valid AAA, or Barbara 
syllogism). 
                                                 
217 The four categorical propositions have logical relationships with each other that allow various 
logical moves. Obversion changes the quality of a proposition (in this case, from negative to positive) and 
replaces the predicate with what is called the “complement” but might be more usefully thought of as the 
opposite (in this case, from “one who is apart from the church” to “one who is not apart from the church”). 
See Bonevac, Simple Logic, 163-171. 
218 Similar to obversion discussed above (n.217), the contrapositive results from a logical 
operation on a categorical proposition that consists of first switching the order of the subject and the 
predicate and then replacing each term with its complement (as explained above in n.217). Again, see 
Bonevac, Simple Logic, 163-171. 
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94) All Gentiles219 are to be baptized. 
95) [All children are part of all Gentiles.] 
96) All children are to be baptized. 
Most likely the nature of Melanchthon’s more complicated argument was the result of the 
very nature of the dispute with the Anabaptists and other reformed who denied that 
baptism was a means of grace and therefore also denied that it was necessary for 
salvation.220 
 Another place where a syllogistic argument is used regarding the “necessity” of 
Baptism is in Luther’s Large Catechism’s article on Baptism. Again, the Anabaptists are 
the target. 
 Nu sind sie so toll, daß sie voneinander scheiden den Glauben und 
das Ding, daran der Glaube haftet und gebunden ist, ob es gleich 
äusserlich ist. Ja, es soll und muss äusserlich sein, daß man’s mit Sinnen 
fassen und begreifen und dadurch ins Herz bringen könne, wie denn das 
ganze Evangelium ein äusserliche mündliche Predigt ist. Summa, was 
Gott in uns tuet und wirket, will er durch solch äusserliche Ordnung 
wirken. Wo er nu redet, ja wohin oder wodurch er redet, da soll der 
Glaube hinsehen und sich daran halten. Nu haben wir hie die Wort: „Wer 
da gläubt und getauft wird, der wird selig“. Worauf sind sie geredet anders 
denn auf die Taufe, das ist, das Wasser in Gottes Ordnung gefasset? 
Darümb folget, daß, wer die Taufe verwirft, der verwirft Gottes Wort, den 
Glauben und Christum, der uns dahin weiset und an die Taufe bindet. 
 Jam nostri  aut potius spermalogi spiritus usque adeo 
vecordes sunt et nullius judicii, ut disjungere non vereantur fidem et rem, 
cui fides adhaerescit et alligata est, tametsi externa sit. Verum haec non 
potest non externa esse, ut sensibus percipi et comprehendi possit atque ita 
deinceps animo infigi, quemadmodum totum evangelium externa quaedam 
et corporalis est praedicatio. In summa, quidquid Deus in nobis facit et 
operatur, tantum externis hisce rebus et constitutionibus operari dignatur. 
Ubicumque jam loquitur, imo potius quocumque aut per quemcumque 
locutus fuerit, eo fidei dirigendi sunt oculi eique adhaerendum. Jam hic 
                                                 
219 Matthew 28:19 uses the Greek word for heathen  (the root word of which gives English 
“ethnic”), and the Latin and German of Ap IX:2 use, respectively, gentes and Heiden. While the usual 
English translation of the Greek word is “nations” (so KJV, ASV, NIV, NASB et al.), the sense is “all 
people” especially those outside the church as the spiritual children of Abraham, the spiritual Jews. The 
Latin gentes can have the sense of “nation” but the German Heiden is much more specifically “heathen” or 
“pagans” as in the Jew-Gentile dichotomy. To be sure, baptizing one representative person from each 
nationality is not what Jesus has in mind. 
220 The “necessity” taught by true catholics is tempered according to St. Augustine’s maxim: 
contemptus sacramenti damnat, non privatio (“contempt of the sacrament damns, not deprivation”). 
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verbum Dei in promptu habemus: ‘Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, 
salvus erit.’ Quorsum ista verba alias quam de baptismo dicta sunt, hoc est 
de aqua divino ordine fundata et confirmata? Ex hoc sequitur, ut is, qui 
baptismum contemnit et rejicit, verbum Dei, fidem et Christum quoque 
rejiciat eo nos ducentem et baptismo alligantem.  
 Now, these people are so foolish as to separate faith from the 
object to which faith is attached and bound on the grounds that the object 
is something external. Yes, it must be external so that it can be perceived 
and grasped by the senses and thus brought into the heart, just as the entire 
Gospel is an external, oral proclamation. In short, whatever God effects in 
us he does through such external ordinances. No matter where he speaks—
indeed, no matter for what purpose or by what means he speaks—there 
faith must look and to it faith must hold. We have here the words, “He 
who believes and is baptized will be saved.” To what do they refer but to 
Baptism, that is, the water comprehended in God’s ordinance? Hence it 
follows that whoever rejects Baptism rejects God’s Word, faith, and 
Christ, who directs us and binds us to Baptism.221 
The arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with the 
unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. 
97)  Everything that is grasped by the senses (M) is that which must be external (P). 
98)  All that must be brought into the heart (S) is that which must be grasped by the senses (M). 
99)  All that must be brought into the heart (S) is that which must be external (P). 
99)  All that must be brought into the heart (M) is that which must be external (P). 
100) [The Gospel (S) is that which must be brought into the heart (M).] 
101) The Gospel (S) is that which must be external (P). 
101) The Gospel (M) is that which must be external (P). 
102) All that faith looks to and holds to (S) is the Gospel (M). 
103) [All that faith looks to and holds to (S) is that which must be external (P).] 
103) [All that faith looks to and holds to (M) is that which must be external (P).] 
104) [All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are that to which faith looks to and holds to (M). 
105) [All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are that which must be external (P).] 
106) [All external things (M) are rejected by these people (P). 
105) [All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are external things (M).] 
107) All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are rejected by these people (P). 
108) [All who reject something to which God directs us (M) are those who reject God’s Word, faith, 
and Christ (P).] 
109) [All who reject Baptism (S) are those who reject something to which God directs us (M). 
110) All who reject Baptism (S) are those who reject God’s Word, faith, and Christ (P). 
Luther’s primary points are that Baptism is an external form of the Gospel to which God 
has bound His people and that, if one rejects Baptism, then one rejects God’s Word, faith, 
                                                 
221 LC IV:30-31, BKS, 697; Tappert, 440.  
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and Christ. To make these points Luther uses a series of syllogisms (although one is not a 
categorical Aristotelian syllogism in the strict sense), all of which are in the 1st figure 
with the valid mood AAA known as Barbara. The first syllogism (97-98-99) is fully 
expressed, and its conclusion (99) becomes the major premise in the second syllogism 
(99-100-101), where the minor (100) is just assumed. Similarly, the conclusion of that 
second syllogism (101) becomes the major premise in the third syllogism (101-102-103), 
where the minor (102) is just assumed, and its conclusion (103) becomes the major 
premise in the fourth syllogism (103-104-105). That fourth syllogism and the fifth 
syllogism (106-107-108) are reconstructions of Luther’s argument but seem to be 
necessary to get the conclusion he more or less expresses (107), casting his Anabaptist 
opponents in the role of “these people”. Perhaps as support for that conclusion or as an 
alternate but unrelated way of arriving at it, Luther seems to assume the sixth syllogism 
(108-109-110), supporting the minor premise (109) by reading the text of Mark 16:16 
(“He who believes and is baptized will be saved”) as God directing His people to 
Baptism as a means of grace.222 
 Thus, both Melanchthon and Luther in somewhat strikingly different but both 
acceptable ways argue syllogistically about the necessity of Baptism. The primary 
opponents in regards to such arguments were the Anabaptists, but it is back to the 
Reformers’ Roman Catholic opponents that in considering passages where the opponents’ 
bad arguments are specifically identified and refuted. 
Opponents bad arguments identified, as in Apology XXIII 
 Perhaps nowhere else in the Apology is the argumentation of the Reformers’ 
opponents criticized for errors in such a way as the argumentation is criticized in the 
Apology’s article on Sacerdotal Marriage. There, as they appeal to the emperor’s 
judgment, the Reformers contrast their own arguments to those of their opponents thusly. 
Sed quia nulla cadit in hos tuos mores vel turpitudo vel saevitia, speramus 
te et in hac causa clementer nobiscum acturum esse, praesertim ubi 
cognoveris, nos gravissimas habere causas nostrae sententiae sumptas ex 
                                                 
222 Despite Mark 16’s textual issues, Luther uses it as authoritative Scripture here in the Large 
Catechism and in the Small Catechism (SC IV:8). 
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Verbo Dei, cui adversarii nugacissimas et vanissimas persuasiones 
opponunt. 
[Dieweil aber Gott der Allmächtige Euer Majestät mit sonderlicher 
angeborner Güte und Zucht begnadet,] daß Euer Majestät aus hohem, 
adelichen, christlichem Gemüt so große Unzucht zu handhaben oder so 
ungehörte Tyrannei fürzunehmen, selbst Scheu haben und diese Handlung 
ohne Zweifel viel fürstlicher und christlicher bedenken, denn sie losen 
Leute, so hoffen wir, Euer Majestät werden in diesem ganz kaiserlich und 
gnädiglich sich erzeigen und bedenken, daß wir dieses guten Grund und 
Ursach haben aus der heiligen Schrift, dagegen die Widersacher eitel 
Lügen und Irrtum fürbringen. 
Because your conduct is free of disgrace and cruelty, we hope that you 
will deal kindly with us in this case, especially when you learn that for our 
position we have the most serious of reasons, taken from the Word of 
God, while our opponents set against them their own foolish and vain 
opinions.223 
The following paragraph accuses the opponents of not giving significant arguments on 
this topic. 
 Et tamen non tuentur serio coelibatum. Neque enim ignorant, quam 
pauci praestent castitatem, sed praetexunt speciem religionis regno suo, 
cui prodesse coelibatum putant, ut intelligamus Petrum recte monuisse, 
futurum ut pseudoprophetae fictis verbis decipiant homines. Nihil enim 
vere, simpliciter et candide in hac tota causa dicunt, scribunt aut agunt 
adversarii, sed re ipsa dimicant de dominatione, quam falso putant 
periclitari et hanc impio praetextu pietatis munire conantur. 
 Auch so ist es ihnen gewiß nicht Ernst, solchen Zölibat und 
ehelosen Stand zu verfechten; denn sie wissen wohl, wie reine Jungfern 
sie sein, wie wenig unter ihnen die Keuschheit halten. Allein sie bleiben 
bei ihrem Trostwort, das sie in ihrer Schrift finden: si non caste tamen 
caute, und wissen, daß keusch sich rühmen oder nennen und doch nicht 
sein, in der Welt einen Schein der Keuschheit hat, daß auch ihr Papstreich 
und Pfaffenwesen dadurch für der Welt desto heiliger scheinet. Denn 
Petrus der Apostel hat recht gewarnet, daß solche falsche Propheten 
werden die Leute betrügen mit erdichteten Worten. Die Widersacher 
nehmen sich der Sache der Religion, welches die Häuptsache ist, gar nicht 
mit Ernst an. Was sie schreiben, reden, handeln, sind eitel Worte ad 
hominem; da ist kein Ernst, keine Treü, kein recht Herz zu gemeinem 
Nutz den armen Gewissen oder Kirchen zu helfen. Im Grund ists ihnen um 
                                                 
223 Ap XXIII:4, BKS, 333-334; Tappert, 239. The German text enclosed in square brackets is not 
reflected in the Latin or English as excerpted. 
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die Herrschaft zu tun, derselbigen haben sie Sorge und unterstützelen sie 
fein mit eiteln gottlosen, heuchlischen Lügen; so wird sie auch stehen wie 
Butter an der Sonnen. 
 But they are not serious in their defense of celibacy. They know 
good and well how few practise chastity, but [they stick to that comforting 
saying which is found in their treatise, Si non caste, tamen caute (If not 
chastely, at least cautiously), and] they use religion as a pretext to 
maintain their authority, which they think celibacy enhances. Now we see 
the correctness of Peter’s warning (II Pet. 2:1) that false prophets would 
deceive people with their fictions. Our opponents will not speak, write, or 
act honestly [their words are merely an argument ad hominem], frankly, or 
openly in this whole business. All they are actually fighting for is their 
authority; they imagine that this is in danger and they are trying to fortify 
it with a wicked pretense of godliness [they support their case with 
nothing but impious, hypocritical lies; accordingly, it will endure about as 
well as butter exposed to the sun].224 
Significant is the German version’s specific mention of arguing ad hominem (“to the 
man”), perhaps as is also that the Reformers themselves more or less do the same thing in 
the process. The Reformers say serious discussion on this controversy is not needed, but 
they proceed to give six of their own arguments and dismiss their opponents’ counter-
arguments along the way.225 
 While not all of the six arguments need to be detailed here, the first is relevant to 
the discussion at hand regarding syllogistic reasoning. 
 Primum. Genesis docet homines conditos esse, ut sint foecundi, et 
sexus recta ratione sexum appetat. Loquimur enim non de concupiscentia, 
quae peccatum est, sed de illo appetitu, qui in integra natura futurus erat, 
quem vocant . Et haec  est vere ordinatio divina 
sexus ad sexum. Cum autem haec ordinatio Dei sine singulari opere Dei 
tolli non possit, sequitur ius contrahendi matrimonii non posse tolli statutis 
aut votis. 
                                                 
224 Ap XXIII:5, BKS, 334; Tappert, 239-240. The English translations of the German additions are 
provided in the square brackets as from the Triglotta, 365. 
225 Confer the discussion of Ap XXIII:6 above at n.63. Confer also Ap XXIII:62: Obiter etiam, 
dum recensuimus argumenta nostra, indicavimus, quomodo adversarii unum atque alterum cavillentur, et 
calumnias illas diluimus. Nunc brevissime commemorabimus, quam gravibus rationibus defendant legem. 
Wir haben nu etliche unsere Gründe auf diesmal kurz angezeigt, auch haben wir vermeldet, wie die 
Widersacher so ungeschickten Behelf und Träum dawider aufbringen. Nu wöllen wir anzeigen, mit was 
starken Gründen sie ihr Pabstgesetz verteidingen. (“In presenting our own arguments, we have incidentally 
recited and refuted the silly counter-arguments of our opponents. Now we shall briefly review their weighty 
arguments in defense of the law.”) (BKS, 346; Tappert, 247.)  
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 Haec cavillantur adversarii, dicunt initio fuisse mandatum, ut 
repleretur terra, nunc repleta terra non esse mandatum coniugium. Videte, 
quam prudenter iudicent! Natura hominum formatur illo verbo Dei, ut sit 
foecunda non solum initio creationis, sed tantisper, dum haec corporum 
natura existet. Sicut hoc verbo terra fit foecunda: Germinet terra herbam 
virentem. Propter hanc ordinationem non solum initio coepit terra 
producere gramina, sed quotannis vestiuntur agri, donec existet haec 
natura. Sicut igitur legibus humanis non potest natura terrae mutari, ita 
neque votis neque lege humana potest natura hominis mutari sine speciali 
opere Dei.  
 Erstlich ist geschrieben Gen. am 1., daß Mann und Weib also 
geschaffen von Gott sein, daß sie sollen fruchtbar sein, Kinder zeugen 
usw., das Weib geneigt sein zum Mann, der Mann wieder zum Weibe. 
Und wir reden hie nicht von der unordentlichen Brunst, die nach Adams 
Fall gefolgt ist, sondern von natürlicher Neigung zwischen Mann und 
Weib, welche auch gewesen wäre in der Natur, wenn sie rein blieben 
wäre. Und das ist Gottes Geschöpf und Ordnung, daß der Mann zum Weib 
geneigt sei, das Weib zum Mann. So nu die göttliche Ordnung und die 
angeschaffene Art niemands ändern mag noch soll, denn Gott selbst, so 
folget, daß der Ehestand durch kein menschlich Statut oder Gelübde mag 
abgetan werden. 
 Wider diesen starken Grund spielen die Widersacher mit Worten, 
sagen, im Anfang der Schöpfung habe das Wort noch statt gehabt: 
„Wachset und mehret euch und erfüllet die Erde.“ Nu aber, so die Erde 
erfüllet ist, sei die Ehe nicht geboten. Sehet aber, wie weise Leute sein da 
die Widersacher. Durch dies göttliche Wort (Wachset und mehret euch), 
welches noch immer gehet und nicht aufhöret, ist Mann und Weib also 
geschaffen, daß sie sollen fruchtbar sein, nicht allein die Zeit des Anfangs, 
sondern so lang diese Natur währet. Denn gleichwie durch das Wort Gen. 
am 1., da Gott sprach: „Es lasse die Erde aufgehen Gras und Kraut usw.“, 
die Erde also geschaffen ist, daß sie nicht allein im Anfang Frucht bracht, 
sondern daß sie alle Jahr Gras, Kräuter und ander Gewächs brächt, so lang 
diese Natur währet: also ist auch Mann und Weib geschaffen, fruchtbar zu 
sein, so lang diese Natur währet. Wie nun das Menschengebot und Gesetz 
nicht ändern kann, daß die Erde nicht sollte grüne werden usw., also kann 
auch kein Klostergelübde, kein Menschengebot die menschliche Natur 
ändern, daß ein Weib nicht sollt eins Manns begehren, ein Mann eins 
Weibs, ohn ein sonderlich Gottes Werk. 
 First, Gen. 1:28 teaches that men were created to be fruitful and 
that one sex should have a proper desire for the other. We are not talking 
about sinful lust but about so-called “natural love,” the desire which was 
meant to be in uncorrupted nature [which would have existed in nature 
even if it had remained uncorrupted]. This love of one sex for the other is 
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truly a divine ordinance. Since this ordinance of God cannot be suspended 
without an extraordinary work of God, it follows that neither regulations 
nor vows can abolish the right to contract marriage. 
 [¶8] Our opponents reply with the silly argument that originally 
there was a command to replenish the earth, but now that the earth has 
been replenished marriage is not commanded. Look at their clever 
argument! The Word of God did not form the nature of men to be fruitful 
only at the beginning of creation, but it still does as long as this physical 
nature of ours exists. Just so this Word makes the earth fruitful (Gen. 
1:11), “Let the earth put forth vegetation, plants yielding seed.” Because 
of this ordinance, the earth did not begin to bring forth plants only at the 
beginning, but yearly the fields are clothed as long as this universe exists. 
Just as human regulations cannot change the nature of the earth, so neither 
vows nor human regulations can change the nature of man [that a woman 
should not desire a man, nor a man a woman] without an extraordinary act 
of God.226 
The arguments of the preceding paragraphs may be represented as follows, with the 
unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note that “love of one sex for the 
other” and “the right to contract marriage” are equated and interchangeable. 
111) All that can suspend a divine ordinance (M) is an extraordinary divine act (P). 
112) All that can abolish the right to contract marriage (S) is that which can suspend the divine 
ordinance (M). 
113) All that can abolish the right to contract marriage (S) is an extraordinary divine act (P). 
113) All that can abolish the right to contract marriage (P) is an extraordinary divine act (M). 
114) [No human regulation or vow (S) is an extraordinary divine act (M).] 
115) No human regulation or vow (S) can abolish the right to contract marriage (P). 
Melanchthon assumes that the love of one sex for the other is a divine ordinance and that 
expressing such love only in marriage is also a divine ordinance. Based on the accepted 
reading of the Biblical text, his opponents likely would be hard pressed to disagree on 
those points, but that is probably where their agreement would end, which is why 
Melanchthon starts his arguments at that point. The three propositions of the first 
syllogism (111-112-113) are more or less explicit and take the 1st figure form in the valid 
mood AAA known as Barbara. The conclusion of that first syllogism (113) becomes the 
major premise in the second syllogism (113-114-115; a 2nd figure Cambestres), which, 
with the implicit minor premise (114) produces the conclusion Melanchthon wants. 
                                                 
226 Ap XXIII:7-8, BKS, 334-335; Tappert, 240. For the argument of the Confutation, see CR 
27:142; Reu, *367; K-N, 125. 
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 Augsburg Confession XXIII had adduced Genesis 1 in support of the Reformers’ 
position regarding the Marriage of Priests,227 and Confutation XXIII had responded with 
an appeal to the church father Jerome’s writing Adversus Jovinianum (Against 
Jovinian),228 so the the discussion of Genesis 1 in Apology XXIII is of little surprise. The 
opponents’ claim that, since the world was populated, the command to be fruitful and 
multiply no longer applied to priests, goes to the heart of the major premise of the first 
syllogism (111) and thus also its conclusion (113), which is the major premise of the 
second syllogism. Melanchthon’s response is a counter-argument by analogy: the non-
human nature has not changed since the world supposedly has been populated, and 
human nature has not either. Melanchthon no doubt thinks his opponents would agree 
that the command for the earth to continue producing vegetation was not lmited and 
could not be limited by human regulations. So, he expects them to see the falsity of the 
analogy set up in the concluding sentence of ¶8:  
 human regulations : nature of the earth :: vows and human regulations : nature of 
man  
Argument by analogy has been discussed.229 
 The foregoing are not the only examples of the Reformers’ identifying their 
opponents’ bad arguments. Elsewhere in Apology XXIII the Reformers accuse their 
opponent of a specious argument and say another “horrible argument” has an 
anachronism, although the Reformers do not term it such,230 and elsewhere both in the 
Apology and in other confessional writings the Reformers criticize their opponents for 
their poor argumentation.231 Not all of the Reformers’ criticism of their opponents’ 
                                                 
227 AC XXIII:5-9. 
228 On the argument of the Confutation, again see CR 27:142; Reu, *367; K-N, 125. 
229 See Chapter III. 
230 Ap XXIII:64 (see above, n.194) and Ap XXIII:67. 
231 Other examples include the following. In Ap XXI:10 (see above at n.88, p.161), the Reformers 
say that the church invoking the saints does not follow (non sequitur; so folget doch daraus nicht [BKS, 
318]) from the saints praying for the church, but technically the Confutation does not claim invoking the 
saints follows from the saints praying, although it does argue by analogy that since the angels pray for 
people so do the saints (CR 27:125-126; Reu, ed., The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources, 
*360; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 119.) and the opponents may have made the claim 
more specifically elsewhere. (Confer SA II:ii:26, and note that in ¶25 invocation is said to conflict with the 
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arguments has to do the form of the opponents’ arguments, some criticism has to do with 
their opponents lack of support for their claims. 
No “proof” without Scripture, as in Ap XXI:10-13 and XXIV:92 
 A more specific form of criticism of the Reformers’ opponents’ arguments 
involving syllogisms pertains to their lack of Scriptural evidence. Two examples illustrate 
such reasoning by the Reformers, one at the locus of the Invocation of the Saints and the 
other at the locus of the Mass. 
 The opponents’ failure to produce even an example from Scripture for the 
invocation of the saints was discussed above,232 but here closer examination is made of 
the implications of that failure. 
Cum autem neque praeceptum neque promissio neque exemplum ex 
scripturis de invocandis sanctis afferri possit, sequitur conscientiam nihil 
posse certi de illa invocatione habere. Et cum oratio debeat ex fide fieri, 
quomodo scimus, quod Deus approbet illam invocationem? Unde scimus 
sine testimonio scripturae, quod sancti intelligant singulorum preces? 
Quidam plane tribuunt divinitatem sanctis, videlicet quod tacitas 
cogitationes mentium in nobis cernant. Disputant de matutina et vespertina 
cognitione, fortassis, quia dubitant, utrum mane an vesperi audiant. Haec 
comminiscuntur, non ut sanctos honore afficiant, sed ut quaestuosos cultus 
defendant. Nihil afferri potest ab adversariis contra hanc rationem, quod 
cum invocatio non habeat testimonium ex verbo Dei, non possit affirmari, 
quod sancti intelligant invocationem nostram, aut, ut maxime intelligant, 
quod Deus eam approbet. Quare adversarii non debebant nos ad rem 
incertam cogere, quia oratio sine fide non est oratio.  
So man nun weder Gebot noch Zusage noch Exempel aus der Schrift mag 
fürbringen, so folget, daß kein Herz noch Gewissen darauf sich verlassen 
kann. Denn dieweil ein jeglich Gebet soll aus dem Glauben geschehen, 
woher will ich denn wissen, daß Gott ihm gefallen läßt Anrufen der 
                                                                                                                                                 
chief article of the faith, which presumably trumps any other argument.) In Ap XXVIII:14, the Reformers 
say their opponents’ claim that bishops “may institute new acts of worship” does not follow (Quare non 
sequitur; so folget doch nicht [BKS, 400]) from their limited jurisdiction. (The Confutation does more or 
less deduce authority to govern from spiritual jurisdiction; see CR 27:179; Reu *381, K-N, 138. In Tr 30, 
the refomers argue that their opponents’ claim of a special superiority for Peter does not follow (nondum 
sequitur; folget noch nicht [BKS, 480]) from passages such as John 21:15, 17, which refer to the 
commission common among all the disciples. And, in SD VIII:37, the Reformers say that something being 
a property of both natures does not follow (folget nicht; non sequitur) from ascribing something to the 
person with the two natures. 
232 See above at n.88, p.161. 
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Heiligen, wenn ich nicht Gottes Wort davon habe? Wodurch werde ich 
gewiß, daß die Heiligen mein Gebet und eines jeden besondern hören? 
Etliche machen schlechts Götter aus den Heiligen und sagen, sie können 
unser Gedanken wissen und uns ins Herz sehen. Dasselbige erdichten sie, 
nicht, daß sie damit die Heligen ehren, sondern daß sie ihre Kretschmerei 
und Jahrmarkt, welcher ihnen Geld trägt, verteidigen. Wir sagen noch wie 
vor: in Gottes Wort, in der Schrift, steht nichts, daß die Heiligen unser 
Anrufen verstehen, und ob sie es verstünden, daß Gott ihm solch Anrufen 
gefallen lasse; so hats je kein Grund. Dawider können die Widersacher 
nichts aufbringen; darum sollten die Widersacher uns zu ungewissen 
Dingen nicht zwingen oder dringen, denn ein Gebet ohne Glauben ist nicht 
ein Gebet.  
Neither a command nor a promise nor an example can be shown from 
Scripture for the invocation of the saints; from this it follows that 
consciences cannot be sure about such invocation. Since prayer ought to 
come from faith, how do we know that God approves such invocation? 
How do we know, without proof from Scripture, that the saints hear the 
individual’s prayers? Evidently some attribute divinity to the saints, the 
power to perceive the unspoken thoughts of our minds. They argue about 
morning and evening knowledge, perhaps because they are not sure 
whether they hear us in the morning or in the evening. They have not 
thought this up to honor the saints but to defend their religious traffic. Our 
opponents can produce nothing against the argument that since invocation 
cannot be proved from the Word of God, we cannot affirm that the saints 
are aware of it or, even if they are, that God approves it. Therefore our 
opponents should not coerce us to adopt something uncertain, for a prayer 
without faith is not prayer.233 
Melanchthon’s arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with 
unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note the close connection between 
consciences being unsure and the lack of knowledge regarding the saints hearing 
invocation, as well as the close connection between praying without faith and the 
invocation lacking God’s approval. 
116) [All that of which the conscience can be sure (P) is commanded, promised, or exemplified in 
Scripture (M).] 
117) No invocation of the saints (S) is commanded, promised, or exemplified in Scripture (M). 
118) No invocation of the saints (S) is that of which the conscience can be sure (P). 
119) [All done with faith (P) is that of which the conscience can be sure (M).] 
118) No invocation of the saints (S) is that of which the conscience can be sure (M). 
120) No invocation of the saints (S) is done with faith (P). 
                                                 
233 Ap XXI:10-13, BKS, 318-319; Tappert, 230. 
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121) [All that has God’s approval (P) is that which comes from faith (M).] 
120) No invocation of the saints (S) is done with faith (P). 
122) No invocation of the saints (S) is approved by God (P). 
123) All prayer (P) is done with faith (M). 
120) No invocation of the saints (S) is done with faith (M).  
124) No invocation of the saints (S) is prayer (P). 
125) Everything known with certainty (P) is known by Scripture (M). 
126) No hearing of our prayers by the saints (S) is known by Scripture (M). 
127) No hearing of our prayers by the saints (S) is known with certainty (P). 
128) If the invocation of the saints is to be commanded (p), one must know either God approves it 
(q) or the saints hear it (r). 
129) One does not know that God approves it (~q) or that the saints hear it (~r). 
130) The invocation of the saints is not to be commanded (~p). 
There are two separate arguments here that come together in the end. One pertains to the 
uncertainity of the invocation leading to its not being made with faith and therefore not 
having God’s approval, and the other pertains to the uncertainty of the saints hearing the 
prayers; both lead Melanchthon to conclude the invocation should not be commanded. 
What follows is how Melanchthon gets there. The first syllogism (116-117-118) is a 2nd 
figure Cambestres with an unexpressed major premise (116) that produces a conclusion 
(118) that becomes the minor premise in the second syllogism (119-118-120), which is 
also a 2nd figure Cambestres with an unexpressed major premise (119). In keeping with 
that pattern, that syllogism’s conclusion (120) becomes the minor premise in the third 
syllogism (121-120-122), which is also a 2nd figure Cambestres with an unexpressed 
major premise (121). The fourth syllogism (123-120-124), which is also a 2nd figure 
Cambestres, also draws on the conclusion of the second syllogism (120), but this 
syllogism seems to not be a vital link in the chain but seems simply to make the point that 
the invocation is not really prayer. The fifth syllogism (125-126-127) is quite similar to 
the first (116-117-118; 2nd figure Cambestres), except that, instead of focusing on the 
certainty of the invocation, Melanchthon focuses on the certainty of the saints even 
hearing prayers addressed to them.234 Armed with the two critical conclusions (122 and 
127), Melanchthon can proceeds to an argument in the form of propositional logic and 
deduces by modus tollens that the invocation is not to be commanded. 
                                                 
234 In the preceding paragraph (Ap XXI:8-9), Melanchthon grants that the saints in heaven might 
pray for people on earth (confer Luther in SA II:ii:26). 
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 The matter of the opponents’ lack of scriptural evidence for their claims also 
comes up in seemingly syllogistic form at the locus of the Mass. Consider the following 
paragraph regarding transferring the supposed merits of the mass to the dead. 
Cum missa non sit satisfactio, nec pro poena nec pro culpa, ex opere 
operato sine fide: sequitur applicationem pro mortuis inutilem esse. Neque 
hic opus est longiore disputatione. Constat enim, quod illae applicationes 
pro mortuis nulla habeant ex scripturis testimonia. Nec tutum est in 
ecclesia cultus instituere sine auctoritate scripturae. Et si quando opus erit, 
prolixius de tota re dicemus. Quid enim nunc rixemur cum adversariis, qui 
neque quid sacrificium, neque quid sacramentum, neque quid remissio 
peccatorum, neque quid sit fides, intelligunt? 
So die Messe nu nicht eine Genugtuung ist weder für eine Pein noch 
Schuld ex opere operato, so folget, daß die Messe, so man für die Toten 
hältet, unnütz und nichts sei. Und es darf nicht langer Disputation. Denn 
da ist gewiß, das solche Messe halten für die Toten in der Schrift gar kein 
Grund hat. Nu ist es ein Greuel, in der Kirchen Gottesdienst anrichten 
ohne alles Gottes Wort, ohne alle Schrift. Und wenn es not wird sein, so 
wollen wir von diesem Stücke ganz reichlich mehr und nach aller Notdurft 
weiter reden. Denn was sollen wir uns jetzund hier viel mit den 
Widersachern zanken, so sie gar nicht verstehen, was Opfer, was 
Sakrament, was Vergebung der Sunde, was Glaube sei?  
Since the Mass is not a satisfaction for either punishment or guilt, ex opere 
operato and without faith, it follows that it is useless to transfer it to the 
dead. There is no need here of a very lengthy discussion. Clearly this 
transference to the dead cannot be proved from the Scriptures, and it is not 
safe to institute services in the church without the authority of Scripture. If 
the need ever arises, we shall discuss this whole issue more fully. Why 
should we wrangle with our opponents who understand the meaning of 
neither sacrifice nor sacrament nor forgiveness of sins nor faith?235 
Melanchthon’s arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with 
unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note that Melanchthon is only 
granting for the sake of argument that a mass can provide satisfaction of punishment or 
guilt.236 
                                                 
235 Ap XXIV:92, BKS, 375; Tappert, 266-267. 
236 This is reading the non (“not”) as primarily applying to ex opere operato sine fide (“from the 
work itself having worked without faith”). 
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131) All who receive satisfaction of punishment or guilt by a mass (P) are those who exercise faith 
to the mass itself (M). 
132) No dead person (S) is one who exercises faith the the mass itself (M). 
133) No dead person (S) is one who receives satisfaction of punishment or guilt by a mass (P). 
134) All things instituted without the authority of Scripture (M) are not sure (P). 
135) All institutions of mass for the dead (S) are without the authority of Scripture (M). 
136) [All institutions of mass for the dead (S) are not sure (P).] 
The two syllogisms provide two relatively straightforward separate arguments. The first 
(131-132-133) is a 2nd figure Cambestres with all three propositions more or less 
expressed. The second (134-135-136) is a 1st figure Barbara for which Melanchthon 
leaves it to the reader to draw the obvious conclusion (136) from the two premises (134, 
135). 
 This subsection has given two significant examples of the Reformers’ criticizing 
their opponents for the lack of Scriptural support for their claims. Both examples are of 
Roman Catholic abuses that the Reformers had corrected, but more significantly both 
pertain to faith and its role in the comforting of consciences with the forgiveness of sins.  
Logical moves, as in LC I:63-64 
 With Scripture on one’s side, even when Scripture does not make the precise 
statement needed, various conclusions can be drawn after a little logical reasoning. A 
case in point is found in the Large Catechism’s discussion of the Second Commandment, 
which regards not taking God’s name in vain. Luther appears to make a logical move 
from those things prohibited to those things commanded. 
Daneben muss Du auch wissen, wie man des Namens recht brauche. Denn 
neben dem Wort, als er sagt: „Du sollst Gottes Namen nicht vergeblich 
brauchen“, gibt er gleichwohl zu verstehen, daß man sein wohl brauchen 
solle. Denn er ist uns eben darümb offenbaret und gegeben, daß er im 
Brauch und Nutz soll stehen. Darümb schleußt sich’s nu selbs, weil hie 
verboten ist, den heiligen Namen zur Lügen oder Untugend zu führen, daß 
wiederümb gepoten ist, ihn zur Wahrheit und allem Guten zu brauchen. 
Als nämlich, so man recht schweret, wo es not ist und gefordert wird, also 
auch, wenn man recht lehret, item, wenn man den Namen anrufet in 
Nöten, lobt und dankt im Guten etc. Welchs alles zuhauf gefasset und 
gepoten ist in dem Spruch, Psalm. 50.: „Rufe mich an zur Zeit der Not, so 
will ich Dich erretten, so sollst Du mich preisen.“ Denn das heißet alles 
ihn zur Wahrheit angezogen und seliglich gebraucht, und wird also sein 
Name geheiligt, wie das Vaterunser betet. 
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Ad haec scitu quoque opus est, quinam Dei nomine recte utamur. Hisce 
enim verbis, quibus praecepit: ‘Non assumes nomen Domini Dei tui in 
vanum,’ etiam illud intelligendum nobis proponit suo nomine nos etiam 
recte et utiliter uti posse. Non enim aliam ob causam nobis revelatum est, 
quam ut utentibus subinde sit fructuosum et utile. Inde hoc utro evincitur, 
quod, cum hic praecepto cautum sit, ne mentientes aut alioqui flagitiose 
delinquentes sanctum Dei nomen prave usurpemus, contra praeceptum 
nobis esse arbitremur, ut eo ad confirmandam veritatem ac reliquas 
actiones honestas utamur. Nempe, quando recte juramus, dum aut 
necessitas postulat, aut a nobis jusjurandum exigitur. Ita quoque, quando 
recte et sincere docetur veritas evangelii. Praeterea, quando in 
necessitatibus nomen Dei imploramus aut idem rebus secundis laudamus 
et gratias agimus etc. Quae omnia summatim comprehensa ac praecepta 
inveniuntur psal. L. : ‘Voca me in die tribulationis, eripiam te et 
glorificabis me.’ Omnibus hisce rationibus vere et salubriter divino 
nomine utimur, atque ita ejus nomen sanctificatur, quemadmodum in 
oratione Dominica precamur.  
 In addition, you must also know how to use the name of God 
aright. With the words, “You shall not take the name of God in vain,” God 
at the same time gives us to understand that we are to use his name 
properly, for it has been revealed and given to us precisely for our use and 
benefit. Since we are forbidden here to use the holy name in support of 
falsehood or wickedness, it follows, conversely, that we commanded to 
use it in the service of truth and all that is good—for example, when we 
swear properly where it is necessary and required. So, also, when we teach 
properly; again when we call on his name in time of need, or praise and 
thank him in time of prosperity, etc. All this is summarized in the 
commanded in Ps. 50:15, “Call upon me in the day of trouble: I will 
deliver you and you shall glorify me.” All this is what we mean by calling 
upon his name in service of truth and using it devoutly. Thus His name is 
hallowed, as we pray in the Lord’s Prayer.237 
Although translated into English as a cognate of “conversion”, the move that Luther 
seems to be making is not conversion (switching the subject and predicate of a 
proposition238) but rather something closer to obversion (changing the quality and 
replacing the predicate with its complement239). Thus, “Do not support falsehood” 
becomes “Support truth”. This logical move is apparently not the only one Luther makes. 
                                                 
237 LC I:63-64, BKS, 576; Tappert, 373. (Emphasis added.) The Triglotta translates “natural 
inference” (Triglotta, 599); with Tappert confer “follows conversely” in K-W, 394. 
238 Bonevac, Simple Logic, 164-166. 
239 See above, n.217, p.285. 
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Illustrating bad syllogisms, as in LC IV:58-59 
 Luther seems to make use of another logical move later in the Large Catechism 
where he also illustrates the bad logic of his opponents. 
 Darümb sind es je vermeßene, tölpische Geister, die also folgern 
und schliessen: Wo der Glaube nicht recht ist, da müsse auch die Taufe 
nicht recht sein. Gerade als ich wollt’ schließen: Wenn ich nicht gläube, so 
ist Christus nichts, oder also: Wenn ich nicht gehorsam bin, so ist Vater, 
Mutter und Oberkeit nichts. Ist das wohl geschlossen, wo jemand nicht 
tuet, was er tuen soll, daß darümb das Ding an ihm selbs nichts sein noch 
gelten soll? Lieber, kehre es ümb und schleuss vielmehr also: Eben 
darümb ist die Taufe etwas und recht, daß man’s unrecht empfangen hat. 
Denn wo sie an ihr selbs nicht recht wäre, künnd’ man nicht missbrauchen 
noch daran sundigen. Es heißet also: „Abusus non tollit, sed confirmat 
substantiam“, „Missbrauch nimmt nicht hinweg das Wesen, sondern 
bestätigt’s“. Denn Gold bleibt nichts weniger Gold, ob es gleich eine 
Bübin mit Sunden und Schanden trägt. 
 Quocirca illi vesani baptismonastiges nimium sibi sumunt, qui ita 
concludentes inferunt: Ubi fides non est, ibi nec baptismus rectus esse 
potest. Quasi ita velim concludere: Si fidem non habuero, sequitur 
Christum nihil esse. Aut sic: Si majorum jussis morem non gessero, nec 
parentes nec magistratus quicquam esse constat. Nonne vero hoc est inepte 
et inefficaciter colligere, ubi quis non facit, quod illi faciendum fuerat, 
propterea sequi rem per se nihil esse aut valere? Quin potius argumentum 
inverte atque ita collige: Sane ob id ipsum baptismum quantivis pretii et 
rectus habendus est, quod non recte ab hominibus susceptus est. Quippe si 
per se baptismus rectus non esset, eo nullo modo possemus abuti aut 
abutendo delinquere. Ita enim dicitur: ‘Abusus non tollit, sed confirmat 
substantiam.’ Siquidem aurum manet aurum, tametsi hoc meretrix 
contumelioso quaestu corporis partum circumferat. 
 Therefore only presumptuous and stupid persons draw the 
conclusion that where there is no true faith, there also can be no true 
Baptism. Likewise I might argue, “If I have no faith, then Christ is 
nothing.” Or again, “If I am not obedient, then father, mother, and 
magistrates are nothing.” Is it correct to conclude that when anybody does 
not do what he should, the thing that he misuses has no existence or no 
value? My friend, rather invert the argument and conclude, Precisely 
because Baptism has been wrongly received, it has existence and value. 
The saying goes, “Abusus non tollit, sed confirmat substantiam,” that is 
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“Misuse does not destroy the substance, but confirms its existence.” Gold 
remains no less gold if a harlot wears it in sin and shame.240 
                                                 
240 LC IV:58-59, BKS, 703; Tappert, 444. Note in this paragraph (and the next) the convergence of 
words used in connection with reasoning and syllogistic arguments. This note details the use of some of the 
relevant words and is placed as a note so as not to interrupt the flow of the main argument in the text. 
 The English translations of the works in The Book of Concord would suggest there are a number 
of places where specific conclusions are being reached or things are being concluded. A closer examination 
in the original languages, however, indicates fewer actual “conclusions” than the English would suggest. A 
number of the English uses are renderings of the words for reasoning or arguing (for example, Ap 
XXIV:52; see the discussion of this passage above at n.143, p.189, and the discussion of these words above 
in n.72, p.221) instead of translating the words for “conclusion” and “concluding”. However, the Latin 
works and translations do still use the noun finis, finis and the verbs concludo, concludere, conclusi, 
conclusus; colligo, colligere, collegi, collectus; and statuo, statuere, statui, statutus. Though the German 
versions often lack the more technical passages of reasoning, corresponding German words are the noun 
der Beschluß and verb beschließen.  
 Other words are used. The Latin noun conclusum, conclusi is used of a conclusion regarding the 
validity of Baptism (LC IV:60 [sei beschlossen]; see the discussion of this passage below, at n.241, p.304). 
The Latin noun conclusio, conclusionis is used of what Christ adds in Luke 11:41 (Ap IV:283 [Beschluß]) 
and as a heading (LC I:311 [Beschluß]). The Latin epilogus, epilogi is used in the heading to the Ausburg 
Confession’s Conclusion (Schluss) and LC I:219 (zu beschliessen gesagt). One other notable passage is SD 
VII:46, where the Reformers say Abraham had grounds for a disputation (er wohl Ursach gnug gehabt zu 
disputieren; poterat certe occasionem disputandi arripere) and could have debated the interpretation of 
God’s Word (nach dem Buchstaben oder mit einer leidlichen oder sanften Glossa sollten zu verstehen sein; 
an verba secundum litteram accipere, an vero commode et tolerabiliore aliqua interpretatione lenire 
deberet) but instead concluded and believed (geschlossen und geglaubet; sciens [“knowing”] et credens) 
against his reason (Vornunft; rationi) that God could do what He had promised (Tappert, 577; BKS, 
986-987). This particular passage is quite significant for what it says about reason and revelation. 
 A number of references to “conclusions” and “concluding” come in Scripture passage quotations, 
some where the words just given are used and some where other words are used. Galatians 3:22 is cited 
using conclusit (the Vulgate’s word for the Greek ) and beschlossen (Ap IV:84 [leading to the 
use of conclusos immediately following]; XII:81). Romans 3:28 is cited by Ap IV:73, 87 using arbitramur 
(the Vulgate’s word for the Greek ) and halten and by SA II:i:4 using halten translated by 
statuimus. Romans 11:32 is using beschlossen and concluserit (the Vulgate has conclusit for the Greek 
) (Ep XI:10; SD XI:28). 
 The Latin noun finis, finis is used once in the translation of zu beschliessen (LC I:319) to refer to a 
rhetorical sort of “conclusion”. Other uses are more with the sense of a termination and are used in 
connection with the German Ende (Nicene Creed 6; SA III:iii:19; LC I:329). Still other uses have the sense 
of “end” or “goal”, either in a quotation of the Vulgate version of Holy Scripture rendering the Greek 
 also in connection with Ende except where noted (Romans 10:4 in both Ap IV:30 and SD V:24; 1 
Timothy 1:5 in Ap IV:245 [Summa]; 1 Peter 4:17 in Ap XII:151) or without both the quotation and the use 
of Ende (Ap IV:372 [German omits]; Ap XV:24 [German circumlocutes]; Ap XXIV:55 [German omits]; 
Ap XXIV:63 [Ursache]). (The German Am Ende is rendered by the Latin Ultimo in LC V:39.) 
 The Latin verb concludo, concludere, conclusi, conclusus is used of Paul’s conclusion that faith 
accepts promises (Ap IV:285 [German omits]); our conclusion, based on some reasoning, that we are 
justified, reconciled, and reborn by faith (Ap IV:386 [German omits]); of the opponents making a false 
concludsion from statements of Scripture, the Fathers, and the canons (Ap XII:122 [beschließen]); of the 
believer concluding that God hears prayer (LC III:121 [schliessen]); LC IV:58 (rendering schliessen); of 
the conclusion reasoned from Christ’s words that the Sacrament of the Altar is true regardless of the 
character of the person distributing it or receiving it (LC V:16 [schliessen]; confer SD VII:24, which cites 
the LC passage but uses statuimus); and Paul concludes a disputation about the salvation of Israel with 
words of doxology (SD XI:64; on this passage, see n.50 above, p.150). (In the Latin translation of the Large 
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Catechism forms of the verb render other German words with different senses: concludi for stecken in LC 
I:13; conclusum sit for geht in LC I:117; concludatur for nicht so eng spanne in LC I:250; and conclusa for 
eingeschlossen haben in LC III:73.) 
 The Latin verb colligo, colligere, collegi, collectus is used in a quotation from Augustine who 
therein concludes that justification is by faith (Ap IV:87 [schliessen]); of people perceiving things about the 
pope (SA Preface 3 [merken]); of inferring from the meaning of the Second Commandment when and how 
God’s name is abused (LC I:53 [ausrechnen]); of anyone perceiving that those living according to the 
Fourth Commandment were holy (LC I:112 [können nehmen daß]); of praise of God being concluded from 
His many blessings (LC II:19 [consequatur et colligitur render schliessen und folgen]); of concluding and 
thinking from the command to pray (LC III:12 [collige et cogita render schließen und danken], well 
illustrated); of everyone concluding that Baptism is a greater work than anyone else’s (LC IV:10 
[schliessen]); of reasoning regarding the relationship between valid Baptism and faith (LC IV:58-59 [twice, 
rendering wohl geschlossen in ¶58 and schleuss in ¶59]); of the Sacramentarians implying that the 
unworthy do not receive the sacrament (SD VII:88 [deuten]); and of Paul in Romans drawing conclusions 
from Christians’ election (SD XI:47 [Latin adds]). In other places, the same Latin word is used of 
“gathering” or “collecting” different things: truth (AC Introduction to Matters in Dispute ¶5 [German 
omits]); traditions (AC XXVI:14 [zusammenzuziehen], 15 [German omits]; Ap XV:27 [schreiben] with 
interpretations); examples (AC XXVI:45 [zieht zusammen]; AC XXVII:45 [zusammenbringen]); 
testimonies (Ap IV:171 [German omits]); similar instances (Ap VII/VIII:45 [vorbringen und anzeigen]); 
sins (Ap XI:1 [errinern]; circumstances of sins (Ap XI:7 [zusammengelesen]); arguments (Ap XII:133 
[sind]); abuses of the mass (Ap XXIV:99 [vorgetragen]); writings (SD I:4 [fassen]); and the Church (SD 
II:40 [sammelt], quoting SC II:6 where congregare is used in the Latin translation, 50 [sammelt]. In still 
other places, the same Latin word is used of a “connection” or “link” between things (Ap IV:232 [twice]; 
LC I:329). A final notable passage, one omitted from the corresponding German version, is Ap IV:285 
where the Reformers say a conscience “collecting” (colligens) remission of sins through works is never 
able to “conclude” (non potest statuere) God is satisfied. Although colligo, colligere, collegi, collectus is 
used with the sense “conclude” most heavily in the translation of the Large Catechism, the sense is not 
unknown to Melanchthon’s use in the original Apology nor to the translator of the Formula, and the 
meanings are related. Moreover, even if this Latin word was not used at all in those works with the sense of 
“conclude”, its nonuse would not by itself indicate the unwillingness of those authors to draw logical 
conclusions. (In fact, other words for such logical conclusions are used more heavily in those works, as 
seen earlier in this note and as the note continues.) 
 The Latin verb statuo, statuere, statui, statutus is used of reasoning leading to conclusions about 
righteousness by faith (Ap IV:176 [German omits]); Apology X:1 is said to argue and conclude for the 
bodily presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper on the basis of 1 Corinthians 10:16 (SD VII:55 
[argumentatur et statuit render argumentiert und schleußt]); no conclusions are to be reached in the case of 
what is not revealed in God’s Word (SD XI:52, 55 [in both cases statuere renders schließen]; for more on 
this passage and the limit to reasoning on this justification-related matter, see the discussion in the text 
below, beginning on p.313). The tropological meanings of this Latin verb begin with establishing especially 
by example or other authority, but they also include deciding disputes; making up one’s individual mind; 
and judging, being of or holding the opinion, thinking, or considering, especially a conclusion drawn as an 
inference (Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, 1752-1754). (The authors of the works in The Book of 
Concord and their translators may or may not follow all of the strict grammatical distinctions associated 
with the subtleties of these meanings.) 
 With reference to the meaning of making up one’s individual mind, there are quite a number of 
other uses of the Latin verb statuo, statuere, statui, statutus where English translations do not translate 
anything about “concluding” but the German equivalents are similar to those mentioned and the use is 
significant. (There are still other uses of the Latin verb not detailed here where the meaning is more along 
the lines of “ordain” or “establish”.) Although in the cases at hand the adverbs certo (“certainly”) or vere 
(“truly”) are frequently used with statuere, the presence or absence of the modifier does not seem to 
correspond to any difference in usage. Most frequently the Reformers are referring to holding the firm and 
decided conclusion that one is justified before God or otherwise regarded favorably by Him on account of 
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Christ (propter Christum). The list of passages in The Book of Concord where the verb is so used is 
lengthy: AC XX:15; Ap IV:8, 27, 34 (second use), 45, 110, 135, 141, 148, 163 (twice), 165, 174, 178, 180, 
203, 217, 262, 285 (twice), 299, 320, 350, 386; XI:2; XII:80, 88; XIII:4; XX:8; Ep III:9). (For one to 
conclude such deliverance apart from Christ is a “papal idolatry” [SA II:ii:1].) The other forms of God’s 
favorable regard include His hearing prayer (for example, Ap IV:8, 303, 350; XII:89; XV:43 [the content of 
preaching]; XVIII:7, 8; XXI:20; confer LC III:13, 25), cares for a person (for example, Ap IV:303, 350; 
XVIII:7, 8). (The expression can also refer to God’s disfavor: His wrath at sin (Ap IV:34 [first use]) 
 German equivalents in these cases include the following: gewisslich schliesst (AC XX:15); im 
Herzen schliessen (Ap IV:8; XXI:17); gewiss zu stehen (Ap IV:27); im Herzen sollen verlassen (Ap IV:34); 
glauben (Ap IV:135, 203); glauben und schliessen (Ap IV:141); das Herz Gewiss drauf steht (Ap IV:148); 
sollen des gewiß sein (Ap IV:163 [first use]); verläßt (Ap IV:262); halten und wissen (Ap IV:165); gewiß 
bei uns dafürhalten (Ap XI:2); glauben gewiß (Ap XII:80; XIII:20 [transposed]; Ap XXIV:49 [also 
transposed]); gewiß sein (Ap XII:89); gewiß werden (Ap XII:111); gewiß dafürhalten (Ap XVIII:8); 
sollen’s gewiß dafürhalten (Ap XXI:20); wahrhaftig dafürhalt (Ap XXIV:70); für gewiss halten sollen (Ep 
III:9); für Wahrheit halten können (SD II:9); and sollen wir gewiß sein (SD II:56). (Some passages where 
the Latin expression is used, frequently in contexts that are more technical in nature, the German version 
omits or rephrases: Ap IV:163 [second use]; 174, 176, 180, 217, 299, 303, 319, 320, 350; XII:88; XIII:4; 
XV:43; XVIII:7; XX:8). 
 These uses are akin to “belief” yet distinct. English translators sometimes render the Latin as 
“believe” (for example, Ap IV:27 in Tappert), as does the German version in some cases (for example, 
glauben in Ap IV:135, glauben und schliessen in Ap IV:141), but such faith in the heart is in other places 
explicity mentioned along side statuere, suggesting some sort of a conjunction yet distinction, though not a 
separation, between the faith of the heart and the logical conclusion of the mind or heart (for example, Ap 
IV:203, 299). (See the discussion of the Reformers’ alleged complete separation, for example in the text 
above on p.138.) There are even places where the expression seems to be used to explain what faith is (for 
example, Ap IV:148, 386; Ap XII:94 [first use]), and others where faith seems to be the basis of the 
conclusion (for example, Ap IV:217; XII:80). In other places the Word of God is the basis for the 
conclusion (for example, Ap IV:262; Ep III:9; SD II:56; SD XI:29, 36), especially its sacramental forms 
(for example, Ap XI:2 [confer SD XI:38 first use]; XIII:4, 20; XXIV:49, 70; SD XI:38 [second use]). 
Words other than credere (“to believe”) used alongside statuere (“to conclude”) indicate either further 
distinctions or a rhetorical emphasis or desire for clarity (sentire [“to know”] in Ap XI:2; XVIII:7; timere 
[“to fear”] in Ap XVIII:7; percipere [“to perceive”] in SD II:9; intelligere [“to understand”] in SD II:9).  
 Furthermore, the conclusion in view is not a general conclusion about objective righteousness but 
an individual’s—frequently the conscience’s—conclusion about subjective righteousness (for example, Ap 
IV:285 [twice], 321; Ap XII:88). To not make the conclusion that one is forgiven is regarded as blasphemy 
(Ap XII:94 [second use]), and the Reformers often indicate the difficulty in reaching the conclusion if 
relying on works, the law, the need for a complete confession, or the invocation of the saints (for example, 
Ap IV:176, 285 [twice]; XII:111; XX:10; XXI:17). Some of these uses thus not surprisingly come in 
contexts where fallen human reason and the will, their uses and limitations, are being discussed (Ap IV:8, 
303; XVIII:7; SD II:9). 
 The vast majority of these uses of statuo, statuere with the sense of concluding come in the 
Apology of the Augsburg confession. (Some of the uses of the verb in the Latin translations of German 
writings do not seem to really fit into the foregoing discussion: SA III:viii:3, 4; LC I:7, 29, 169; SD XI:9.) 
Of the some 45 uses in the Apology, more than half (28) are in the article on Justification, which could be 
due to that article’s being about one-third of the whole Apology but seems to be due more to the nature of 
the expression’s use primarily as referring to a person concluding that he or she is forgiven for Christ’s 
sake. Overall, various things are said to be so certain, but most cut right to the core of the Gospel and its 
central article of justification by faith on account of Christ (propter Christum). The salvation God so 
graciously offers is accepted by faith, but the person and his or her conscience also logically concludes on 
the basis of faith and God’s Word and Sacraments that he or she is forgiven. (Again, the absence of a 
greater number of uses in the works other than the Apology is not taken to be indicative of a rejection of 
such concluding by the authors writing in German.) 
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(Note the use of the Latin maxim, followed by a paraphrase in the German and a concrete 
illustration in both languages.) In the following paragraph Luther reiterates the argument 
and says that, even if only one person were baptized and did not have true faith, Baptism 
would still have validity and integrity.241 The arguments Luther uses in the paragraph just 
quoted may be represented as follows, with unexpressed premises indicated in square 
brackets. Note that Luther is equating “confirming the substance” with “having existence 
and value”. 
137) No abuses of Baptism (M) are true Baptisms (that is, have existence and value) (P). 
138) All Baptisms in the absence of faith (S) are abuses of Baptism (M). 
139) No Baptism in the absence of faith (S) is a true Baptism (that is, has existence and value) (P). 
140) All abuses of Baptism (M) are true Baptisms (that is, have existence and value) (P). 
138) All Baptisms in the absence of faith (S) are abuses of Baptism (M). 
141) All Baptisms in the absence of faith (S) are true Baptisms (that is, have existence and value) 
(P). 
Based on this passage, Luther seems to have in mind two related arguments—one which 
his opponents hold and the other which he holds. He provides absurd counter-examples to 
argue against his opponents, he and backs up his with a Latin maxim. The opponents’ 
syllogism is the first syllogism given (137-138-139), and it has a 1st figure form in the 
valid mood EAE known as Celarent. Luther’s syllogism is the second one given 
(140-138-141), and it has his usual 1st figure form in the valid AAA mood known as 
Barbara. Note that the minor premise (138) is the same in both syllogisms, for both 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Somewhat similarly, the use of the German Beschluß is sometimes used to refer to what the heart 
reasons, from its own experience of afflictions, regarding righteousness by faith (Ap IV:333 [a German 
addition]; confer the use of schließen in Ap IV:161 [German addition]). Other uses of Beschluß seem to 
less logical and more rhetorical (Ap VII/VIII:8 [German addition]; XII:66 [German addition]).  
 Thus, the Reformers themselves draw logical conclusions regarding matters of faith and expect 
others to do the same. Regardless of the word used in the original Latin or German, concluding is taking 
place and conclusions are being reached. The Reformers refer to people in the Bible concluding and to 
conclusions reached by Biblical figures. Likewise, the Reformers can refer to their opponents concuding 
and to their conclusions. For the Reformers, human reason has its limits: it must submit itself to the 
revealed Word of God and the corresponding Sacraments, which can be the basis for the concluding and 
conclusions. Human reason is not to make conclusions that contradict the principle of justification by faith 
for the sake of Christ or to draw conclusions about matters that are not revealed, such as the complete 
mysteries of election, concluding instead in and with doxology, praise of God. Although in some cases faith 
is the basis for the conclusion, the mind’s or the conscience’s logical conclusion itself serves a purpose for 
each individual believer, conjoined with and yet in some ways distinct from faith in the heart, even if the 
purpose is not more specifically detailed or always explicit, especially in the German. 
241 LC IV:60-63, Tappert, 444. The language of syllogistic arguments continues in that 
“paragraph” as well. 
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Luther and his opponents would seem to agree that Baptism received wrongly (that is, 
apart from faith) is an abuse of Baptism. Luther invites his opponents to “invert” their 
argument and “conclude” as he does (kehre es ümb und schleuss vielmehr; argumentum 
inverte atque ita collige). Although there appears to be a Greek logical term that can be 
translated as “inversion” more with the sense of “conversion”,242 what Luther appears to 
have in mind is not switching the predicates243 but changing the quality of the proposition 
from a negative to an affirmative, that is, take the contrary of the major premise (137 
becomes 140).244 The result is the contrary of the conclusion (139 becomes 141). Of 
course, the change is not a usual logical move because it does not produce an equivalent 
result, but Luther’s intention in this case is not to provide an equivalent opposite but 
illustrate the absurdity and falsity of his opponents’ claim and the logicality and truth of 
his own. 
 Both Melanchthon and Luther freely use syllogistic arguments to attack their 
opponents’ positions and defend their own, and the later Reformers continue their 
ministerial supra-sentential use of philosophy. In fact, the final two subsections show the 
later Reformers making quite clearly the points that individuals must use logic to comfort 
their souls but at the same time must keep logic in its place. 
Need to conclude about God’s will, as in SD XI:35-41 
 While the Reformers are critical of their opponents’ poor reasoning and wrong 
and unsupported premises, the Reformers by no means reject syllogistic reasoning as a 
whole. In fact, as is seen in the Solid Declaration at the locus of Election, the Reformers 
see reasoning as a vital part of sinners receiving comfort through the Word and 
Sacraments.245 Where their opponents falsely conclude from some people rejecting the 
Gospel that God does not really want all people to be saved, the Reformers say that 
                                                 
242 See above, n.101, p.165. 
243 See above, n.238, p.299. 
244 On contraries, see Bonevac, Simple Logic, 173; Copi and Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 189-
190. 
245 Confer the implicit argument by analogy in SD XI:60 that people need to be able to use 
induction to apply the law to themselves; see above in the text, beginning on p.169. 
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conclusion destroys the Gospel’s comfort, and they look at the same evidence and come 
to quite a different conclusion than their opponents after critiquing pointing out the 
pitfalls of their opponents’ conclusion.  
Hoc enim esset Deo contradictorias voluntates affingere, das ist, 
solchergestalt würde gelehret, daß Gott, der doch die ewige Wahrheit ist, 
ihme selbst zuwider sein sollte; so doch Gott solche Untugend, da man 
sich eins Dinges erkläret und ein anderes im Herzen gedenkt und meinet, 
auch an Menschen strafet Psal. 5. und 12. Dadurch uns auch der nötige, 
tröstliche Grund gänzlich ungewiß und zunichte gemacht, da wir täglich 
erinnert und vermahnet werden, daß wir alleine aus Gottes Wort, dadurch 
er mit uns handelt und uns beruft, lernen und schließen sollen, was sein 
Wille gegen uns sei; und was uns solches zusagt und verheißt, daß wir das 
gewiß gläuben und doran nicht zweifeln sollen. 
 Derhalben auch Christus die Vorheißunge des Evangelii nicht 
allein läßt ingemein fürtragen, sondern durch die Sakrament, die er als 
Siegel der Vorheißung angehänkt, und darmit einen jeden Gläubigen 
insunderheit bestätiget. 
 Darumb behalten wir auch, wie die Augsburgische Confession 
articulo 11. saget, die Privatabsolution und lehren, daß es Gottes Gebot 
sei, daß wir solcher „Absolution gläuben und für gewiß halten sollen, daß 
wir so wahrhaftig, wenn wir dem Wort der Absolution gläuben, Gott 
versöhnet werden, als hätten wir eine Stimme vom Himmel gehöret“, wie 
die Apologia diesen Artikel erkläret; welcher Trost uns ganz und gar 
genommen, wenn wir nicht aus dem Beruf, der durchs Wort und durch die 
Sakramente geschicht, von Gottes willen gegen uns schließen sollten. 
 Es würde uns auch der Grund umbgestoßen und genommen, daß 
der H. Geist bei dem gepredigten, gehörten, betrachteten Worter gewißlich 
gegenwärtig und dadurch kräftig sein und wirken wölle. Derhalben hats 
die Meinung in keinem Wege, darvon hievor Meldung geschehen, daß 
nämblich diejenigen die Auserwählten sein sollten, wann sie gleich das 
Wort Gottes verachten, von sich stoßen, lästern und verfolgen, Matth. 22. 
Act. 15.; oder wenn sie es hören, ihre Herzen verstocken, Ebr. 4., dem H. 
Geist widerstreben, Act. 7., ohn Buß in Sünden vorharren Luc. 14., an 
Christum nicht wahrhaftig glauben, Mar. 16., nur einen äußerlichen 
Schein führen, Matth. 7. und 22., oder außer Christo andere Wege zur 
Gerechtigkeit und Seligkeit suchen, Rom. 9. Sondern wie Gott in seinem 
Rat verordnet hat, daß der Heilige Geist die Auserwählten durchs Wort 
berufen, erleuchten und bekehren, und daß er alle die, so durch rechten 
Glauben Christum annehmen, gerecht und selig machen wolle, also hat er 
auch in seinem Rat beschlossen, daß er diejenigen, so durch Wort berufen 
werden, wann sie das Wort von sich stoßen und dem Heiligen Geist, der in 
ihnen durchs Wort kräftig sein und wirken will, widerstreben und darin 
 
307 
vorharren, sie verstocken, verwerfen und verdammen wolle. Und also sind 
„viel berufen und wenig auserwählet“. 
 Denn wenig nehmen das Wort an und folgen ihme, der größeste 
Haufe verachtet das Wort und will zu der Hochzeit nicht kommen. 
 Solcher Verachtung des Worts ist nicht die Ursach Gottes 
Versehung, sonder des Menschen vorkehrter Wille, der das Mittel und 
Werkzeug des H. Geistes, so ihm Gott durch den Beruf fürträget, von sich 
stößet oder verkehret und den H. Geist, der durchs Wort kräftig sein will 
und wirket, widerstrebet; wie Christus spricht: „Wie oft habe ich dich 
versamblen wollen, und du hast nicht gewollt“. Matth. 23. 
Hoc enim esset Deo contradictorias voluntates affingere, quasi is, qui 
aeterna veritas est, secum ipse dissentiret aut aliud loqueretur, aliud vero 
corde premeret. Hanc levitatem, hanc improbitatem (cum aliud verbis 
proponitur, aliud in corde fovetur) Deus ipse etiam in hominibus arguit et 
punit, ut David aliquoties testatur. Et hac ratione fundamentum fidei 
nostrae maxime necessarium et consolationis verae plenissimum prorsus 
verteretur, ex quo nobis quotidie admonitiones hac adferuntur et 
inculcantur, quod ex solo Dei verbo (per quod nobiscum agit nosque 
vocat) dicere atque statuere debeamus, quae sit ipsius erga nos voluntas, et 
quod omnia illa, quae nobis in verbo Domini promittuntur, firma fide 
amplecti neque de iis ulla ratione dubitare debeamus. 
 Et quidem eam ipsam ob causam (ne de revelata Dei erga nos 
voluntate dubitemus) promissionem evangelii Christus non tantum 
generaliter proponi curat, sed etiam sacramenta promissioni annectere 
voluit, quibus tamquam sigillis ad promissionem appensis unicuique 
credenti promissionis evangelicae certitudinem confirmat. 
 Ea de causa retinemus etiam privatam absolutionem (ut Augustana 
Confessio articulo undecimo loquitur) docentes Dei mandatum esse, ut 
absolutioni fidem habeamus ac certo statuamus, tam vere (quando verbis 
absolutionis fidem habemus) Deo reconciliatos nos esse, ac si vocem 
coelitus delapsam ea de re audivissemus, quam sententiam etiam Apologia 
confirmat. Haec vero consolatio eximia prorsus nobis eriperetur, si non ex 
vocatione, quae fit per Verbum et sacramenta, de voluntate Dei erga nos 
statuendum esset. 
 Quin etiam illud fundamentum religionis nostrae everteretur, quod 
credimus spiritum sanctum cum Verbo praedicato, audito et diligenter 
considerato praesentem atque efficacem esse et operari velle. Quare 
nequaquam sentiendum est, ut paulo ante monuimus, eos etiam in 
electorum numero habendos, qui Verbum Dei contemnunt, repellunt, 
exsecrantur atque persequuntur, qui audito Verbo corda sua contra illud 
obfirmant, qui spiritui sancto resistunt, qui in peccatis absque poenitentia 
perseverant neque in Christum vere credunt, externa tantum specie 
pietatem prae se ferunt aut extra Christum alias iustitiae et salutis rationes 
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quaerunt. Ut enim Deus in aeterno suo consilio ordinavit, ut spiritus 
sanctus electos per verbum vocet, illuminet atque convertat, atque omnes 
illos, qui Christum vera fide amplectuntur, iustificet atque in eos aeternam 
salutem conferat: ita in eodem suo consilio decrevit, quod eos, qui per 
Verbum vocati illud repudiant et spiritui sancto (qui in ipsis per verbum 
efficaciter operari et efficax esse vult) resistunt et obstinati in ea 
contumacia perseverant, indurare, reprobare et aeternae damnationi 
devovere velit. Et secundum has rationes intelligendum est, quod scriptura 
dicit: Multos vocatos, paucos vero electos esse. 
 Pauci enim Verbum Dei serio recipiunt eique sincere obtemperant, 
maior pars contemnit verbum neque in regiis illis nuptiis vult comparere. 
Huius contemptus verbi non est in causa vel praescientia vel praedestinatio 
Dei, sed perversa hominis voluntas, quae medium illud et instrumentum 
spiritus sancti, quod Deus homini per vocationem offert, reiicit aut 
depravat et spiritui sancto, qui per verbum efficaciter operari cupit, 
repugnat, sicut Christus dicit: Quoties volui congregare te, et noluisti. 
In this way it would be taught that God, who is the eternal Truth, 
contradicts himself. Yet God himself punishes men for such wickedness 
when they say one thing and think and intend something different in their 
hearts (Ps. 5:10, 11; 12:3, 4). This would also completely undermine and 
totally destroy for us the necessary and comforting foundation, which 
daily reminds and admonishes us to learn and to determine God’s will 
toward us and what assures and promises it to us solely from his Word, 
through which he deals with us and calls us, so that we should believe it 
with absolute certainty and not doubt it in the least. 
 For this reason Christ has the promise of the Gospel offered not 
only in general but also through the sacraments, which he has attached as a 
seal of the promise and by which he confirms it to every believer 
individually. For that reason also, as the Augsburg Confession states in 
Article. XI, we retain individual absolution and teach that it is God’s 
command that we “believe this absolution and firmly hold that when we 
believe the word of absolution we are as truly reconciled with God as if 
we had heard a voice from heaven,” as the Apology explains this article. 
We would be deprived of this comfort completely if we could not 
determine God’s will toward us from the call which comes to us through 
the Word and through the Sacraments. This would also overturn and 
destroy for us the foundation, namely that the Holy Spirit wills to be 
certainly present with and most efficacious and active through the Word 
when it is proclaimed, heard, and meditated upon. Hence, as was 
mentioned before, there is no basis for the assumption that those might be 
the elect [among the elect are to be numbered such] who despise God’s 
Word and who reject, blaspheme, and persecute it (Matt. 22:5, 6; Acts 
13:40f., 46), or who harden their hearts when they hear it (Heb. 4:2, 7), 
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resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51), remain in sin without repentance (Luke 
14:18, 24), do not truly believe in Christ (Mark 16:16); make only an 
outward pretense (Matt. 7:15; 22:12), or seek other ways to righteousness 
and salvation outside of Christ (Rom. 9:31). On the contrary, as God has 
ordained in his counsel that the Holy Spirit would call, enlighten, and 
convert the elect through the Word, and that He would justify and save all 
those who accept Christ through true faith, so he has also ordained in his 
counsel that he would harden, reject, and condemn all who, when they are 
called through the Word, spurn the Word and persistently resist the Holy 
Spirit who wants to work efficaciously in them through the Word. In this 
sense “many are called, but few are chosen,” for few accept the Word and 
obey it; the majority despise the Word, and refuse to come to the wedding. 
The reason for such contempt of the Word is not God’s foreknowledge but 
man’s own perverse will, which rejects or perverts the means and 
instrument of the Holy Spirit, which God offers to him through the call 
and resists the Holy Spirit who wills to be efficaciously active through the 
Word, as Christ says, “How often would I have gathered you together and 
you would not!” (Matt. 23, 37).246 
The arguments the formulators discuss in the preceding passage may be represented as 
follows, with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. 
142) If God offered salvation to all (p) and intended only a few to be converted (q) then He would 
be contradicting Himself (r). 
143) [He has offered salvation to all (p).] 
144) [He does not contradict Himself (~r).] 
145) [He does not intend only a few be converted (~q).] 
146) [All those whom God punishes (M) are those who are evil (P).] 
147) All those who say one thing and mean something else (S) are those whom God punishes (M). 
148) [All those who say one thing and mean something else (S) are evil (P).] 
149) [If God said one thing and meant something else (p) then He would be evil (q).] 
150) [God is not evil (~q).] 
151) [God does not say one thing and mean something else (~p).] 
152) If God said one thing and intended something else (p) then we could not trust what God says in 
His Word (q). 
153) [We can trust what says in His Word (~q).] 
154) [God does not say one thing and mean something else (~p).] 
155) [All God’s words (M) are truly intended by God to be efficacious (P).] 
156) All words of individual absolution (S) are God’s words (M). 
157) [All words of individual absolution (S) are truly intended by God to be efficacious (P).] 
158) All offers of salvation in the Gospel (M) are offers of salvation that are intended by God to be 
efficacious (P). 
159) All men (S) are offered salvation in the Gospel (M). 
160) All men (S) are those who are offered salvation that is intended by God to be efficacious (P). 
                                                 
246 SD XI:35-41, BKS, 1074-1076; Tappert, 622-623. 
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161) All who receive what God intends in the offer of salvation (M) are those who are saved (P). 
162) All who receive the Gospel in faith (S) are those who receive what God intends in the offer of 
salvation (M). 
163) All who receive the Gospel in faith (S) are those who are saved (P). 
164) No elect are unbelievers (that is, depise the Word, seek other salvation, etc.). 
obversion 
165) All the elect (M) are believers (that is, hear the Gospel in faith) (P). 
166) [All those saved (S) are the elect (M).] 
167) [All those saved (S) are believers (P).] 
168) All who accept and “obey” (that is, believe) the Gospel (M) are among the few (P). 
169) [All who are chosen (S) are those who accept and obey the Gospel (M).] 
170) [All who are chosen (S) are among the few (P).] 
171) No one who acts from a perverse will (M) is one who does so because of God’s foreknowledge 
(P). 
172) All who reject God’s Word (S) are those who are acting (that is, rejecting it) from a perverse 
will (M). 
173) No one who rejects God’s Word (S) is one who does so (that is, rejects it) because of God’s 
foreknowledge (P). 
The second generation of Reformers make quite a logical argument against the teaching 
of double predestination and its related interpretations of Scripture. The Reformers begin 
by arguing against the idea that God offers salvation to all but does not intend for all to be 
saved. The first argument against this idea (142-143-144-145) centers on God not 
contradicting Himself and uses Modus Tollens, (what is today known as) one of 
DeMorgan’s laws, and a disjunctive syllogism to reach its conclusion in propositional 
logic.247 The second argument against this idea centers on God not saying one thing and 
meaning another because it would make Him evil; this argument is in the form of a 
categorical syllogism (146-147-148, a 1st figure, namely Barbara) and an argument of 
propositional logic (149-150-151). The third argument against the idea (152-153-154), 
another in propositional logic, centers on God’s Word needing to be trustworthy for 
people to be saved. 
 Then, as if anticipating a counter argument by their opponents that God is not 
contradicting Himself but simply speaks to some as if to all, the Reformers take the 
argument down to an individual before taking it back out to a universal. In the first 
syllogism of this grouping (155-156-157, another Barbara), the Reformers argue from the 
                                                 




genuineness of individual absolution, which genuineness genesio Lutherans would 
recognize on the basis of the Apology, that even to individuals God’s words mean what 
they say. (Presumably, if double predestination were true, then in at least some cases 
some words of private absolution would not be intended to be efficacious.) Then, as if by 
induction, the Reformers argue that what was true of absolution spoken to the individual 
is true of all of the Gospel’s offers spoken to all (158-159-160, another Barbara).248 
Perhaps realizing that the conclusion of the second syllogism in this group (160) borders 
on the Lutheran-condemned ex opere operato teaching of the Roman Catholics, the 
Reformers then allude to faith by qualifying their statement about the Word “when it is 
proclaimed, heard, and meditated upon”. The third syllogism in this group (161-162-163) 
brings faith into consideration. 
 Having more or less preached to believers, who might doubt their salvation on 
account of the teaching of election, good news about the sufficiency of hearing and 
believing the Word, the Reformers turn to preach law to unbelievers, who might be 
assuming they can be saved apart from the Word and Sacrament that produce faith and 
good works, the law about the necessity of hearing and believing the Word. The 
Reformers’ simple statement that no elect are unbelievers (164) by obversion produces a 
major premise (165) from which a whole syllogism is extracted (165-166-167, also 
Barbara).249 
                                                 
248 Instead of the two categorical syllogisms—namely 155-156-157 and 158-159-160—the 
Reformers might have used one propositional argument: 
 If the offer of salvation is not intended to be efficacious (p), then people are without comfort (q). 
 People are not without comfort (~q). 
 The offer of salvation is intended to be efficacious (~p). 
249 Related to this discussion is the example of Pharaoh who hardened his own heart and whose 
heart God then further hardened. The Reformers refer to Paul’s use of the example of Pharaoh, presumably 
the mention in Romans 9:17 in the larger context of chapter 9, and explain what conclusions can and cannot 
be reasoned from that example. SD XI:85-86 (BKS, 1088; Tappert, 630-631) follows below. 
 Daß aber Gott Pharaonis Herz verhärtet, daß nämlich Pharao immer fort und fort sündiget, und 
je mehr er vermahnet, je verstockter er wird, das ist eine Strafe seiner vorgehenden Sünde und gräulichen 
Tyrannei gewesen, die er an den Kindern Israel viel und mannigerlei, ganz unmenschlich und wider das 
Anklagen seines Herzens geübet hat. Und weil ihm Gott sein Wort predigen und seinen Willen verkündigen 
ließ, und aber Pharao sich mutwillig stracks wider alle Vermahnung und Warnung auflehnete: hat Gott die 
Hand von ihme abgezogen, und ist also das Herze verhärtet und verstocket, und hat Gott sein Gerichte an 
ihm erzeiget; dann er anders nichts, dann „des hellischen Feuers schuldig war“; wie dann der heilige 
Apostel das Exempel Pharaonis auch anders nicht einführet, dann hiermit die Gerechtigkeit Gottes zu 
erweisen, die er über die Unbußfertigen und Verächter seines Worts erzeiget, keinesweges aber dahin 
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 Finally, the Reformers return to the Bible passage (about the many called and few 
chosen) that started the whole discussion. A person is either among the few chosen (also 
implicitly called) or among the many called but not chosen. The “few chosen” are the 
focus of the first syllogism in this grouping (168-169-170, a Barbara), and note that the 
minor premise (169) can be taken as teaching God alone being responsible for the 
salvation of an individual. The “many not chosen” are the focus of the second syllogism 
in this grouping (171-172-173, a Barbara), and note that its minor premise (172) can be 
taken as teaching that an individual human being alone is responsible for his or her 
damnation. The lack of “symmetry” or what might be perceived as a logical 
inconsistency in what the Lutherans regard as the proper teaching about election is part of 
what drove the reformed to hold to a double predestination. 
 The Lutherans’s explanation, however, is not logically inconsistent, even if it 
neither makes God responsible for both salvation and damnation (double predestination) 
nor human beings responsible for both damnation and salvation (synergism, where a 
person cooperates in their own salvation, in contrast to Divine monergism). People want 
                                                                                                                                                 
gemeinet noch verstanden, daß Gott ihme oder einigem Menschen die Seligkeit nicht gönnete, sondern also 
in seinem heimlichen Rat zur ewigen Verdammnus verordnet, daß er nicht sollt können oder mögen selig 
werden. 
 Quod autem Dominus cor Pharaonis indurat, ut Pharao subinde peccando pergat, et quo gravius 
admonetur, eo magis ipse induretur, id poena est antecedentium ipsius peccatorum et immanissimae et 
multiplicis tyrannidis, quam in filios Israel (contra conscientiae suae stimulos) exercuerat. Et cum 
Dominus ipsi Verbum ac voluntatem suam annuntiari curaret, Pharao vero nihilominus ex proposito et 
destinata malitia simpliciter adversus omnes exhortationes et admonitiones contumaciter insurgeret: 
Dominus manum ab eo suam retraxit, eum deseruit, atque ita cor ipsius induratum est et Dominus iustum 
iudicium suum adversus eum exsecutus est. Omnino enim Pharao aeterno gehennae incendio dignus erat. 
Et sane divus Paulus exemplum Pharaonis non alio fine adfert, quam ut eo ipso Dei iustitiam declararet, 
quam in impoenitentibus hominibus et verbi divini contemptoribus puniendis demonstrat. Nequaquam 
autem Pauli mens est, quod Dominus Pharaoni aut ulli alii homini salutem invideat, aut quod in arcano 
suo consilio quendam ad damnationem praedestinaverit, ut ille nullo modo salutem consequi possit. 
 “But that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart so that Pharaoh continued to sin and became the more 
obdurate the more he was admonished was a punishment for his preceding sin and his horrible tyranny with 
which he oppressed the children of Israel by many, various, and most inhuman devices contrary to the 
voice of his conscience. But after God arranged to have his Word proclaimed and his will revealed to 
Pharaoh, and he deliberately rebelled against all the admonitions and warnings, God withdrew his hand 
from him, and so his heart became hardened and calloused and God executed His judgment on him, for he 
was indeed guilty of ‘hell-fire.’ The holy apostle adduces Pharaoh’s example for the sole purpose of 
thereby setting forth the righteousness of God which God manifests toward the impenitent and despisers of 
his Word, and in no way does he want us to infer that God had not wanted to grant Pharaoh or any other 
person eternal life, or that in his secret counsel God had ordained him to eternal damnation so that he could 
not and might not be saved.” 
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an explanation that not only elucidate the difference in factors (as the Lutheran position 
above does) but also explains the difference in outcomes for the individual (which the 
Lutheran position does not). Without disparaging logic, the Lutherans reject such an 
unreasonable rationalism that requires a rationale for every query. Believers are to hold to 
God’s Word and Sacraments for their certainty that God has elected them to salvation and 
take no credit for their salvation, but all blame for the loss of those who reject God’s 
means of grace lies not with God but with those who reject Him. The Reformers, as will 
be seen in the next subsection, say attempting to resolve that apparent contradiction is 
one place reason is not to go. 
Limit to reason, as in SD XI:52-55 
 The Reformers recognize that God has revealed some things in His Word but not 
other things, and they say that reason is not to try to go beyond God’s revelation in an 
attempt to resolve things God has not revealed, even though that reasoning seems more 
exciting. 
 Es muß aber mit sonderem Fleiß Unterschied gehalten werden 
zwischen dem, was in Gottes Wort ausdrücklich hiervon offenbaret oder 
nicht geoffenbaret. Dann über das, davon bisher gesagt, so hiervon in 
Christo offenbaret, hat Gott von diesem Geheimnis noch viel 
verschwiegen und verborgen und allein seiner Weisheit und Erkenntnus 
vorbehalten, welchs wir nicht erforschen, noch unsern Gedanken hierinn 
folgen, schließen oder grübeln, sondern uns an das geoffenbarte Wort 
halten sollen. Welche Erinnerung zum höchsten vonnöten. 
 Dann damit hat unser Fürwitz immer viel mehr Lust sich zu 
bekümmern als mit dem, das Gott uns in seinem Wort darvon geoffenbart 
hat, weil wirs nicht zusammenreumen können, welches uns auch zu tun 
nicht befohlen ist. 
 Also ist daran kein Zweifel, daß Gott gar wohl und aufs 
allergewisseste vor der Zeit der Welt zuvor ersehen habe und noch wisse, 
welche von denen, so berufen werden, glauben oder nicht glauben werden. 
Item welche von den Bekehrten beständig, welche nicht beständig bleiben 
werden; welche nach dem Fall wiederkehren, welche in Verstockung 
fallen werden. So ist auch die Zahl, wieviel derselben beiderseits sein 
werden, Gott ohn allen Zweifel bewußt und bekannt. Weil aber solch 
Geheimnis Gott seiner Weisheit vorbehalten und uns im Wort davon 
nichts offenbaret, vielweniger solches durch unsere Gedanken zu 
erforschen uns befohlen, sondern ernstlich darvon abgehalten hat, Rom. 
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11: sollen wir mit unsern Gedanken nicht folgern, schließen noch darin 
grüblen, sondern uns auf sein geoffenbartes Wort, daran er uns weiset, 
halten. 
Accurate autem discrimen observandum et retinendum est inter id, quod 
de hoc negotio expresse in sacris litteris revelatum est, et inter ea, quae 
non sunt revelata. Praeter illa enim, de quibus hactenus dictum est, et quae 
in Christo manifeste revelata sunt, multa adhuc Dominus de hoc mysterio 
reticuit et occultavit, eaque soli suae sapientiae et scientiae reservavit. 
Talia investigare, cogitationibus nostris indulgere, aliquid de iis statuere 
aut scrutari nobis non licet, sed toti a verbo Dei revelato, quod ipse nobis 
proponit, pendere debemus. Haec admonitio in hoc mysterio apprime 
necessaria est. 
 Ea enim est corruptae naturae nostrae curiositas, ut magis iis, quae 
abstrusa et arcana sunt, indagandis quam iis, quae de hoc negotio Deus in 
verbo suo nobis revelavit, cognoscendis delectemur, praesertim cum 
quaedam in hoc mysterio tam intricata et perplexa occurrant, quae nos in 
mentibus nostris acumine ingenii nostri conciliare non possumus; sed 
neque id nobis a Deo demandatum est. 
 Dubium quidem non est, quin Deus exactissime et certissime ante 
tempora mundi praeviderit et hodie etiam norit, quinam ex eorum numero, 
qui vocati sunt, in Christum credituri aut non credituri sint; qui ex 
conversis in fide perseveraturi sint, qui non; et qui in peccata gravia 
prolapsi reversuri sint et qui in sceleribus perituri. Et baud dubie etiam 
numerus eorum, qui salvabuntur, et damnandorum Deo probe notus est. 
Quia vero Dominus talia arcana soli suae sapientiae reservavit neque ea de 
re quicquam in Verbo suo revelavit, multo vero minus haec mysteria 
cogitationibus nostris indagare nos iussit, quin potius, ne id conaremur, 
prohibuit: non decet nos cogitationibus nostris indulgere, statuere aliquid, 
ratiocinari aut illa occultissima investigare velle, sed in Verbo ipsius 
revelato (ad quod ille nos ablegavit) acquiescere nos oportet. 
 We must, however, carefully distinguish between what God has 
expressly revealed in his Word and what he has not revealed. Beyond the 
matters which have been revealed in Christ and of which we have spoken 
thus far, there are many points in this mystery about which God has 
remained silent and which he has not revealed but has kept reserved solely 
to his own wisdom and knowledge. We are not to pry into these, nor are 
we to follow our own thoughts in this matter and draw our own 
conclusions and brood, but we are to adhere exclusively to the revealed 
Word. This admonition is eminently necessary. In our presumption we 
take much greater delight in concerning ourselves with matters [with 
investigating those things which are hidden and abstruse] which we cannot 
harmonize—in fact, we have no command to do so—than with those 
aspects of the question which God has revealed to us in His Word [since 
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certain things occur in this mystery so intricate and involved that we are 
not able by the penetration of our natural ability to harmonize them; but 
this has not been demanded of us by God]. 
 Thus there is no doubt that before the world began God foresaw 
right well and with utter certainty, and that he still knows, who of those 
that are called will believe and who will not; likewise, who of the 
converted will persevere and who will not persevere; and who after falling 
away [into grievous sins] will return and who will become obdurate [will 
perish in their sins]. God is also aware and knows exactly how many there 
will be on either side. But because God has reserved this mystery to his 
own wisdom and not revealed anything concerning it in the Word, still 
less has commanded us to explore it through our speculations but has 
earnestly warned against it (Rom. 11:33), therefore we are not, on the 
basis of our speculations, to make our own deductions, draw conclusions, 
or brood over it, but cling solely to his revealed Word, to which he directs 
us.250 
(Note that the Latin expresses more strongly the limitation of natural reason.) Obviously 
no syllogism is used in this discussion, but rather the general principle of limiting reason 
to the basis of revelation prevents the kind of syllogisms the Reformers’ opponents were 
forming. Instead of forming such syllogisms that go beyond revelation, the Reformers 
instead follow Paul to doxology.251 
Chapter IV Summary 
 Deductive syllogisms such as those used in The Book of Concord by authors of its 
earlier and later works originate in the philosophy of Aristotle and figure prominently in 
logic all through the time period leading up to the Reformation. While not every 
argument merited such an elaborate structure, many did. The Reformers accused their 
opponents of “quibbling” and using distinctions that belong only to the schools on a 
number of different loci, and, while some of the opponents’ arguments are more or less 
dismissed out of hand, others get a significant treatment, especially those regarding 
                                                 
250 SD XI:52-55, BKS, 1079-1080; Tappert, 625. 
251 Confer Ep XI:10; SD XI:28, 64. (SD XI:64 was mentioned above at n.50, p.150.) See also SD 
XI:91-93 where using reason in teaching election is said to deny comfort, drive to despair, and strengthen 
impenitence. On limits to reason, confer also SD VII:46, the significant passage noted above in which the 
Reformers say Abraham could have disputed with God over the meaning of His Word but instead 
concluded against reason (see n.240, p.301). 
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justification by faith alone. The Reformers’ vocabulary regarding expressions, formulae, 
and propositions reflects their own philosophical training and alludes to the more 
structured form of arguments even when full or partial syllogisms are absent. 
Significantly, the Reformers closely relate philosophical propositions and doctrinal 
expressions, and the Reformers were highly concerned over the proper use and meaning 
of both. Again Scripture was used as a basis for syllogisms (the lack of which was said to 
particularly undermine an argument) and generally resulted in sufficient proof. Other 
bases for arguments were statements from the Church Fathers, including the confessors 
themselves and their own confessional writings, or other general principles. Such can go 
against reason, but reason cannot go against them.  
 The close scrutiny of passages in The Book of Concord containing more or less 
full syllogisms yielded a number of insights. While a relatively simple syllogism could be 
used in some places, in other places more complicated syllogisms and proofs filled up to 
a whole section. The most frequent topic was justification by faith alone, but it was by no 
means the only content of syllogisms used. In some cases premises were assumed to be 
accepted by the opponents to argue that a conclusion was entailed in that position or had 
to follow from it. Most likely due to a slightly different audience, the German “version” 
of the Apology was seen both to simplify the philosophical content of some passages and 
to sharpen the polemic of others. Similarly, Luther’s Catechism contained a number of 
syllogisms, but he also provided multiple illustrations of his opponents’ bad reasoning to 
help make his point to those who might be less-trained in logic. Where the authors of the 
works contained in The Book of Concord widely used deductive reasoning and even said 
it was to some extent “necessary”, they also knew its limits: reasoning could not go 
beyond revelation or otherwise probe hidden aspects of the mystery of God. Even with 
such limits, deduction by syllogism was often used for the expressed purpose of 
comforting troubled consciences by providing certainty for the content of their faith and 
for the Sacramental means by which they are to receive the forgiveness of sins. 
 Discussing the logic of the argument at hand was not a problem for the 
Reformers. As with the inductive methods, the matter came up when the Reformers 
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accused their opponents of errors in reasoning. The technical side of logic also arose 
when the Reformers made logical moves, such as obversion and changing the quality of 
the predicates—both used by Luther. As far as the forms used in the arguments that are 
analyzed in this chapter, Melanchthon was seen to use syllogisms in the valid moods 
Barbara, Celarent, Cesare, and Cambestres. Luther was seen to use primarily Barbara, 
with one observed use of Celarent, which is, like Barbara, a 1st figure form. Chemnitz, or 
whoever authored SD XI:35-41, used 1st figure syllogisms Barbara and Celarent. Some 
propositional logic was also seen to be used. All such uses for the authors of the works 
contained in The Book of Concord were philosophy in service to theology. 
 Worth noting is that the use of inductive and deductive reasoning is not limited to 
the places identified in this dissertation. Those identified were generally identified by 
verbal markers, but there are no doubt other places where arguments were nevertheless 
also made by way of example and analogy. Furthermore, other verbal markers indicate 
logical relationships, such as the Latin word prius (essentially “before”), to which 
consideration now turns in Chapter V, which in some ways presents the Reformers’ 
distinction between justification and sanctification as a case study of the supra-sentential 
use of philosophy in its ministerial role serving theology. 
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Chapter V:  
The Justification/Sanctification Distinction  
From this it follows that although converted persons and believers possess 
the beginning of renewal, sanctification, love, virtues, and good works, 
these should and must not be drawn or mingled into the article of 
justification before God, in order to preserve the glory due to Christ, the 
redeemer, and, because our new obedience is imperfect and impure, in 
order to supply tempted consciences with abiding comfort. 
 —Solid Declaration III:35 
At this point, The Book of Concord’s supra-sentential uses of philosophy, in such forms 
as methods of organization and argumentation, are clear. Those uses are found at the 
same time and in spite of the Reformers’ generally negative regard for “philosophy” and 
mixed regard for “logic”, and those uses are generally continuous both with the preceding 
medieval tradition and within the Reformation era. A point of alleged theological 
discontinuity is the distinction the Reformers make between justification and 
sanctification. Already the Reformers’ separating the two via the loci method has been 
seen; this chapter will show the distinction between justification and sanctification is the 
logical result of philosophy serving theology with the goal of preserving the teaching of 
justification by faith. While the Reformers refuse to allow the teaching of good works’ 
necessity at the locus of justification, they nevertheless teach that good works necessarily 
follow. This chapter’s first section looks at the various ways that necessity is expressed, 
such as by a more-than-chronological prius. The second section examines The Book of 
Concord’s references to sanctification, especially how the authors logically distinguish 
sanctification from justification. The third section presents the claim that this distinction 
is an innovation, and the section also presents seven responses to that claim. Somewhat 
also a response to the claim of discontinuity, the final section discusses the medieval 
“formal distinction” and whether the justification-sanctification might be an example of 
precisely that philosophical idea that preserves the inseparability of justification and 
 
319 
sanctification, while also allowing the two to be defined separately.1 First, however, are 
the various ways of expressing the necessity of good works, such as the use of the 
more-than-chronological prius. 
Prius and other indications of necessity 
 There are a number of places in The Book of Concord where something is said, 
using the Latin word prius (German ehe, erst, vor, zuvor),2 to occur before something 
else and where the connection is more than chronological. The majority of these passages 
are in Melanchthon’s Apology of the Augsburg Confession and concern the relationship 
between faith and works, even if they are not found at the specific locus dealing with 
either justifying faith or good works.3 That, in the case of the relationship between faith 
and works, faith, the “earlier” condition has the status of being logically necessary for 
works, the “later” condition, will be seen, as the confessions in The Book of Concord say 
the works cannot be done without faith. To explore this relationship, this section will first 
note general uses of prius, then describe uses where some sense of necessity is present 
apart from the uses in connection with faith and works, and finally detail the faith-and-
works passages where prius bears this sense of logical necessity.4 
General uses of prius 
 Not every use of prius has the more-than-chronological sense; some can be 
described as quite general, with a simple chronological sense. The first in that category is 
in the Athanasian Creed, where no Person of the Trinity is said to exist “before or after” 
                                                 
1 On the basis of Galatians, Das discusses the indissolvable connection between justification and 
sanctification and their necessary distinction (A. Andrew Das, “Oneness in Christ: The Nexus Indivulsus 
Between Justification and Sanctification in Paul's Letter to the Galatians,” Concordia Journal 21.2 [1995]). 
2 The Latin word prius, a form of prior, is an adjective meaning “former”, “first”. The word can 
also be used as an adverb meaning “before”, “previously”. Used as a noun, the word can refer to a logically 
prior proposition. (See, for example, Whitaker, Words by William Whitaker.) 
3 Of the 50 uses of prius found by a Libronix search of the Triglotta, about 3/5 of the total are in 
the Apology, and about half of the total are in connection with faith and good works. These statistics are 
not surprising, as the Apology is not only the longest of the confessions written in Latin but also one of the 
longest confessions; moreover, Article IV on Justification is a significant portion of the Apology. 
4 In a number of the uses of prius produced by Libronix, the word appears to be an addition in the 
Latin translations of German works. Among those uses, I would list the following: LC Longer Preface 1; 
LC Short Forms 25; LC I:236, 265; LC II:26; LC IV:56; LC V:26, 83; and SD VII:32. 
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another (prius aut posterius; keine die erste, keine die letzte).5 Similar is a use in the 
Large Catechism, where Luther writes of the devil doing damage “before we realize it” 
(ehe man’s gewahr wird; ac citius, [other versions prius] quam persentiri potest aut iri 
obviam).6 A number of other uses come where the confessors describe how they are 
proceeding with their argument or presentation. A typical example is in the Apology’s 
article dealing with Original Sin. 
Sed postea ostendemus pluribus verbis, nostram descriptionem consentire 
cum usitata ac veteri definitione. Prius enim consilium nostrum 
aperiendum est, cur his potissimum verbis hoc loco usi simus.  
Aber danach wollen wir mit mehr Worten anzeigen, daß wir von der 
Erbsünde, nämlich was dieselbige sei oder nicht, auch auf geübte, alte 
Weise der Scholastiker und nicht so ungewöhnlich geredet haben. Ich 
muss aber erst anzeigen, aus was Ursachen ich an dem Ort fürnehmlich 
solcher und nicht ander Wort habe brauchen wollen. 
Later on we shall show at length that our definition agrees with the 
traditional one. First we must show why we used these words here.7 
There are other similar examples.8 One other, from the Epitome’s treatment of Election, 
is worth quoting in full. 
Wer nun sich also mit dem geoffenbarten Willen Gottes bekümmert und 
der Ordnung nachgeht, welche sanctus Paulus in der Epistel an die Römer 
gehalten, der zuvor die Menschen zur Buß, Erkenntnis der Sünden, zum 
Glauben in Christum, zum göttlichen Gehorsam weiset, ehe er vom 
Geheimbnis der ewigen Wahl Gottes redet, dem ist solche Lehr nützlich 
und tröstlich. 
Qui igitur voluntatem Dei revelatam inquirunt eoque ordine progrediuntur, 
quem divus Paulus in epistola ad Romanos secutus est (qui hominem prius 
deducit ad poenitentiam, ad agnitionem peccatorum, ad fidem in Christum, 
ad obedientiam mandatorum Dei, quam de aeternae praedestinationis 
mysterio loquatur) iis doctrina de praedestinatione Dei salutaris est et 
maximam consolationem adfert. 
                                                 
5 Athanasian Creed, 24; Tappert, 20; BKS, 29. 
6 LC I:100, Tappert, 379; BKS, 586. 
7 Ap II:4, BKS, 147; Tappert, 101. Perhaps significantly this paragraph goes on to refer both to the 
confessors’ “scholastic opponents” (Adversarii in scholis; Die Widersacher ... in ihren Schulen) and those 
who “philosophize” (philosophantur; aus der Philosophie) about original sin. 
8 Ap XII:156; LC II:4; and LC III:4. 
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The doctrine of God’s eternal election is profitable and comforting to the 
person who concerns himself with the revealed will of God and observes 
the order which St. Paul follows in the Epistle to the Romans. He there 
directs men first to repent, to acknowledge their sins, to believe in Christ, 
and to obey God, and only then does he speak of the mystery of God’s 
eternal election.9 
This example is worth quoting not only because it bases the presentation of its argument 
on Holy Scripture, but also because Paul’s “order” (Ordnung, ordine) in Romans, and 
thus the order in the Epitome, seems to be more than the sequence in which he chose to 
present his discussion. That is to say, the doctrine of election can be profitable and 
comforting only after sorrow for sin, faith in Christ, and good works are established. This 
order at least comes close to having some sense of logical necessity. 
Prius with some sense of necessity 
 There are a number of examples where prius is used with a more obvious and 
certain sense of logical necessity, though the chronological aspect remains important. 
Close to half of these uses are in the Apology’s article dealing with Penitence. 
Melanchthon grants that judges have to hear cases before (prius, erst) pronouncing 
sentences, but he says that does not mean pastors have to investigate sins before 
pronouncing absolution.10 Even though in the past priests had to know the offenses of the 
lapsed before (prius, ohne) they could prescribe satisfactions,11 waiting for evidence of 
penitence before (prius, ohne) accepting the lapsed is no longer necessary.12 However, in 
two other places in the Apology Melanchthon writes that some things—instruction, 
examination, and absolution—are necessary before (prius, erst) people receive the Lord’s 
Supper.13 Luther in the Smalcald Articles writes that Lorenzo Campegio would have died 
from torture before (ehe, prius) giving up the Mass and that the papists would put the 
                                                 
9 Ep XI:11, BKS, 818; Tappert, 495-496. 
10 Ap XII:103, BKS, 273. 
11 Ap XII:112, BKS, 275. 
12 Ap XII:113, BKS, 275. 
13 Ap XV:40, BKS, 304-305; Ap XXIV:49, BKS, 364. 
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Reformers to death before (ehe, prius) they let the Mass and papacy fall.14 With an 
allusion to Romans 10:8-11, Luther in the Large Catechism under the Second 
Commandment writes of belief in the heart coming before (zuvor, prius) the confession 
of the lips.15 And, under the Large Catechism’s heading of the Third Commandment, 
Luther writes that the doer of work must be holy before (zuvor, prius) the work itself is 
holy.16 Finally, the authors of the Solid Declaration, at the locus of Election and with 
reference to 2 Timothy 2:21, write that someone who is to be purified must first (zuvor, 
prius) be impure.17 All of these uses of prius have a chronological sense plus some sense 
of necessity. 
Faith and works passages with prius 
 The use of prius with the sense of necessity is especially evident and significant in 
passages dealing with faith and works. On good authority, the confessors can say any of a 
number of equivalent things comes first: accepting or taking hold of forgiveness by faith; 
the promise that one is reconciled by faith or through Christ or by the promise; being 
justified, reborn or reconciled; receiving the Holy Spirit, mercy by faith, forgiveness; or 
being accounted righteous. Likewise, the confessors can say any number of things follow: 
keeping the law, love, love of God, or doing good works. Some of these will be seen 
below. For example, a simple declaration to this effect is found in the Apology’s article 
on Penance. 
Nec prius dilectio adest, quam sit facta fide reconciliatio. Lex enim non fit 
sine Christo ... 
Denn eigentlich ist in keinem Herzen einige Liebe Gottes, es sei denn, daß 
wir erst Gott versühnet werden, durch Christum. Denn Gottes Gesetz oder 
das erste Gebot kann ohne Christum niemands erfüllen noch halten ... 
                                                 
14 SA II:ii:10, BKS, 419. 
15 LC I:70, BKS, 578. Luther in this paragraph refers to his previous comment in LC I:50. 
16 LC I:94, BKS, 584. 
17 SD XI:82, BKS, 1087. 
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Nor is love present before [prius] faith has effected the reconciliation. For 
the law is not kept without Christ ...18 
Such statements are made with good authority. In the Apology’s treatment of 
justification, such a statement is made in connection with two passages from Paul’s 
epistles. 
Nam iustitia evangelii, quae versatur circa promissionem gratiae, gratis 
accipit iustificationem et vivificationem. Sed impletio legis, quae sequitur 
fidem, versatur circa legem, in qua non gratis, sed pro nostris operibus 
offertur et debetur merces. Sed qui hanc merentur, prius iustificati sunt, 
quam legem faciunt. Itaque prius sunt translati in regnum filii Dei, ut 
Paulus ait, et facti coheredes Christi. 
The righteousness of the Gospel, which deals with the promise of grace, 
receives justification and new life gratis. The keeping of the law that 
follows faith deals with the law, in which a reward is offered and owed, 
not gratis but for our works. Those who merit this are justified before 
[prius] they keep the law. First [prius] they have been “transferred into the 
kingdom of God’s Son,” as Paul says (Col. 1:13), and made fellow heirs 
with Christ (Rom. 8:17).19 
Earlier in the same article, St. Augustine is adduced in support of this relationship 
between faith and works.20 
 The before-after sequence is not only declared, but the confessors also say that 
one cannot keep the law without faith and those things that accompany faith coming first. 
A short statement from the Apology’s article on Justification, just a few lines down from 
the preceding quotation, denies the very possibility. 
Nec legem prius facimus aut facere possumus, quam reconciliati Deo, 
iustificati et renati sumus. 
We neither do nor can keep the law before [prius] we have been 
reconciled to God, justified, and reborn.21 
                                                 
18 Ap XII:37, BKS, 258; Tappert, 186. (Emphasis added.) The Latin of the Apology goes on to 
quote Romans 5, while in the German reference is made to Ephesians 2 and 3. 
19 Ap IV:366, BKS, 229; Tappert, 163. (Emphasis added.) The German at this place seems to go 
off on another point and does not appear to make the same statement. 
20 Ap IV:106. 
21 Ap IV:368, BKS, 229; Tappert, 163. (Emphasis added.) Again, the German at this place seems 
to go off on another point and does not appear to make the same statement. 
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Earlier in the same article from the Apology, love’s impossibility to precede faith was 
stated. 
 Postremo hoc imprudentissime scribitur ab adversariis, quod 
homines, rei aeternae irae, mereantur remissionem peccatorum per actum 
elicitum dilectionis, cum impossibile sit diligere Deum, nisi prius fide 
apprehendatur remissio peccatorum. Non enim potest cor, vere sentiens 
Deum irasci, diligere Deum, nisi ostendatur placatus. Donec terret et 
videtur nos abiicere in aeternam mortem, non potest se erigere natura 
humana, ut diligat iratum, iudicantem et punientem. 
 Zuletzt, so ist je das auch aufs närrischt und ungeschicktest von 
den Widersachern geredt, daß die Menschen, die auch ewiges Zorns 
schuldig sein, Vergebung der Sünden erlangen durch die Leibe oder actum 
elicitum dilectionis; so es doch unmöglich ist Gott zu lieben, wenn das 
Herz nicht erst durch den Glauben Vergebung der Sünden ergriffen hat. 
Denn es kann je ein Herz, das in Aengsten ist, Gottes Zorn recht fühlet, 
Gott nicht lieben, er geb denn dem Herzen Luft, er tröste und erzeige sich 
denn wieder gnädig. Denn dieweil er schrecket und also uns angreift, als 
wolle er uns in ewiger Ungnade in den ewigen Tod von sich stoßen, so 
muß der armen schwachen Natur das Herz und Mut entfallen und muß je 
für so großen Zorn erzittern, der so gräulich schreckt und straft, und kann 
je alsdenn, ehe Gott selbst tröstet, kein Fünklein Liebe fühlen. 
 Finally, it was very foolish of our opponents to write that men who 
are under eternal wrath merit the forgiveness of sins by an elicited act of 
love, since it is impossible to love God unless faith has first [prius] 
accepted the forgiveness of sins. A heart that really feels God’s wrath 
cannot love him unless it sees that he is reconciled. While he terrifies us 
and seems to be casting us into eternal death, human nature cannot bring 
itself to love a wrathful, judging, punishing God.22 
Elsewhere the Apology reiterates one’s inability to keep the law unless first receiving the 
Holy Spirit and being reconciled through Christ.23 
 So strong is the human’s inability to do God-pleasing good works before faith that 
the confessors can say faith is logically necessary for good works, love, keeping the law, 
and the like. This logical necessity is variously expressed in the authoritative Latin with a 
grammatical construction known as a gerundive of necessity, the adjective necesse 
                                                 
22 Ap IV:36, BKS, 167; Tappert, 112. (Emphasis added.) 
23 Ap IV:70; Ap XII:76. 
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(“necessary”), the verb oporteo, oportere (“it is necessary”), and the adverb necessario 
(“necessarily,” “of necessity”). An example of the use of the gerundive is in the 
Apology’s article on Justification, where the claim is also supported with Scripture. 
Videmus nobis evangelium et promissionem de Christo propositam esse. 
Cum igitur lex praedicatur, cum praecipiuntur opera, non est repudianda 
promissio de Christo. Sed haec prius apprehendenda est, ut bene operari 
possimus, et ut opera nostra Deo placere queant, sicut inquit Christus: Sine 
me nihil potestis facere. 
We see that the Gospel and the promise of Christ are presented to us. We 
must not reject the promise of Christ when the law is preached and works 
are enjoined. We must first take hold of [apprehendenda, the gerundive of 
necessity] the promise so that we may be able to do good works and that 
our works may be pleasing to God, as Christ says (John 15:5), “Apart 
from me you can do nothing.”24 
Later in the same article of the Apology on Justification, the confessors make a similar 
statement using the adjective necesse, significantly while drawing on Paul and, in a sense, 
turning away from human reason. 
At Paulus docet nos non ex lege, sed ex promissione iustificari, quae 
tantum fide accipitur. Neque enim accedimus ad Deum sine mediatore 
Christo, neque accipimus remissionem peccatorum propter nostram 
dilectionem, sed propter Christum. Ac ne diligere quidem possumus 
iratum Deum, et lex semper accusat nos, semper ostendit iratum Deum. 
Necesse est igitur nos prius fide apprehendere promissionem, quod propter 
Christum Pater sit placatus et ignoscat. Postea incipimus legem facere. 
Procul a ratione humana, procul a Mose reiiciendi sunt oculi in Christum, 
et sentiendum, quod Christus sit nobis donatus, ut propter eum iusti 
reputemur. 
Paul teaches that we are justified not by the law but by the promise, which 
is received by faith only. We cannot come to God without Christ, the 
mediator; nor do we receive forgiveness of sin because of our love but 
because of Christ. We cannot even love an angry God; the law always 
accuses us and thus always shows us an angry God. Therefore we must 
[literally “it is necessary that we”] first [prius] take hold of the promise by 
faith, that for Christ’s sake the Father is reconciled and forgiving. Later we 
begin to keep the law. Far away from human reason, far away from 
                                                 
24 Ap IV:266, BKS, 213; Tappert, 146. The German at this place seems to go off on another point 
and does not appear to make the same statement. On the use of John 15:5, confer Ap XII:85. 
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Moses, we must turn our eyes to Christ, and believe that he was given for 
us to be justified on his account.25 
A similar claim is made in the Apology’s article dealing with Penitence, using, among 
other key expressions in the authoritative Latin, both necesse (“necessary”) and the verb 
oporteo, oportere (“it is necessary”). 
 Propter has causas contendit Paulus, quod non iustificemur ex lege, 
et opponit legi promissionem remissionis peccatorum, quae propter 
Christum donatur, ac docet nos gratis propter Christum fide accipere 
remissionem peccatorum. Ad hanc promissionem revocat nos Paulus a 
lege. In hanc promissionem iubet intueri, quae certe irrita erit, si prius lege 
iustificamur, quam per promissionem, aut si propter nostram iustitiam 
consequimur remissionem peccatorum. At constat, quod ideo nobis data 
est promissio, ideo exhibitus est Christus, quia legem non possumus 
facere. Quare necesse est prius nos promissione reconciliari, quam legem 
facimus. Promissio autem tantum fide accipitur. Igitur necesse est 
contritos apprehendere fide promissionem remissionis peccatorum donatae 
propter Christum, ac statuere, quod gratis propter Christum habeant 
placatum Patrem. Haec est sententia Pauli ad Rom. 4., ubi inquit: Ideo ex 
fide, ut secundum gratiam firma sit promissio. Et ad Galatas 3.: Conclusit 
Scriptura omnia sub peccatum, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi detur 
credentibus, id est, omnes sunt sub peccato, nec possunt aliter liberari, nisi 
fide apprehendant promissionem remissionis peccatorum. Prius igitur 
oportet nos fide accipere remissionem peccatorum, quam legem facimus, 
etsi, ut supra dictum est, fidem dilectio sequitur, quia renati Spiritum 
Sanctum accipiunt; ideo legem facere incipiunt. 
 Aus dieser Ursache streitet Paulus, daß wir nicht durch das Gesetz 
gerecht werden, und hält gegen das Gesetz die Zusage Gottes, die 
Verheißung der Gnade, welche um Christus willen uns gegeben wird. Da 
rücket uns Paulus herum und weiset uns vom Gesetz auf die göttliche 
Verheißung. da will er, daß wir sollen auf Gott und seine Zusage sehen. 
und den Herrn Christum für unsern Schatz halten; denn dieselbe Zusage 
wird vergeblich sein. so wir durch des Gesetzes Werk gerecht für Gott 
werden. so wir durch unser Gerechtigkeit Vergebung der Sünden 
verdienen. Nu ist es gewiß, daß Gott darum die Zusage tut, darum Christus 
auch kommen ist. daß wir das Gesetz nicht halten noch erfüllen können. 
Darum müssen wir erst durch die Verheißung versühnet werden, ehe wir 
das Gesetz erfüllen, die Verheißung aber kann man nicht fassen, denn 
                                                 
25 Ap IV:294-296, BKS, 218; Tappert, 152. (Emphasis added.) This passage comes in the midst of 
a nine-formatted-paragraph Latin section (¶285-315) with a German equivalent of one formatted paragraph 
that does not appear to translate this text. Confer above, n.191, p.266. 
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allein durch den Glauben. Darum alle diejenigen, so rechte Reue haben, 
ergreifen die Verheißung der Gnade durch den Glauben und glauben 
gewiß. daß wir dem Vater versühnet werden durch Christum. Das ist auch 
die Meinung Pauli zun Römern am 4.: „Darum erlangen wir Gnade durch 
den Glauben, daß die Verheißung fest stehe.“ Und zu den Galatern am 3.: 
„Die Schrift hat alles unter die Sunde beschlossen. daß die Verheißung 
Jesu Christi durch den Glauben werde gegeben den Gläubigen“, das ist, 
alle Menschen sind unter der Sünde und können nicht erlöset werden, sie 
ergreifen denn Vergebung der Sunde durch den Glauben. Darum müssen 
wir erst Vergebung der Sünden durch den Glauben erlangen, ehe wir das 
Gesetz erfüllen. Wiewohl, wie wir oben gesagt, aus dem Glauben die 
Liebe gewiß folget, denn diejenigen, so gläuben, empfahen den heiligen 
Geist. Darum fahen sie an, dem Gesetz hold zu werden und demselbigen 
zu gehorchen. 
 For these reasons Paul contends that we are not justified by the 
law; to the law he opposes the promise of the forgiveness of sins granted 
for Christ’s sake, and he teaches us to accept the forgiveness of sins by 
faith, freely for Christ’s sake. Paul calls us away from the law to this 
promise. He asks us to look at this promise, which would certainly be 
useless if we were justified by the law before the promise or if we 
obtained the forgiveness of sins because of our own righteousness. But 
clearly the promise was given and Christ revealed precisely because we 
cannot keep the law, and therefore we must [Quare necesse est] be 
reconciled by the promise before [prius] we keep the law. Only faith 
accepts the promise. Therefore it is necessary for the contrite by faith to 
take hold of the promise of the forgiveness of sins granted for Christ’s 
sake, and to be sure that freely for Christ’s sake they have a gracious 
Father. This is what Paul means when he says in Rom. 4:16, “That is why 
it depends on faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be 
guaranteed”; and in Gal. 3:22, “The scripture consigned all things to sin, 
that what was promised to faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those 
who believe.” That is, all men are under sin, and they cannot be freed in 
any other way than by taking hold through faith of the promise of the 
forgiveness of sins. We must therefore [Prius igitur oportet] accept the 
forgiveness of sins by faith before we keep the law although, as we said 
before, love follows faith, for the regenerate receive the Holy Spirit and 
therefore begin to keep the law.26 
Not only is faith necessary for love, but also love necessarily follows faith, as the 
confessors make clear in the Apology’s article on Justification, even using in the Latin 
                                                 
26 Ap XII:79-82, BKS, 268; Tappert, 193-194. The use of consequimur is no doubt also significant, 
even though in this context it is negated. 
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the term “effect” (effectus) and making an apparent attack on Duns Scotus and the 
Nominalists.27 
 Nos quoque dicimus, quod dilectio fidem sequi debeat, sicut et 
Paulus ait: In Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque 
praeputium, sed fides per dilectionem efficax. Neque tamen ideo 
sentiendum est, quod fiducia huius dilectionis aut propter hanc 
dilectionem accipiamus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, 
sicut neque accipimus remissionem peccatorum propter alia opera 
sequentia, sed sola fide, et quidem fide proprie dicta, accipitur remissio 
peccatorum, quia promissio non potest accipi nisi fide. Est autem fides 
proprie dicta, quae assentitur promissioni; de hac fide loquitur scriptura. Et 
quia accipit remissionem peccatorum et reconciliat nos Deo, prius hac fide 
iusti reputamur propter Christum, quam diligimus ac legem facimus, etsi 
necessario sequitur dilectio. Neque vero haec fides est otiosa notitia, nec 
potest stare cum peccato mortali, sed est opus spiritus sancti, quo 
liberamur a morte, quo eriguntur et vivificantur perterrefactae mentes. Et 
quia sola haec fides accipit remissionem peccatorum, et reddit nos 
acceptos Deo, et affert spiritum sanctum: rectius vocari gratia gratum 
faciens poterat, quam effectus sequens, videlicet dilectio. 
 Wir sagen auch, daß die Liebe dem Glauben folgen soll, wie 
Paulus sagt: „In Christo Jesu ist weder Beschneidung noch Vorhaut etwas, 
sondern der Glaub, welcher durch die Liebe wirket.“ Man soll aber darum 
auf die Liebe nicht vertrauen, noch bauen, als erlangten wir um der Liebe 
willen oder durch die Liebe Vergebung der Sunde und Versühnung 
Gottes. Gleichwie wir nicht Vergebung der Sunde erlangen um anderer 
Werk willen, die da folgen, sondern allein durch den Glauben, Denn die 
Verheißung Gottes kann niemands durch Werk fassen, sondern allein mit 
dem Glauben. Und der Glaube eigentlich oder fides proprie dicta ist, wenn 
mir mein Herz und der heilig Geist im Herzen sagt, die Verheißung Gottes 
ist wahr und ja; von demselbigen Glauben redet die Schrift. Und dieweil 
der Glaub, ehe wir etwas tun oder wirken, nur ihm schenken und geben 
lässet und empfähet, so wird uns der Glaube zur Gerechtigkeit gerechnet 
wie Abraham, ehe wir lieben, ehe wir das Gesetz tun oder einig Werk. 
„Wiewohl es wahr ist, daß Frücht und Werk nicht aussen bleiben, und der 
Glaub ist nicht eine bloß, schlecht Erkenntnis der Historien, sondern ein 
neu Licht im Herzen und kräftig Werk des heiligen Geistes, dadurch wir 
neu geboren werden, dadurch die erschrockene Gewissen wieder 
aufgericht und Leben erlangen.“ Und dieweil der Glaub allein Vergebung 
der Sünden erlangt und uns Gott angenehm macht, bringt er mit sich den 
                                                 
27 For the medieval background, see BKS, 183-184 n.2; K-W, 139 n.119. 
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heiligen Geist und sollt billiger genennet werden gratia gratum faciens, 
das ist, die Gnade, die da angenehm macht, denn die Liebe, welche folgt.  
 We also say, too, that love should follow faith, as Paul also says, 
“In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, 
but faith working through love” (Gal. 5:6). We are not to think from this 
that we receive the forgiveness of sins by trust in this love or on account 
of this love, just as little as we receive the forgiveness of sins on account 
of the other works that follow it. For the forgiveness of sins is received by 
faith alone—and we mean faith in the true sense of the word—since the 
promise can be received only by faith. But faith in the true sense, as the 
Scriptures use the word, is that which accepts the promise. And because it 
receives the forgiveness of sins and reconciles us to God, we must be 
accounted righteous by this faith for Christ’s sake before we love and keep 
the law, although love must necessarily follow. This faith is no idle 
knowledge, nor can it exist with mortal sin; but it is a work of the Holy 
Spirit that frees us from death, comforting and quickening terrified minds. 
And since this faith alone receives the forgiveness of sins, renders us 
acceptable to God, and brings the Holy Spirit, it should be called “grace 
that makes us acceptable to God” rather than love, which is the effect 
[effectus] resulting from it.28 
All other passages where good works or their equivalent are said to follow faith or its 
equivalent can reasonably be read in light of the logical necessity laid out in the 
foregoing. 
 The Reformers criticize their Roman Catholic opponents for not teaching the right 
sequence of faith first and good works logically following. The Reformers’ criticism is 
expressed in ways similar to those just seen. The first example, which comes from the 
Apology’s article on Justification, is a simple expression of sequence in connection with 
the terminology of cause and effect in connection with an expression of one’s inability to 
satisfy the law. 
 Ex his effectibus fidei excerpunt adversarii unum, videlicet 
dilectionem, et docent, quod dilectio iustificet. Ita manifeste apparet, eos 
tantum docere legem. Non prius docent accipere remissionem peccatorum 
per fidem. Non docent de mediatore Christo, quod propter Christum 
habeamus Deum propitium, sed propter nostram dilectionem. Et tamen 
qualis sit illa dilectio, non dicunt, neque dicere possunt. Praedicant se 
                                                 
28 Ap IV:111-116, BKS, 183-184; Tappert, 123. (Emphasis added.) Note the use of the Latin terms 
in the German version, followed by a definitional paraphrase.  
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legem implere, cum haec gloria proprie debeatur Christo; et fiduciam 
propriorum operum opponunt iudicio Dei, dicunt enim se de condigno 
mereri gratiam et vitam aeternam. Haec est simpliciter impia et vana 
fiducia. Nam in hac vita non possumus legi satisfacere, quia natura 
carnalis non desinit malos affectus parere, etsi his resistit Spiritus in nobis. 
 Aus diesen Früchten und Werken des Glaubens klauben die 
Widersacher nur ein Stücke, nämlich die Liebe, und lehren, daß die Liebe 
für Gott gerecht mache; also sind sie nichts anderes denn Werkprediger 
und Gesetzlehrer. Sie lehren nicht erst, daß wir Vergebung der Sunde 
erlangen durch den Glauben. Sie lehren nichts von dem Mittler Christo, 
daß wir durch denselbigen einen gnädigen Gott erlangen, sondern reden 
von unser Liebe und unsern Werken, und sagen doch nicht, was es vor 
eine Liebe sei, und können es auch nicht sagen. Sie rühmen, sie könnten 
das Gesetz erfüllen oder halten, so doch die Ehre niemands gehöret, denn 
Christo; und halten also ihr eigen Werk gegen Gottes Urteil, sagen, sie 
verdienen de condigno Gnad und ewiges Leben. Das ist doch ein ganz 
vergeblich und gottlos Vertrauen auf eigene Werk. Denn in diesem Leben 
können auch Christen und die Heiligen selbst Gottes Gesetz nicht 
vollkömmlich halten; denn es bleiben immer böse Neigung und Lüst in 
uns, wiewohl der Heilig Geist denselbigen widerstehet.  
 Selecting love, which is only one of these effects of faith [Ex his 
effectibus fidei], our opponents teach that love justifies. From this it is 
clear that they teach only the law. They do not teach that we must first 
[prius] receive the forgiveness of sins by faith, nor that on account of 
Christ, the mediator, we have a gracious God. They think this is on 
account of our love, thought they do not and cannot say what the nature of 
this love is. They claim to keep the law, though this glory properly 
belongs to Christ. In opposition to the judgment of God they set a trust in 
their own works, for they say they earn grace and eternal life by merit. 
Such a trust is simply wicked and vain. In this life we cannot satisfy the 
law, because our unspiritual nature continually brings forth evil desires, 
though the Spirit in us resists them.29 
Significant in the foregoing example also is the German translation’s rendering the 
Latin’s “effect” (effectibus) with the German “fruits and works” (Früchten und Werken). 
The next example comes later in the Apology’s article on Justification, where 
                                                 
29 Ap IV:145-146, BKS, 188-189; Tappert, 127. (Emphasis added.) The German adds terminology 
that seems intended to bring concupiscence into view. The BKS points to the Confutation’s sixth article 
(CR 27:100; confer Reu, 352*; K-N, 110) and to Bonaventure Breviloguium V, 2. In sent. II d. 27 a. 2 a. 3 
(BKS, 188 n.1, 189 n.1). 
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Melanchthon is critiquing his opponents’ two faulty modes of justification, based upon 
reason and the law, respectively (the second mode is connected with scholastic 
theologians such as Thomas Aquinas).30 
 Facile est autem iudicium homini Christiano de utroque modo, 
quia uterque modus excludit Christum, ideo reprehendendi sunt. In priore 
manifesta est impietas, qui docet, quod opera nostra sint propitiatio pro 
peccatis. Posterior modus multa habet incommoda. Non docet uti Christo, 
cum renascimur. Non docet iustificationem esse remissionem peccatorum. 
Non docet prius remissionem peccatorum contingere, quam diligimus, sed 
fingit, quod eliciamus actum dilectionis, per quem mereamur remissionem 
peccatorum. Nec docet fide in Christum vincere terrores peccati et mortis. 
Fingit homines propria impletione legis accedere ad Deum sine 
propitiatore Christo; fingit postea ipsam impletionem legis sine 
propitiatore Christo iustitiam esse dignam gratia et vita aeterna, cum 
tamen vix imbecillis et exigua legis impletio contingat etiam sanctis. 
 A Christian can easily evaluate both modes, since both exclude 
Christ and therefore both are to be rejected. The ungodliness of the first is 
obvious because it teaches that our works are a propitiation for sin. The 
second contains much that is harmful. It does not teach us to avail 
ourselves of Christ in our regeneration. It does not teach that justification 
is the forgiveness of sins. It does not teach that the forgiveness of sins 
precedes our love, but it imagines that we produce an act of love whereby 
we merit the forgiveness of sins. It does not teach that by faith in Christ 
we overcome the terrors of sin and death. Without any warrant it teaches 
that men come to God through their own keeping of the law and not 
through Christ, the propitiator. Then it imagines that this very keeping of 
the law, with Christ, the propitiator, is a righteousness worthy of grace and 
eternal life, although even a weak and feeble keeping of the law is rare, 
even among saints.31 
Significant in the foregoing example also is the German translation’s complete omission 
of the discussion of “modes”. The next example is from the Apology’s article on 
Penitence, which, in addition to drawing on John 15:5, makes use of the gerundive 
accipienda and the verb oportet in connection with prius in criticizing the opponents. 
                                                 
30 See Ap IV:287-289, Tappert, 150-151; BKS, 217. 
31 Ap IV:290, BKS, 218; Tappert, 151. This passage comes in the midst of a nine-formatted-
paragraph Latin section (¶285-315) with a German equivalent of one formatted paragraph that does not 
appear to translate this text.  
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 Itaque repudientur illae pharisaicae opiniones adversariorum, quod 
non accipiamus fide remissionem peccatorum, sed quod oporteat mereri 
dilectione nostra et operibus, quod dilectionem nostram et opera nostra 
irae Dei opponere debeamus. Haec doctrina legis est, non evangelii, quae 
fingit prius hominem lege iustificari, quam per Christum reconciliatus sit 
Deo, cum Christus dicat: Sine me nihil potestis facere; item: Ego sum vitis 
vera, vos palmites. Verum adversarii fingunt nos esse palmites non 
Christi, sed Moisi. Prius enim volunt lege iustificari, dilectionem nostram 
et opera offerre Deo, quam reconcilientur Deo per Christum, quam sint 
palmites Christi. Paulus contra contendit legem non posse fieri sine 
Christo. Ideo promissio prius accipienda est, ut fide reconciliemur Deo 
propter Christum, quam legem facimus. Haec satis perspicua esse piis 
conscientiis existimamus. Et hinc intelligent, cur supra professi simus, 
iustificari homines fide, non dilectione, quia oportet nos opponere irae Dei 
non nostram dilectionem aut opera, aut confidere nostra dilectione ac 
operibus, sed Christum mediatorem. Et prius oportet apprehendere 
promissionem remissionis peccatorum, quam legem facimus. 
 Derhalben nur weit, weit von uns mit den pharisäischen Lehren der 
Widersacher, da sie sagen, daß wir Vergebung der Sünden nicht durch den 
Glauben erlangen, sondern daß wir sie verdienen müssen mit unsern 
Werken und mit unserer Liebe gegen Gott. Item, daß wir mit unsern 
Werken und Liebe sollen Gottes Zorn versühnen. Denn es ist eine recht 
pharisäische Lehre, eine Lehre des Gesetzes, nicht des Evangelii, da sie 
lehren, daß der Mensch erst durch das Gesetz gerecht werde, ehe er durch 
Christum Gott versühnet werde, so doch Christus sagt: „Ohn mich könnt 
ihr nichts thun.“ Item: „Ich bin der Weinstock; ihr seid die Reben.“ Die 
Widersacher aber, die reden davon, als seien wir nicht Christi Reben, 
sondern Mosi. Denn sie wollen erst durchs Gesetz fromm und gerecht vor 
Gott werden und erst unsere Werke und Dilection Gott opfern, ehe sie 
Reben am Weinstock Christi sein. Paulus aber, welcher freilich ein viel 
höher Doctor ist, denn die Widersacher, redet klar und streitet wiederum 
dies allein, daß niemand das Gesetz tun könne ohne Christo. Darum 
diejenigen, so die Sünde und Angst des Gewissens recht fühlen oder 
erfahren haben, die müssen sich an die Zusage der Gnade halten, daß sie 
durch den Glauben erst Gott versühnt werden um Christus willen, ehe sie 
das Gesetz erfüllen. Dieses alles ist öffentlich und klar genug bei 
gottesfürchtigen Gewissen, und hieraus werden Christen wohl verstehen, 
warum wir hieroben gesagt haben, daß wir allein durch den Glauben für 
Gott gerecht werden, nicht durch unsere Werke oder Dilection usw. Denn 
all unser Vermügen, alles Tun und Werk sind zu schwach, Gottes Zorn 




 Therefore we reject the Pharisaic opinions of our opponents that 
we do not receive the forgiveness of sins by faith but merit it by our love 
and works, and that we ought to set our love and works against the wrath 
of God. This is a teaching of the law and not of the Gospel, to imagine that 
a man is justified by the law before being reconciled to God through 
Christ, though Christ says (John 15:5), “Apart from me you can do 
nothing,” and “I am the vine, you are the branches.” But our opponents 
imagine that we are members of Moses rather than of Christ. They want to 
be justified by the law and to offer our works to God before [prius] being 
reconciled to God and becoming the branches of Christ. Paul, on the 
contrary, contends that we cannot keep the law without Christ. Therefore 
we must accept [accipienda] the promise that by faith we are reconciled to 
God before [prius] we keep the law. We think that this is clear enough for 
devout consciences, and from this they will see why we said above that 
men are justified by faith and not by love. For we must not set our love or 
works against the wrath of God or trust in our love or works, but only in 
Christ, the mediator. We must [oportet] take hold of the promise of the 
forgiveness of sins before [prius]we keep the law.32 
The opponents not only have the teaching wrong, but the Reformers in the Apology’s 
article on Good Works says that the opponents misread Scripture and confuse cause and 
effect (the Latin words are used this time in the German and without translation, with 
Fruchten [“fruit”] added after Werken [“works”]). 
 Adversarii etiam addunt testimonia suae condemnationi. Et operae 
pretium est unum atque alterum recitare. Allegant ex Petro: Studete 
firmam facere vocationem vestram etc. Iam vides, lector, adversarios 
nostros non perdidisse operam in discenda dialectica, sed habere artificium 
ratiocinandi ex scripturis prorsus quidquid libet. Facite firmam 
vocationem vestram per bona opera. Igitur opera merentur remissionem 
peccatorum. Sane concinna erit argumentatio, si quis sic ratiocinetur de 
reo capitalis poenae, cui poena remissa est: Magistratus praecipit, ut in 
posterum abstineas ab alieno. Igitur per hoc meritus es condonationem 
poenae, quod nunc ab alieno abstines. Sic argumentari est ex non causa 
causam facere. Nam Petrus loquitur de operibus sequentibus remissionem 
peccatorum et docet, quare sint facienda, scilicet, ut sit firma vocatio, hoc 
est, ne vocatione sua excidant, si iterum peccent. Facite bona opera, ut 
perseveretis in vocatione, ne amittatis dona vocationis, quae prius 
contigerunt, non propter sequentia opera, sed iam retinentur fide, et fides 
                                                 
32 Ap XII:85-87, BKS, 269; Tappert, 194-195. (Emphasis added.) Tappert notably does not 
translate per Christum (“through Christ”) in regards to the underlined reconciliation. On a similar use of 
John 15:5, confer Ap IV:266 above in the text. 
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non manet in his, qui amittunt spiritum sanctum, qui abiiciunt 
poenitentiam, sicut supra diximus, fidem exsistere in poenitentia. 
 Die Widersacher führen auch etliche Sprüche der Schrift ein, 
warum sie diesen Artikel verdammen. Nämlich bringen sie den Spruch 
Petri herfür: „Fleißet euch, euren Beruf fest zu machen durch gute Werke 
usw.“ Da siehet jedermann, daß unsere Widersacher ihr Geld nicht übel 
angelegt, da sie Dialecticam studiert haben. Denn sie mügen die Sprüche 
der Schrift gereimt, ungereimt, schließlich, unschließlich, wie sie wollen, 
und wie es ihnen gefällt, einführen. Denn also schließen sie: Petrus sagt: 
“Fleißiet euch durch gute Werke, euren Beruf fest zu machen”; darum 
verdienen wir durch Werke Vergebung der Sunde. Es ist wahrlich einen 
feine Argumentation, als wenn einer spräche von einem Beklagten im 
Halsgericht, welchem das Leben gefristet wäre: Der Richter hat geboten, 
daß der forthin sich solcher Übeltat soll enthalten, darum so hat er 
verdienet mit solchem Enthalten, daß ihm das Leben gefristet ist. Also 
argumentieren, das heißt ex non causa causam machen. Denn Petrus redet 
von guten Werken und Früchten, die da folgen dem Glauben, und lehret, 
warum man sie tun solle, nämlich, daß wir unsern Beruf fest machen, das 
ist, daß wir nicht wiederum vom Evangelio fallen, wenn wir wiederum 
sündigeten. Will sagen: Tut gute Werke, daß ihr bei dem Evangelio, bei 
eurem himmlischen Beruf bleibt, daß ihr nicht wiederum abfallet, kalt 
werdet, verliert Geist und Gaben, die euch aus Gnaden durch Christum 
widerfahren sind, nicht um der folgenden Werke willen. Denn in dem 
Beruf bleibt man fest durch den Glauben, und der Glaube und heilige 
Geist bleibet in denjenigen nicht, die sündlich Leben führen. 
 Our opponents quote many Scripture passages to show why they 
have condemned our article, and it is worthwhile to examine some of 
them. From Peter they quote (II Pet. 1:10), “Be zealous to confirm your 
call.” Now you see, dear reader, that our opponents have indeed got the 
most out of their logic courses, for they have learned the trick of deducing 
from Scripture whatever suits them. “Confirm your call by good works”; 
therefore works merit the forgiveness of sins! By the same argument we 
could say to a man who was sentenced to die and then pardoned, “The 
magistrate commands that from now on you steal no more, and therefore 
you are pardoned.” Such argumentation is to make the effect the cause. 
Peter is talking about the works that follow the forgiveness of sins; he is 
giving instruction that they should be done in order to confirm their call, 
that is, lest they fall from their call by sinning again. Do good works to 
persevere in your call and not to lose its gifts, which were given to you 
before your works and not because of them and which are now kept by 
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faith. Faith does not remain in those who lose the Holy Spirit and reject 
penitence; as we have said before, faith has its existence in penitence.33  
Major portions of this passage from the Apology are cited by Solid Declaration IV:33 
(Good Works), making its own the same expression of the relationship in logical 
language.34 Thus, not just in early confessions but also in later ones and thus throughout 
The Book of Concord the Latin word prius is used to indicate a logical relationship of 
cause and effect between faith and good works. 
Summary of prius uses and other indications of necessity 
 Good works not only follow faith but follow faith necessarily, as an effect follows 
its cause, according to the authors of the documents in The Book of Concord. The logical 
relationship between faith and works and their equivalents is variously expressed by the 
simple use of the Latin word prius and its German equivalents, by the gerundive 
construction indicating necessity, by various other words indicating necessity, and by 
different combinations of these expressions. Scripture and church fathers are adduced in 
support of this logical relationship, and other thinkers are criticized, at least indirectly, for 
teaching otherwise. At the center of such statements is fallen people’s inability to do the 
works of the law, as well as even redeemed people’s inability to fully keep the law. Also 
central in such statements is the Reformers’ concern over preserving the teaching of 
justification by faith alone. Precisely because their opponents do not preserve this 
teaching of justification by faith alone and misuse logic in the process, the Reformers at 
                                                 
33 Ap XX:12-13, BKS, 315-316; Tappert, 228. (Emphasis added. This passage was also cited 
above, at n.8, p.96) The BKS points to the Confutation’s twelfth article (CR 27:112; confer Reu, 356*; K-
N, 114), but the reference at that point in the Confutation is to Peter’s statement in Acts 2:38, not to his 
epistle, 2 Peter 1:10. 
 In Melanchthon’s 1547 Erotemata Dialectices, he lists as one of seven fallacies, Secundum non 
causam ut causam (“according to a non-cause as a cause”), and he refers to medicine where great errors 
occur if the proper cause is not identified; he further illustrates the discussion with classical examples since 
he says he cannot find many scholastic examples, although he gives one related to the relationship between 
philosophy and theology (CR 13:737, 742-744; confer the 1528 Dialectica current at the time of the 
Augsburg Confession and its Apology, Melanchthon, De dialectica libri quatuor, 235-237). “False cause” 
continues to be fallacy identified by logicians today (for example, see Copi and Cohen, Introduction to 
Logic, 158-159). 
34 Neither the authoritative German of the Formula nor its Latin translation follow particularly 
closely the precise wording of the Apology’s authoritative Latin or its German translation (see BKS, 948). 
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this locus make a correct logical distinction between justification and sanctification, also 
as between cause and effect, respectively. 
Sanctification as a logical distinction 
 In Solid Declaration III, The Righteousness of Faith before God, there is an 
extended discussion of justification as distinct from sanctification.35 Though elsewhere in 
The Book of Concord both justification and sanctification have broad senses that can 
include the narrow sense of the other term, in Solid Declaration III an explicit logical 
distinction is made between the narrow senses of the two terms, while nevertheless 
maintaining the interrelatedness of the two. (The different senses of these words are 
explained further below.) To properly consider this matter, this section begins with the 
earlier references to sanctification, proceeds to the later references in the Formula of 
Concord. 
Early Book of Concord references to sanctification 
 Early references in The Book of Concord to sanctification are found in 
Melanchthon’s Apology of the Augsburg Confession and in Luther’s Small Catechism 
and Large Catechism. Though slightly out of chronological order, the references are here 
considered in Book of Concord order. 
 Twice in the Latin of Apology IV, Justification, but not in its German equivalent, 
Melanchthon cites 1 Corinthians 1:30 from the Vulgate: Christ is said to be made by God 
“our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and redemption” (sapientia, iustitia, 
sanctificatio et redemptio). In both ¶86 and ¶306, where the quotes are made, the 
                                                 
35 The usual distinction between the two terms follows. “Justification” is God the Father’s 
gracious act of declaring and making a believing sinner righteous by imputing to him or her the 
righteousness of Jesus Christ, Whose life, death, and resurrection alone merit such forgiveness of sins 
(human beings are dead in sin prior to justification and do not cooperate in any way with justification; the 
faith that receives forgiveness is itself a gift of God). “Sanctification” is the God-pleasing fighting against 
sin and doing of good works that justification brings about in the life of the believer by the Holy Spirit 
working through Word and Sacrament (a redeemed sinner in some sense can be said to cooperate with his 
or her sanctification). The text of the chapter explains the distinction more as it continues; see, for example, 
Table 5: Senses of “justification” and “sanctification” on p.342. On the definition of justification, confer 
with discretion “justification”, Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 914-915 (the Dictionary lacks a 
definition of “sanctification”). 
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emphasis is on faith alone justifying, though in ¶306 the point is also being made, in 
addressing the voluntarist and intellectualist controversy (Ap IV:304), that the confessors 
are speaking of righteousness differently than “the philosophical or judicial investigation 
of a man’s own righteousness”.36 So, despite the fact that the 1 Corinthians 1:30 passage 
is not being used to claim a distinction between justification and sanctification or a lack 
thereof, the confessors’ use of this passage coordinating the Greek terms  and 
 and their Latin equivalents is significant.37 Though Christ is not to be divided, 
his value for the Corinthians can be distinguished according to these terms, even if 
commentators on this passage do not always agree on the precise distinction.38 
 Luther, in both his Small Catechism and Large Catechism, also makes a 
distinction between justification and sanctification, but, instead of assigning 
sanctification to Christ, Luther assigns it to the Holy Spirit.39 Luther titles the Second 
Article of the Apostolic Creed dealing with the work of the Son as “Redemption” (von 
der Erlösung, de redemptione) and the Third Article of the Creed dealing with the work 
of the Holy Spirit as Sanctification (von der Heligung, de sanctificatione).40 While the 
theological maxim opera ad extra indivisa sunt holds that the works of the Trinity 
                                                 
36 Tappert, 119, 154; BKS, 178, 219. On the critique of the “philosophical investigation”, see 
below at n.124. 
37 SD V:22 also refers to 1 Corinthians 1:30, though only by way of “righteousness” 
(Gerechtigkeit, iustitia) (Tappert, 562; BKS, 959). 
38 In three other paragraphs of the Apology one finds reference to sanctification in connection with 
citations from the New Testament: Ap XXIII:43, 65 (both citing 1 Thessalonians 4:4 [ , Vulgate 
sanctificatione]); Ap XXIV:36 (citing 1 Peter 1:2 [ , Vulgate sanctificatione]). In Ap XXIII:43 and 
XXIV:36, forms of both the Latin sanctificatio and German Heiligung are used; in Ap XXIII:66, the 
German version does not carry over the reference from the authoritative Latin (as with the two paragraphs 
using 1 Corinthians 1:30 discussed in the text above). (BKS, 342, 347, 361; Tappert, 245 and 248, 
translating “holiness”, and 257, translating “Sanctified”.) 
 Notably AC VI, generally regarded as the article dealing with sanctification, is commonly titled 
“The New Obedience” (Von neuen Gehorsam, De nova oboedientia) and makes no use of the term 
“sanctification”. The Confutation takes issue with AC VI in that justification is ascribed to faith alone, and 
thus the Confessors include in Ap IV their response to the Confutation’s objection to AC VI (see Reu, 
*352-353; Ap IV:1). 
39 This apparent contradiction to 1 Corinthians 1:30 is only an apparent contradiction, as the work 
of the Holy Spirit can be identified as the continuation of Christ’s work, and, as noted below in the text, the 
works of the three Persons of the Godhead towards the world are united. 
40 SC II:3, 5 (Tappert, 345; BKS, 511); LC II:6, 35 (Tappert, 411, 415; BKS, 647, 653). 
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towards the world are not to be divided, Luther nevertheless proceeds to “sum up the 
entire Creed in three articles, according to the three persons of the Godhead” (wollen wir 
den ganzen Glauben kürzlich fassen in drei Häuptartikel nach den dreien Personen der 
Gottheit; totum fidei Symbolum tribus tantum principalibus articulis complectemurjiuxta 
tres divinitatis personas).41 Luther writes that, in order to accomplish sanctification, the 
Holy Spirit uses the other items of the Third Article—the holy Christian church, the 
communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life 
everlasting—as means (LC II:37) and that through such means the Holy Spirit “creates 
and increases sanctification, causing it daily to grow and become strong in the faith and 
in the fruits of the Spirit” (dadurch er die Heiligung machet und mehret, daß sie täglich 
zunehme und stark werden im Glauben und seinen Früchten, so er schaffet; per quod 
sanctificationem efficit, communionem amplificans, ut quotidianis incrementis crescat et 
in fide ejusque fructibus, quos producit, corroborata fortis evadat).42 
 In the Large Catechism discussion of the Third Article that then follows, Luther 
elaborates on the idea that forgiveness of sins is constantly needed because in this world a 
human being is always sinful. In so doing, Luther refers to the Holy Spirit working 
sanctification (die Heiligkeit durch den Heiligen Geist gemacht, sanctificatio per spiritum 
sanctum facta)43 and says that outside the Christian church there is no forgiveness and, as 
a result, no sanctification (auch keine Heiligkeit da sein kann, quemadmodum nec ulla 
                                                 
41 LC II:6, BKS, 647; Tappert, 411. Luther did something similar nearly a decade earlier (see 
BKS, 647 n.1; Tappert, 411 n.9), though apparently without attaching the labels of creation, redemption, 
and sanctification (WA 7:21425-27; Aland #234, Eine kurze Form des Glaubens [1520]; not in the AE). 
 Later Lutheran dogmaticians, such as Johannes Andreas Quenstedt (1617-1688), would defend 
attributing sanctification to the Holy Spirit “terminatively” (as the last One to do it and One present in the 
believer as a result of it), while at the same time acknowledging that the entire Trinity is sanctification’s 
efficient cause (Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans. 
Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs, 3rd ed., rev. ed. [Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1899], 491). 
42 LC II:37 (Tappert, 415), 53 (Tappert, 417; BKS, 657-658). 
 The discussion of sanctification that comes up in Luther’s Large Catechism treatment of the Third 
Commandment, pertaining to sanctifying the Holy Day, has little bearing on the discussion of the 
distinction between justification and sanctification. Luther simply says the day itself does not need 
sanctification (LC I:87; darf fur sich selbs keins Heiligens nicht, pro se non opus habet sanctificatione) and 
that our sanctification of the day occurs as “we occupy ourselves with God’s Word and exercise ourselves 
therein” (LC I:88; Heiligen, sanctificatio). (Tappert, 376-377; BKS, 582.) 
43 LC II:54; BKS, 658 (Tappert, 417, translates “holiness”). 
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sanctificatio adesse potest).44 For those inside the church, sanctification on earth has 
begun and grows daily (weil die Heiligkeit angefangen ist und täglich zunimmpt, quando 
sanctificationis opus inchoatum est et quotidie augetur)45 by the Holy Spirit’s work (das 
alles soll des heiligen Geists Ampt und Werk sein, daß er auf Erden die Heiligkeit anfahe 
und täglich mehre, haec omnia spiritus sancti sunt officia et opera, ut hic in terris 
sanctificationem exordiatur eandemque quotidie).46 Though because of the flesh 
believers are now “only halfway pure and holy” (halb und halb reine und heilig, dimidio 
puri ac sancti)47 and the Holy Spirit must continue to work, in the life to come there will 
be “complete and perfect holiness” (ganzer und volliger Heiligkeit, perfectam et 
absolutam sanctitatem).48 
 Worth noting at this point in this discussion is that the New Testament can speak 
of a believer’s present sanctification both as being complete according to the new, 
spiritual human being/nature and as being incomplete according to the old, sinful human 
being/nature, which distinctions also relate to different senses of the word 
“sanctification”. One example is in Hebrews chapter 10. Verse 10 reads as follows: 
NA26: 
 
Vulgate: in qua voluntate sanctificati sumus per oblationem corporis 
Christi Iesu in semel 
Luther Bibel: In diesem Willen sind wir geheiligt auf einmal durch das 
Opfer des Leibes Jesu Christi. 
                                                 
44 LC II:56; BKS, 658 (Tappert, 418, translates “holiness”). 
 Paragraph 56 also includes a statement by Luther that those who seek to merit sanctification 
through their own works (sondern durch ihre Werke Heiligkeit süchen und verdienen wöllen, sed propriis 
operibus sanctificationem quaerunt ac venantur ac promereri contendunt) have separated themselves from 
the church. For the late medieval use of promereri in connection with meritum de condigno, see Heiko A. 
Oberman, “Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent,” John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, eds. John 
Kenneth Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
1965). 
45 LC II:57; BKS, 659 (Tappert, 418, translates “holiness”). Inchoate sanctification is discussed 
below in the text at greater length; see the discussions beginning on pp.350 and 370. 
46 LC II:59; BKS, 659 (Tappert, 418, translates “holiness”). 
47 LC II:58; Tappert, 418; BKS, 659. 
48 LC II:57; Tappert, 418; BKS, 659. 
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KJV: By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body 
of Jesus Christ once for all 
A little further down is verse 14:  
NA26: 
 
Vulgate: una enim oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos 
Luther Bibel: Denn mit einem Opfer hat er in Ewigkeit vollendet die 
geheiligt werden. 
KJV: For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are 
sanctified 
Thus in verse 10 the writer speaks with a Greek perfect tense of complete sanctification, 
as in verse 14 he speaks with a perfect tense of one offering having completed its work of 
perfecting the saints. Verse 14, however, refers with a Greek present tense to those saints 
as presently being sanctified. Applied to believers who are still in this world and 
therefore sinful, the completed perfection of verse 10 and the first part of verse 14 is 
sanctification in the broad sense, which term entails justification in the narrow sense and 
sanctification in the narrow sense (although, if applied only to the believers according to 
their redeemed nature, the statement properly could be made of sanctification in the 
narrow sense alone). Applied to those same beliver-sinners, the in-progress sanctification 
of the second part of verse 14 is strictly sanctification in the narrow sense. (See 
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Table 5 for a display of how the senses of these terms correspond.) Luther’s Small 
Catechism explanation to the Third Article of the Apostolic Creed is one example of 
where in The Book of Concord one finds reference to sanctification with a perfect tense.49 
                                                 
49 im rechten Glauben geheiliget und erhalten; recta fide sanctificavit et conservavit; “sanctified 
and preserved me in the true faith” (SC II:6; BKS, 512; Tappert, 345). According to the redeemed human 
nature the sanctification is one-time and complete, but according to the fallen human nature the 
sanctification in this life is in progress. The perfect tense also can be taken as a Greek perfect tense 
representing action in the past that resulted in a present and future state. Furthermore, note that present 
tense verbs are subsequently used in SC II:6 in connection with the Holy Spirit’s work in the Church: 
berüft, sammlet, erleucht, heiliget … erhält; vocare, congregare, illuminare, snactificare … conservare; 
“calls, gathers, enlightens, … sanctifies … preserves” (BKS, 512; Tappert, 345).  
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Table 5: Senses of “justification” and “sanctification” 
Term Equivalent 
justificationnarrow = forgiveness of sins, made righteous, declared righteous, etc. 
sanctificationnarrow = love, good works, incipient keeping of the law, etc. 
justificationbroad = justificationnarrow + sanctificationnarrow = sanctificationbroad 
sanctificationbroad = justificationnarrow + sanctificationnarrow = justificationbroad 
 
Later Book of Concord references to sanctification 
 Later references to sanctification in the The Book of Concord come in both the 
Epitome and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord and are found in several 
different articles: Original Sin, Free Will, and the Righteousness of Faith Before God. 
 The Formula of Concord in Article I, Original Sin, continues from the Catechisms 
both the idea of a chief article of faith titled sanctification and the idea of a corrupted 
human nature needing the process of sanctification to continue in this life. In the case of 
the Epitome, ¶3 lists as “the chief articles of our Christian faith” (die Hauptartikel unsers 
christlichen Glaubens, praecipuis fidei nostrae articulis): “creation, redemption, 
sanctification, and the resurrection of the flesh” (Erschaffung, Erlösung, Heiligung und 
Auferstehung, de creatione, de redemptione, de sanctificatione et resurrectione carnis 
nostrae), and the paragraph makes it clear that these articles could not coexist with a view 
that does not distinguish between corrupted human nature and original sin.50 As would be 
expected, the Solid Declaration version makes the same point in greater detail, listing 
each of the four articles of faith and explaining why, under each heading, the failure to 
distinguish between corrupted human nature and original sin would contradict the 
Scriptures.51 As with the use of the 1 Corinthians 1:30 passage noted above, these 
paragraphs from the Formula do not directly address the issue of a distinction between 
                                                 
50 Ep I:3; Tappert, 466; BKS, 771. While such a division into four articles is not specifically found 
in Luther’s Catechisms, LC II:59 makes at least a chronological distinction between the sanctification that 
takes place now and the sanctification that takes place later “by means of the last two parts of this article” 
(durch die letzten zwei, duobus articulis posterioribus), namely, the resurrection of the body and the life 
everlasting. 
51 SD I:34, 43, 45, 46. 
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justification and sanctification, but the paragraphs do presume such a distinction, and, at 
the same time, as the paragraphs explicitly discuss the existence of the corrupted human 
nature needing increased sanctification, they presume in the believer the existence also of 
the renewed human nature already completely sanctified. 
 In Solid Declaration II, Free Will, as in the Large Catechism, the work of 
increasing sanctification is attributed to the Holy Spirit. In fact, the Solid Declaration 
cites the Large Catechism in making this point (SD II:36-39, citing from LC II:51-53). 
The key excerpt for the matter at hand follows: 
So bleibet der Heilige Geist bei der heiligen Gemeine der Christenheit bis 
auf den jüngsten Tag, dadurch er uns heilet, und braucht sie dazu das Wort 
zu führen und treiben, dardurch er die Heiligung macht und mehret, daß 
wir täglich zunehmen und stark werden im Glauben und seinen Früchten, 
so er schaffet 
Spiritus Sanctus autem manet cum sancta ecclesia catholica ad 
novissimum usque diem et per ecclesiam nos sanat eiusque opera utitur in 
docendo et propagando Dei Verbo, per quod ipse sanctificationem nostram 
operatur et promovet, ut de die in diem proficiamus et in fide 
confirmemur, atque in ferendis bonis fidei fructibus, quos ipse efficit, 
progressus subinde maiores faciamus 
Until the last day, the Holy Spirit remains with the holy community of 
Christendom, through which he heals us and which he uses to proclaim 
and propagate his Word, whereby he initiates and increases sanctification 
[die Heiligung macht und mehret] so that we grow daily and become 
strong in the faith and its fruits, which he creates.52 
Shortly after the Large Catechism quotation, the Solid Declaration, in denying the 
believer’s will and power, states: 
Und obwohl die Neugebornen auch in diesem Leben so fern kommen, daß 
sie das Gute wollen, und es ihnen liebe, auch Guts tun und in demselbigen 
zunehmen, so ist doch solchs (wie daroben vermeldet) nicht aus unserm 
Willen und unserm Vermugen, sondern der Heilige Geist, wie Paulus 
selbst davon redet, wirket solch „Wollen und Vollbringen“ Philip. 2. Wie 
er auch zun Ephe. 2. solch Werk alleine Gott zuschreibt, da er sagt: „Wir 
seind seine Werk, geschaffen in Christo Jesu zu guten Werken, zu 
welchen uns Gott zuvor bereitet hat, daß wir darinnen wandeln sollen.“ 
                                                 
52 SD II:37; BKS, 887; Tappert, 528. Cf. LC II:52-53; BKS, 657-658. 
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Quamvis autem renati etiam in hac vita eo usque progrediantur, ut bonum 
velint eoque delectentur et bene agere atque in pietate proficere studeant, 
tamen hoc ipsum (ut paulo ante dictum est) non a nostra voluntate aut a 
viribus nostris proficiscitur; sed spiritus sanctus (ut Paulus ipse de hac re 
loquitur) operatur in nobis illud velle et perficere. Quemadmodum etiam 
alibi apostolus hoc opus soli Deo tribuit, cum inquit: Ipsius sumus factura, 
creati in Christo Iesu ad opera bona, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis 
ambulemus. 
Although the regenerated, while still in this life, reach the point where 
they desire to do the good and delight in it (indeed actually do good deeds 
and grow in sanctification), nevertheless, as mentioned above, we do this 
not of our own will and power, but the Holy Spirit, as St. Paul says, 
creates such willing and doing (Phil. 2:13), just as the apostle ascribes this 
work to God when he says, “We are his workmanship, created in Christ 
Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should 
walk in them” (Eph. 2:10).53 
The Holy Spirit is given the ultimate credit for the good works,54 which pertains more to 
the article’s discussion of Free Will, but this passage is also relevant to the distinction 
between justification and sanctification, at least indirectly, as the progress in 
sanctification of the regenerated person’s corrupted nature is being discussed.55 
 In Solid Declaration III, the Righteousness of Faith Before God, the vocabulary of 
justification is taken up before the distinction in question is made between justification 
                                                 
53 SD II:39; BKS, 887-888; Tappert, 528. Notably the Triglotta (895) reads, “they will what is 
good, and love it, and even do good and grow in it”, and Kolb-Wengert (551) reads, “they desire the good 
and delight in it and even do good deeds and grow in practicing them”. Tappert’s insertion of 
“sanctification” may make an effective paraphrase but is not at this point, strictly speaking, a translation. 
The antecedent of demselbigen may be debated but appears to be Guts (“good deeds”, as K-W suggests 
with the pronoun “them”). To be sure, good works are the fruits of justification that are caused as an effect 
and are roughly equivalent to sanctification. 
54 In some places the Formula can also give the regenerated believer partial credit for the good 
works (Ep III:17 is just one example). Pieper says the Christian “plays a part”, but the Christian’s work is 
“not co-ordinate” with God’s “as when two horses draw a wagon”; instead, the “new man is always and 
fully subordinated to God’s activity” (dependenter a Deo) (Pieper, III:14). The illustration of the two 
horses and the wagon could go back to Plato’s description in the Phaedrus of the soul being like a 
charioteer and two horses pulling his chariot, one horse good and the other bad (Plato, Symposium and 
Phaedrus trans. Tom Griffith, Everyman’s Library [London: Everyman Publications, 2000], 121-122). 
55 Earlier in the same article, there is discussion of prayers for sanctification by the saints (for 
example, David and St. Paul) when they were living in this world (SD II:15; daß sie von Gott gelehret, 
erleuchtet und geheiliget werden, doceantur, illuminentur et sanctificentur). Such prayers cannot be 
construed as the prayer of an unbeliever for conversion or justification, as is made clear in ¶16, when the 
saints’ prayers are made a model for contemporary believers. 
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and sanctification. In ¶17, “justify” is defined and supported with relevant Bible passages 
as declaring or pronouncing righteous, freeing or absolving from sins, and reckoning or 
imputing Christ’s righteousness to faith. 
Demnach das Wort rechtfertigen hier heißt gerecht und ledig von Sünden 
sprechen und derselbigen ewigen Straf ledig zählen umb der Gerechtigkeit 
Christi willen, wölche „von Gott dem Glauben zugerechnet wird“, Phil. 3.; 
wie dann solcher Gebrauch und Verstand dieses Worts in Heiliger Schrift 
Altes und Neues Testaments gemein ist, 
Vocabulum igitur iustificationis in hoc negotio significat iustum 
pronuntiare, a peccatis et aeternis peccatorum suppliciis absolvere, propter 
iustitiam Christi, quae a Deo fidei imputatur. Et sane hic vocabuli illius 
usus tam in Veteri quam in Novo Testamento admodum frequens est. 
Accordingly, the word “justify” [rechtfertigen] here means to declare 
righteous and free from sins and from the eternal punishment of these sins 
on account of the righteousness of Christ which God reckons to faith (Phil. 
3:9). And this is the usual usage and meaning of the word in the Holy 
Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments.56 
 In paragraphs 18, 19, and 21, “regeneration” is defined both as a sometime 
synonym of “justification” and as something distinct from “justification”. Clearly there 
are for the Reformers different senses of the word, and so extra caution is needed. (Note 
how in the following the German uses both the Latin terms and German equivalents.) 
Dieweil aber zuzeiten das Wort regeneratio, Wiedergeburt, für das Wort 
iustificatio, Rechtfertigung, gebraucht, ist vonnöten, das solch Wort 
eigentlich erklärt, damit die Verneurung, so der Rechtfertigung des 
Glaubens nachfolget, nicht mit der Rechtfertigung des Glaubens 
vormenget, sondern eigentlich voneinander unterschieden werden. 
Cum autem interdum vocabulum regenerationis pro vocabulo 
iustificationis usurpetur, necesse est, ut illud dextre et proprie explicetur, 
ne renovatio, quae iustificationem sequitur, cum iustificatione fidei 
confundatur, sed haec recte a se invicem discernantur. 
Since the word “regeneration” [regeneratio, Wiedergeburt] is sometimes 
used in place of “justification,” [iustificatio, Rechtfertigung] it is necessary 
to explain the term strictly so that the renewal which follows justification 
by faith will not be confused with justification and so that in their strict 
senses the two will be differentiated from one another.57 
                                                 
56 SD III:17; BKS, 919; Tappert, 541-542. 
57 SD III:18; BKS, 920; Tappert, 542. 
 
346 
First, the broad sense of “regeneration” is given, which includes, though not specified in 
such terms, “justification” in the narrow sense and “sanctification” in the narrow sense. 
(Again, the German uses both the Latin technical term and a German equivalent.) 
Denn das Wort regeneratio, das ist, Wiedergeburt, erstlich also gebraucht 
wird, daß es zugleich die Vergebung der Sünden allein umb Christus 
wilIen und die nachfolgende Verneurung begreifet, welche der Heilige 
Geist wirket in denen, so durch den Glauben gerechtfertigt sind. 
Vocabulum enim regenerationis interdum in eo sensu accipitur, ut simul et 
remissionem peccatorem (quae duntaxat propter Christum contingit) et 
subsequentem renovationem complectatur, quam Spiritus Sanctus in illis, 
qui per fidem iustificati sunt, operatur. 
The word “regeneration” [regeneratio, Wiedergeburt] is used, in the first 
place, to include both the forgiveness of sins solely for Christ’s sake and 
the subsequent renewal which the Holy Spirit works in those who are 
justified by faith.58 
Then, a “limited” or narrow sense of “regeneration” is given that is equated to 
“justification” in the narrow sense. 
Darnach wird es gebraucht allein pro remissione peccatorum et adoptione 
in filios Dei, das ist, daß es heißet allein Vergebung der Sünden, und daß 
wir zu Kindern Gottes angenommen werden. Und in diesem andern 
Verstand wird in der Apologia viel und oft dies Wort gebraucht, da 
geschrieben: iustificatio est regeneratio, das ist, die Rechtfertigung für 
Gott ist die Wiedergeburt, wie auch St. Paulus solche Worte 
unterschiedlich gesetzt Tit. 3: Er hat uns selig gemacht „durch das Bad der 
Wiedergeburt und Erneuerung des Heiligen Geistes.“ 
Quandoque etiam solam remissionem peccatorum et adoptionem in filios 
Dei significat. Et in hoc posteriore usu saepe multumque id vocabulum in 
Apologia Confessionis ponitur. Verbi gratia, cum dicitur: Iustificatio est 
regeneratio. Sed et Paulus haec vocabula cum discrimine ponit, cum dicit: 
Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus 
Sancti.  
But this word is also used in the limited sense of the forgiveness of sins 
and our adoption as God’s children. In this latter sense it is frequently used 
in the Apology, where the statement is made, “Justification is 
regeneration,” that is, justification before God is regeneration, just as St. 
                                                 
58 SD III:19; BKS, 920; Tappert, 542. 
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Paul uses the terms discriminately when he states, “He saved us by the 
washing of regeneration and renewing in the Holy Spirit” (Titus 3:5).59 
Next, the term “vivification” is equated to that sense of regeneration (justification in the 
narrow sense). 
Wie denn auch das Wort vivificatio, das ist, Lebendigmachung, zuzeiten in 
gleichem Verstand gebraucht worden. Denn so der Mensch durch den 
Glauben (wolchen allein der Heilig Geist wirket) gerechtfertiget, sollichs 
wahrhaftig ein Wiedergeburt ist, weil aus einem Kind des Zorns ein Kind 
Gottes und also aus dem Tod in das Leben gesetzt wird, wie geschrieben 
stehet: „Da wir tot waren in Sünden, hat er uns sampt Christo lebendig 
gemacht,“ Eph. 2. Item: „Der Gerechte wird seines Glaubens leben,“ Röm. 
1. In welchem Verstand dies Wort in der Apologie viel und oft gebraucht 
wird. 
Quin etiam vivificationis vocabulum interdum ita accipitur, ut 
remissionem peccatorum notet. Cum enim homo per fidem (quam quidem 
solus Spiritus Sanctus operatur) iustificatur, id ipsum revera est quaedam 
regeneratio, quia ex filio irae fit filius Dei et hoc modo e morte in vitam 
transfertur, sicut scriptum est: Cum essemus mortui in peccatis, 
convivificavit nos in Christo. Et alibi: Iustus fide sua vivet. Et in hac 
posteriore significatione Apologia vocabulo regenerationis frequenter uti 
solet. 
Likewise the term “vivification,” [vivificatio, Lebendigmachung] that is, 
being made alive, has sometimes been used in the same sense. For when 
the Holy Spirit has brought a person to faith and has justified him, a 
regeneration has indeed taken place, because he has transformed a child of 
wrath into a child of God and thus is translated him from death into life, as 
it is written, “When we were dead through our trespasses, he made us 
alive together with Christ” (Eph. 2:5). “He who through faith is righteous 
shall live” (Rom. 1:17). The Apology often uses the term in this sense.60 
Finally, a narrow sense of “regeneration” is given that is identical to “sanctification” in 
the narrow sense. 
Darnach aber wird es auch oft für die Heiligung und Erneuerung 
genummen, wölche der Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens nachfolget, wie es D. 
                                                 
59 SD III:19; BKS, 920; Tappert, 542. The exact phrase cited by the Formula does not appear in the 
Apology, though the sense is found in several places (Ap IV:72 [Et quia iustificari significant ex iniustis 
iustos effici seu regerari (BKS, 17437)], 78 [ex iniusto iustum effici seu regenerari (BKS, 17539)], and 117 
[ex iniustis iusti efficiamur seu regeneremur (BKS, 18410)]) and the phrase is said to be of the Apology’s 
author Melanchthon (confer CR 27:466, 468, 470). (See BKS, 920 n.4; Tappert, 542 n.2.)  
60 SD III:20; BKS, 920-921; Tappert, 542. Examples given from the Apology are Ap IV:250 and 
VII:31 (see BKS, 921 n.2; Tappert, 542 n.4). 
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Luther im Buch von der Kirche und Konzilien und anderstwo also 
gebraucht hat. 
Deinde etiam regeneratio saepe pro sanctificatione et renovatione (quae 
fidei iustificationem sequitur) usurpatur. In qua significatione D. Lutherus 
hac voce tum in libro De Ecclesia et conciliis tum alibi etiam multum usus 
est. 
Frequently the word “regeneration” means the sanctification or renewal 
which follows the righteousness of faith, as Dr. Luther used the term in his 
book On the Councils and the Church and elsewhere.61 
So, regeneration can be equal to justification in the narrow sense plus sanctification in the 
narrow sense (which is to be equal to justification in the broad sense or to sanctification 
in the broad sense), equal only to justification in the narrow sense (which is also equal to 
vivification), or equal to sanctification in the narrow sense. (See Table 6 for a summary 
of the senses of these terms according to SD III:17-21.) That the distinctions are being 
made is especially important. 
Table 6: Terminology according to SD III:17-21 
Term Equivalent 
regenerationbroad 
= justificationnarrow + sanctificationnarrow 
= justificationbroad = sanctificationbroad 
regenerationnarrow/justification = justificationnarrow = vivification 
vivification = regenerationnarrow/justification = justificationnarrow  
regenerationnarrow/sanctification = sanctificationnarrow  
 
                                                 
61 SD III:21; BKS, 921; Tappert, 542. Note that in the German es might be taken to refer to 
Lebendigmachung, the subject of the immediately preceding paragraph, but, as the Latin version makes 
clear (also with its paragraphing), the treatment of vivificationis was just a small digression from the term at 
hand, regenerationis. 
 The Luther reference is to Von den Konziliis und Kirchen (1539), Aland #382; WA 50:509-653; 
AE 41:9-178, translated by Charles M. Jacobs, revised by Eric W. Gritsch. More specifically, BKS (921 
n.3) refers to WA 50:59926-35; 62525f.; 62630f.; 62710f. (confer Tappert, 542 n.5). Those passages are found in 
AE 41:11413-24; 14431-33; 14612-17; 14632-34. In these places, Luther in passing does distinguish 
sanctificatione and vivificatione (though vivification apparently in a different sense than that elaborated in 
SD III), or as he puts it “the sanctification of the Holy Spirit” (der heiligung des Heiligen Geists), from “the 
redemption of Jesus Christ” (der Erlösung Christi). As in the Catechisms of the late 1520s, Luther in this 
1539 writing attributes the work of redemption to Christ and the work of vivification and sanctification to 
the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he indicates that the work of sanctification that is incomplete in this life takes 
place according to the old Adam, who is only fully and finally perfected “in the life beyond”. On The Book 
of Concord’s giving deutero-confessional status to some other writings, see above, n.73, p.223. 
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 The discussion that follows in Article III makes use of the terms so defined as it 
notes that in this life “unrighteousness in essence and life adheres” (Ungerechtigkeit … 
im Wesen und Leben …anhangen; iniustitia … substantiae ipsorum … adhaereat) to the 
“justified and regenerated” (den Gerechtfertigen und Wiedergeburt; iustificatis et 
renatis).62 Likewise, the Formula does not “mingle or insert that which precedes faith” 
(was für dem Galuben hergehet … eingemenget oder eingeschoben; quae fidem 
praecedunt … admisceantur aut inserantur), namely conversion or “contrition and 
sorrow” (Reu und Leid; contritione), and that which “follows faith” (was demselbigen 
nachfolget; quae eam sequuntur), namely love or good works, “into the article of 
justification, as if it were a necessary or component part” (in den Artikel der 
Rechtfertigung, asl darzu nötig und gehörig; articulo huic tanquam ad iustificationem 
necessaria et ad eam pertinentia).63 
 Love and good works “certainly and necessarily follow” (gewißlich notwendig 
folget; certissime et necessario sequitur),64 not precede, faith and justification, the 
Formula says, “since a person must be righteous before he can do good works” (die 
Person muß erst gerecht sein, eher sie gute Werk tun kann; oportet personam primum 
esse iustam, antequam bona opera facere queat).65 In the same way, sanctification 
logically results from justification. 
Gleichsfalls auch, wiewohl die Verneuerung und Heiligung auch eine 
Wohltat des Mittlers Christi und ein Werk des Heiligen Geists ist, gehört 
sie doch nicht in den Artikel oder in den Handel der Rechtfertigung vor 
Gott, sondern folget derselben, weil sie vonwegen unsers verderbten 
Fleisches in diesem Leben nicht ganz rein und vollkommen ist … 
                                                 
62 SD III:22-23; Tappert, 543; BKS, 921. 
63 SD III:24-26; Tappert, 543; BKS, 922.  
64 The words are those of logical necessity. Folgen generally translates sequor (Friedrich Adolph 
Heinichen, F. A. Heinichen's Lateinish-deutsches Schulworterbuch: mit einem Abriss der lateinischen 
Lautgeschichte, Wortbildung und Bedeutungsentwicklung, sowie der romischen Literaturgeschichte: 
Neubearbeitung von Heinrich Blase, Wilhelm Reeb, Otto Hoffmann, 9th ed. [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 
1917], 778), and sequor is usually used for immediate consequences, in particular in logical conclusions 
(Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, 1677). Confer Grimm, Deutsches Worterbuch, 9:727-728; 24:2503, 
2506-2508. 
 SD IV:14-20 refers to the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and Scripture itself in defending the 
use of “necessity” and clarifying precisely what is meant. 
65 SD III:27; BKS, 923; Tappert, 543-544. 
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Similiter et renovatio seu sanctificatio, quamvis et ipsa sit beneficium 
Mediatoris Christi et opus spiritus sancti, non tamen ad articulum aut 
negotium iustificationis coram Deo pertinet, sed eam sequitur, quia 
propter carnis nostrae corruptionem in hac vita imperfecta est et nondum 
omnibus numeris absoluta.  
Similarly, although renewal and sanctification [die Verneuerung und 
Heiligung] are a blessing of Christ, the mediator, and a work of the Holy 
Spirit, it does not belong in the article or matter of justification [der 
Rechtfertigung] before God; it rather follows justification, because in this 
life sanctification [sie] is never wholly pure and perfect on account of our 
corrupt flesh …66  
An extended quotation from Luther’s 1531 exposition of Galatians 2:16 comes next in 
the text of the Formula, in which quotation Luther explains that the teaching of “love and 
good works” must be done “apart from” (außerhalb; extra) the article of justification, 
which has to do with “how a person may be justified before God and be saved” (wodurch 
man doch gerecht für Gott und selig warden möge; qua re iustificemur et vitam aeternam 
consequamur).67 
 In the lengthy discussion that ensues (¶32-36)68, the Formula notes that justified 
believers have both “the reckoned righteousness of faith” (die zugerechnete Gerechtigkeit 
des Glaubens; imputatem fidei iustitiam) and “the inchoate righteousness of the new 
obedience or of good works” (die angefangene Gerechtigkeit des neuen Gehorsambs 
oder guten Werk; inchoatam iustitiam novae obedientiae seu bonorum operum habeant), 
but “these two dare not be confused with one another or introduced simultaneously into 
the article of justification by faith before God” (diese beide müssen nich ineinander 
gemenget oder zugleich in den Artikel der Rechtfertigung des Glaubens für Gott 
                                                 
66 SD III:28; BKS, 923; Tappert, 544. Confer the Triglotta, 925, with a compound subject and 
singular pronoun and verbal forms. Kolb-Wengert makes the English pronouns and verbal forms plural: 
“Likewise, too, although renewal and sanctification are a blessing of our mediator Christ and a work of the 
Holy Spirit, they do not belong in the article or in the treatment of justification before God but rather result 
from it since, because of our corrupted flesh, they are never fully pure and perfect in this life …” (K-W, 
566).  
 Again, the location of the progress of sanctification in the sinful human nature is to be noted, with 
the implication being that the believer is perfectly sanctified according to the redeemed spiritual nature. 
67 SD III:29; Tappert, 544; BKS, 923-924. The quotation from Luther is more or less found in WA, 
40I:24017-26 (Aland #229; not included in the AE). 
68 This text is formatted as one paragraph in Tappert, 544-546. 
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eingeschoben werden; haec duo non inter se permiscenda aut simul in articulum de 
iustificatione fidei coram Deo ingerenda sunt).69 
Also, wenngleich die Bekehrten und Gläubigen haben angefangne 
Verneuerung, Heiligung, Liebe, Tugend und gute Werk, so können doch, 
sollen und müssen dieselbigen nicht eingezogen oder eingemenget werden 
in den Artikel der Rechtfertigung für Gott, auf das dem Erlöser Christo 
seine Ehre bleibe und, weil unser neuer Gehorsam unvollkommen und 
unrein, die angefochtene Gewissen einen beständigen Trost haben mugen. 
Quare, etsi conversi et in Christum credentes habent inchoatam in se 
renovationem, sanctificationem, dilectionem, virtutes et bona opera, tamen 
haec omnia nequaquam possunt aut debent immisceri articulo 
iustificationis coram Deo, ut Redemptori Christo honor illibatus maneat, 
et, cum nostra nova obedientia imperfecta et impura sit, perturbatae 
conscientiae certa et firma consolatione sese sustentare valeant. 
From this it follows that although converted persons and believers possess 
the beginning of renewal, sanctification, love, virtues, and good works, 
[angefangne Verneuerung, Heiligung, Liebe, Tugend und gute Werk] these 
should and must not be drawn or mingled into the article of 
justification[der Rechtfertigung] before God, in order to preserve the glory 
due to Christ, the redeemer, and, because our new obedience is imperfect 
and impure, in order to supply tempted consciences with abiding 
comfort.70 
Preserving Christ’s glory and the believers’ comfort are the controlling concerns.71 Three 
key points come next, the third of which makes it clear that sanctification is not a cause 
of justification. (Note well the Latin expression present and translated in the authoritative 
German.72) 
Das weder Neuerung, Heiligung, Tugende oder gute Werk tamquam 
forma aut pars aut causa iustificationis, das ist, unser Gerechtigkeit für 
Gott seie, noch für ein Teil oder Ursache unserer Gerechtigkeit gemacht 
                                                 
69 SD III:32; Tappert, 544-545; BKS, 924-925. There is additional discussion of inchoate 
righteousness below in the text, beginning on p.370. 
70 SD III:35; BKS, 925-926; Tappert, 545. This passage was this chapter’s epigram. 
71 Similarly in SD XI:89, “despondency or a riotous and dissolute life” are avoided by the correct 
teaching regarding election, which includes the promise of the Holy Spirit “to cleanse and renew” (zur 
Reinigung und Erneurung verheißet; ad emundationem et sanctificationem promittit) (Tappert, 631; BKS, 
1089). 
72 The phrase is translated “as a form or part or cause of justification” and is said to “reflect the 
Roman Catholic argument at Trent that love provides the ‘form’ for the ‘material’ of faith”, with reference 
given to Examination of Trent I, 493-494 (K-W, 569 n.118). 
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und gesetzet oder sonst unter einigerlei Schein, Titel oder Namen in den 
Artikel der Rechtfertigung, als darzu nötig und gehörig, eingemenget 
werden sollen ... 
Denique has formulas teneamus, ut neque renovatio neque sanctificatio, 
virtutes aut bona opera, tanquam forma aut pars aut causa iustificationis 
aut sub qualicunque praetextu, titulo aut nomine, articulo iustificationis, 
tamquam ad eam rem necessaria aut pertinentia, immisceantur ... 
That neither renewal, sanctification, virtues nor other good 
works[Neuerung, Heiligung, Tugende oder gute Werk] are our 
righteousness before God, nor are they to be made and posited to be a part 
or cause of our justification, nor under any kind of pretense, title, or name 
are they to be mingled with the article of justification [der Rechtfertigung] 
as pertinent or necessary to it …73 
 Quite the contrary, justification is the cause of sanctification, as the following 
paragraph states in terms steeped in meaning from centuries of medieval philosophy, 
especially in a section of Latin text contained in the authoritative German that is only 
paraphrased in that same German version.74 
 Also muß auch bleiben und erhalten werden die Ordnung zwischen 
dem Glauben und guten Werken; item, zwischen der Rechtfertigung und 
Erneuerung oder Heiligung. 
 Dann gute Werk gehen nicht für dem Glauben her, auch nicht die 
Heiligung für der Rechtfertigung, sondern erstlich wird in der Bekehrung 
durch den Heiligen Geist der Glaub aus dem Gehör des Evangelii in uns 
angezündet; derselbe ergreift Gottes Gnade in Christo, dadurch die Person 
                                                 
73 SD III:39; BKS, 927; Tappert, 546. The BKS editors indicate this paragraph targets Osiander, 
and they cite CR VII:783. 
 Similarly, SD III’s fourth antithesis condemns the following position: daß zwei Stück oder Teile zu 
der Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens vor Gott gehören, darinn sie bestehe, nämlich die gnädige Vergebung der 
Sünden und dann zum andern auch die Verneuerung oder Heiligung; Quod iustitia fidei coram Deo duabus 
partibus constet, remissione peccatorum et renovatione seu sanctificatione (“righteousness by faith before 
God consists of two pieces or parts, namely, the gracious forgiveness of sins and, as a second element, 
renewal or sanctification”) (SD III:48; BKS, 931; Tappert, 548). Also here the BKS editors note that 
Osiander is the target of this condemnation. Confer also K-W, 573 n.132. 
74 Ordo, ordinis suggests the regular succession; causa, causae is that on account of which 
anything takes place; effectus, effectus in particular refers to the result of an action; antecedente, 
antecedentis is a technical term in philosophy for the antecedent or cause and is used opposite consequens; 
consequens, consequentis is the consequence that follows as an effect or results from a logical sequence 
(Lewis and Short, 1277, 303-304, 628, 129, 429-430, respectively). For one of Melanchthon’s treatments of 
cause and effect, see his 1547 Erotemata Dialectices in Philipp Melanchthon, ed., Philippi Melancthonis 
Opera quae supersunt omnia, 28 vols. (Halle: C. A. Schwetschke et filium, 1834-1860), 13:673-687. Confer 
De Dialectica of 1528, current at the time of the Augsburg Confession and Apology, Melanchthon, De 
dialectica libri quatuor, 189-195. 
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gerechtfertigt wird; darnach, wenn die Person gerechtfertigt ist, so wird sie 
auch durch den Heiligen Geist verneuert und geheiliget, aus welcher 
Verneuerung und Heiligung alsdann die Früchte der guten Werk folgen. Et 
haec non ita divelluntur quasi vera fides aliquando et aIiquamdiu stare 
possit cum malo proposito, sed ordine causarum et effectuum, 
antecedentium et consequentium ita distribuuntur; manet enim, quod 
Lutherus recte dicit: Bene conveniunt et sunt connexa inseparabiliter fides 
et opera, sed sola fides est, quae apprehendit benedictionem sine 
operibus, et tamen nun quam est sola. Das ist: Welches nicht also 
verstanden werden soll, als ob die Rechtfertigung und Erneuerung 
voneinander geschieden, dermaßen, daß ein wahrhaftiger Glaube 
unterweilen eine Zeitlang neben einem bösen Vorsatz sein und bestehen 
könnte, sondern es wird hiemit allein die Ordnung angezeigt, wie eins dem 
andern vorgehe oder nachfolge, denn es bleibt doch wahr, das D. Luther 
recht gesagt hat: Es reimen und schicken sich fein zusammen der Glaube 
und die guten Werk, aber der Glaube ist es allein, der den Segen ergreift 
ohne die Werke, doch nimmer und zu keiner Zeit allein ist, wie daroben 
erkläret worden. 
 Eodem modo etiam conservandus est ordo inter fidem et bona 
opera, inter iustificationem et renovationem seu sanctificationem. 
 Bona enim opera non praecedunt fidem et sanctificatio non 
praecedit iustificationem. Sed primum in conversione per Spiritum 
Sanctum fides ex auditu evangelii in nobis accenditur. Illa vero 
apprehendit gratiam Dei in Christo, qua persona iustificatur. Cum vero 
persona iam est iustificata, tum etiam per spiritum sanctum renovatur et 
sanctificatur; ex ea vero renovatione et sanctificatione deinceps fructus, 
hoc est, bona opera, sequuntur. Et haec non ita divelluntur, quasi vera 
fides aliquando et aliquamdiu stare possit cum malo proposito, sed ordine 
causarum et effectuum, antecedentium et consequentium, ita distribuuntur. 
Manet enim, quod Lutherus recte dicit: Bene conveniunt et sunt connexa 
inseparabiliter fides et opera; sed sola fides est, quae apprehendit 
benedictionem sine operibus; et tamen nunquam est sola. De qua re supra 
satis est dictum. 
 In this way, too, the proper order also[Ordnung] between faith and 
good works is bound to be maintained and preserved, as well as between 
justification and renewal or sanctification [der Rechtfertigung und 
Erneuerung oder Heiligung]. For good works do not precede [gehen nicht 
für] faith, nor is sanctification prior to justification. First the Holy Spirit 
kindles faith in us in conversion through the hearing of the Gospel. Faith 
apprehends the grace of God in Christ whereby the person is justified. 
After the person is justified, the Holy Spirit next renews and sanctifies 
him, and from this renewal and sanctification the fruits of good works then 
follow. This is not to be understood, however, as though justification and 
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sanctification are separated from each other in such a way as though on 
occasion true faith could exist and survive for a while side by side with a 
wicked intention, but this merely shows the order in which one thing 
precedes or follows the other. For Dr. Luther’s excellent statement 
remains true: “There is a beautiful agreement between faith and good 
works; nevertheless, it is faith alone which apprehends the blessing 
without works. And yet faith is at no time ever alone.” This has been set 
forth above.75 
Note the Latin text found in the German version, which text apparently originally stood 
in the German original of the Formula without the German paraphrase until the princes 
insisted it be translated,76 and note that the translation of the Latin given in the Formula’s 
German noticeably lacks the philosophical terminology pertaining to the order between 
justification and sanctification: that of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent.77 The 
reference to the true nature of faith in this context is also significant.78 
                                                 
75 SD III:40-41; BKS, 927-928; Tappert, 546. Regarding the Latin text contained in the German 
text, other English translations at least try to bring in the Latin terminology. The Triglotta, 931, for 
example, inserts in brackets the translations of several Latin words: “but hereby only the order [of causes 
and effects, of antecedents and consequents] is indicated”. K-W, 569, reads almost identically to Tappert. 
 The source of the Luther quotation is his lecture (ca. 1539-1540) on Genesis 22:16-18, WA 
43:25538-39; Aland #517; AE 4:66, translated by George V. Schick. There the Latin reads: Bene quidem 
conveniunt, et sunt connexa inseparabiliter fides et opera. Sed sola fides est, quae apprehendit 
benedictionem. Ideo solam fidem iustificantem praedicamus, quia sola benedicitur, opera non habent 
gloriam, quod benedicant, sed sunt fructus benedictae personae (WA 43:25538-41). The AE translates: “To 
be sure, faith and works indeed fit together well and are inseparably joined; but it is faith alone that obtains 
the blessing. Therefore we declare that faith alone justifies, because it alone is blessed. Works do not bless; 
they do not have this glory. No, they are the fruits of the person who has been blessed.” (AE 4:16621-23.) 
The SD quotation does not match the WA, though arguably the SD does not misrepresent Luther, although 
the German of the SD does undercut the “inseparable connection” (connexa inseparabiliter), which is 
expression pertains to the formal distinction between justification and sanctification discussed below in the 
text, beginning on p.372. In addition, though Luther is talking about faith and works and the SD primarily 
about justification and sanctification, the SD, as has been seen, made faith parallel to justification and 
works parallel to sanctification (SD III:40).  
76 Tappert, 464. 
77 In fact, the German paraphrase of the Latin in the German text might be read as a “dumbing-
down” or a removal of the cause-effect relationship, since not everything that follows something else does 
so as an effect necessarily following a cause. The German text might also be taken as suggesting a temporal 
relationship between the two, though clearly the temporal relationship is excluded (for more on that 
exclusion, see Edmund Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, Theologie der lutherischen 
Bekenntnisschriften, 3rd ed., 1948, trans. Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert J. A. Bouman [Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1961], 114-116). 
 Kolb-Wengert note: “At the time, technical theological vocabulary had not yet developed in 
German, and the authors of the Formula of Concord believed that points that hinged on such technical 
terms had to be made with the aid of the Latin” (K-W, 485). 
78 See more below in reference to the formal distinction beginning on p.372. 
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 The Book of Concord from beginning to end at a minimum knows of some sort of 
distinction between justification and sanctification, though no separation of them. 
Luther’s Catechisms, for example, distinguish between the two in identifying justification 
with Jesus and sanctification with the Holy Ghost. Melanchthon’s Apology in its Biblical 
citations could be taken as identifying justification with sanctification, at least in broad 
senses of both words, though more likely gives evidence of a distinction on the basis of 
the Biblical citations. The Formula of Concord is arguably more precise in its 
terminology and makes a logical distinction between the two, with justification as a cause 
and sanctification its effect.79 Yet, the later Formula does not go beyond the authors of 
the earlier confessions, making a point to cite both Luther and Melanchthon in support of 
its position.80 Finally, the Formula’s own statement in SD III:41 noted above must be 
emphasized: that justification and sanctification are not separated (Welches nicht also 
verstanden werden soll, als ob die Rechtfertigung und Erneuerung voneinander 
geschieden; haec non ita divelluntur).81 
                                                 
79 While the Formula at least speaks of the relationship between justification and sanctification as 
that of cause and effect, The Book of Concord itself does not otherwise directly speak of justification as 
“the cause” of sanctification. Uses of philosophical “cause” terminology are sub-sentential uses of 
philosophy that are outside this dissertation’s scope, which focuses on the supra-sentential uses of logic and 
argumentation. 
80 Of course, the intent of the Formula as a whole is to clarify and show continuity with the 
teaching of Luther and Melanchthon (see, for example, the Preface to The Book of Concord, BKS, 14 [¶21]; 
Tappert, 13; K-W, 15 [¶23]). 
81 Pieper writes both of the “inseparable connection (nexus indivulsus; unauflösliche Verbindung) 
between justification and sanctification” and of the need to maintain the proper order, not putting the cart 
(sanctification) before the horse (justification) (Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, III:7-13; Pieper, Christliche 
Dogmatik, III:6). In support of the first point, he cites Quenstedt who writes that “their union is closer than 
that of a mathematical point; they cannot be separated and divorced” (Pieper, III:8 n.9) (Regeneratio, 
iustificatio, unio et renovation tempore simul sunt et quovis puncto mathematico arcticores, adeo et divelli 
et sequestrari nequeant, cohaerent [Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, III:7 n.9.]). 
 Likely drawing on the Formula’s distinction, 17th-century Lutheran dogmaticians, such as 
Quenstedt, would similarly differentiate between justification and renovation in part on the basis of their 
logical order: “Regeneration precedes justification, and justification precedes renovation. Renovation is 
related to justification as an effect to a cause, and follows it, not in the order of time, but of nature. 
Therefore Paul does not use these words indiscriminately. Tit. 3:5.” (Quoted by Schmid, Doctrinal 
Theology, 488.) Confer SD III:19’s reference above to Titus 3. (Quenstedt’s other grounds for the 
distinction were the efficient cause, the subject, the object, the form, and the properties [Schmid, Doctrinal 
Theology, 488].) As to the efficient cause of sanctification, David Hollaz (1646-1713), for one, listed “the 
regenerate and justified man … as a secondary cause” (quoted by Schmid, Doctrinal Theology, 491 ). More 
modern Lutheran dogmaticians suggest faith is the instrument of the Holy Spirit, who is the efficient cause 
of sanctification (Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 11-12; Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, III:12 ). 
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Sanctification distinction as alleged discontinuity 
 Despite the Reformers’ insistence that justification and sanctification could not be 
separated, the logical distinction between the two that they made in the discussion of 
justification is sometimes taken as a point of discontinuity between the Reformation 
period and that which precedes it. This section presents that claim of discontinuity and 
seven responses to it. Ultimately, one sees that the authors of the writings in The Book of 
Concord consistently make—and thus The Book of Concord itself consistently makes—a 
logical distinction between justification in the narrow sense and sanctification in the 
narrow sense, which distinction has conceptual if not terminological continuity with the 
preceding medieval tradition. (The nature of this distinction—that of a philosophical 
formal distinction—is also a response of a sort to the claim of discontinuity, though it is 
discussed in the section that follows this one.) 
 Albert Ritschl, in his 1870 study of justification titled Die christliche Lehre von 
der Rechtfertigun und Vorsöhnung, translated in 1872 as A Critical History of the 
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, took note of the difference 
between the medieval and Reformation writers on this point, after noting their similarity 
on another: 
 We shall on the other hand search in vain to find in any theologian 
of the Middle Ages the Reformation idea of justification—the deliberate 
distinction between justification and regeneration. Instances indeed occur 
in which, by the word of justification is specially meant the Divine 
sentence of absolution from sins—particularly when certain unambiguous 
expressions of the apostle Paul are laid hold of; but we must not lay stress 
upon these instances so as to fancy in them an anticipation of the 
conscious thought of the Reformers. Their [presumably the Medieval 
theologians’] deliberate treatment of the idea of justification proceeds 
rather on the principle that a real change in the sinner is thought of as 
involved in it; in other words, the Reformation distinction between the two 
is at the outset rejected, and the explanation of justification in the forensic 
sense is seen to be only a preliminary statement that requires to be 
corrected and filled out. But this implies an essential difference of 
meaning in those formulae in which medieaval theologians seem to utter 
the watchword of the Reformers, and the work of collecting such 
utterances with a view to the defence of the doctrine of the Reformation, 
—such an attempt, for example, as may be seen in John Gerhard’s 
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Confessio Catholica—exposes him who undertakes it to a strong suspicion 
of having suffered himself to be misled by careless observation. It was 
understood in the Middle Ages that faith alone pertains to justification; 
that justification is bestowed freely by grace; that it does not depend on 
merita de congruo as conditions: it is only the Nominalistic theory that 
forsakes these positions; nevertheless, from a theological point of view, 
what is meant by them is something entirely different from what is meant 
by the formulae of the Reformers that sound so like them.82 
While Ritschl says the theologians of the Middle Ages did not make a “deliberate 
distinction between justification and regeneration”, he does find that the Reformers’ 
emphasis had “a broad basis in the Church”:83 
For in the thought of justification, so far as the Reformers are concerned, 
what is aimed at primarily and chiefly is by no means an objective 
doctrine of systematic theology, but simply a supreme standard whereby 
the subject who is a member of the Christian Church, and who, as such, is 
active in good works by the influence of the Holy Spirit, may judge for 
himself of his true religious condition. And what in fact the Reformers 
wish to establish is that the regenerate person does not owe his position 
before God and his assurance of salvation to the good works which he 
really does perform, but to the grace of God, which to his believing 
confidence pledges his justification through Christ.84  
So, when moving past the problems with terminology to the ideas behind them, Ritschl 
finds continuity in logical progression from the medieval thinkers to the Reformers. 
But that this religious estimate of self, which practically denies to merit 
the value which is theoretically affirmed, should appear in a very 
pronounced form among the heroes of the mediaeval church, serves to 
show that the same way of thinking when adapted by the Reformers was a 
product of the Church; and that the Reformation use of that line of 
thought, to bring about a complete change in the doctrine and ordinances 
of the Western Church, is simply a logical result of the idea of grace 
which came to be practically operative on all hands when the time came 
and the proper men were raised up.85 
                                                 
82 A. B. Ritschl, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, tr. 
John S. Black (Edinburgh, 1872), 90-91. Ritschl cites Bernardi Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi cap. vi.16 
and viii.20; In Cantica, sermo xxii. 6. These can be found in MSL 182:1066-1067, 1069; 183:880. Nothing 
there seems to necessarily rule out what the Reformers claim. 
83 Ritschl, Critical History, 92. 
84 Ritschl, Critical History, 92. 
85 Ritschl, Critical History, 94. 
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(Ultimately this dissertation’s position is that there was not a change in the doctrine.) 
Ritschl proceeds to consider those on whom the logical result operated, such as Bernard 
of Clairvaux, Saint Francis of Assisi, John Staupitz (Luther’s “mentor”), John Wessel, 
and others.86 
 Alister McGrath, in his more recent study of justification that he claims surpasses 
Ritschl’s,87 nevertheless cites Ritschl on this matter.88 McGrath says the Reformers 
disagreed with their predecessors on justification’s nature. McGrath writes that with the 
forensic nature of justification, which he says represents a “theological novum” and is 
“chief” among the discontinuities between the Reformation period and the period before 
it, came the introduction of the distinction between justification and regeneration, what 
McGrath calls a “fundamental discontinuity” in “the western theological tradition where 
none had existed before.”89 McGrath thus summarizes as a “leading primary 
characteristic” of Lutheran justification:  
A deliberate and systematic distinction … made between justification (the 
external act by which God declares the sinner to be righteous) and 
sanctification or regeneration (the internal process of renewal within 
man). Although the two are treated as inseparable, a notional distinction is 
thus drawn where none was conceded before.90 
McGrath similarly writes: 
the notional distinction between iustificatio and regeneratio provides one 
of the best differentiae between Catholic and Protestant understandings of 
justification, marking the Reformers’ complete discontinuity with the 
earlier western theological tradition.91 
                                                 
86 Ritschl, Critical History, 95-120. 
87 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, x. McGrath there gives four reasons why he thinks his study is better: 
some of Ritschl’s presuppositions are prejudicial against the early Luther, Ritschl restricts his focus to 
German Protestantism, scholarship since Ritschl calls his conclusions into question, and “new interest in 
ecumenism” makes essential a better-informed discussion of justification.  
88 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §19, p.184, cites in an abbreviated form the quote in the text above from 
Ritschl, 90-91. McGrath’s abbreviation of Ritschl’s text is consistent with McGrath’s purpose, though it 
seems to misrepresent the broader context of the quotation. 
89 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §19, pp.184, 187 (emphasis McGrath’s). 
90 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, Introduction to §20, p.189. Confer Introduction to §20, p.190. 
91 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §5, p.51. 
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Though some find in Augustine evidence of a distinction between the event and process 
of justification, McGrath claims Augustine is in such cases misrepresented or 
misunderstood.92 
 There are a number of responses, seven, to be exact, to be made to the claim of 
discontinuity raised by Ritschl and McGrath. First, their claims of a distinction between 
justification and sanctification being rejected or excluded are not supported; 93 neither 
contemporary author offers evidence of an ancient author saying that justification and 
sanctification cannot in this or any other way be distinguished. While McGrath’s search 
of the sources may not have produced evidence of such a distinction, McGrath’s search 
only supports the absence of a distinction, not the rejection or exclusion of a distinction. 
In essence, McGrath’s claim is an invalid argument from silence. There are ways of 
interpreting the statements of the church fathers consistent with the Reformers’ 
position.94 
 Second, McGrath arguably misrepresents the Lutheran position we have seen in 
The Book of Concord95and is inconsistent in how serious of a problem he considers the 
case of a notional distinction to be, perhaps failing to recognize the justification-
                                                 
92 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §4, pp.31-32. He gives no examples of and does not specifically deal with 
the “isolated passages” where Augustine’s view of justification is said to consist of the remission of sins 
only and not also of the sinner’s renewal. 
93 See the Ritschl quote above at n.82 on p.357 and confer McGrath’s similar comment regarding 
the distinction being “excluded” (McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §5, p.41 ). 
94 Chemnitz writes: “For although the fathers mostly take the word ‘justify’ for the renewal, by 
which the works of righteousness are wrought in us through the Spirit, we do not start a quarrel with them 
where they according to the Scripture rightly and appropriately teach the doctrine how and why a person is 
reconciled to God, receives the remission of sins and the adoption, and is accepted to life eternal. This 
difference in meanings has often been shown by our teachers, and also how the former meaning can be 
righly, piously, and skillfully understood and admitted according to the analogy of faith and the perpetual 
sense of the Scripture if it is accepted with the fathers according to the manner of the Latin composition. 
However, the papalists have not been placated at all. For the dissension and strife in the article of 
justification is not only about words but chiefly about the matters themselves.” (Martin Chemnitz, 
Examination of the Council of Trent, trans. Fred Kramer, 4 vols. [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1971-1986], I:468.) The mention of “the analogy of faith” is notable. 
95 McGrath, of course, has not limited his sample of Reformation writings to those contained in 
The Book of Concord. While, in the case of justification, he does consider specific writings contained in the 
BOC (for examples, AC IV, AC VI, Ap IV, Formula III in §22, 211-219 and §24, 231), he does not seem to 
regard the confessional authority of these writings and their resulting normative force over and against 
other writings of the Reformers not given such subscription. In other words, McGrath wrongly gives equal 
weight to any and all writings. 
 
360 
sanctification distinction as an example of a medieval Scotus-like formal distinction.96 
McGrath grants that justification and sanctification are “treated as inseparable” but still 
calls the “notional distinction” a distinction.97 McGrath fails to identify the nature of the 
distinction as one of logic’s cause and effect, or antecedent and consequent, where 
sanctification necessarily follows justification and thus is never distinct in actuality.98 
Moreover, though McGrath here makes much of this “notional distinction”, elsewhere, as 
in the case of Aquinas, he minimizes the significance of such a difference.99 Moreover, 
such distinctions were not in and of themselves innovations.100 
 Third, McGrath’s own evidence bears out some distinctions in the process of 
justification.101 McGrath documents the development, beginning in the early 12th century, 
“of the inner structure of justification”. Notably developed in part through Aquinas’ 
application of Aristotelian physics, McGrath writes how this “processus iustificationis” 
comes to be accepted as consisting of four steps: (1) the infusion of grace, (2) the free 
will’s movement to God through faith, (3) the free will’s movement against sin 
(contrition), and (4) the remission of sin. Although there is no regeneration even 
mentioned, McGrath notes that “the four elements of the process were regarded as 
essentially aspects of the one and the same transformation, causally linked by their very 
nature (ex natura rei).102 While the Reformers might differ on the precise steps or the 
sequence of the steps, their “notional distinction” between justification and sanctification 
                                                 
96 In one of the few somewhat-critical reviews of Iustitia Dei, Bray writes, “It is difficult to avoid 
the suspicion that these matters have been simplified, even to the point of distortion” (Gerald L. Bray, 
“Alister E. McGrath and Justification,” Alister E. McGrath and Evangelical Theology, ed. Sung Wook 
Chung [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003], 30.) 
97 See the quote above at n.90 p.358 in the text. Compare Schlink, who comments, “While the 
Formula of Concord distinguishes both, it does not tear them apart” (Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran 
Confessions, 126). 
98 SD III:27, as noted above in the text. 
99 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §9, p.106. Confer McGrath’s discussion of Trent in regards to the 
“notional distinction” and “terminological confusion” (McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §27, p.259, and §28, p.272 ). 
100 On the matter of the justification-sanctification distinction as a medieval Scotus-like formal 
distinction, see in the text below, beginning on p.372. 
101 Confer Miyon Chung, “Faith, Merit, and Justification: Luther's Exodus from Ockhamism en 
route to Reformation,” Torch Trinity Journal 6 (2003): 211. 
102 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §5, pp.40-51, with the quotation from p.50. 
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by way of a causal relationship, rooted in medieval philosophy, is clearly similar to 
distinctions in the process of justification being made centuries before their time. The 
Book of Concord can allow a broad sense to justification in passages such as Solid 
Declaration III:18, though Solid Declaration III:28-29, in keeping with Luther, when 
discussing salvation makes the logical distinction between justification in the narrow 
sense (salvation) and sanctification in the narrow sense and excludes from the salvation 
discussion any treatment of works.  
 A related matter of Luther on the process of justification warrants mention at this 
point. McGrath claims, “Luther does not make the distinction between justification and 
sanctification associated with later Protestantism, treating justification as a process of 
becoming: fieri est iustificatio.”103 Of course, Luther could use both terms in a wide sense 
where they are equal. Either way, McGrath’s quotation does not say that Luther rules out 
such a distinction, but, even if it did, the early date of the work (1515-1516) would lessen 
its weight, which weight is already far less than the normative force of the later Luther 
citations from the subscribed Book of Concord given above, which citations clearly show 
Luther made at least some sort of distinction between justification and sanctification 
consistent with at least later Lutheranism, if not all of McGrath’s “Protestantism”. 
Furthermore, a closer inspection of the Luther quotation proffered by McGrath reveals 
that the quotation in question contradicts the very claim McGrath is using it to make. The 
quotation comes as Luther comments on Romans 12:2: Sed Reformamini (“but be 
transformed”), and Luther notes that Christians are to make progress (pro profectu).104 
Luther lists five stages in the case of the things of nature, relates them to Aristotelian 
                                                 
103 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §21, p.200, citing WA 56:442.3, the scholia for Luther’s 1515-1516 
lectures on Romans, which covers pages 157-528 in WA 56 (Aland #646; AE 25:133-524, translated by 
Walter G. Tillmanns). 
104 WA 56:44113; AE 25:433. 
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terms,105 and then relates them to spiritual matters—all in a scheme that can be outlined 
thusly:106 
1. nonbeing (Non esse)—privation (priuatio)—a thing without a name and a man in 
his sins (Non Esse Est res sine nomine et homo in peccatis) 
2. becoming (fieri)—matter (Materia)—justification (fieri Est Iustificatio) 
3. being (Esse)—form (forma)—righteousness (Esse est Iustitia) 
4. action (Actio)—operation (operatio)—doing and living righteously (opus Est 
Iuste agere et viuere) 
5. being acted upon (passio)—passion (passio)—to be made perfect and complete 
(pati est perfici et consummari) 
Clearly by this categorization, Luther does distinguish between justification and 
sanctification, and he can do so in light of a person being both righteous and sinful at the 
same time. 
Et hęc quinque semper velut in motu sunt in homine. Et quodlibet in 
homine est Inueniri – respectiue preter primum non esse et vltimum esse, 
Nam inter illa duo: Non esse et pati currunt illa tria semper, sc. fieri, esse, 
agere – per Natiuitatem nouam transit de peccato ad Iustitiam, Et sic de 
non esse per fieri ad esse. Quo facto operator Iuste. Se dab hocipso esse 
nouo, quod est verum non esse, ad aliud nouum esse proficiendo transit 
per passionem i. e. aliud fieri, in esse melius, Et ab illo iterum in aliud. 
Quare Verissime homo semper est in priuatione, semper in fieri seu 
potentia et materia et semper in actu. Sic enim de rebus philosophatur 
Aristoteles et Bene, Sed non ita imsum intelligunt. Semper homo Est in 
Non Esse, In fieri, In esse, Semper in priuatione, in potentia, in actu, 
Semper in peccato, in Iustificatione, In Iustitia, i. e. Semper peccator, 
semer penitens, semper Iustus. Quod enim penitet, hoc fit de non Iusto 
Iustus. Ergo penitentia Est medium inter Iniustitiam et Iustitiam. Et sic est 
in peccato quoad terminum a quo et in Iustitia quoad terminum ad quem. 
Si ergo semper penitemus, semper peccatores sumus, et tamen eoipso et 
Iusti sumus ac Iustificamur, partim peccatores, partim Iusti i. e. nihil nisi 
                                                 
105 The editors of the Weimar edition suggest that Luther may be drawing on a number of different 
Aristotelian distinctions that he would have known through such authors as Ockam and Trutvetter (see the 
note on line 23ff. on pp.441-442). As noted previously, such sub-sentential uses of philosophy are outside 
the scope of this dissertation. 
106 WA 56:441-442; AE 25:434. 
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penitentes. Sicut econtra Impii, Qui recedunt a Iustitia, medium tenent 
inter peccatum et Iustitiam contrario motu. Quare hęc Vita Est via ad 
cęlum et infernum. Nemo ita bonus, vt non fiat melior, nemo ita malus, vt 
non fiat peior, vsque dum ad extremam formam perueniamus. 
And these five stages in some way are always in motion in man. And 
whatever is found in the nature of man—except for the first stage of 
nonbeing and the last form of existence, for between these two, nonbeing 
and being acted upon, there are the three stages which are always in 
movement, namely, becoming, being, and acting—through his new birth 
he moves from sin to righteousness, and thus from nonbeing through 
becoming to being. And when this has happened, he lives righteously. But 
from this new being, which is really a nonbeing, man proceeds and passes 
to another new being by being acted upon, that is, through becoming new, 
he proceeds to become better, and from this again into something new. 
Thus it is most correct to say that man is always in privation, always in 
becoming or in potentiality, in matter, and always in action. Aristotle 
philosophizes about such matters, and he does it well, but people do not 
understand him well. Man is always in nonbeing, in becoming, in being, 
always in privation, in potentiality, in action, always in sin, in justification, 
in righteousness, that is, he is always a sinner, always a penitent, always 
righteous. For the fact that he repents makes [fit] a righteous man out of an 
unrighteous one. Thus repentance is the medium between unrighteousness 
and righteousness. And thus a man is in sin as the terminus a quo and 
righteousness as the terminus ad quem. Therefore if we always are 
repentant, we are always sinners, and yet thereby we are righteous and we 
are justified; we are in part sinners and in part righteous, that is, we are 
nothing but penitents. Likewise, on the other side, the ungodly, who depart 
from righteousness, hold a middle position between sin and righteousness, 
but with a contrary direction. For this life is the road to heaven or to hell. 
No one is so good that he does not become better, and no one so evil that 
he does not become worse, until at last we come to our final state.107  
 This Luther quotation, with its “always a sinner, always a penitent, always 
righteous” (Semper peccator, semer penitens, semper Iustus) and its “in part sinners and 
                                                 
107 WA 56:442; AE 25:434-435.  
 The idea that one’s whole earthly life of faith is lived in penitence finds expression as the first of 
Luther’s 95 Theses and in The Book of Concord in Ap IV:142 (Item fides illa, de qua loquimur, existit in 
poenitentia; Item, dieser Glaube ist in denen, da rechte Buße ist; “The faith of which we are speaking, 
moreover, has its existence in penitence” [BKS, 188; Tappert, 126]; Ap IV:349 (Haec fides, de qua 
loquimur, existit in poenitentia; “The faith we speak of has its existence in penitence” [BKS, 227; Tappert, 
160 (there is no German equivalent)]), and Ap IV:353 (hanc fidem docemus in poenitentia existere et 
debere subinde crescere in poenitentia; “this faith arises in penitence and ought to grow continually in 
penitence” [BKS, 227; Tappert, 161 (there is no German equivalent)]).  
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in part righteous” (partim peccatores, partim Iusti), leads directly to a fourth response to 
Ritschl and McGrath’s claims of discontinuity: that of complete justification and 
sanctification according to a person’s new, redeemed nature and renewed justification 
and in-process sanctification according to a person’s old, sinful nature. A classic 
expression of this daily struggle—and one both intended to be and in fact actually 
accessible to the ordinary Christian—is found in Luther’s Small Catechism treatment of 
Baptism. 
Zum vierden. 
Was bedeut denn solch Wassertäufen? 
Antwort. 
Es bedeut, daß der alte Adam in uns durch tägliche Reu und Buße soll 
ersäuft werden und sterben mit allen Sunden und bösen Lüsten, und 
wiederumb täglich erauskommen und auferstehen ein neuer Mensch, der 
in Gerechtigkeit und Reinigkeit für Gott ewiglich lebe. 
Quartum. 
Quid significat autem ista in aquam immersio? Responsio: 
Significat, quod vetus Adam debet subinde per mortificationem ac 
poenitentiam in nobis submergi et extingui cum omnibus peccatis et malis 
concupiscentiis atque rursus quotidie emergere ac resurgere novus homo, 
qui in sanctitate et iustitia coram Deo vivat in aeternum. 
Fourth 
What does such baptizing with water signify? 
Answer: It signifies that the old Adam in us, together with all sins and evil 
lusts, should be drowned by daily sorrow and repentance and be put to 
death, and that the new man should come forth daily and rise up, cleansed 
and righteous, to live forever in God’s presence.108 
McGrath of course knows of Luther’s simul justus et peccator concept, referring to it as 
“totus homo [whole man] theology”, and elsewhere, perhaps more precisely, 
anthropology. McGrath claims that where Augustine, in a neo-Platonic fashion, 
understood caro (flesh) and spiritus (spirit) anthropologically, Luther understood them 
theologically. 
                                                 
108 SC IV:11-12, BKS, 516; Tappert, 349. For Biblical support of this answer, the next question 
and answer in the next two paragraphs cite Romans 6:4: “Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into 
death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should 
walk in newness of life” (KJV). 
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On an anthropological approach to the antithesis, caro is the ‘fleshly’, 
sensual or worldly side of man, whilst spiritus represents man’s higher 
nature, orientated towards striving towards God. For Luther, it is the 
whole man (totus homo) who serves the law of God and the law of sin at 
one and the same time, and who thus exists under a double servitude. The 
one and the same man is spiritual and carnal, righteous and a sinner, good 
and evil. It is on the basis of this anthropology that Luther bases his 
famous assertion that the believer is iustus et peccator simul.109 
McGrath goes on to claim that according to this understanding the believer and 
unbeliever are distinguished on the basis of “the frame of reference from which the totus 
homo is viewed”: the believer is righteous before God (coram Deo) and the unbeliever 
before men (coram hominibus).110 
 But, McGrath misunderstands what Luther is saying. Luther and the other authors 
of The Book of Concord hold that from God’s perspective believers are fully redeemed 
and sanctified, while from their own perspectives they continue to struggle with 
sanctification. While the frame of reference is indeed central, coram hominibus is not 
necessarily only understood as one person before the eyes of other people, but coram 
hominibus is also understood as all people in their own eyes, as the English translation of 
the extended quotation McGrath gives makes clear, even giving the Latin term within the 
English text.111 
                                                 
109 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §21, pp.198-199. For Luther’s position, McGrath cites from WA 56, 
Luther’s 1515-1516 scholia for lectures on Romans: 2709-11 (on Ro 4:7, cf. AE 25:25828-31); 34316-23 (on Ro 
7:18, cf. AE 25:3324-13); 3472-11 (on Ro 7:25, cf. AE 25:3361-18); 35123-3527 (on Ro 7:17, cf. AE 34028-
3411). The last citation is especially notable as Luther calls “silly and ridiculous” (friuolum et delyriosum) 
the “metaphysical theologians” (Methaphysicorum theologorum) who make philosophical distinctions 
between such things as spirit and sensuality. 
 For Augustine’s position and Luther’s departure from it, McGrath gives as an example Alois 
Schubert (Augustins Lex-Aeterna-Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie 
des Mittelalters: Texte und Untersuchungen [Münster: Aschendorff, 1924]) and refers to §4 of his book (in 
the 2nd ed., pages 32-34 are especially relevant, and there McGrath does provide citations from primary 
Augustine sources). 
110 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §21, p.199, again citing WA 56, this time 26827-2692 (on Ro 4:7, cf. AE 
25:2578-17) and 26925-30 (on Ro 4:7, cf. AE 25:2589-17). 
111 To be sure, Luther is not locked into one sense or application of these two views. McGrath later 
presents evidence of what he calls Luther’s “two dimensions to justification” one by faith before God and 
the other evidenced by works before the world: “Duplex in scripturis traditur iustificatio, altera fidei 
coram Deo, altera operum coram mundo” (“A twofold justification is handed down in Scripture, one by 
faith before God, the other by works before the world”) (McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §21, p.204, citing WA 
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Sancti Intrinsece sunt peccatores semper, ideo extrinsece Iustificantur 
semper. Hypocrite autem intrinsece sunt Iusti semper, ideo extrinsece sunt 
peccatores semper. Intrinsece dico, i.e., quomodo in nobis, in nostris 
oculis, in nostra estimatione sumus, Extrinsece autem, quomodo apud 
Deum et in reputatione eius sumus. Igitur extrinsece sumus Iusti, quando 
non ex nobis ex nec operibus, Sed ex sola reputation Iusti sumus.112 
 The saints are always sinners in their own sight, and therefore 
always justified outwardly. 
 But the hypocrites are always righteous in their own sight, and thus 
always sinners outwardly. 
 I use the term “inwardly” (intrinsice) to show how we are in 
ourselves, in our own eyes, in our own estimation; and the term 
“outwardly” (extrinsice) to indicate how we are before God and in His 
reckoning. Therefore we are righteous outwardly when we are righteous 
solely by the imputation of God and not of ourselves or of our own works. 
For His imputation is not ours by reason of anything in us or in our own 
power.113 
McGrath makes much of an alleged difference in Luther between intrinsic and extrinsic 
justification, but McGrath fails to understand as Luther himself explains it here and 
elsewhere.114 Moreover, the internal struggle between the redeemed nature and sinful 
nature does not take place in the unbeliever, so the distinction in view that McGrath 
applies to the unbeliever is an application Luther is unwilling to make, as Luther himself 
                                                                                                                                                 
39I:2089-10, the 1536 Disputation on Justification, Aland #355, which is not found in the AE; this author’s 
translation). 
112 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §21, p.199, citing WA 56: 26827-2692. As with most extended quotations 
in the 2nd ed. of his book, McGrath leaves the quote untranslated. 
113 AE 25:2578-17. 
114 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §21, p.201, where McGrath writes: “Luther is able to assert at one and 
the same time that the righteousness of the believer is, and will remain, extrinsic to him, whilst Christ is 
nonetheless really present within the believer, effecting his renovation and regeneration.” McGrath cites as 
an example WA 56:27922, but McGrath again misrepresents what Luther is saying (and note the use of 1 Co 
1:30): “Therefore, I was correct when I said that all our good is outside of us, and this good is Christ, as the 
apostle says (1 Cor. 1:30): ‘God made Him our wisdom, our righteousness, and sanctification, and 
redemption.’ And none of these things are in us except through faith and hope in Him.” (WA 56:27922-25: 
Ideo Recte dixi, quod Extrinsecum nobis est omne bonum nostrum quod est Christus. Sicut Apostolus dicit: 
‘Qui nobis factus est a Deo Sapientia est Iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio.’ Quę omnia in nobis sunt non 
nisi per fidem et spem in ipsum.) What is outside of human beings is the ability to make themselves 
righteous, not the righteousness itself. Luther makes this point clear in a sentence immediately after where 
McGrath ends a previous quotation: “For His imputation is not ours by reason of anything in us or of our 
own works” (AE 25:25717-18; WA 56:2692-4: Reputatio enim eius non in nobis nec in potestate nostra est. 
ergo nec Iustitia nostra in nobis est nec in potestate nostra). 
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says in the continuation of a quotation from where McGrath leaves off.115 Furthermore, 
McGrath’s claim that Luther diverges from Augustine is refuted by McGrath’s own 
evidence: Augustine could grant pagans who did their duties a civil righteousness of sorts 
in the eyes of human beings, but Augustine held the pagans would never be righteous in 
the eyes of God without faith. This continuity with Augustine, then can form a fifth 
response to McGrath’s claim. 
 Related to the simul justus et peccator and what McGrath calls totus homo 
theology is justification understood forensically.116 McGrath explains how he understands 
forensic justification: 
The term ‘forensic’ derives from the Latin forum – the place in which 
judicial and other business was transacted – and in relation to the doctrine 
of justification, refers to a purely legal declaration that the sinner is 
righteous, without or prior to the concomitant actualization of 
righteousness in the sinner.117  
While such an understanding may be McGrath’s, such an understanding is not that of The 
Book of Concord, where justification is both forgiveness of sins and the accompanying 
change in the sinner. One example of that understanding is in Apology IV:76-78: 
Consequi remissionem peccatorum est iustificari iuxta illud: Beati, 
quorum remissae sunt iniquitates. Sola fide in Christum, non per 
dilectionem, non propter dilectionem aut opera consequimur remissionem 
peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem. Igitur sola fide iustificamur, 
intelligendo iustificationem, ex iniusto iustum effici seu regenerari. 
Vergebung der Sunde erlangen und haben, dasselbige heißt für Gott 
gerecht und fromm werden, wie der 31. Psalm sagt: „Wohl dem, dem die 
Ubertretung vergeben ist. Allein aber durch den Glauben an Christum“, 
nicht durch die Liebe, nicht um der Liebe oder Werk willen, erlangen wir 
Vergebung der Sünde, wiewohl die Liebe folget, wo der Glaub ist, 
Derhalben muß folgen, daß wir allein durch den Glauben gerecht werden. 
                                                 
115 Luther writes: “But this applies in no way to the carnal man, where the whole man is entirely 
flesh, because the Spirit of God has not remained in him” (AE 25:33213-15; WA 56:34323-25: Hęc autem in 
Carnali homine nequaquam habent locum, Vbi omnino totus homo caro est, quia non permansit in eo 
spiritus Dei). 
116 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §22, p.209: “Luther’s extrinsic conception of justifying righteousness is 
partly a consequence of his totus homo anthropology … For Luther, what is being stated is that the believer 
is extrinsically righteous and intrinsically sinful” (emphasis McGrath’s). 
117 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §22 n.9, p.456. (emphasis McGrath’s). A more detailed discussion of the 
much debated origins of the terminology related to justification is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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Denn gerecht werden heißt ja aus einem Sünder fromm werden und durch 
den heiligen Geist neu geboren werden. 
First, forgiveness of sins is the same as justification according to Ps. 32, 1, 
“Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven.” We obtain the forgiveness 
of sins only by faith in Christ, not through love, or because of love or 
works, though love does follow faith. Therefore we are justified by faith 
alone, justification being understood as making an unrighteous man 
righteous or effecting his regeneration.118  
McGrath knows of and even cites this statement in the Apology, but, McGrath claims the 
Apology and its author Melanchthon are ambiguous, pointing to Apology IV:252 as an 
example of a contradictory statement.119 
Et iustificari significat hic non ex impio iustum effici, sed usu forensi 
iustum pronuntiari. 
“To be justified” here does not mean that a wicked man is made righteous 
but that he is pronounced righteous in a forensic way,120 
What McGrath seems to miss, however, is that in this latter statement Melanchthon is 
referring specifically to arguments their opponents made on the basis of James 2:24.121 
Melanchthon responds that in the James 2:24 passage the person who has believed and 
produced good works as a result of that faith is pronounced righteous and that James 
describes “only the nature of the just who have already been justified and reborn” (quales 
sint iusti, postquam iam sunt iustificati et renati).122 Following the explanation of the 
sense or justification in James 2:24, another Bible passage where the meaning of 
justification is the same, Romans 2:13, is adduced, and Melanchthon then rejects the 
opponents’ conclusions that do not follow (“Non enim sequitur”) from James’ words.123 
                                                 
118 Ap IV:76-78, BKS, 175; Tappert, 117. 
119 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §22, p.212., see especially at his notes 30 and 28 (p.457), respectively. 
120 Ap IV:252, BKS, 209; Tappert, 143. That there is no direct German equivalent may even speak 
to the contradictory nature of the statement at first glance. 
121 Ap IV:244. James 2:24: 
 (NA26); videtis quoniam ex operibus iustificatur homo et non ex fide tantum (Vulgate); So sehet ihr 
nun, daß der Mensch durch die Werke gerecht wird, nicht durch den Glauben allein (Luther Bibel); “Ye see 
then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only” (KJV). 
122 Ap IV:245-251. The quoted words are from ¶251, BKS, 209; Tappert, 143. 
123 Ap IV:252-253. The quoted phrase is in ¶253, BKS, 210. The German version does not directly 
translate the Latin at this point, but the German version does use rhetorically a repeated phrase making 
clear what cannot be drawn from the James passage: James sagt nicht (“does not say”). 
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Later in the Apology, in connection with Romans 5:1, Melanchthon makes the following 
comment pertinent to what is meant by forensic justification. 
Iustificare vero hoc loco forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et 
pronuntiare iustum, sed propter alienam iustitiam, videlicet Christi, quae 
aliena iustitia communicatur nobis per fidem. Itaque quum hoc loco 
iustitia nostra sit imputatio alienae iustitiae, aliter hic de iustitia 
loquendum est, quam cum in philosophia aut in foro quaerimus iustitiam 
proprii operis, quae certe est in voluntate. Ideo Paulus inquit 1 Cor. 1.: Ex 
ipso vos estis in Christo Iesu, qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo, iustitia 
et sanctificatio et redemptio. Et 2 Cor. 5.: Eum, qui non novit peccatum, 
pro nobis fecit peccatum, ut nos efficeremur iustitia Dei in ipso. Sed quia 
iustitia Christi donatur nobis per fidem, ideo fides est iustitia in nobis 
imputative, id est, est id, quo efficimur accepti Deo propter imputationem 
et ordinationem Dei, sicut Paulus ait: Fides imputatur ad iustitiam. 
In this passage “justify” is used in a judicial way to mean “to absolve a 
guilty man and pronounce him righteous,” and to do so on account of 
someone else’s righteousness, namely, Christ’s, which is communicated to 
us through faith. Since in this passage our righteousness is the imputation 
of someone else’s righteousness, we must speak of righteousness in a 
different way here from the philosophical or judicial investigation of a 
man’s own righteousness, which certainly resides in the will. Paul says (I 
Cor. 1:30), “He is the source of your life in Jesus Christ, whom God made 
our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and Redemption.” And 
II Cor. 5:21, “For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, that in 
him we might become the righteousness of God.” But because the 
righteousness of Christ is given us through faith, therefore faith is 
righteousness in us by imputation. That is, by it we are made acceptable to 
God because of God’s imputation and ordinance of God, as Paul says 
(Rom. 4:5), “Faith is reckoned as righteousness.”124 
Thus, McGrath tries to take the sense of justification used in one place in Apology IV and 
play it off a much more general sense used more consistently throughout Apology IV. To 
be sure, in regards to justification The Book of Concord uses a number of expressions 
with some degree of synonymy. As others have noted in other contexts, Apology IV is 
not trying to set out a systematic treatment of justification with precisely defined and 
used terms but rather to set forth a treatment of justification through faith by grace for the 
                                                 
124 Ap IV:305-307, BKS, 219; Tappert, 154. Again, there is no German equivalent. Aside from Ap 
IV:252 and 305, the only other four uses of forensis, forensis in The Book of Concord: come in LC I:53, 
257, 261, and 301, where Luther refers to misusing God’s name in court, not bearing false witness in court, 
and coveting as exemplified in suits in court. 
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sake of Christ. The forensic sense of justification is not limited to those places noted 
above where the sense is said to be forensic nor is the sense of justification as used 
throughout only forensic. Courtroom illustrations serve some role in elucidating 
justification, but they are not the exclusive illustration. Moreover, there is a significant 
difference between human verdicts and verdicts of God: God speaks efficacious words 
that recreate. Thus, the Lutheran understanding of justification includes, contrary to what 
Ritschl and McGrath claim, a real change in the sinner.125 
 A sixth response to McGrath’s claim of discontinuity pertains to the similarity 
between the concept of double righteousness and the Reformation’s conceptual 
distinction between reckoned and inchoate righteousness. McGrath finds medieval 
evidence both of iustitia infusa (infused righteousness) or iustitia inhaerens (inherent 
righteousness), which provides the basis for justification (its “formal cause”), and of 
iustitia acquisita (acquired righteousness), which is subsequently established.126 As has 
been seen above, the Formula of Concord confesses both first “the reckoned 
righteousness of faith” (die zugerechnete Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens; imputatam fidei 
iustitiam) as the basis for standing before God justified and second “the inchoate 
righteousness of the new obedience or of good works” (die angefangene Gerechtigkeit 
des neün Gehorsams oder der guten Werk; inchoatam iustitiam novae obedientiae seu 
bonorum operum), which “inchoate righteousness or renewal in us is imperfect and 
impure in this life on account of the flesh” (angefangene Gerechtigkeit oder Verneuerung 
in uns von wegen des Fleisches in diesem Leben unvollkommen und unrein; inchoata illa 
                                                 
125 For more on the equation and use of terminology pertaining to justification, see, for example, 
Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran Confessions. Schlink’s treatment of justification’s terminology deals 
with some of the same secondary sources as McGrath’s, and Schlink can also be colorful, as seen in this 
statement: “Forgiveness of sins and justification are not only repeatedly used side by side, but they are also 
interchanged promiscuously” (Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, 91). 
 There is also a decidedly anti-philosophical aspect of calling a person righteous before they have 
done righteous works. In his 1531 lecture on Galatians 3:11 (published in 1535), Luther discusses that issue 
and specifically contrasts his position to Aristotle’s. The AE editors suggest perhaps the reference is to 
Politics VIII:6, but that does not appear to be the case (see WA 40I:402; Aland #229; AE 26:256; and 
Barnes, II:2126-2128). 
126 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §25, pp.245-247. According to McGrath, the Council of Trent would 




iustitia seu renovatio in nobis propter carnem in hac vita imperfecta sit et impura) and 
therefore cannot be the basis of justification.127 While, the Formula’s confessors will not 
allow these two righteousnesses to “be confused with one another or introduced 
simultaneously into the article of justification by faith before God” (müssen nicht 
ineinandergemengt oder zugleich ... eingeschoben werden; non inter se permiscenda aut 
simul ... ingerenda sunt), the distinction between the two and the distinction’s medieval 
background in double righteousness nevertheless further demonstrates the continuity of 
the distinction between justification and sanctification.128 
 Seventh and finally, even if one grants that the distinction made is some sort of an 
innovation, one can counter that the circumstances of the controversy necessitated the 
distinction. McGrath himself notes the role of controversy in shaping at least the 
expression of the doctrine of justification: 
For the first three hundred and fifty years of the history of the church, her 
teaching on justification was inchoate and ill-defined. There had never 
been a serious controversy over the matter, such as those which had so 
stimulated the development of Christology over the period. The patristic 
inexactitude and naïveté on the question merely reflects the absence of a 
controversy which would force more precise definition of the terms 
used.129 
If controversy could force terminological precision at the end of the patristic period, why 
are controversy-forced refinements in terminology at the end of the medieval period 
questioned? The justification-sanctification distinction is precisely one born of the 
controversy over the role of good works in God’s declaring and making the sinner 
righteous. McGrath himself notes the role of polemics in clarifying important points 
                                                 
127 SD III:32, Tappert, 544-545; BKS, 925. As has been seen, the BOC also makes it clear such 
inchoate righteousness is only pleasing to God on account of faith. 
128 Furthermore, McGrath notes a similarity between the Council of Trent’s concept of second 
justification and the Reformers’ concept of sanctification (McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §28, p.271). 
129 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, §3, p.23. 
 
372 
during the 1530s.130 And, even Ritschl, as noted above, sees the Reformation’s 
expression of this distinction a logical outgrowth of medieval thought.131 
 Thus, we see both that the authors of the writings in The Book of Concord 
consistently make—and thus The Book of Concord itself consistently makes—a logical 
distinction between justification in the narrow sense and sanctification in the narrow 
sense and that that distinction has continuity with the preceding medieval tradition. In 
fact, evidence suggests that the nature of the distinction is that of a distinction usually 
attributed to John Duns Scotus and known as the “formal distinction”. 
Justification and sanctification as “formally” distinct? 
 The foregoing discussion showed that the Reformers do not separate justification 
and sanctification in practice; that lack of separation can be further seen to reflect 
justification’s and sanctification’s inseparability, a prerequisite for a type of formal 
distinction that may be in the Reformers’ minds.132 The Reformers explicitly state that 
they do not separate justification and sanctification as if true faith can exist with a wicked 
intention.133 Furthermore, against their Roman Catholic opponents, the Reformers make 
clear that mortal sin drives out the Holy Spirit and faith, which faith otherwise brings 
about the believer’s new life and good works.134 In sharp contrast, moreover, the 
Reformers say their Roman Catholic opponents hold that, for people still in mortal sin, 
satisfactions nevertheless avail ex opere operato (“from the work having been done”), 
presumably apart from faith.135 Thus, unlike their opponents, the Reformers do not 
envision the possibility of justification taking place without sanctification following as a 
result. In other words, justification and sanctification not only are not separated, but, if, 
                                                 
130 McGrath, Iustitia Dei, Introduction to §25, 241. 
131 See the quotation above at n.85, p.357. Confer Chung, who comments on the development of 
soteriology as the Roman Catholic church dealt with the rediscovery of Aristotle (Chung, “Luther's 
Exodus,” 211). 
132 Recall Luther’s use of the expression connexa inseparabiliter in the Latin quotation used by 
SD III:40-41 that was paraphrased out of the authoritative German version (see above n.75, p.354). 
133 Ap IV:64, 115, 144; SA III:iii:43-45. 
134 Ap IV:48, 109. 
135 Ap XII:118, 132, 143, 165. 
 
373 
as the Reformers hold, mortal sin drives out the Holy Spirit and faith that justify and 
thereby bring about sanctification’s new life and good works, then the Reformers can be 
taken to hold that justification and sanctification cannot be separated. The distinction 
between justification and sanctification may well then be understood as an example of the 
kind of formal distinction made by John Duns Scotus (and perhaps to a lesser extent by 
William Ockham).136  
 Before considering whether or not the justification-sanctification distinction is 
such a formal distinction, Scotus’s formal distinction itself must be considered, its 
transmission through Ockham observed, and the Reformers’ regard for Scotus and the 
formal distinction surveyed.137 
The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus 
 Scotus may well be “the most powerful and unrestricted defender” of the formal 
distinction, but the notion is not his alone.138 One viewing the world can somewhat 
                                                 
136 Credit for raising this possibility goes to Dr. Robert C. Koons, Professor of Philosophy, at the 
University of Texas at Austin. 
137 The potential relationship between philosophy and the justification-sanctification distinction is 
not necessarily a new idea. In writing about English reformer Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), McGee said, 
“Where [Stephen] Gardiner [Bishop of Winchester, a principal Cranmer Roman Catholic opponent] and the 
Catholics held that man’s justification was also his sanctification, that faith and glory were identical, and 
that good works set forth God’s glory, the Protestants and Nominalists divided the two” (Eugene K. 
McGee, “Cranmer and Nominalism,” The Harvard Theological Review 57.3 [1964]: 211). At that point, 
McGee cites the following sources: Lacey Baldwin Smith, Tudor Prelates and Politics, 1536-1558, 
Princeton University Princeton Studies in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 194; 
Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of Trent., trans. Ernest Graf, 2 vols. (London: Nelson, 1957-1961), 
I:167-169; and Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot and Emile 
Amann, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1908-1950), coll. 775-775. However, none of those sources seem 
to support his claim (and at least one might be construed against it). Courtenay, who produced a 
thoroughgoing trashing of McGee’s article, wrote: “For the Nominalists there is no distinction between 
justification and sanctification” (William J. Courtenay, “Cranmer as a Nominalist: Sed Contra,” The 
Harvard Theological Review 57.4 [1964]: 379). Courtenay cited Oberman, Harvest of Medieval Theology, 
353ff. On those pages (353-356), Oberman discusses the mischaracterization of “the nominalistic doctrine 
of justification” as “essentially forensic”, denying that for the nominalists “acceptation by God” could be 
equated to the “favor dei of later Protestant orthodoxy”. Oberman says that in Biel he “found no trace of a 
distinction between justification and sanctification”, although Oberman recognized that Biel understood 
justification as a process. 
138 Philotheus Boehner, “The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the Centiloquium 
Attributed to Ockham,” Franciscan Studies 25 (1944): 163. Boehner cites Bernhard Jansen, “Beiträge zur 
geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis,” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 53 (1929): 
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obviously distinguish natural things existing in reality, and one’s mind creates other 
distinctions on the basis of logic. Those two types of distinctions, however, seemed to 
lack the sophistication to make all the needed distinctions. So, in some cases 
modifications were made to the real and logical distinctions, and in other cases a third 
type of distinction, generally known as a distinctio formalis (“formal distinction”), came 
to be developed.139 The most-debated alternatives were the so-called “virtual distinction” 
of Thomas Aquinas and Scotus’s “formal distinction”. Some thought the virtual and 
formal distinctions to be identical (among them were those who explained where the two 
contradicted), and others said the formal distinction restated the real distinction, therefore 
arguing against it on the basis of history, ontology, and theology.140 Most would probably 
agree today that the virtual and formal distinctions are different; some would claim that 
Scotus’s formal distinction is an innovation, but others, such as Maurice Grajewski, 
recognize such a distinction “at the core of the medieval Augustinian system”.141 For his 
part, Grajewski’s seminal study traces its roots in Scotus’s own work from Aristotle 
through Augustine (354-430) and other church fathers, Bonaventure (1221-1274), Peter 
John Olivi (1248/9-1298), Peter de Falco (c.1280), Peter de Trabibus (c.1290), and 
William of Ware (c.1290, one of Scotus’s own teachers at Oxford), Matthew of 
Aquasparta (1240-1302), William of Macclesfield (c.1303), Roger Marston (c.1303), 
Alexander of Alexandria (1270-1314), William of Nottingham (c.1336), and others. 
However, where others had variously written of or used a formal distinction, Grajewski 
                                                                                                                                                 
371ff. Confer Michael Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” Franciscan Studies 45 
(1985): 98-99. 
139 For an overview of this thinking, see Maurice John Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns 
Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics, The Catholic University of America Philosophical Series, vol. XC 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), xi-xii. 
140 Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 1-22. Scotus can be taken to have developed his formal 
distinction in order to address the weakensses of Thomas Aquinas’s virtual distinction (Maurice John 
Grajewski, “The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus and Its Philosophic Applications,” The Proceedings of 
the American Catholic Philosophical Association 20 [1945]: 146-148). 
141 Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 102-103. Generally with Grajewski, confer Allan B. Wolter, 
“The Formal Distinction,” John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, eds. John Kenneth Ryan and Bernardine M. 
Bonansea, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1965). 
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wrote that Scotus perfected it, organized it, and made it “one of the foundations of his 
entire metaphysics.”142  
 What is Scotus’s formal distinction? Peter King introduced it as follows: “The 
core intuition behind Scotus’s formal distinction is, roughly, that existential inseparability 
does not entail identity in definition, backed up by the conviction that this is a fact about 
the way things are rather than how we conceive of them.”143 King says the distinction is 
in a broad sense “real” because a person’s intellect does not cause the distinction, 
although the intellect may discover the rationes (or definitions) that are distinct.144 A 
leading contemporary Scotus scholar, Richard Cross, explains that Scotus’s formal 
distinction is “mid-way between a real distinction and a merely rational or conceptual 
distinction” and applies to two realities or different aspects of one thing “if and only if 
they are both really identical and susceptible of definition independently of each 
other”.145 Scotus measured real identity by real inseparability; put another way, real 
inseparability, the logical impossibility of separating two or more realities, “is necessary 
and sufficient for real identity”.146 Although the formal distinction came out of Scotus’ 
                                                 
142 Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 103-123. Swindler seems to trace Scotus’s distinction back 
to Avicenna, seemingly arguing also that Aristotle in Categories I can be taken as understanding there to be 
a secondary substance that is not a property of an individual but nevertheless present in an individual. 
Swindler reports a perception of “vacillation in Aristotle and Scotus”, evident in the term “formal 
distinction” itself. (J. K. Swindler, “The Formal Distinction,” Southwest Philosophy Review 4.1 [1988]: 
71-72). On Scotus not introducing the formal distinction, also confer Boehner, “Medieval Crisis of Logic,” 
163, and Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 98-99. 
143 Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas 
Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22. King primarily refers to Lectura (Lect.). 1, 
distinction (d.) 8, pars 1, question (q.) 4, paragraph numbers (nn.) 172-88; Ordinatio (Ord.). 1, d. 2, pars 2, 
qq. 1-4, nn. 388-410, and d.8, pars 1, q. 4, nn.191-217. 
144 King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 22. King quotes Ord. 1, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 193; and he refers 
further to d. 25, q. un., n. 10, and Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (In Metaph.) 7, q. 
13, nn. 90-1. 
145 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 149. In Cross’s n.13, he refers “usefully” to Ord. 1.8.1.4, n. 193. For his part, 
Grajewski objects to describing the formal distinction as “a middle distinction between the real and logical” 
(Grajewski, “Philosophic Applications,” 146 ). 
146 Cross, Duns Scotus 149. In Cross’s n.14, he refers “particularly” to Quaestiones Quodlibetales 
(Quod.) 3. n. 15 and Ord. 2.1.4-5. 
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work on the Trinity,147 Scotus found occasion to apply this formal distinction in 
discussions of both God and humanity.148 
 Grajewski groups Scotus’ applications of the formal distinction into three 
categories.149 First, Scotus uses the formal distinction in metaphysics, applying it as 
follows: to the transcendentals (distinguishing between convertible and non-convertible 
transcendentals),150 to grades of being (such as animality and rationality), to the 
universals and the common nature,151 and to individuation and haecceitas (“thisness”).152 
Second, Scotus uses the formal distinction in what Grajewswki calls “psychology”, 
applying it to soul and its faculties.153 Third and finally, Scotus uses the formal 
                                                 
147 Grajewski, “Philosophic Applications,” 155. Oberman says, “Scotus’ idea of the formal 
distinction apparently had its origin in the problem of man’s knowledge of God” (Heiko A. Oberman, 
“Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance,” The 
Harvard Theological Review 53 [1960]: 50). Confer also Robert G. Wengert, “The Development of the 
Doctrine of the Formal Distinction in the Lectura Prima of John Duns Scotus,” Monist 49 (1965). 
148 Cross, Duns Scotus, 147. Confer Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God, Ashgate Studies in the 
History of Philosophical Theology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 107-111, 154, 235-240. 
149 Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 124-197. What follows in the text is a summary of 
Grajewski’s treatment with some other writers’ comments noted. 
150 According to Cross, the facts we can know about God apart from revelation are knowable 
through metaphysics, or what Scotus calls the study of “transcendentals”, or things that go beyond the 
substantial and accidental attributes that can be predicated in keeping with Aristotle’s Categories, such as 
“being” and its properties. Being has coextensive attributes, disjunctive attributes (such as cause or caused, 
prior or posterior), and pure perfections. (Cross, Duns Scotus, 147-148.) Cross cites Allan B. Wolter, The 
Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, Franciscan Institute Publications, 
Philosophy Series (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 138-161. 
151 Adams writes: “The most striking feature of Scotus’ theory of universals, however, is his 
contention that the common nature and individuating principles are neither really distinct – in the sense of 
being distinct real things – nor distinct only in reason – in the sense of being thought of by means of 
distinct concepts.” (Marilyn McCord Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg [New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 414.) 
152 On the formal distinctions relation to individuation, Cross refers to both n.15 Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 32 
and 2.3.1.5-6, nn. 179-80, 192 (Cross, Duns Scotus 149 ). On genus and differentia, also confer King, 
“Scotus on Metaphysics,” 23, who cites In Metaph. 7, q. 19, nn. 20-1 and n. 43; Lect. 1, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, 
nn. 100-5; Ord. 1, d. 8, pars 1, q.3, nn. 101-7, and 2, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 5-6, nn. 189-90. 
 Swindler suggests “the difference between properties and universals is the difference between the 
ways attention can be paid to them,” and he goes on to suggest that only Scotus’ formal distinction stands 
between a property and a universal (Swindler, “The Formal Distinction,” 72, 76). 
153 Cross says the “formal distinction between the soul and its powers of intellect and will” is more 
or less against Aquinas (Cross, Duns Scotus 83-84; Cross cites Ord. 2.1.6, n. 316 [Vatican, 7:154]; and 
Ord. 2.16.un., nn. 15-16, 18 [Wadding, 6:770-771, 773]). Scotus apparently also can be taken as making a 




distinction in what this author would term “theology”, applying it as follows: to the 
divine essence and its attributes (both perfections—such as goodness, wisdom, and 
justice—and attributes),154 to the divine essence and the Persons of the Trinity,155 and to 
the Persons and their properties (such as paternity). Scotus’s applications of the formal 
distinction in these different areas were not without controversy then or now—
controversies that may have refined Scotus’s position over time, which change thus led to 
claims that his position changed over time. 
 Scotus’s discussion of the formal distinction comes up in a number of his 
different complete and incomplete surviving works, which works can somewhat be 
placed on a timeline, although not all scholars agree on the chronology and Scotus no 
doubt later revisited some of the works and revised them. The first work relevant here is 
the Lectura (to which some refer as the Lectura Prima), consisting of notes Scotus used 
as a bachelor at Oxford for his lectures on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.156 The second 
relevant work is the Ordinatio (to which some refer as Opus Oxoniense), a revision of the 
Lectura that Scotus prepared for publication, which revision itself underwent at least two 
major alterations, one at Oxford and one at Paris. The third relevant work (or, given the 
number, group of works) is the Reportatio parisiensis, or students’ reports of Scotus’s 
Paris lectures, including one report that Scotus himself examined (and presumably 
revised or approved).157 Likely to be placed somewhere in the midst of the Paris revisions 
                                                 
154 Cross explains that for Scotus God’s essential attributes are formally distinct from each other 
and are instantiated by His essence but only formally distinct from it. Where Scotus’s univocity gives a 
weak account of divine simplicity, Aquinas’ stronger account of divine simplicity, which rejects 
distinctions between divine attributes, requires an analogous use of language and produces knowledge of 
what God is not. Cross, Duns Scotus, 43-45. 
155 Confer Cross, Duns Scotus, 69-70, 120-121; Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the 
Incarnation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12 n., 307-308. Cross does not find Scotus’ 
Trinitarian treatment “wholly satisfactory” (Cross, Duns Scotus, 69 ). 
156 The Lectura is said both to show progressively more sophisticated technical language, 
consistent with the more technical language found in the later Ordinatio, and, after the Lectura’s section 
about ultimate abstraction, to reflect the end of reservations Scotus apparently had about the formal 
distinction, at least at that time. Wengert, “Formal Distinction in the Lectura Prima”. On the sophistication 
of the language clarifying the distinction, confer Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 
100. 
157 On the general sequence of Scotus’s life and works and related controversies over them, see 
Thomas Williams, “The Life and Works of John Duns the Scot,” The Cambridge Companion to Duns 
Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Confer Allan B. Wolter, 
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of the Ordinatio is the Quaestio logica Scoti, a report of a special disputation given by 
Scotus in Paris over his applying the formal distinction to God.158 
 Scotus’s applying the formal distinction to God was controversial, and, some 
writers think the controversy led Scotus to change his position over time, as previously 
mentioned. Marilyn Adams is one writer who addresses Scotus’s “at least two 
importantly different accounts of this alternative sort of non-identity or distinction, which 
he employs so often in his philosophy and theology.” Adams explains Scotus’s earlier 
first version thusly: “within what is really one and the same thing (res) there often is a 
plurality of entities or property-bearers whose non-identity or distinction in no way 
depends upon the activity of any intellect, created or divine.” According to Adams, 
Scotus’s later second version, perhaps in response to the charge by opponents in Paris 
that Scotus’s formal distinction applied to God compromised His divine simplicity, 
denied “distinguishing a plurality of property-bearers within what is really one and the 
same thing”, while still contending for “the existence of some distinction in reality (ex 
natura rei) and prior to every act of the intellect, but alternative to the real distinction 
between one thing and another”. Thus Scotus allows a distinction secundum quid 
(“according to which”) contrasted to distinctio simpliciter (an absolute distinction). 
According to Adams, the secundum quid distinction applies when x and y exist only as 
objects of thought or exist “only virtually in their causes” or when “fully real and actual” 
they are “only non-identical secundum quid.”159 
 Against Adams and others, Stephen Dumont says the view that Scotus later had a 
less-realist take on his formal distinction depends in part on problems with two texts. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Reflections about Scotus’s Early Works,” John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, eds. Ludger 
Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Mechthild Dreyer, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 
(New York: E.J. Brill, 1996). 
158 Stephen D. Dumont, “Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction,” Vivarium 
43.1 (2005). 
159 Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 414-416. Among others, Adams cites, 
from the so-called Reportatio examinata, Reportatio Parisiensis 1, d. 33, q. 2. 
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first problem is reading a work of William of Alnwick as that of Scotus.160 The second 
problem is Luke Wadding’s “highly corrupt” edition of the Quaestio logica Scoti, an 
often-ignored genuine Scotus work as drawn from a fourteenth-century Vatican 
manuscript that appears in print as the first of seven questions (the other six of which are 
inauthentic), which Wadding titles Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus. 
According to Dumont, the work also exists in seven other manuscripts that help clear up 
Wadding’s misreadings and errant emendations. After extensive textual analysis of the 
work, Dumont essentially agrees with Michael J. Jordan and Christopher J. Martin that 
Scotus later simply clarified his position, perhaps in response to his Parisian opponents. 
Dumont concludes that Scotus, who uses terminology from Aristotle’s Topics 2.11 
(115b29-30) along the way, does not in fact later rule out the existence of “formalities” 
(“realities” or “entities”), even in the case of the Trinity, provided the formalities are 
given a qualified non-identity, or, put another way, provided that the formal distinction 
itself is qualified.161 
Scotus’s distinction through Ockham 
 Modern scholars are not the only ones to wrestle with interpreting Scotus’s formal 
distinction. Attention now turns to William of Ockham, who stands in the line of Luther’s 
teachers and to whom is attributed differing positions regarding Scotus’s formal 
distinction. Ockham is said to be the first and most important critic of Scotus’s formal 
distinction.162 Ockham regarded distinguishing nature and a contracting difference to be 
an ontological paradox, and he thought that, taken together, five of Scotus’s theses 
regarding the formal distinction were contradictory.163 Still, Ockham allowed that faith 
                                                 
160 For her part, Adams is aware of the problem with the Alnwick’s work and says she is reading 
from a manuscript of the Reportatio that Scotus himself revised Adams, “Universals in the Early 
Fourteenth Century,” 416 n.20. 
161 Dumont, “Parisian Question.” Confer Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 
99-100. Jordan also sees Scotus shifting attention between “the type of subject in which the formal 
distinction occurs” and “the types of subjects between which the formal distinction occurs” (Jordan, 
“What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 100). 
162 Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 102. 
163 Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 417-422. On the surrender of the 
principle of contradiction, confer Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 103-104. Oberman 
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could call for making a formal distinction in the theological realm.164 While Ockham and 
the nominalists did not distinguish between God’s will and His intellect,165 at least 
Ockham accepted Scotus’s formal distinction (or “formal non-identity”) between the 
three Persons of the Trinity and their shared divine essence.166 
 Not everyone, however, who accepts that Ockham made a formal distinction 
agrees that that formal distinction was Scotus’s.167 There are said to be different schools 
of thought on the relationship between the formal distinctions of Scotus and Ockham, 
with Marilyn Adams holding that their formal distinctions are very different and with 
Philotheus Boehner and Hester Gelber holding that they are essentially the same but 
applied differently. Michael Jordan says Ockham’s theory did not differ so much from 
Scotus’s theory but that Ockham, perhaps because he did not fully observe Scotus’s shifts 
in vantage points, had trouble transferring it to his own ontology. Jordan concludes that 
Ockham’s formal distinction can be criticized the same way that Ockham criticized 
Scotus’s distinction and that, unlike Scotus who used the distinction to explain 
individuation and the faculties of the soul, Ockham will only apply the distinction to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
wrote that Ockham criticizes not the distinction itself but its incomplete application (Oberman, “Notes on 
the Theology of Nominalism”). On Ockham regarding Scotus’s particular applications, see also Jordan, 
“What's new in Ockham’s formal distinction?” 104-105. 
164 Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” 105-106, 110. 
165 Courtenay, “Cranmer as a Nominalist: Sed Contra,” 378. 
166 Russell L. Friedman, “Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology,” The Medieval 
Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory: 1400-1700, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge 
O. Nielsen, The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 113. 
167 Out of the vast literature regarding the formal distinction, Scotus, and Ockham, Friedman refers 
to the following studies as valuable: Wolter, “The Formal Distinction”; Hester G. Gelber, “Logic and the 
Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335,” University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1974; 
Marilyn McCord Adams, “Ockham on Identity and Distinction,” Franciscan Studies 36 (1976); Marilyn 
McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Rolf 
Schönberger, “Realität und Differenz: Ockhams Kritik an der distinctio formalis,” Die Gegenwart 
Ockhams, eds. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl and Rolf Schönberger, Acta Humaniora (Weinheim: VCH 
Verlagsgesellschaft 1990); and Timothy B. Noone, “Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the 
Formal Distinction,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993). (Friedman, "Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval 
Trinitarian Theology,” 113 n.24.) 
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Trinity in order to reaffirm its mystery.168 There were certainly other options from which 
Ockham could choose.169 
The Reformers’ regard for Scotus and the formal distinction 
 The Reformers likewise had all of the philosophy and theology of the preceding 
medieval period that was known to them from which to choose, and there is evidence that 
the authors of the earlier works in The Book of Concord (and thus presumably the authors 
of the later works, as well) knew of and may have used Scotus’s or another’s formal 
distinction in their theology. Although neither the earlier nor later works contained in The 
Book of Concord make any specific mention of the formal distinction by name, there is 
evidence inside The Book of Concord and in other works of its authors that the formal 
distinction may nevertheless be in use. Thus, several works outside The Book of Concord 
from two of its relevant writers are briefly surveyed in the following subsections, 
beginning with Luther and Melanchthon and proceeding to Chemnitz. Works taken up 
include some pertaining to the Trinity, one of the traditional loci for the formal 
distinction, as well as those pertaining to justification—the latter especially to see if there 
is evidence of a “formal” justification-sanctification distinction. 
Martin Luther 
 Secondary literature might lead one to expect Martin Luther, following Biel 
following Ockham, to accept a Scotus-like formal distinction at the locus of the 
Trinity.170 Indeed, Luther’s opposition to Ockham certainly seems to have centered more 
                                                 
168 Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” For more on Scotus, Ockham, and 
Luther regarding God and creatures, see Klaus Bannach, “Relationen: Ihre Theorie in der 
spatmittelalterlichen Theologie und bei Luther,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 47.1-
2 (2000). 
169 Scotus’ moderate realism was not the only one at the time of Ockham: Walter Burley had a 
position in some ways similar with that of Scotus, but it was rejected by Ockham and Henry of Harclay, 
and, not surprisingly, Ockham and Burley attacked Harclay’s position, and Ockham’s position was 
criticized by Walter Chatton (Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 422-439 ). Walter 
Chatton is said to have defended Scotus against Ockham, at least in part on the basis of the Logica Scoti 
(Dumont, “Parisian Question,” 18-22). 
170 Friedman points out that Biel followed Ockham in his “late Franciscan style Trinitarian 
theology”, and, after his study and those of others, he suggests that Luther may have similarly followed 
Biel (Friedman, “Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology,” 109-119 ). 
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on the anthropology in his theology than on the epistemology and other aspects of his 
philosophy.171 However, when Luther’s works are examined for specific mentions of the 
distinctio formalis (“formal distinction”), one finds results suggesting Luther may have 
disagreed with Ockham on the application of a formal distinction at the locus of the 
Trinity.172 The consideration of Luther in this subsection treats in chronological order 
Luther’s specific mentions of distinctio formalis in a Psalm commentary, a Luther thesis 
that targets Scotus, and a significant letter Luther sent regarding Scotus’ inclusion in the 
Wittenberg University curriculum. 
 In commenting on Psalm 66:17 (“I cried to Him with my mouth”) as part of his 
1513-1515 Psalm lectures, Luther says theologians, including himself, irreverently 
mention God’s name arguing about things like the Trinity. Then he says, de disctinctione 
formali et reali sicut sutor de corio suo disputat (“We argue about the formal and real 
distinction the way a cobbler argues about his leather”).173 Luther goes on, referring to 
proceeding per nostra subtilitates in temeritate (“foolhardily through our subtleties”), to 
having learned from Aristotle how to argue loquaciter et audacter (“verbosely and 
boldly”), and to hating the bold opinions Thomistarum, Scotistarum et aliorum (“of the 
Thomists, Scotists, and others”). Thus, Luther in this place of 1513-1515 does not appear 
to be a fan of the Scotist subtlety of the formal distinction, at least not in so far as it 
contributes to irreverent arguments about God. 
 Before October of 1517’s more-famous 95 Theses for the Disputation on the 
Power and Efficacy of Indulgences, there were in September of 1517 the lesser-known 97 
Theses for the Disputation against Scholastic Theology. The Disputation as a whole 
defends Augustine’s views regarding the will against the “Pelagian tendencies” of 
others.174 In four of the theses—specifically theses 6, 10, 13, and 19—Luther specifically 
targets Scotus. Singled out are positions that voluntas possit se conformare dictamini 
                                                 
171 See, for example, Chung, “Luther's Exodus.” 
172 Thanks go to Michael Hayes and Reference Services at Concordia Seminary Library, St. Louis, 
Missouri, for conducting a search of the electronic version of the Weimar Edition of Luther’s works for 
distinctio formalis in the various declensions. 
173 WA 3:382 (confer WA 55:353); Aland #593; AE 10:322, tr. Herbert J. A. Bouman. 
174 Gerrish, Grace and Reason, 95-96. 
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recto naturaliter (“the will can by nature conform to correct precept”); voluntas … est 
libera ad tendendum in quodlibet secundum rationem boni sibi ostensum (“the will is … 
free to strive toward whatever is declared good”), homo errans potest diligere creaturam 
super omnia, ergo et deum (“erring man can love the creature above all things, therefore 
also God”), and de forti politico rempublicam plusquam seipsum diligente (“concerning 
the brave citizen who loves his country more than himself”).175 Such ideas led Luther to 
make other specific and more-general negative statements about Scotus, although not 
every single reference is negative.176 
 Another of the specific, negative Luther-references to Scotus is found in a 
December 9, 1518, letter Luther wrote to George Spalatin, seeking his approval to 
substitute in the Wittenberg University curriculum a course in Ovid for courses in 
Thomistic studies. In the letter, Luther wrote how he also expected that eventually the 
Scotus studies would be eliminated also. 
 Salutem. Convenit inter dominum Rectorem & me, Mi Georgi, de 
lectionibus bonum videri, ut non modo Physica Thomistica caderet, quam 
nunc deserit Magister Gunckel, succedens textuali lectioni D. Rectoris, 
verum ut rueret quoque logica Thomistica, quam profitetur Magister 
premßel Torgensis, ut pro ea OVidium Metamorphosiacum legeret idem 
Magister, cum in literis humanitatis non parum valeat. Nam Scotisticam 
philosophiam & logicam cum textuali physica & logica sufficere putamus, 
donec & Scotiticę sectę, ęque inutilis ac infelicis ingeniorum negocii, 
cadat profession, si quo modo tandem dissidiorum nomina funditus 
pereant & pura philosophia & Theologia omnesque Matheses in fontibus 
suis hauriantur. Tuum in hac re audiamus Consilium. Vale Altera 
Conceptionis die 1518. 
      F. Martinus Eleutherius 
Greetings. The President [Bartholomew Bernhardi] and I agreed, my 
George, on several things concerning the curriculum: it seems to be good 
not only to eliminate the course on Thomistic Physics (which is now being 
dropped by Master Gunckel, who is taking over the President’s reading 
                                                 
175 WA 1:224-225 (Aland #263); AE 31:224-225, tr. Harold J. Grimm. 
176 In the American Edition of Luther’s Works, there are some 36 references to Scotus made by 
Luther and the editors (who note when Luther might be targeting Scotus under various labels such as 
“modernists”, “newer doctors”, “our theologians”, or “subtle theologians”). Less than a handful of these 
references to Scotus could be regarded as in any sense positive, and even those are really only relative to 
other scholastic theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas. That Luther may have thought Scotus to be a little 
better than Aquinas is still not really saying anything positive. 
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course), but also to eliminate the course on Thomistic logic, which is now 
taught by Master Premsel from Torgau. Instead the same master is to 
lecture on Ovid’s Metamorphoses, since he is well qualified to teach 
classical literature. For we consider the course on Scotistic philosophy and 
logic, together with the reading course in [Aristotle’s] Physics and logic, 
to be enough until such time as the Chair of the Scotistic Sect—that 
equally useless and unfruitful occupation of gifted men—is also abolished. 
In this way the subtle hair-splitting finally may perish altogether, and 
genuine philosophy, theology, and all the arts may be drawn from their 
true sources. We would appreciate your advice in this matter. 
 Farewell. 
 December 9, 1518 
      Friar Martin Eleut177 
Again Luther’s antipathy to Scotus and his subtle distinctions is clear. Although, to the 
extent that the formal distinction can said to be Aristotelian, Luther’s curricular reforms 
would not remove completely the foundation for delineating such differences. Moreover, 
given the evidence from disputations that follows, it is clear that Scotus and his formal 
distinction never completely ceased to be a point of contention in Wittenberg. 
 On August 24, 1543, Pastor Erasmus Alber from Frankfort on the Main—and a 
friend of Luther’s and Melanchthon’s—had the disputation for his doctoral degree, which 
he was awarded the following October 11. Dr. John Bugenhagen, the bishop of the 
Wittenberg city church, was the doctoral “advisor” (Promotor), but Luther drew up the 
theses, presided over the disputation, and, as dean, made the official entry in the 
theological faculty’s record (Dekanatsbuch) in his own hand. The 38 theses for the 
disputation were under the heading De unitate essentiae divinae (“Of the unity of the 
divine essence”). A string of five theses is particularly relevant.178 
7.  Quomodo distinguatur persona a divinitate ipsa, non est rationis 
inquirere, nec angelis comprehensibile  
(“How the persons might be distinguished from the divinity is not of 
reason to inquire, nor is it understandable by the angels”).  
                                                 
177 #117, WA Br 1:262; #30, AE 48:95-96, ed. & tr. Gottfried G. Krodel. The insertions in square 
brackets to clarify the letter are drawn from the AE editors’ notes. Names are reproduced as found in the 
AE. 
178 Nearly all of the theses are interesting on their own right, especially the following others: 17, 
which likens dialectics to women who should keep silent in the church; 18, which groups Arians, Jews, and 
Muslims in denying the divinity of Christ; 23 and 24, which speak of grammar and philosophy in 
relationship to theology; and 30 and 31, which target an aspect of Aristotle. 
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8.  Imo periculosum et cavendum est ibi, ullam esse putari distinctionem, 
cum sit quaelibet persona ipsissimus et totus Deus.  
(“On the contrary, the danger of holding any distinction there ought to 
be avoided, since whichever Person is His own very self and whole 
God.”) 
9.  Frustranea est cogitatio et nihil Scoti et similium, qui formalem vel 
aliam distinctionem hic finxerunt. 
(“It is a vain thinking up and nothing of the Scotists and his like-
minded, who here have fictioned a formal or other disctinction.”) 
10. Nesciunt quid loquantur vel affirment, dum talibus sapientiae 
pharmacis rationem iuvare volunt. 
(“They don’t know what they are talking about or saying yes to while 
by such poison of wisdom they wish to help their account.”) 
11. Nam utcunque ista subtiliter dici videantur, ratio tamen non capit 
distinctionem formalem esse aliam, quam realem seu essentialem. 
(“For no matter how subtly such seems to be spoken, reason, however, 
does not grasp a formal distinction to be other than real or 
essential.”)179 
Assuming that Luther means to affirm the positions expressed in these theses, in 1543 he 
still opposes the use of Scotus’s formal distinction in the context of delineating the 
persons of the Trinity from their divine substance, a topic Luther thinks is off-limits to 
reason. Perhaps more significantly, Luther speaks as if there is no such thing as a formal 
distinction, essentially saying the Scotists and their ilk imagined such a formal distinction 
while on drugs (talibus sapientiae pharmacis).180 
 The next year, on December 12, 1544, to be precise, George Major and John 
Faber disputed for their promotion with theses that Luther had drawn up for them—
Major on the Trinity and Faber on justification. One of Major’s theses on the Trinity 
specifically mentions the formal distinction. 
                                                 
179 For the background and the theses, see WA 39II:252-255 (Aland #18; not translated in the 
American Edition). The translations are this author’s.  
180 These theses were published in 1545 under the title De unitate essentiae divinae (“Of the unity 
of the Divine essence”) along with the theses used on July 3 of that year for the doctoral disputation of 
Petrus Hegemon, titled De distinctione personarum fideliter explicatae (“Of the distinction of persons 
faithfully set forth”). Together the two sets of theses were titled Disputationes duae de unitate essentiae 
divinae et de distinctione personarum in divinitate fideliter explicatae (“Two disputations of the unity of 
the Divine essence and of the disction of Persons in the Divinity faithfully set forth”) (WA 39II:252-253). 
On Hegemon’s disputation, see below in the text. 
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14. Leviter et frigide consolantur nos Scotus et Scholastici cum suis 
distinctionibus formalibus et realibus. 
(“We are consoled by Scotus and the Scholastics with their distinctions 
formal and real about as much as by airheads and icequeens.”)181 
Again, taking the thesis at face value suggests that Luther had little regard for the formal 
distinction of Scotus or that of any other scholastics. While Thesis 14 with its mention of 
the formal distinction does not appear to have been discussed, according to the extant 
record of the disputation,182 the formal distinction does appear in the Anhang 
(“Appendix”) of Praeparatorium D. Georgii Maioris in suam disputationem fideliter 
conscriptum (“Of the preparations for Dr. George Major in his disputation, faithfully 
written down”). This work apparently reflects Major’s own “carefully written down” 
preparations for the disputation with the involvement of Melanchthon.183 There we find 
the following. 
 Essentia divina et persona non distinguuntur realiter, sed 
formaliter, et sunt unum. Hoc sic intellige: Essentia divina et persona sunt 
una res, una essentia divina. Inter personam enim et essentiam divinam 
non est discrimen. Personae tres sunt realiter distinctae inter se vel a se, 
sed non ab essentia. Et de utrisque recte dicitur: Essentia generat, item: 
Persona generat. Nam similitudo potest dari de Christo, ubi in una persona 
duae sunt naturae, divina et humana sic unitae, ut unus tantum sit Christus, 
et tamen mens cogitando distinguit inter naturam divinam et humanam, 
quamquam unus sit et maneat Christus, quae distinctio formalis Deo est. 
Realiter enim hae duae naturae in Christo distingui non possunt, quia in 
Christo sunt unitae, ut idem Christus verus sit Deus et verus homo. 
 Divine essence and person are not distinguished in themselves but 
by essence, and they are [numerically] one. Understand this so: the divine 
essence and person are one res, one divine essence. For between the 
person and divine essence there is no division. The three persons are really 
distinct between each other or from each other, but not by essence. And 
about which things it is rightly said: “the essence begets”, again “the 
person begets”. For example, a similitude can be given to Christ, with 
whom in one person there are two natures, divine and human, united so 
that there is only one Christ, and however a mind by having thought 
                                                 
181 On the background and the theses, see WA 39II:284-289 (Aland #447; not translated in the 
American Edition). The translation is this author’s, although the vivid colloquial expressions came from Dr. 
Ernest N. Kauhlbach, Professor of English, at the University of Texas at Austin. 
182 WA 39II:290-320. 
183 WA 39II:286. 
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distinguishes between the divine and human nature, nevertheless one 
Christ is and remains, which formal distinction is by God. For these two 
natures are not able to be really distinguished in Christ, because they are 
united in Christ, so that the same Christ truly is true God and true man.184 
Major, possibly under Melanchthon’s influence, significantly is willing to posit a formal 
distinction in Christ.185 Although Luther had concerns about Major’s theology and 
although Major was involved in one of the controversies that precipitated the Formula of 
Concord, the formal distinction was not explicitly at issue.186 
 The last disputation Luther was in charge of187 was Peter Hegemon’s, who on July 
3, 1545, disputed for his doctoral promotion using theses that Luther had written on June 
10, 1545. The 50 theses touched on the Trinity,188 the Incarnation, forgiveness of sins, 
and traducianism (the question whether all souls were created by God in the beginning or 
whether He creates new souls each time new life is conceived). For this disputation, none 
of the theses themselves mentioned the formal distinction, although Luther apparently 
raised the matter when Thesis 13 was discussed in the disputation itself.189 That thesis 
and the exchange designated “Argument 11” follow (only the records designated B and C 
contain Luther’s reference to the formal distinction, so only they are reproduced below 
and translated). 
13. In divinis relatio est res, id est, hypostasis et subsistentia. nempe idem, 
quod ipsa divinitas; tres enim personae, tres hypostases et res 
subsistentes sunt. 
(“From God’s perspective, a relationship is a res, that is, a hypostasis 
                                                 
184 WA 39II:333. The translation is this author’s. 
185 Scotus is said to have applied the formal distinction to things that might otherwise be taken to 
be identical, not to things that are unified (Grajewski, “Philosophic Applications,” 146). One type of unity 
is formal identity, but that type of unity is said not apply to the hypostatic union for Scotus because it is a 
union “of really distinct things” (Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation 121; Cross cites Ord. 1. 2. 2. 1-
4, n. 403 [Vatican, ii. 356-7] and Quod. 19, n. 2 [Wadding, xii. 492; Alluntis and Wolter, 419 (n. 19. 5)]). 
186 See Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §120, p.94; §13, p.102; §144, pp.115-116. 
187 Simo Knuuttila and Risto Saarinen, “Luther's Trinitarian Theology and its Medieval 
Background,” Studia Theologica 53.11 (1999): 7. 
188 These theses specifically are examined by Knuuttila and Saarinen, “Luther's Trinitarian 
Theology,” 7-10. 
189 On the background and the theses, see WA 39II:337-342 (Aland #275; not translated in the 
American Edition). Knuuttila and Saarinen write, “Theses 11 to 13 are relatively general and do not 




and a subsistence. Formally the same as the divinity itself; for the 
persons are three, the hypostases are three, and the res are 
subsistences.”190 
[B] 
Doctoris Philippi argumentum. Contra 13. Relatio non est essentia. Relatio 
est res. Ergo in persona erunt duae res, relatio et essentia. 
Resp. Martinus Lutherus: Duae res conveniunt ad personam. Persona 
constituitur ex divina natura et relatione. Concedimus, quod essentia 
generet essentiam, sed sic ut personam. Scotus format disctinctionem 
formalem, quod est falsum, quia nostra natura non potest aliam 
distinctionem parare, animus non potest concipere. Scotus non intellegit se 
ipsum. Sunt tres hypotheses [sic!] ita distinctae, ut altera alteram generet 
et tertiam spirent. Audio, unam essentiam et tres personas esse, Wie es 
zugehe, necescio, credam. 
Argument of Doctor Philip. Against 13. Relation is not an essence. 
Relation is a res. Therefore in the person there are two res, relation and 
essence. 
Response of Martin Luther: The two things occur in the [divine] person. 
The person is constituted from the divine nature and a relation. We 
concede that essence generates essence but as [to generate] a person. 
Scotus falsely brings in a formal distinction, because our nature is not 
equal to making another distinction, our intellect can’t conceive it. Scotus 
does not understand himself. There are three hypostases so distinct that the 
one generates the other and [the two] spirate the third. I hear one essence 
and three persons, how it goes from there, I don’t know, let me believe. 
[C] 
11. Argumentum Domini Philippi Melanchthonis. Contra 13. Relatio non 
est essentia. Relatio sunt duae res secundum vestras propositiones. Ergo 
etiam in persona erunt duae res, relatio et essentia. 
Responsio D. Lutheri: Concedo totum argumentum. 
Philippus Melanchthon. Contra. Ergo vultis duas res in essentia? 
Respondit Lutherus: Volumus. 
Philippus Melanchthon. Quaero ergo declarationem. 
Respondit D. Lutherus: Persona constituitur ex relatione et essentia, ut 
filius est essentia genita, natura essentia generat essentiam, sed ita, ut sint 
dictinctae personae. Quomodo autem differant personae non possumus 
intelligere nec animo nostro concipere. Scotus cum sua subtilitate hoc loco 
seipsum non intelligit, qui volenter dicit, quod sit realis personarum 
distinctio. Nos vero essentia causa formalis distinctionem, quia animus . . . 
. . . . . aliam distinctionem concipere. Formalem non intelligas ratione, sed 
                                                 
190 WA 39II:340. The translation is this author’s. 
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si qua est essentialis distinctio, sunt tres personae, distinctae hypostases, 
alter alteram generat. Duae spirant tertiam. Ich hoer, das eine essentia sey 
et tres personae. Wie es zugehet, hic simpliciter tacendum est et 
credendum Deo, qui se ita cognoscendum in verbo suo nobis proposuit. 
11. Argument of Lord Philip Melanchthon. Against 13. Relation is not 
essence. Relation is two res following your propositions. Therefore even 
in the [divine] person there are two res, relation and essence. 
Response of Dr. Luther: I concede your whole argument. 
Philip Melanchthon. Against. Therefore do you want two res in an 
essence? 
Luther responded: Yes, we do. 
Philip Melanchthon. I am looking for a clarification. 
Luther responded: The [divine] person is made up of a relation and an 
essence, as the Son is a begotten essence, the nature by essence begets an 
essence, but in such a way that the persons are distinguished. How the 
persons might differ, however, we are not able to understand nor conceive 
in our mind. Scotus with all his subtlety does not understand this locus in 
and of itself when he willingly says there is a real distinction of persons. 
We [understand] essence to be the formal cause [which brings about] the 
distinction because our mind [cannot] conceive another distinction. Do not 
understand the word “formal” in any kind of rational way, but if there is 
an essential distinction, there are three persons, distinct hypostases, one 
generating another. Two spirating the third. I hear there is one essence and 
three persons. How that happens, this simply has to be kept quiet and God 
has to be believed, Who proposed that He is so to be known by us in His 
Word.191 
Scotus, whether rightly or wrongly understood, continues to be ridiculed, and Luther 
seems to have no real need of making a formal distinction. Instead, Luther seems content 
to let the matter of the Trinity go without a complete explanation and just take the matter 
on faith. 
 From the 1513-1515 Psalm lectures through to the last disputation under his 
leadership, Luther seems to have little positive regard for Scotus or his formal distinction. 
Luther instead placed limits on into what reason ought to or even could inquire. At the 
same time, however, in Luther’s circle Major and Melanchthon appear to have allowed 
                                                 
191 WA 39II:362-365. The translation is this author’s. Knuuttila and Saarinen note, “As is known, 
Luther often wished to accept the expression essentia generat, condemned by the fourth Lateran Council. 
However in the last disputations this view is moderated by the qualification that the essence does not 




the possibility that there is a formal distinction in the case of the divine and human 
natures united in the person of Jesus Christ, a place where Scotus could be taken to rule 
out such a distinction. Where Luther above was seen to have distinguished between 
justification and sanctification in a way that fit Scotus’ definition of the formal distinction 
(to Luther justification and sanctification are inseparable, capable of being defined 
differently, and found that way apart from one’s intellect) and, consciously or 
subconsciously could have been formed with Scotus’s formal distinction in mind, this 
subsection has suggested that Luther likely would have been hard pressed to have termed 
the distinction a “formal distinction”. 
Philipp Melanchthon 
 At least in his early years, Philipp Melanchthon is generally thought to have held 
to the same positions as Luther, and Melanchthon’s association with Luther in the 
disputations considered above might be taken as evidence of their similar regard for 
Scotus and his formal distinction, but there is more to consider. First, there is evidence of 
at least some outright rejection of Scotus by Melanchthon. In October or early November 
of 1521, Melanchthon published in Latin a set of 65 theses or propositions about the 
Mass, the next to last of which condemned Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.192 
64. Anathema sit Thomas et Scotus, qui huius abusus missae auctores 
sunt. 
64. Let Thomas and Scotus, who are the originators of this abuse of the 
mass, be anathema.193 
Around that same time in autumn of 1521, Melanchthon published a defense of Luther 
against the contemporary Paris theologians who had, after the Pope had excommunicated 
Luther, themselves entered judgment against more than 100 of Luther’s alleged 
                                                 
192 Compare James W. Richard, “The Beginnings of Protestant Worship in Germany and 
Switzerland,” The American Journal of Theology 5.2 (1901): 246, who cites Corpus Reformatorum I:478-
481, and Philipp Melanchthon, Selected Writings, trans. Charles Leander Hill, eds. Elmer Ellsworth Flack 
and Lowell J. Satre (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 62. 
193 Latin from CR I:481; English from Melanchthon, Selected Writings, 67. Only select theses are 
translated in Charles Leander Hill, “Some Theses of Philip Melanchthon,” Lutheran Quarterly 6 (1954), 
and the relevant one is not one of them. 
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statements.194 In that defense of Luther, Melanchthon condemns Paris’ theological 
school, the Sorbonne, for originating scholasticism and the false teaching that goes with 
it, singling out as Paris “triflers” Thomist John Versor (d. ca. 1485), Scotist Peter 
Tartaretus (d.1522), and Nominalist John Major (1467-1550). At least in one place, 
Melanchthon favorably refers to Paris theologians Jean Gerson (1363-1429) and William 
of Ockham (1288-1348), but in another place he negatively refers to Ockham along with 
John Duns Scotus (1266-1308).195 Melanchthon contrasts the Paris theologians to the 
church fathers whose correct exposition of Scripture, Melanchthon wrote, Luther 
followed. 
Das ertzele ich nit darumb, das ich achte, es sey viel dran gelegen, was die 
lerer gehalten haben, wer sie auch sind, so anderß der schrift meynung 
kund ist, sondernn das ich auch den eygen willigen will fare, die da 
meynen, Luther wolle alle ding new machen, ßo er doch nichts anderß 
thut, denn das er unß widder tzu der schrift bringe, ya auch tzu den 
veternn, die tzu dem vorstand der schrifft am nehsten kommen sind. Abir 
yhr, was thut yhr? Ists nit war, das yhr nichts anderß thut, denn das die 
Christlichen hertzen mehr ynn den formaliten Scoti und connotaten 
Occam, denn ynn Christo groß werden? Und hört, ihr sophisten, wie woll 
ihrß nit werdet vorstehen, yhr widder strebt dem auffgehenden liecht des 
Evangelii nit anderß, denn wie Jamnes und Mambres Mosi widder 
stunden. Derselben nach komling ist auch des Sorbonische gefinde, 
nemlich des da geporn ist auß der Aegyptischen Sorbonity. 
I am enumerating these things not because I think that it makes a great 
difference what the writers thought, whoever they finally are, when the 
meaning of Scripture is settled, but to satisfy those captious souls who 
think that Luther has changed everything, when he has done nothing else 
than to call us back to Scripture and also to the fathers who came the 
closest to the meaning of Scripture. But what do you do? Anything other 
than let the minds of Christians become great in the formalities of Scotus 
and in the connotations of Ockham rather than in Christ? You oppose the 
rising light of the Gospel (hear, you Sophists, who will not understand) as 
Moses was opposed by Jannes and Jambres, whose posterity is the family 
                                                 
194 WA 8:267-312; Melanchthon, Selected Writings, 68-87. 
195 Elsewhere in the writing, Melanchthon negatively refers to Scotus along with Gabriel Biel 
(c.1420 or 1425 -1495), who did not attend or teach at Paris but considered Ockham his master. 
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of Sorbonne, beyond doubt descendants from that Egyptian 
“Sorbonnity.”196 
Melanchthon’s specific mention of Scotus’s “formalities” is significant. Yet, when the 
Apology of the Augsburg Confession was published some ten years later, Melanchthon 
may be taken to have made use of Scotus’s formal distinction while at the same time 
distancing himself from Scotus. 
 There are several relevant passages from Apology IV. First, Melanchthon makes 
it clear that when faith justifies it is more than a preparation for justification and does 
more than start a process of justification.197 Melanchthon is clear that works follow such 
justification and are a form of righteousness, but he is also clear that such works do not 
themselves justify and are only accepted by God because of faith.198 Melanchthon is 
distinguishing between justification, the righteousness God brings about by faith, and 
sanctification, the works that justification causes. In a highly significant passage, 
Melanchthon presumably makes a not-so-subtle reference to the Doctor Subtilis (“Subtle 
Doctor”, what Scotus was called already by his contemporaries) and his formal 
distinction while explaining that Scripture sometimes “lump together the righteousness of 
the heart and its fruit” (scriptura simul complectitur iustitiam cordis cum fructibus).199 
Nemo sanus iudicare aliter potest, nec nos aliquam otiosam subtilitatem 
hic affectamus, ut divellamus fructus a iustitia cordis, si tantum adversarii 
concesserint, quod fructus propter fidem et mediatorem Christum placeant, 
non sint per sese digni gratia et vita aeterna.  
No sane man can judge otherwise. We are not trying to be overly subtle 
here in distinguishing the righteousness of the heart from its fruits, if only 
our opponents would grant that the fruits please God because of faith and 
                                                 
196 WA 8:300; Melanchthon, Selected Writings 74-75; emphasis added. Melanchthon apparently 
refers to the Egyptian wise men, sorcerers, and magicians mentioned in Exodus 7:11 as “opponents” of 
Moses; although no one is named in that passage, Jewish tradition said two of the opposing magicians were 
named Jannes and Jambres, and Paul, in the context of discussing the false teachers of the latter days, 
mentions the two and their opposition to Moses (2 Timothy 3:8). Jannes is also reportedly mentioned in 
Dead Sea Scrolls that predate Christianity.  
197 Ap IV:71. 
198 Ap IV:160-161. 
199 Ap IV:374, Tappert, 164; BKS, 230. On Ap IV:375-377, confer above at n.53, p.114. 
 Later humanist and Reformation opponents of Scotus’s teachings termed his followers, instead of 
“Scotists”, “Dunse”, which term led to “dunce” in English. 
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the mediator Christ but in themselves are not worthy of grace and of 
eternal life.200 
Although the German paraphrase at this point is different, it carries over the essence of 
the “subtle” reference and gives a contrasting example of an incorrect distinction by the 
opponents. 
Wir suchen hie nicht eine unnötige Subtilität, sondern es hat große 
Ursache, warum man in diesen Fragen einen gewissen Bericht muß haben. 
Denn alsbald, wenn man den Widersachern zulässet, daß die Werk das 
ewige Leben verdienen, bald spinnen sie diese ungeschickte Lehre daraus, 
daß wir vermögen Gottes Gesetz zu halten, daß wir keiner Barmherzigkeit 
bedürfen, daß wir vor Gott gerecht sein, das ist, Gott angenehm, durch 
unsere Werke, nicht um Christus willen, daß wir auch opera 
supererogationis und mehr tun können, denn das Gesetz erfordert. Also 
wird denn die ganze Lehre vom Glauben gar unterdrückt. 
We are not seeking an unnecessary subtlety here, but there is a great 
reason why in these questions one must have a certain account. For, when 
one grants the opponents that works merit eternal life, then immediately 
they spin from it these inept teachings: that we are able to keep God’s 
Commandments; that we need no mercy; that we are righteous before 
God, that is, pleasing to God, through our works, not for Christ’s sake; and 
that we also can do opera supererogationis and more than the 
Commandments require. So then the whole teaching of faith becomes 
entirely suppressed.201 
Clearly Melanchthon is not only distinguishing between justification and sanctification 
but is aware that his distinction might be subject to the kind of criticism that Scotus’s 
formal distinction receives, namely, that of being too subtle. He nevertheless makes the 
decision, and the German especially defends it by arguing it is necessary to defend 
against the opponents’ false teaching. Additional evidence from Melanchthon regarding 
the justification/sanctification distinction and the formal distinction is considered in 
connection with his student, Martin Chemnitz. 
Martin Chemnitz 
 Martin Chemnitz, who studied under both Luther and Melanchthon in Wittenberg 
and could even have been present at Luther’s last disputation, seems to have gone beyond 
                                                 
200 Ap IV:375, BKS, 230; Tappert, 164. 
201 BKS, 231; this author’s translation. 
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Luther and perhaps even beyond Melanchthon in being more ready to acknowledge at 
least some sort of formal distinction both at the locus of the Trinity and at the locus of 
Justification. As with the evidence from Luther and Melanchthon, this subsection 
presents relevant evidence from Chemnitz in chronological order. 
 The earliest piece of evidence may be the most convincing. In his refutation of the 
Council of Trent, the first two parts of which were published in 1566 and the latter two in 
1573, Chemnitz distinguishes justification from sanctification as Luther did, with an 
allusion to the same comment on Galatians cited by the Formula of Concord, but, after a 
brief sarcastic mocking of his opponents, Chemnitz also likens the distinction to that 
between the senses and powers of the soul, the latter of which is understood as one of 
Scotus’s applications of the formal distinction.202 
Ita etiam nullo modo decemus, fidem justificantem esse solitariam, hoc 
est, talem persuasionem, quae sit sine poenitentia, et nulla omnino pariat 
bona opera. Sed fidem quae sine operibus otiose et mortua est, dicimus 
non esse veram et vivam illam fidem quae per charitatem efficax est. Gal. 
5. Considerat autem Lector, qualis sit consequentia argumenti 
Tridentinorum. Fides viva non est solitaria, sine charitate, ergo non sola, 
sed una cum charitate justificat. Ergone quae simul adsunt, quae cohaerent 
et conjuncta sunt, unum officium, et eandem omnia habebunt 
proprietatem? Simul ergo auribus et pedibus audiemus, oculis et minibus 
videbimus. Nulla ergo erit vel sensuum, vel potentiarum animae distinctio: 
quia homo simul illa accipit, et habet. Sicut igitur haec et similia multa, 
etiam quando simul adsunt, recte et necessario distinguuntur. ita nos 
reconciliationem et renovationem, fidem et charitatem non ita divellimus, 
ut alterum tollamus et negemus: sed cuique suum locum, suum officium, 
et suam proprietatem tribuimus cum Scriptura: quae solius fidei hoc 
proprium esse docet, apprehendere et accipere in promissione Evangelii, 
Christum ad justitiam coram Deo ad vitam aeternam. Et illam justitiam 
fides non partitur inter Christum et nostram novitatem seu charitatem, sed 
in solidum eam tribuit merito Christi. 
 So also we by no means teach that justifying faith is alone, that is, 
that it is such a persuasion which is without repentance, and that it does 
not bring forth any good works at all. But we say that a faith which is 
without works, idle, and dead is not that true and living faith which works 
through love (Gal. 5:6). But let the reader consider what the consequence 
of the argument of the men of Trent is. Living faith is not alone, without 
                                                 
202 See above at n. 153. Confer Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 163-178. 
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love, therefore it does not justify alone, but together with love. Do 
therefore the things which are present at the same time, which hang 
together and are connected, have one office, and one and the same 
function? In that case we shall hear with our ears and with our feet and see 
with our eyes and with our hands. There will, therefore, be no distinction 
either of the sense or of the powers of the soul because a man receives and 
possesses them at one and the same time. As therefore these and many 
similar things, even when they are present at the same time, are rightly and 
necessarily distinguished, so we do not tear apart reconciliation and 
renewal, faith and love, in such a manner that we remove and deny one of 
them, but we give to each its place, its function, and its peculiar nature, 
with the Scripture, which teaches that this is the peculiar function of faith 
alone that it apprehends and accepts Christ in the promise of the Gospel 
for righteousness before God to life eternal. Faith does not divine this 
righteousness between Christ and our newness, or love, but it ascribes it 
entirely to the merit of Christ.203 
Thus, in Chemnitz’s 1566 Examen, Chemnitz essentially makes a formal distinction 
between justification and sanctification, albeit without using the terms “formal 
distinction” or “sanctification”. There may be good reason for Chemnitz’s avoidance of 
the term “formal distinction” so associated with Duns Scotus. 
 Whether or not Chemnitz himself was at the later disputations cited above, he 
certainly knew of them, writing in his 1578 De Duabus Naturis in Christo (The Two 
Natures in Christ) as follows.  
[W]e know that Luther in the disputations of the year 1544 and 1545 and 
Philip with him, in opposition to certain Scholastics, taught that the person 
or the hypostasis of the divine being is not something which exists outside 
of or beyond the divine essence, to which this essence together with its 
essential attributes is communicated later on; and that the divine essence 
does not exist outside of or beyond the persons of the Deity; nor do the 
hypostasis and the essence actually differ in the same person of the 
Trinity, although they do differ in aspect.204  
                                                 
203 Ninth topic, section two, paragraph 23. Martin Chemnitz, Examen Concilii Tridentini, ed. 
Eduard Preuss (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972), 187-188. Chemnitz, Examination of 
the Council of Trent, I:580-581.  
204 Martin Chemnitz, Two Natures in Christ, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1971), 42. Preus footnotes a reference to Luther’s 1544 Kurzes Bekenntnis vom heiligen 
Sakrament (“Brief Confession Concerning the Holy Sacrament”), WA 54:157-158 (Aland #661; AE 
38:305-308). There, Luther relates believing in the real, physical presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the 
Altar as easier than believing the union of the two natures with only one of the three Persons of the Trinity; 
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With this knowledge of the disputations and almost certainly of their disregard for the 
formal distinction, Chemnitz can be understood as carefully avoiding the term “formal 
distinction” while nevertheless making precisely that kind of distinction. In De Duabus 
Naturis, Chemnitz goes on to cite approvingly the scholastic regard for the unity of the 
divine substance, especially in itself, but he also, as considered in relation to other things, 
goes on to approve a “degree of distinction” between God’s essence and attributes “for 
the sake of teaching and learning”.205 Although unnamed, the “degree of distinction” is 
nothing less than Scotus’ formal distinction in one of the precise places Scotus applied 
it.206 
 Chemnitz apparently was willing to make such un-termed formal distinctions 
even where his teachers Luther and Melanchthon were unwilling. For example, in 
Melanchthon’s 1543 Loci Communes, Melanchthon wrote that “attributes such as God’s 
power are not to be distinguished or separated from His essence. Nor is the attribute one 
thing and the essence another.”207 Chemnitz knew Melanchthon’s Loci Communes well, 
living with Melanchthon in Wittenberg and, at Melanchthon’s request, lecturing on the 
Loci Communes for a time there, sometimes with Melanchthon present, and later for 
some 30 years in Brunswick.208 However, in commenting on that same part of 
Melanchthon’s Loci Communes in his own posthumously-published Loci Theologici, 
Chemnitz departs from Melanchthon, whom he identifies as “our preceptor”. First 
                                                                                                                                                 
Luther faults his opponents with failing to believe both—the faulty Christology a result of the faulty 
sacramentology. 
205 Chemnitz, Two Natures in Christ, 307. Pieper quotes Chemnitz’s Latin at length (with some 
ellipses); the relevant wording here: in ea relatione seu consideratione aliquam quasi distinctionem inter 
essentiam et attributa eius docendi et discendi causa cogitamus (Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 265 n.561, 
emphasis original). Confer Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, II:240-241. 
206 For a relatively-thorough treatment, see Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 180-192. 
207 Melanchthon, Loci Communes 1543, 20. 
208 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, I:13. Confer Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 50-53. 
 Jacob Andreä, a coworker of Chemnitz on the Formula of Concord, served as professor of 
theology at the University of Tübingen and there also lectured on Melanchthon’s Loci, a future examination 
of the content of those lectures, if such were possible, might be informative, although Andreä is said to 
have been more interested in the teaching about the Sacrament of the Altar than that of justification. Still, 
Andreä included treatments of justification in his proposals for Lutheran unity in 1568 and his 1573 
sermons on controverted doctrines, which sermons eventually led to the Swabian Concordia, one of the 
precursors of the Formula of Concord. (Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 29, 30, 34-35, 37-38.) 
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Chemnitz refers to a scholastic distinction drawn from the Thesaurus of Cyril between 
things said about the substance of God and His relationships, both inter-Trinitarian and 
with His creatures. Next, Chemnitz allows that the attributes can be predicated of God’s 
essence, and, finally, Chemnitz explains that “accidents” cannot be spoken of God, even 
analogically, although the term “analogically” does not seem to be used (Thomists would 
nevertheless seem to be in view).209 Like Melanchthon, Chemnitz says God’s attributes 
are not separated from his essence, but, unlike Melanchthon, Chemnitz is willing to 
distinguish the attributes from the essence. 
 In the same Loci Theologici, Chemnitz is careful, as he had done previously, to 
distinguish between justification and sanctification, although this time he eventually uses 
the term. Writing of the controversies over Grace and Justification as he expands on 
Melanchthon’s Loci Communes, Chemnitz refers to church fathers who mixed the 
teaching of good works in with the doctrine of justification, implying a justification and 
sanctification distinction without terming it such and alluding to Luther’s insistence that 
the distinction between justification and sanctification be made at this precise point.210 
Similarly, Chemnitz writes that the central point at the locus of justification is confused 
when mingled with good works that follow justification, which he himself says must be 
carefully distinguished.211 In dealing with the Scripture testimonies about justification, 
Chemnitz makes a comment quite similar to those found in the Formula of Concord he 
helped author. 
Scripture says that renewal is an effect or result of justification. … We 
judge the cause by the effects. … This distinction between causes and 
effects is also useful for showing that sanctification or renewal is to be 
distinguished from justification, and that the new obedience is not a cause 
or an essential part of our justification, because it is an effect or result.212 
Chemnitz goes on to talk about how the distinction between such cause and its effect 
allows people to comfort themselves when they subjectively do not feel “joy, peace, or 
                                                 
209 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, I:56-62. Preus gives the citation for Cyril’s Thesarus as MPG 
75.24 ff. 
210 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:470. Confer Chemnitz, Examination of the Council of Trent 468. 
211 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:474. 
212 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:555. 
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happiness.”213 Then, in discussion at the locus of Good Works, he contrasts justification 
and good works, or sanctification, making it clear that faith-produced good works do 
follow justification,214 and, again similar to the treatment of righteousness in the Formula, 
he further adds, to the treatment of Good Works from Melanchthon’s Loci, discussion of 
terminology, such as distinguishing an affective sense and a formal sense to the term 
“sanctification”.215 Later, Chemnitz cites the same excerpt from Luther’s 1535 Galatians 
commentary regarding the necessary separation of the discussion of good works from the 
locus of justification.216 
 In short, Chemnitz makes distinctions like Scotus’s formal distinctions at the 
locus of the Trinity where his teachers Luther and Melanchthon would not, although 
Chemnitz, perhaps out of respect for his teachers, did not, in the passages cited, term such 
distinctions a “formal distinction”. Both at the locus of the Trinity and at the locus of 
Justification (like Melanchthon), Chemnitz, by his similar applications of the distinction, 
can be seen as clearly making Scotus-like formal distinctions. Seemingly in keeping with 
Scotus’s definition of the distinction, Chemnitz does not conceive of justification and 
sanctification as potentially occurring separately but nevertheless defines each 
independent of the other for the sake of preserving what he regards as the true teaching of 
justification.217 
Summary of justification-sanctification as a “formal distinction” 
 Considering the justification-sanctification distinction to be a “formal distinction” 
such as that of Scotus is not out of the question.218 Although John Duns Scotus did not 
                                                 
213 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:555. 
214 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:573. 
215 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:574-575. 
216 Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, II:619. Confer WAI:240; AE 26:137; SD III:29, BKS, 923-924; 
Tappert, 544 (above at n.83, p.127). 
217 Recall Ep I:19’s rejection of Flacius’s rejection of what appears to be the formal distinction 
(above, n.30, p.103) and SD III:40-41’s use of the Luther quote essentially referring to justification and 
sanctification as inseparable but nevertheless distinct (above, n.75, p.354). 
218 The whole matter of the formal distinction’s complicating God’s simplicity seems to be not 
really relevant to the discussion of justification and sanctification being formally distinct, unless one sees 
some need for that process to be “simple”. 
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invent the formal distinction, he is best known for the distinguishing different aspects of 
one thing when the aspects are both in some sense identical and capable of being defined 
independently.219 That Scotus considered cause and caused to be disjunctive attributes of 
being is also significant.220 Although the distinction was primarily used in discussing God 
and His attributes, other applications have been noted, and Scotus’s works have been 
observed to consistently speak of a qualified formal distinction.221 Subsequent theoligian-
philosophers such as William of Ockham made similar if not the same type of 
distinctions as Scotus did in some of the same applications, especially those in the 
theological realm. 
 While the foregoing survey of principally Luther’s and Chemnitz’s regard for 
Scotus and the formal distinction with which he is usually associated did not provide 
definitive proof that the justification-sanctification distinction is or is not a “formal 
distinction”, one might reasonably conclude that it is. From the foregoing evidence it is 
clear that Melanchthon and Luther, the authors of the early writings in The Book of 
Concord, knew of Scotus’ formal distinction. While they generally spoke ill of Scotus 
and may have refused to make every formal distinction he made and to refer to those 
distinctions like his that they did make as “formal distinctions”, they nevertheless could 
have made use of his formal distinction, even without terming it such. In fact, 
Melanchthon can be taken in Apology IV:375 to have made the formal distinctin 
precisely regarding justification and sanctification. Chemnitz, one of the authors of the 
later writings in The Book of Concord, was a student of Melanchthon’s and Luther’s and 
almost certainly knew of the formal distinction and of their generally negative regard for 
it. For that very reason, Chemnitz may well have been inclined to avoid the term, as he 
did, if he were to use the distinction, which the evidence suggests he also did. 
                                                 
219 Various names are used by Scotus to refer to what are distinguished within the same thing: 
“‘realities’ (realitates), ‘formalities’ (formalitates), ‘aspects’ (rationes), ‘formal aspects’ (rationes 
formales), ‘intentions’ (intentiones), or ‘real aspects’ (rationes reales)” (Adams, “Universals in the Early 
Fourteenth Century,” 415). 
220 See above, n.150. 
221 Although it may not be the sense in which Scotus or Dumont as he interprets Scotus uses it, the 
Reformers do “qualify” the distinction between justification and sanctification in that it is only made at the 
locus of justification, nowhere else. 
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 Admittedly, the formal distinction is not specifically mentioned in the writings 
that are contained in The Book of Concord, and the writings of Luther, Melanchthon, and 
Chemnitz just considered were from outside The Book of Concord and therefore by and 
large lack its authoritative normative force. There are at least three potential reasons for 
the distinction’s not being mentioned in The Book of Concord. A first reason that the 
formal distinction may not be mentioned in The Book of Concord is that the discussion of 
the Trinity, at which point the term is often introduced, is for the most part absent from 
the works in The Book of Concord. The locus of the Trinity was not one of contention 
between the Lutherans and the Roman Catholics nor, for the most part, between the 
Lutherans and the Reformed pseudo-Lutherans.222 A second reason the formal distinction 
may not be mentioned is that, as has been seen, at least two of the principal authors 
(namely, Luther and Melanchthon) had a quite negative regard for the distinction and its 
chief advocate Scotus, and a third author (namely, Chemnitz) may have avoided using the 
term due to their negative regard. A third reason that the formal distinction may not be 
mentioned is that in some cases the Reformers avoided using technical terms that would 
be unfamiliar to the average person;223 the uses of the term considered above were 
primarily in academic settings, and The Book of Concord had at least somewhat of a 
different target. Yet, the failure to find the term used does not mean the distinction is not 
being made, especially given the considered examples from writings outside and inside 
The Book of Concord where the distinction is arguably in use. To be sure, disregard for a 
philosopher or one aspect of his teaching does not keep the Reformers from using the 
philosopher or other aspects of his teaching, with or without mentioning him by name. 
 Thinking of the justification-sanctification distinction as a formal distinction has 
several advantages. First, while the Reformers do distinguish between justification and 
sanctification at the locus of justification, in other places (presumably all of them) they 
want to emphasize that justification and sanctification are in a sense united, and the 
                                                 
222 For the case of the Roman Catholics, see AC I and Ap I. For the case of the Reformed pseudo-
Lutherans, note the lack of an article on the Trinity, but see the claim Luther made that is discussed above 
in n.204. 
223 Ep II:23-24 and its counterpart, SD I:54, are examples; there the Reformers recommend not 
using the terms substantia and accidens in sermons when teaching about original sin. 
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formal distinction helps in that emphasis.224 Such an emphasis on unity with distinction is 
in keeping with Scotus’s logical and metaphysical motivation behind the formal 
distinction,225 and the specific relationship between justification and sanctification as 
“cause” to “caused” also fits. Second, if one is inclined to accept McGrath’s claim that 
there is some degree of innovation in the Reformers’ treatment of justification and 
sanctification, one might posit that the Reformers’ innovation is in making a formal 
distinction between the two and in using the word “sanctification” in a narrow sense to 
speak of the aspect distinguished from the aspect referred to by “justification” in the 
narrow sense. McGrath’s own evidence, as was discussed above, demonstrates that the 
Reformers were not the first to distinguish stages in the process known as the broad 
senses of “justification” and “sanctification”, but they may well have been the first to 
articulate the distinction the way that they have been seen to articulate it. Third and 
finally, the consideration of the justification-sanctification distinction as a formal 
distinction has reinforced the understanding that the authors of both the earlier writings in 
The Book of Concord and the authors of its later writings essentially agree on the matter 
of the justification-sanctification distinction, even if the precise expressions are not 
identical. Moreover, the use of such a middle distinction, although it may be new to the 
discussion of justification and sanctification, is nevertheless perfectly in keeping with the 
preceding medieval philosophical tradition. That fact further minimizes McGrath’s 
concern over the “notional” distinction that the Reformers make between the two aspects 
of God’s one work in the lives of believers. 
                                                 
224 Grajewski, for example, discusses how understanding distinctions helps understand unity 
(Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, xii; Grajewski cites Thomas Harper, The Metaphysics of the School, `. 
I, 3 vols. [New York: Peter Smith, 1940], 342, and Jacques Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, trans. 
Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson [New York: Scribner, 1938], ix). 
 For his part, Engelland sees Melanchthon as emphasizing the unity of justification and 
sanctification, at least in the broad sense of the word “justification” as the “total benefit” (Hans Engelland, 
“Introduction,” Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, Library of Protestant Thought 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1965], xxxix-xl). 
225 Adams writes: “often in philosophy and theology there is reason to deny that x and y are really 
distinct things (res) and yet apparent cause to affirm that x is F and y is not F” (Adams, “Universals in the 
Early Fourteenth Century,” 415). 
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Chapter V summary 
 Chapter V has shown that the Reformers’ distinction between justification and 
sanctification, against their opponents, is the logical result of philosophy serving theology 
with the goal of preserving the teaching of justification by faith. The Reformers refuse to 
say that good works are necessary for salvation, but they similarly cannot imagine 
salvation occurring without good works necessarily following as an effect follows its 
cause. They indicate sanctification’s (or good works’) following justification as a logical 
necessity by use of prius and other indicators (gerundives and other words indicating 
necessity), and such indications are consistent within the Reformation era writings’ 
mentions of sanctification. Where the claim is arguably falsely made that the distinction 
between justification and sanctification is theologically discontinuous with the preceding 
era, the distinction, likely an example of Scotus’ “formal distinction”, is certainly 
philosophically continuous.226 While the justification-sanctification distinction is never 
called a “formal distinction”—perhaps because of the Reformers’ antipathy to Scotus, its 
primary advocate—contextual clues in the writings of the Reformers both inside and 
outside The Book of Concord indicate that the distinction both was still discussed and is 
likely intended in this case. A formal distinction between justification and sanctification 
preserves their inseparability but allows that in some ways they be treated independently, 
which serves the Reformers’ goals of keeping with Scripture, comforting consciences, 
and giving glory to Christ. 
                                                 
226 For the purposes of this dissertation, even if the claim of theological discontinuity were true, it 
would not necessarily mean the distinction was philosophically discontinuous. 
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Chapter VI:  
Consideration of Findings and Conclusion 
. . . we are not minded to manufacture anything new by this work of 
agreement or to depart in any way at all, either in content or in 
formulation, from the divine truth that our pious forebears and we have 
acknowledged and confessed in the past . . . 
 —Preface to The Book of Concord 
The second generation of Reformers certainly did not intend to innovate theologically in 
comparison to their predecessors, who for them include not only the first generation of 
Reformers but also Christians from the beginning, as they make clear contextually by 
referring not only to the earlier confessional writings but also to Scripture and the three 
Creeds. The primary question being asked in this dissertation, however, centers on the 
continuity not of their theology but of their philosophy. Did the second-generation of 
Reformers or their forebears innovate philosophically? Using a close reading to explore 
the logic and argumentation of The Book of Concord, this dissertation has considered 
both the Reformers’ opposition to philosophy and their use of philosophy despite that 
opposition, with a view also to the continuity of that use with the preceding medieval 
period and within the Reformation era. The working hypothesis was as follows: 
Despite a second-order repudiation of philoshopy, logic and philosophical 
argumentation are not a problem for either the authors of the earlier 
documents or the authors of the later documents contained in The Book of 
Concord; rather, consistent with the preceding medieval tradition, the 
problem with philosophy and philosophers seems to arise where the use of 
such methods directly contradicts how the authors understood God’s 
revelation in the Bible. 
The evidence gathered and considered in the preceding chapters bears out the working 
hypothesis. Before concluding the dissertation, this chapter presents a summary of that 
evidence regarding uses, considers those findings in terms of the present research 
questions, suggests implications of the research, and offers reflections that might lead to 
questions for future research. 
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Summary of evidence regarding uses 
 First, then is the summary of the evidence regarding uses. The Book of Concord 
clearly uses philosophy at the supra-sentential level, that of logic and argumentation. 
Such uses have been examined pertaining to the confessors’ organization of their works 
according to  or loci (“topics” or “places”), their positive second-order regard for 
logic, their first order use of logic and argumentation by both inductive methods 
(example and analogy) and deductive methods (syllogisms), and their distinction between 
justification and sanctification that is philosophical in nature but nevertheless a product of 
philosophy in the ministerial handmaiden role. 
 The organization of content according to  or loci for all practical purposes 
began with Aristotle and continued to some extent by way of figures like Cicero, 
Rudolph Agricola, and Erasmus through the period leading up to the Reformation. While 
the dialectical (or logical) and rhetorical uses of the method are variously related or 
distinguished in Aristotle himself and those that followed him, the authors of the works 
contained in The Book of Concord, used the logic to serve the rhetoric, but even that is 
not their innovation. The Book of Concord uses the word locus, loci in a number of 
different but related senses, from a general place, to a specific passage, to a point or 
argument, to a whole doctrinal article. That last sense of a whole doctrinal article is 
where the organizational role is found, principally in reference to the “chief locus” of 
justification by faith and the closely related topic of penitence, although the vast majority 
if not all of the doctrinal articles in the writings considered more or less relate to the main 
article of justification. All the documents in The Book of Concord, both early and late, 
use the loci method, and such documents use the method, essentially in continuity with 
the preceding tradition. While the Reformers are accused of letting the loci method distort 
their educational method and the faith itself, especially by turning faith into head 
knowledge, such claims were seen not to hold up, however, as the Reformers’ primary 
concern is on faith that can be certain of salvation, and sanctified reason for them is a 
means to that end. Thus, philosophy is put in service of theology both by the teacher of 
the faith and by the individual believer. 
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 Although they were neutral or negative about second-order “philosophy” and its 
related words, the authors of the works contained in The Book of Concord, both those 
early in the sixteenth century and those later, generally had a positive second-order regard 
for logic, as did, arguably, the bulk of the tradition leading up to their time period. Where 
the Reformers write negatively of logic their criticism is not directed at logic per se but at 
their opponents’ poor use of it in order to deceive and trick people into their opponents’ 
errors. Frequently the writings of the Bible are the basis for the Reformers’ opponents’ 
distortions, as the writings of the Bible are the basis for the Reformers’ own logical 
claims. To some extent the Reformers’ accusing their opponents of bad logic may also be 
a rhetorical or polemical device, but no examples were seen where the Reformers’ 
accusation was not accompanied by a case in point. For the Reformers, logic and human 
reason are impacted by original sin and cannot be used over the writings of the Bible but 
must remain subservient to them. 
 With the Reformers generally having a positive second-order regard for logic, 
their use both of induction by example and by analogy and of deduction by syllogism is 
not surprising. Such methods, in both their dialectical and rhetorical uses, also go back to 
Aristotle, and are used, in the case of induction, generally to reason from particulars to 
universals and, in the case of deduction, from universals to particulars. Medieval 
theologians made use of the inductive methods on some controversial issues, none of 
which were in contention between the Reformers and their opponents, which is not to say 
that the Reformers’ own use of the methods was discontinuous with the preceding 
tradition. The Reformers, early and late, capitalized on their own education in example 
and analogy and drew on a number of different Biblical and other examples to provide a 
basis for their reasoning on a wide range of loci, both for their own positions and against 
their opponents’ positions. The Reformers, who describe guidelines for the use of 
example, significantly criticize their opponents regarding teachings, such as those 
regarding the Mass and the Invocation of the Saints, that lack Biblical examples. The 
Reformers especially make use of analogy as it relates to the “analogy of faith”, which is 
equated to Scripture and their own confessional writings, as normative standards to allow 
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some things and disallow others. (A similar concept used by the Reformers is “the 
example of the Church”.) Analogy is said to be especially useful for those less-initiated. 
The Reformers in some cases criticize their opponents’ use of analogy but not analogy 
itself, although analogy does have its limits for the Reformers: it cannot be used over and 
against the Word of God.  
 Deductive syllogisms were also used in service to but not over Scripture. 
Although not every point in The Book of Concord merited such an elaborate argument, at 
least one extended argument and accompanying proofs stretched up to a full section. 
Even where partial or full syllogisms were not present, the vocabulary used by the 
Reformers nevertheless reflected the philosophical milieu. Scripture was a critical 
component for the Reformers’ arguments, although in some cases premises were assumed 
or provided from general principles otherwise demonstrated or assumed. As with the 
Reformers’ use of inductive methods, their use of the deductive methods generally 
followed uses in the period of time that preceded them and did not hesitate to dissect their 
opponents’ arguments at a technical level. Both inductive and deductive methods were 
put in service of establishing and defending the truth of the chief locus of justification by 
faith, itself a “general principle”, and its related loci. And, again this supra-sentential use 
of philosophy is for both the theological teacher and the individual believer, especially 
for his or her comfort. 
 A pair of premises comes before a conclusion that logically follows, and, in a 
similar way for the Reformers, faith of necessity comes before (prius) good works. In 
both earlier and later works in The Book of Concord, faith or its variously used 
equivalents—such as forgiveness, reconciliation, justification, rebirth, receiving the Holy 
Spirit—for the Reformers must precede works or their variously used equivalents—such 
as keeping the law and love. The Reformers base their exposition of this logical sequence 
on Scripture. The existence of faith is essentially treated as a premise from which the 
conclusion of good works certainly follows, as an effect follows a cause. In this way, as 
also in others, faith and good works are inseparably joined, but what amounts to a formal 
distinction between justification and sanctification nevertheless allows the Reformers to 
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treat them separately (at different loci) in order to preserve the teaching of justification by 
faith in Christ. Thus, the authors of both the earlier and later works in The Book of 
Concord, for the sake of preserving the teaching of justification by faith alone, make a 
logical distinction between justification that comes by faith and the sanctification that 
produces good works. Although the charge is made that this logical distinction is a point 
of discontinuity with the medieval period, the distinction is supported in the preceding era 
in spirit if not in letter. In addition, even one of the most strident claimants of innovation 
grants that the distinction is only notional and that the Reformers do not actually separate 
justification from sanctification. The logical “formal” distinction between justification 
and sanctification is an extremely valuable illustration of the supra-sentential philosophy 
in The Book of Concord serving its theology, principally the chief locus of justification 
by faith alone. 
Findings for questions 
 With the evidence regarding the uses of logic and argumentation summarized, 
attention now turns to how those findings relate to the three specific research sub-
questions: the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, continuity and 
discontinuity between the late-medieval period and the Reformation period, and 
continuity and discontinuity between the initial Reformers and the next generation. 
Repudiation but simultaneous use  
 The first of those sub-questions is the repudiation but simultaneous use of 
philosophy. The repudiation is seen in the second-order data regarding mentions of 
“philosophers”, “philosophy”, “philosophical”, “philosophize”, and “logic”. In the case 
of The Book of Concord’s references to the “philosophy” cognates, despite some neutral 
mentions, the Reformers’ regard was overwhelmingly negative, particularly at the locus 
of justification and those more-closely related to it. The Reformers were explicitly 
against any mingling of things philosophical with things theological, setting things 
philosophical opposite the Word of God and labeling opponents “philosophers” and 
grouping them with other opponents polemically termed. In the case of The Book of 
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Concord’s second-order mentions of “logic”, those connected with the Reformers’ 
opponents were negative, while those connected with the Reformers themselves were 
positive. The simultaneous use is seen in the first-order data regarding the  or loci 
method of organization, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the logical distinction 
between justification and sanctification, fully in service of the chief locus of justification. 
The Reformers clearly make supra-sentential use of philosophy and allow that its 
methods can and even must be used up to a point.  
 Although the sub-question is answered that there is in The Book of Concord a 
repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, one is inclined to ask why there is a 
repudiation of philosophy if the Reformers nevertheless use its logic and argumentation. 
That question is harder to answer definitively, but some tentative answers may be 
proffered. First, some arguably polemical uses of the “philosopher” label were observed, 
and there seems to be a sense in which the Reformers are tapping into a history of 
denigrating an opponent by the use of such a term. Second, in at least some cases where 
the second-order repudiation is found even an objective reader must affirm the 
Reformers’ criticism of their opponents’ philosophical method or logical argument. Third 
and finally, the Reformers cast philosophy and its logic in ministerial roles, as handmaids 
to theology, so a repudiation from the Reformers is not surprising when their opponents’ 
philosophizing and logic exceed that handmaid role and become the “devil’s whore”. 
 One wonders why the reformers would repudiate philosophy but nevertheless still 
use it. One could think that they initially desired more of a break with the preceding 
medieval philosophical tradition but later realized that they needed that philosophical 
tradition more than they originally thought. However, the consistency of the polemic 
against philosophy and the simultaneous use despite that polemic militates against such 
thinking. Rather, it seems that the Reformers were both tapping into a long-standing 
polemic of negatively regarding opposing teachers and at the same time accurately 
critiquing their opponents’ bad logic and argumentation. The polemical labels—such as 
“sophist”, which goes back to Socrates and Plato—can arguably be said to come 
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precisely where the Reformers’ opponents use logic poorly and let the argumentation 
exceed its set limits. 
 A final point regarding the repudiation but simultaneous use centers on an “irony” 
of sorts—that it is both precisely in regards to the locus of justification where philosophy 
is most severely criticized and in regards to the locus of justification where philosophy’s 
logic and argumentation are arguably put in the greatest service of theology. The loci 
method itself allows the Reformers to somewhat separate their teaching regarding 
justification by faith from their teaching regarding the sanctification (or good works) that 
necessarily follows justification. In keeping with that difference in definition but logical 
inseparability, the Reformers use what is essentially Scotus’s formal distinction to further 
keep the faith that saves both separate from but united to the works that follow. 
Continuity between the medieval and Reformation eras 
 The second sub-question is about the continuity and discontinuity between the 
medieval and Reformation eras. Chapter I outlined how the tension between theology and 
philosophy has more or less existed since the beginning, so the second-order data 
indicating a repudiation of philosophy and logic certainly has some precedent from Old 
Testament times forward. The handmaid metaphor served as lens for seeing how some 
theological philosophers (or philosophical theologians) drew up the job descriptions for 
philosophy as a handmaid and how others let her take over the house. In Chapters I and 
II, the Reformers’ “continuous” repudiation of philosophy and logic were seen. The 
Reformers were certainly not the first to repudiate philosophy, and their simultaneous use 
indicates the extent to which that repudiation was to be taken. The Reformers knew 
logic’s and argumentation’s places, and they kept them there.  
 For the Reformers philosophy was serving theology as a handmaid in their 
various uses that were continuous with the preceding tradition. The  or loci method 
can be traced through Aristotle, Cicero, Agricola, Erasmus, and the like, even as the 
Reformers related the method’s uses to logic and rhetoric, focusing arguments and 
indexing and arranging the Bible’s teaching as means to theological ends. (There 
certainly also is a sense in which Peter Lombard’s Sentences and Thomas Aquinas’s 
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Summa were topically-oriented theological works.) Similarly, the Reformers’ induction 
by example and analogy goes back to Aristotle. Although contentious medieval issues 
connected to these methods of induction were not at issue in The Book of Concord, that 
fact does not make the methods’ use discontinuous. The Reformers made use of these 
methods especially for less-initiated, and they followed Aristotle both in deriving and 
applying universal principles regarding both examples and analogies and in turning their 
opponents’ arguments into their own. Likewise, the deductive syllogisms used in The 
Book of Concord originate in the philosophy of Aristotle and figure prominently in logic 
all through the time period leading up to the Reformation. While not every locus has 
fully-developed syllogisms, the technical terminology and vocabulary related to 
syllogistic reasoning is quite frequently present at the various loci, and that same 
terminology and vocabulary makes it clear that the Reformers are not just thinking 
deductively but they are also doing so after the manner of Aristotle and those who 
followed him. Finally, even if the Reformers’ justification-sanctification distinction is an 
unique application of philosophy’s logic and argumentation, the philosophical 
relationships and concepts (for example, the relationship of cause to effect and the 
concept of the formal distinction) are nevertheless continuous with some lines from the 
preceding medieval era. 
 While the sub-question is answered that there is continuity of the philosophical 
uses between the preceding medieval era and the Reformation era, the wording of the 
foregoing phrase, “with some lines from the preceding medieval era”, makes clear one of 
the considerations regarding this finding. What constitutes continuity? How is continuity 
defined? If, for the sake of argument, the Reformers are a continuation of Ockham’s line 
but Ockham innovated in his use of philosophy, are the Reformers still continuous? 
Augustine is frequently said to have heavily influenced Luther and the other Reformers, 
especially through Gregory of Rimini; what if the line with which the Reformers are 
continuous had to skip an intervening millennium or so, does it still constitute continuity? 
Significantly, where aspects of a philosophical tradition are rejected, that which is 
rejected might be seen as a later accretion. Under this view, the Lutherans’ break with 
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that preceding tradition to return to an earlier one would be true reformation in the sense 
of a return “to a primitive excellence”.1 Another consideration regarding this finding is 
that the at least the first generation of Reformers were for the most part products of the 
late-medieval tradition, even though Luther at least came in some contact with 
humanism. The Reformers may have at one time intended a cleaner break with their own 
past, but as they realized the benefits of philosophy’s methods they may have found 
themselves keeping more of it than they had intended. Wittenberg’s University’s 
temporary abandonment of degree disputations could be a case in point, but the 
consistency with which philosophy’s methods are repudiated but nevertheless used 
militates against such an explanation. 
Continuity within the Reformation era 
 The third sub-question is about the continuity and discontinuity within the 
Reformation era, between the earlier and later Reformers. No significant differences were 
found in their second-order regards for philosophy, and there was also no essential 
difference in their second-order regards for logic, even though the earlier Reformers’ 
references were all negative about their opponents’ and the later Reformers’ references 
were all positive about their own uses. In the case of organization by the  or loci 
method, all of the documents in The Book of Concord are so organized, both those of the 
earlier authors and those of the later authors. In the case of the inductive methods of 
analogy and example, even if the uses of these methods are found somewhat less 
frequently in writings other than the Apology (The Book of Concord’s longest single 
work), the early and late uses are nevertheless consistently made and made both for the 
Reformers’ positions and against their opponents’ positions. Likewise both earlier and 
later authors envision that the analogy of faith plays an important normative role, such as 
determining what philosophical sub-sentential terminology is to be used in service to 
theology. In the case of the deductive method, Melanchthon the logic teacher again in the 
Apology makes the most use of the method, but syllogisms are also found in the 
                                                 
1 See above at n.105, p.37. 
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confessional writings by Luther (albeit in a “simpler” syllogistic form) and in the 
confessional writing of their students. Furthermore, even where syllogistic forms are 
lacking but terminology or related vocabulary are present, deductive reasoning is in view, 
especially also where a later confessional article has taken over arguments from an earlier 
one. In the case of the justification-sanctification, the distinction is made in the earlier 
and later works, although the logical nature of the distinction is certainly more explicit in 
the later work, even as Chemnitz comes the closest of those considered to actually 
making the distinction’s connection to Scotus’s formal distionction. 
 The sub-question is answered that there is continuity of the philosophical uses 
within the Reformation era, but the findings again merit two further considerations. First, 
as with the earlier Reformers being products of the late-medieval tradition, so the later 
reformer were products of the Reformation tradition. The Formula’s principal author, 
Chemnitz, studied at Wittenberg and had a close association with Melanchthon, and even 
Andreä, who did not himself study at Wittenberg, came under the school’s influence via 
Brenz. The second consideration is more complex. At the time of the controversies that 
precipitated the Formula of Concord, there were various parties and factions, each at least 
to some extent claiming to be the correct interpreters of the Augsburg Confession. 
Perhaps from a socio-political point of view, Senator Marcy W. Learned’s 1832 
statement regarding patronage is true in this case: “to the victor belong the spoils”.2 By 
this thinking, if a different one of the factions had triumphed in the conflict, the degree to 
which the uses of philosophy would be continuous within the Reformation era would 
likely be different, especially as philosophical terminology and logic were more involved 
in some of the controversies. The Reformers, however, might have argued against this 
socio-political view that the triumph in the conflict was itself determined by the truth of 
the various claims and that the level of philosophical involvement in those claims was a 
determining factor (in other words, that God’s providence saw to it that the spoils went to 
the victorious theological truths with the duly deferential philosophical handmaid). 
                                                 
2 Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested from the Congressional Research 
Service, 1989, Library of Congress, Available: http://www.bartleby.com/73/1314.html, March 7, 2007. 
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Implications of this research 
 Was ist das? (“What does this mean?”) is a classic catechetical question, and it is 
to the implications or meaning of this research that this next section of this chapter now 
turns. For example, shortly after the 2004 presidential election, Pulitzer Prize winner 
Maureen Dowd criticized George W. Bush’s presidency for “replacing science with 
religion” and said “We’re entering another dark age”.3 One take on Dowd’s statement 
was that she was afraid “religious superstition and religious bigotry will replace science 
and reason.”4 Regardless of the statement’s accuracy or the accuracy of its interpretation, 
Dowd’s dire prediction highlights contemporary tension between religion and reason. 
Such tension between religion and reason is often associated with the last “dark ages”, 
and Martin Luther and his reform are generally characterized in the manner of Dowd’s 
prediction. For example, the character Lazarus in John Calvin Batchelor’s 1983 novel 
The Birth of the People’s Republic of Antarctica tells the protagonist, “You 
Lutherans…turn your face from the Age of Reason that you helped birth.”5 Lazarus 
mischaracterizes Luther’s position on reason; the simultaneous continuous use of 
philosophy militates against such perceptions and portrayals, which has significance for 
those who see religion in modern society as antithetical to reason. How one understands 
that tension between religion and reason to have been resolved in the 16th century bears 
on how we might see resolution of that tension take place in our time. Illuminating that 
process is the first of the implications of this research. 
 Other implications of this research are less universal in their application. A 
second implication has to do with work being done between different religious traditions 
and denominations. Since The Book of Concord continues to serve as a confessional 
standard for many Lutherans worldwide, the elucidation of philosophy’s role in past 
religious differences might aid in discovering present common ground obscured by 
                                                 
3 Maureen Dowd, “Rove's Revenge,” New York Times November 7, 2004.  
4 Joe Scarborough, 2005 (April 9), MSNBC.com, Available: 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6330851, April 16, 2005. 




centuries of misunderstanding. Third, those who care about the internal claim of The 
Book of Concord that it maintained continuity and did not make anything new “in content 
or in formulation” can know that philosophically speaking that claim is demonstrated to 
be true. And fourth and finally, while the need for philosophical knowledge in theological 
instruction may seem obvious, seminarians experience it piecemeal, if at all; a systematic 
and coherent working through of philosophy’s sub-sentential, sentential, and 
supra-sentential uses that pertain to theology’s loci would be ideal. For this last 
implication to fully bear fruit, more research is needed, however. 
Reflections for future questions 
 Beyond the obvious need to consider the preliminary hypothesis in light of the 
sentential and sub-sentential uses of philosophy in The Book of Concord and the 
precedents of those uses,6 the dissertation’s findings led to several reflections that might 
have bearing on future research. First, if one were to consider The Book of Concord’s use 
of justification by faith alone as a general principle and then develop a system of 
theology as one might develop a system of mathematics, with self-evident axioms and 
deducible theorems both contributing to proofs, one might wonder into which category 
justification by faith alone should be placed: axiom or theorem. At times the authors of 
the works contained in The Book of Concord treat justification by faith alone as a self-
evident axiom, perhaps because for them as believers in Christ its truth is at least to some 
extent subjectively self-evident. Yet, in other places, most especially Apology IV:75-121, 
the confessors try to objectively demonstrate the truth of justification by faith alone, 
which would suggest its categorization as a theorem. One wonders, if justification by 
faith alone is demonstrable, whether it remains something received by faith. An answer 
may lie in the subjective appropriation of what is objectively true, or an answer may rest 
in the fact that the demonstration relies on Scripture, which itself is accepted on the basis 
of faith (faith itself at least logically preceding the acceptance of Scripture). 
                                                 
6 For examples, the locus of the two natures personally united in Christ includes sub-sentential 
philosophical terminology and concepts, and loci such as original sin, free will, and predestination include 
sentential philosophical content. 
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 Second, the appearance that, when it comes to justification by faith alone, that the 
Reformers are arguing in a circle, with their agenda becoming an axiom that leads them 
to that very conclusion, seems to warrant still-closer scrutiny. Not every proposed 
structure of Apology IV’s argument is the same, nor need they be, but a critical 
consideration of the argument over the whole article might demonstrate or disprove the 
suspicion of circularity. Somewhat similarly, the “example of the Church”, the “analogy 
of faith” and the “analogy of the Word of God” are universal principles arrived at 
inductively from particulars, but they are also “deductively” applied as principles that 
norm how examples and analogies are to be used and understood. Finding the beginning 
of that cycle is a bit like asking, “Which came first: the chicken or the egg?” (with every 
intention of alluding to the Greek philosopher Plutarch who is said to have introduced 
that proverbial dilemma). If locating the beginning of the process is shrouded in mystery, 
that mystery may be where the Reformers would suggest the Holy Spirit enters the 
process. The Spirit works through the Word and ultimately is the One Who guides 
Jesus’s followers into all truth. The Spirit works through means and keeps alive in the 
Church the correct understanding of both the particular examples and the universal 
principles. (Sola scriptura is not a campaign slogan for the Reformers that produces a 
Biblical or Biblicist fundamentalism.) 
 Third, returning for a moment to the questions about the distinction between 
justification and sanctification. Would the Reformers or their followers today be able to 
construct a proof to support the distinction that would meet the klar genug (“clear 
enough”) standard of proof of which the Reformers themselves make use? Would the 
Reformers be done in by their own expectations? That the Reformers make a case, if not 
a structured proof, to support their distinction is clear, as are its Scriptural base and 
logical result, especially given their goal of protecting justification by faith alone. That 
their case may not be convincing to everyone is also clear. That the nature of justification 
as distinct from sanctification continued to be a source of controversy in the time 
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immediately following the Reformation and continues to be a source of controversy in 
modern times7 suggests there may be a higher standard of proof. 
 Finally, there is the somewhat-classic question about the authors’ intent, which 
question also takes up considerations of awareness and consciousness. For example, is it 
possible that the Reformers were just arguing syllogistically without necessarily being 
“philosophical” about it? One must almost deny the possibility, for, in using 
philosophical terminology such as “major” and “minor” to refer to the two premises that 
must lead to the resulting conclusion, they seem to be both aware of and consciously 
intending to use the Aristotelian method. Another example is the formal distinction of 
Duns Scotus. This dissertation has concluded that the evidence suggests the Reformers, 
despite their never specifically using the term in the context, are using the subtile doctor’s 
device to both separate and keep together justification and sanctification. They may have 
been doing so subconsciously, but they may also have been so polemicized against 
Scotus and his formal distinction (or have been so aware of others’ opposition to it) that 
they could not bring themselves to use the term. Given the evidence considered herein, 
one hardly can come to a firm conclusion, and that there is evidence out there that would 
support a firm conclusion is hard to imagine. 
Conclusion 
 In short, The Book of Concord repudiates philosophy and logic but nevertheless 
simultaneously makes supra-sentential use of them in the forms of the  or loci 
method of organization and inductive and deductive reasoning. A significant example of 
The Book of Concord’s use of philosophy is the logical “formal distinction” made 
between justification and sanctification, which is demonstrably in keeping with the 
handmaid role that The Book of Concord’s authors give philosophy in service to 
theology. Although the authors hold that fallen human reason cannot properly use 
philosophy and its logic, they allow that logic enlightened by Scripture and baptized 
reason can and even must be used, up to a point. Returning to the illustrations that began 
                                                 
7 Parties on both sides of the 1999 Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification readily 
admitted it was an agreement in name only. 
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this dissertation, the Reformers might themselves say Athens has much to do with 
Jerusalem, Wittenberg, and all points beyond. The Academy and the Church can have 
harmony, as long as a philosophical blend of Christianity is avoided by philosophy 
serving theology as her handmaid. 
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Appendix: The Book of Concord by Structure and 
Content 
Augsburg Confession The Apology to the A.C. 
(Articles of Faith and Doctrine)  
I. God I. God 
II. Original Sin II. Original Sin 
III. The Son of God III. Christ 
IV. Justification IV. Justification 
 What Is Justifying Faith? 
 Faith In Christ Justifies 
 We Obtain the Forgiveness of Sins 
only by Faith in Christ 
 Love and the Keeping of the Law 
 Reply to the Opponents’ Arguments 
V. The Office of the Ministry  
VI. The New Obedience  
VII. The Church VII/VIII The Church 
VIII. What the Church Is  
IX. Baptism IX. Baptism 
X. The Holy Supper of Our Lord X. The Holy Supper 
XI. Confession XI. Confession 
XII. Repentance XII. Penitence 
XIII. The Use of the Sacraments XIII. The Number and Use of the Sacraments 
XIV. Order in the Church XIV. Ecclesiastical Order 
XV. Church Usages XV. Human Traditions in the Church 
XVI. Civil Government XVI. Political Order 
XVII. The Return of Christ to Judgment XVII. Christ’s Return to Judgment 
XVIII. Freedom of the Will XVIII. Free Will 
XIX. The Cause of Sin XIX. The Cause of Sin 
XX. Faith and Good Works XX. Good Works 
XXI. The Cult of the Saints XXI. The Invocation of the Saints 
(Articles about Matters in Dispute)  
XXII. Both Kinds in the Sacrament XXII. The Lord’s Supper Under Both Kinds 
XXIII. The Marriage of Priests XXIII. The Marriage of Priests 
XXIV. The Mass XXIV. The Mass 
XXV. Confession  
XXVI. The Distinction of Foods  
XXVII. Monastic Vows XXVII. Monastic Vows 
XXVIII. The Power of Bishops XXVIII. Ecclesiastical Power 
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The Smalcald Articles 
Part I: Sublime Articles of the Divine Majesty 
Part II: Office and Work of Jesus Christ 
I. Christ and Faith 
II. The Mass 
The Invocation of the Saints 
III. Chapters and Monasteries 
IV. The Papacy 
Part III: Matters we may discuss with learned and sensible men, or even among ourselves 
I. Sin 
II. The Law 
III. Repentance 
The False Repentance of the Papists 
IV. The Gospel 
V. Baptism 
VI. The Sacrament of the Altar 
VII. The Keys 
VIII. Confession 
IX. Excommunication 
X. Ordination and Vocation 
XI. The Marriage of Priests 
XII. The Church 
XIII. How Man is Justified Before God, and His Good Works 
XIV. Monastic Vows 
XV. Human Traditions 
 
The Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope 
Testimony of the Scriptures 
Testimony from History 
Arguments of Opponents Refuted 
The Marks of the Antichrist 




The Small Catechism The Large Catechism 
The Ten Commandments First Part: The Ten Commandments 
The First The First Commandment 
 Explanation of the 
Appendix 
The Second The Second Commandment 
The Third The Third Commandment 
The Fourth The Fourth Commandment 
The Fifth The Fifth Commandment 
The Sixth The Sixth Commandment 
The Seventh The Seventh Commandment 
The Eighth The Eighth Commandment 
The Ninth The Ninth and Tenth 
Commandments 
The Tenth  
Conclusion Conclusion of the Ten 
Commandments 
The Creed Second Part: The Creed 
The First Article: Creation The First Article 
The Second Article: Redemption The Second Article 
The Third Article: Sanctification The Third Article 
The Lord’s Prayer Third Part: The Lord’s Prayer 
Introduction Introduction 
The First Petition The First Petition 
The Second Petition The Second Petition 
The Third Petition The Third Petition 
The Fourth Petition The Fourth Petition 
The Fifth Petition The Fifth Petition 
The Sixth Petition The Sixth Petition 
The Seventh Petition The Last Petition 
Conclusion  





 Infant Baptism 
Confession and Absolution  
The Sacrament of the Altar Fifth Part: The Sacrament of the Altar 
 A Brief Exhortation to Confession 
Morning and Evening Prayers Morning and Evening Prayers 
Grace at Table Grace at Table 
Table of Duties Table of Duties 
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The Formula of Concord 
Part I: Epitome Part II: Solid Declaration 
“Rule & Norm” “Rule & Norm” 
I. Original Sin I. Original Sin 
II. Free Will II. Free Will or Human Powers 
III. The Righteousness of Faith before God III. The Righteousness of Faith before God 
IV. Good Works IV. Good Works 
V. Law and Gospel V. Law and Gospel 
VI. The Third Function of the Law VI. The Third Function of the Law 
VII. The Holy Supper of Christ VII. The Holy Supper 
 The Chief Issue ... 
VIII. The Person of Christ VIII. The Person of Christ 
IX. Christ’s Descent into Hell IX. Christ’s Descent into Hell 
X. Church Usages, Called Adiaphora ... X. The Ecclesiastical Rites ... 
XI. God’s Eternal Foreknowledge ... XI. Eternal Foreknowledge ... 
XII. Other Factions and Sects ... XII. Other Factions and Sects ... 
 ... Anabaptists 
 ... Schwenkfelders 
 ... New Arians 
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